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By John Steward Ambler 
The focus of this important book is the problem 
of the civil control that is exercised over the French 
military establishment. More, specifically, it is an 
examination, not of the broader influence exer­
cised by the military on French public policy in 
general, but of the threat that French military 
politics poses to the civilian political regime. 
As in social phenomena generally, Mr. Ambler 
points out, causality in civil-military relations is 
multiple and complex,- and all patterns of civil-
military relations can be understood only within 
the context of the entire political system in which 
they exist. The professional military community 
itself must, of course, be understood, together with 
its traditions, its values, and the characteristics 
or idiosyncrasies of the "military mind"—but so 
too must the political universe in which it moves, 
the universe that is characterized by the extent, 
nature, and strength of the society's political con­
sensus, the values and styles of operation of the 
political factions that contend within it, the posi­
tion within the government accorded to military 
institutions, and the very stability of the entire 
system itself. 
The insight that Mr. Ambler provides, then, is 
an understanding of the operation of civilian con­
trol as it persists as a fundamental problem in spite 
of the overlapping and intermingling of political 
and military questions that have occurred in this 
age of total war, cold war, and revolution. 
John Steward Ambler is assistant professor of 
political science at Rice University. 
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Preface 
In April of 1961 Frenchmen had cause to wonder if Paris, the 
most civilized of earthly cities, had not been transformed into 
a Latin American capital where the rumbling of tanks in early 
morning substitutes for popular or parliamentary vote as the 
normal procedure for changing governmental leadership. The 
obedient French Army (and its tradition of obedience had once 
been solid) had three years earlier contributed mightily to the 
demise of the Fourth Republic and was now feeding an open 
rebellion against General Charles de Gaulle, a political chief of 
the army's own choosing. It is easy enough for the Western observer 
to dismiss the pronunciamiento in Latin America—and more re­
cently in Egypt, Turkey, Iraq, Pakistan, Burma, Thailand, South 
Korea, and South Vietnam—as nothing more than evidence that 
the social prerequisites of democracy are not present in these 
underdeveloped lands, or that civilian government has proven 
inadequate to handle the tensions of modernization. Praetorianism 
in France, however, strikes closer to home and must be traced 
to different causes, causes which may be of great interest to 
Western democracies generally. 
The central focus for analysis here will be the problem of civilian 
control over the French military establishment. More specifically, 
French military politics will be examined primarily from the stand­
point of threats to the civilian political regime, rather than from 
the broader vantage point of general military influences on public 
policy. Of course, the two are often intertwined. Within the 
French military establishment greatest attention will be given to 
the army officer corps, which, by reason of numbers and involve­
ment in recent colonial wars, played a preponderant role in 
French military adventures in politics from 1945 to 1962. 
The selection of the problem of civilian control is not made 
with the assumption that other problems, especially the effective­
ness of national security, might not on occasion deserve clear 
priority over civilian control. The question of primary concern 
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here will be why armies obey or disobey civilian governments, 
rather than that of whether and when they ought to obey. In 
the United States, at present, the problem of integrating political 
and military considerations into a unified defense policy is probably 
a more immediately useful approach to the study of civil-military 
relations than is that of civilian control, despite recent renewed 
warnings of an American "warfare'' or "garrison" state.1 Yet as 
Clausewitz, the most eminent of military mentors, has shown, 
military science provides the tools but not the political ends 
toward which they shall be used.2 If civilian politicians do not 
determine policy goals and limits, the soldier must choose between 
inaction on the one hand and assumption of the policy-maker's 
role on the other. As the present study will demonstrate, the 
soldier left without civilian leadership is prone to choose the 
latter alternative and in so doing to expropriate for the "military' 
domain all but the original "political" decision to wage war. 
Hence, the problem of civilian control remains a fundamental 
one, despite the overlapping and intermingling of political and 
military questions in an age of total war, cold war, and revolu­
tionary war. 
In civil-military relations, as in social phenomena generally, 
causality is multiple and complex. All patterns of civil-military 
relations can be understood only in the context of the entire 
political system within which they exist. The professional mili­
tary community itself (its traditions and values, the "military mold" 
and the "military mind")must be understood, but so too must the 
political universe in which it moves; i.e., the extent, nature, and 
strength of the society's political consensus, the contending politi­
cal forces (their values and styles of operation), the position of 
military institutions within the government, and the stability of 
the system. Within this political universe, civil-military relations 
will be influenced by the links established between the military 
community and civilian political forces (the social origins of of­
ficers, as well as ideological and political ties between military 
and civilian groups) and by the primary function assigned to the 
military. Though armies always perform more than a single func­
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tion, at any given moment one function tends to predominate; 
e.g., national defense, maintenance of domestic order, or training 
for citizenship.3 
Unless one insists doggedly upon the uniqueness of political 
phenomena (as the writer does not), it should appear obvious 
that a case study of civil-military relations in contemporary 
France must draw inspiration from broader theories of civil-
military relations. An analysis of French experiences will help to 
test and refine theories developed elsewhere. Two such theories 
will be of particular interest here. The first looks to military 
professionalism as the key safeguard of civilian control.4 The 
second assigns pre-eminence to the strength and stability of civilian 
governmental authority and to the political consensus which under­
lies it.5 Though neither of these theories is adequate to unlock 
all of the secrets of French civilian control in strength and weak­
ness, both will provide valuable clues. 
The reader may well be disconcerted at times by the frequent 
resort to such imprecisions as "few, 'many," and "most," in the 
discussion of political attitudes of military officers. The greater 
precision which systematic survey data would allow is now im­
possible because of the lack of such data for past periods and the 
inaccessibility of officers to the survey researcher in recent years. 
Through the use of written materials (supplemented by inter­
views in the case of present attitudes), however, the climate of 
officer opinion at various times can be described in accurate, 
though crude, terms. 
The original research for this study was conducted in France 
in 1961-62 with the assistance of a research-training fellowship 
from the Social Science Research Council. I am also indebted to 
the Mershon Committee on Education in National Security, which 
supported final revisions of the manuscript. Among those numerous 
persons who accorded me interviews and facilitated my research 
in Paris, special mention should be made of Professor Jean 
Touchard, secretary-general of the Fondation Nationale des 
Sciences Politique and M. Joel le Theule, deputy from Sarthe and 
rapporteur of the National Assembly's National Defense Committee. 
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I have profited enormously from the careful advice of Professors 
Leslie Lipson, Eric Bellquist, and Richard Herr, all of the Uni­
versity of California (Berkeley), and Edgar S. Furniss, Jr., director 
of the Social Science Program of the Mershon Center for Educa­
tion in National Security at Ohio State University, all of whom 
read the entire manuscript. They have saved me from numerous 
errors of fact and judgment; for those that may remain, of course, 
I am alone responsible. 
I am grateful for the permission granted me to quote extensively 
from Jean Larteguy's novel The Centurions by the original French 
publisher, Les Presses de la Cite, and the publishers of the English 
edition translated by Xan Fielding, E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., which 
gave special permission to substitute my own translations for Mr. 
Fielding's. 
1. Such warnings are given, for example, by Harold Lasswell, National 
Security and Individual Freedom (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1950); Lasswell, 
"The Garrison-State Hypothesis Today," in Samuel P. Huntington (ed.), 
Changing Patterns of Military Politics (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 
1962); by C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1959), chap. 9; and by Fred J. Cook, The Warfare State (New York: 
Macmillan, 1962). Writers who have stressed integration in policy-making 
more than civilian control include W. T. R. Fox, "Representativeness and 
Efficiency: Dual Problem of Civil-Military Relations," Political Science Quar­
terly, LXXVI, No. 3 (September, 1961), 354-66; M. Howard, Introduction, 
in M. Howard (ed.), Soldiers and Governments (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana 
University Press, 1959), p. 22; and Walter Millis, in Millis, Harvey Mansfield, 
and Harold Stein, Arms and the State (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 
1958), especially pp. 139-44. 
2. Karl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. O. J. Matthijs Jolles (New York: 
The Modern Library, 1943), p. 16. 
3. See David Rapoport, "A Comparative Theory of Military and Political 
Types," in Huntington (ed.), Changing Patterns of Military Politics, pp. 
71-101. 
4. Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Poli­
tics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
1957). 
5. David Rapoport, "Praetorianism: Governmnet without Consensus' (Un­
published Ph.D. dissertation, University of California [Berkeley], 1960); Rapo­
port, Changing Patterns of Military Politics, pp. 71-101; and S. E. Finer, The 
Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics (New York: Praeger, 
1962). 
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The "Great Mute" and the Beginnings





The Parameters of Discipline 
Is there really anything 'strikingly new in the recent rebellious 
activities of a segment of the French Army? Can General Raoul 
Salan be explained as simply the most recent product of a 
strongly political army which produced Napoleon, McMahon, 
Boulanger, and Petain? I would suggest that he cannot be so 
explained. In fact, Napoleon and Petain are separated by over a 
century of rather consistent civilian control of the French Army, 
a century in which that army was frequently described, in both 
military and civilian circles, as the "Great Mute'' which lived by 
the maxim that "the army does not engage in politics." The label 
and the formula are too pat, of course, for military men at times 
spoke out and played politics as well. Nevertheless, the story of 
French civil-military relations from 1815 to 1939 is largely one 
of civilian control over an obedient military establishment. The 
secrets of that pattern of civilian control merit investigation, even 
though they may have limited applicability in the present day, 
when political and military questions are more closely inter­
woven. An examination of the evolution of French civil-military rela­
tions will provide opportunities for one valuable type of com­
parative analysis—that involving different historical periods within 
the setting of a single society. 
The present chapter will simply examine the nature and limi­
tations of civilian control in the period from 1815-1939, leaving 
the primary task of interpretation to the following chapter. 
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French civil-military relations in this period will be categorized 
under four general headings: unquestioning obedience to civil 
authority as this is defined by the civilian political system; jealous 
defense of military prerogatives in specified realms; enthusiastic 
and preferential obedience (by at least part of the army) to one 
of two or more competing governmental institutions; and out­
right rejection of constituted civil authority. 
In keeping with the central concern here, these categories are 
intended to focus in summary fashion upon military threats to 
the civilian political system—or the absence of such threats. They 
are not intended to encompass the entire breadth of French civil-
military relations, nor is the following discussion concerned with 
all of the many direct and indirect influences which military men 
may have exerted on public policy. 
Unquestioning Obedience 
France in the nineteenth century enjoyed neither the constitu­
tional stability nor the geographical invulnerability which favored 
civilian control over diminutive land forces in the United States 
and Great Britain. Yet, despite the necessity of a sizable standing 
army, despite a rapid turnover in nineteenth-century French mon­
archs, emperors, and presidents, never from 1815 to 1939 did the 
French Army engage in a military coup—the pronunciamiento 
so common in Spain at this time. Overcoming the undisciplined 
and even mutinous ways of the Napoleonic officer and soldier,1 
the French Army from 1815 onward tended to become a politically 
neutral instrument in the hands of the government of the day. 
After some reshuffling in the officer ranks and an initial flurry of 
military plots against the Restoration Monarchy from 1820 to 1822,2 
a French Army with two decades of experience in battling against 
traditional European monarchies marched off unflinchingly to 
Spain in 1823 to re-establish the absolute monarchy of Ferdinand 
VII.3 
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Both the revolution of 1830 and that of 1848 were political, 
rather than military, in inspiration and execution. With few excep­
tions troops stationed in Paris in July, 1830, fought the insurgents 
until withdrawn.4 Again in 1848 the army remained loyal to the 
regime against the Paris mobs. Alexis de Tocqueville, a personal 
observer of the 1848 revolution, relates how General Marie-
Alphonse Bedeau, one of the officers in command of troops in 
Paris, adhered scrupulously, though unimaginatively, to the letter 
of the orders he had been issued. He had been ordered not to 
fight. Even when the armed mobs invaded the Chamber, Bedeau, 
confused and hesitant to disregard orders, did nothing to stop 
them.5 Once the July Monarchy had fallen, no one in the army, 
not even the Due d'Aumale, Louis Philippe's son and commander of 
the African army, thought seriously of attempting to restore it by 
force. General Francois du Barail, a young officer in the African 
army at the time, recalls in his memoirs that the army would have 
defended the monarchy gladly as long as the king remained on the 
throne. "But from the moment that the regular government had 
disappeared," he writes, "from the moment that France had given in 
to the uprising, the Prince could not have raised a regiment, and 
did not even think of doing so." 6 
Within the army disgruntled noncommissioned officers in a 
number of units seized upon the revolutionary situation, both in 
1830 and again, to a lesser degree, in 1848, to oust officers whose 
offenses were as often personal as political.7 The progression of 
the concept of an apolitical army is evidenced by the fact that 
only a handful of officers felt obliged to resign upon the fall from 
power of Louis Philippe, whereas eighteen years previous almost 
two thousand had requested retirement after the collapse of the 
Bourbon monarchy.8 
Circumstances laid out for the army a more active political role 
in 1851 and, in more limited fashion, in 1870, as will be seen 
shortly. In the first two decades of the Third Republic, however, 
unquestioning obedience generally prevailed, even in the face 
of a form of government which would not have been the choice 
of the majority of officers.9 The transition into republicanism was 
facilitated for professional officers by the universal respect then 
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enjoyed by the army, which though defeated in 1870, was stil] 
the nation's only hope for revenge, and through the choice of 
Marshal MacMahon as President of the Republic. Throughout 
his tenure MacMahon felt himself to be as much the protector 
of the army as of the nation. He virtually ordered military officers 
to assume political posts on occasion. He considered the Ministry 
of War to be his own special province.10 He retained several 
corps commanders beyond the legal three-year limit.11 He dis­
solved parliament in search of a more sympathetic majority in the 
seize mai crisis of 1877. When the marshal's star faded in the 
wake of that crisis, however, and when the army lost its protector 
with his resignation in 1879, military officers made no attempt to 
prevent the accession of genuine republicans to seats of power 
in the young republic. To be sure, there were a few militantly 
antirepublican officers who talked of the use of force—notably 
General Ducrot, who was heard to say that the Chamber of 
Deputies was in a state of anarchy and that he hoped to dismiss 
it with his army corps.12 There is even some evidence to indicate 
that a military coup was considered briefly by the minority gov­
ernment led by General de Rochebouet in early December, 1877.13 
In its behavior, however, the army adhered strictly to the demands 
of legality in the face of republican electoral victories. 
If the spirit of obedience to the government of the day finally 
prevailed in the 1870's, the same was even more obviously true 
of the 1880's, when the Boulanger crisis presented the army with 
a golden opportunity to do away with the republic simply by 
joining with the numerous civilian admirers of the man on horse­
back. Boulangism, however, though led by a military hero, was 
in no sense a military movement: its appeal was not to the army, 
but to the crowd and to the lingering glamour of "la gloire mili­
taire.'' As the result of his conduct as minister of war, Boulanger 
had won considerable popularity among the army's rank and file, 
though aristocratic officers on the general staff tended to be skepti­
cal, if not hostile, toward' him.14 The army made no move to aid 
his revolutionary cause in those crisis years which ended with 
his flight to Belgium in 1889.15 
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A last period which deserves consideration under the heading 
"unquestioning obedience'' is that of the 1920's and 1930's. To be 
sure, General Maxime Weygand, both as chief of the general staff 
from 1930-31 and as vice-president of the Conseil Superieur de 
Guerre from 1931-35, clashed repeatedly with his civilian superiors 
over such questions as disarmament, appropriations for new military 
equipment, and officer and enlisted strengths.10 The social and 
political conflicts of the 1930's, moreover, attracted a few officers 
into the anticommunist organizations of the extreme Right.17 Never­
theless, there was a general agreement among most military and 
political leaders, including Marshal Petain, Generals Debeney and 
Gamelin, and Premiers Daladier and Blum, in support of the 
fundamental principles of French military policy, i.e., the primacy 
of defense and reliance on a short-term conscript army.18 In the 
elaboration of those policies it was the government, rather than 
the general staff, which took the lead. Military leaders most often 
followed behind almost passively (too passively for some),19 even 
when the nation-in-arms concept (as outlined in 1910 by socialist 
leader Jean Jaures) came near fulfilment in the law of 1928, which 
set the professional core of the army at 106,000 men and reduced 
compulsory military service to twelve months.20 There were no pro­
test resignations and, Weygand apart, few open clashes between 
government and military leaders. If one looks back from the fall of 
France in 1940, the gravest errors of French military leadership 
in the interwar years in fact appears to be its passiveness, its 
lack of imagination, and its failure to challenge civilian political 
leaders more sharply on such matters as modernization of equip­
ment and strengthening of the professional contingent. 
Defense of Military Prerogatives 
If the French Army behaved on most occasions as a faithful 
servant of the state in the period from 1815 to 1939, that faithful­
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ness always assumed the sacredness of military autonomy in cer­
tain privileged domains. At base the Dreyfus Affair involved an 
outside "invasion" into one of those realms—military self-regulation 
within a closed military community. 
In the fall of 1894 a Jewish officer, Captain Alfred Dreyfus, was 
arrested, tried, convicted, and imprisoned on Devil's Island on the 
charge of transmitting military secrets to the German Embassy.21 
Evidence gradually appeared casting serious doubt on Dreyfus' 
guilt, despite the efforts of one Captain Henry, a counterespionage 
officer, to reaffirm that guilt by forging a series of documents. 
As the affair developed into a violent political issue in 1897-98, the 
case was finally brought up for review. In 1898, despite the 
overwhelming evidence now attesting to Dreyfus' innocence, a sec­
ond court-martial again found him guilty, though "with extenu­
ating circumstances." 
Among the Dreyfusards, many like Urbain Gohier, in his book 
L'Armee contre la nation, were convinced that the army was intent 
upon overthrowing the republic. Already, Gohier warned in the 
late 1890's: 
There is only one power in France: military power. In fact, mili­
tary dictatorship is already in existence. It is still collective, 
thanks to the anarchy which reigns in military headquarters, thanks 
to the mutual hatred among military chiefs. But the first fist which 
presents itself will have only to seize it.22 
Yet Gohier's evidence (e.g., secret use of funds without adequate 
reporting to parliament) tends simply to indicate the jealousy of 
military officers over government attempts to "interfere" with the 
administration of the army.23 
In fact, the evidence available tends to indicate that there was 
no military conspiracy to overthrow the republic during the Drey­
fus Affair.-4 The funeral for President of the Republic Felix Faure 
in 1899 was the occasion for a dramatic proof of the army's non-
conspiratorial state of mind. Paul Deroulede, leader of the extreme 
nationalist Ligue de la Patrie Francaise, planned a coup for that 
occasion and wrongly assumed that the army would be with him. 
In fact, he probably had not secured the support of a single gen­
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era!.25 Deroulede had expected to find General Pellieux at the 
head of parade troops; instead, as a result of a change of plans, 
he found General Gaudereque Roget. Deroulede appealed to the 
general to march his troops on the Elysee. Roget did no more than 
to lead them back to their barracks where Deroulede was arrested.26 
Though the interpretation of the Dreyfus Affair as a military 
conspiracy is woefully lacking in factual support, it is nonetheless 
true that military officers in this period were guilty of a number 
of acts of disobedience and bad faith in their relations with the 
civilian government. General Auguste Mercier, the minister of war 
in 1894, for example, ordered the arrest of Dreyfus, and then pub­
licly announced his guilt before the court-martial had taken place, 
despite a prior promise to the foreign minister and the minister of 
justice to delay action on the case until weightier evidence was 
available.27 Once Mercier and other military leaders had publicly 
announced Dreyfus' guilt, their reputations and authority were 
placed on the balance, and every effort toward obstruction was 
made whenever revision of the case was considered by the gov­
ernment.28 In the face of fierce attacks on the army in the press 
and in the Chamber, it was easy enough for the military man, 
always hostile to civilian "interference" in military matters, to 
view the whole affair as simply an attempt to discredit the army.29 
Until the Dreyfus Affair the post of minister of war had been 
filled since 1870, with only two exceptions, by military officers 
on active duty. Military officers serving as ministers of war were 
hardly agents of civil government imposing civilian control on 
the military establishment: "their function was then exactly com­
parable to that of an ambassador delegated by the military and 
charged with representing it before civil authorities."3" Promotions 
of military personnel had long been left to military commissions, 
a procedure which in fact virtually removed control from the 
civilian government.31 The army tended to be an isolated com­
munity, hostile to the bourgeois values of civilian society, sensitive 
to criticism of military affairs in the press, and insistent on au­
tonomy in military matters. In fighting for self-regulation military 
officers did not believe themselves to be seeking political power; 
on the contrary, what they sought (along with their British coun­
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terparts) 32 was the isolation of the army from what were felt to 
be the corrupting and divisive effects of politics. 
The campaign to make French officers on active duty ineligible 
for election to the legislature, for example, was largely led by mili­
tary officers who feared a breakdown of discipline in the army.33 
Self-regulation, however, was another matter. When military au­
tonomy was threatened by civilian attacks on military justice, the 
bulk of the officer corps was willing to sacrifice Dreyfus in an 
attempt to seal off the walls of the military community.34 
By refusing to the end to admit its error in the Dreyfus case, by 
being thrown thereby into league with militant antirepublicans of 
the Right, the army subsequently lost a great measure of the 
autonomy which it had enjoyed for so many years. In the service 
of republican forces demanding that the army be wrested from the 
hands of clericals and antirepublicans, Minister of War General 
Louis Andre (that rare species, a republican and anticlerical gen­
eral) enlisted the secret aid of police and Freemasons in his purge 
of antirepublican officers from key positions, especially from the 
general staff.35 Andre's goal was not simply to eliminate antirepub­
licanism from the officer corps, not solely to reassert the army's pro­
fessional duty to serve any legally constituted government; rather, 
he sought a positive republican commitment from officers and 
men, i.e., a republican "politicization" of the officer corps.36 Though 
Andre was eventually forced to resign when his investigatory tac­
tics were revealed, he left the officer corps divided, in a state of 
turmoil, and embroiled in the conflicts of civilian politics.37 
The army fared better in another of its privileged spheres of 
action—the colonies. The rigorous civilian control imposed upon 
the army in the metropole never extended fully to la France d'outre­
mer. The extension of the French Empire in the nineteenth century 
was partially the result of uncontrolled initiative on the part of 
colonial military commanders. French West Africa, largely the 
creation of General Faidherbe, and the French Congo as well, owed 
most of their expansion to independent military forays into 
the hinterland.38 Military officers were also responsible for the faits 
accomplis which led to a French protectorate in Tahiti in 1842 and, 
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to a lesser extent, to French occupation of Tonkin in Indochina 
in the 1880's.39 
In Algeria in 1830, in Cochin China in 1859, in Tunisia in 1881, 
and in Madagascar in 1895, however, colonial expansion resulted 
from decisions taken in Paris. Nevertheless, military commanders in 
each case were given far more freedom of action than was ever 
the case in the peacetime army at home. From 1830 until 1870, 
with the exception of the short period from 1858-60, the army had 
a strong hand in the administration of Algeria.40 General Bugeaud 
in particular, despite his spotty success, left behind an important 
legend as a military colonizer and governor-general in Algeria 
from 1841 to 1847. The famous Bureaux Arabes turned many 
officers into civil administrators with extensive local powers. The 
Bureaux survived in southern Algeria and were later revived under 
other names in Morocco and Tunisia, despite their suppression in 
northern Algeria after 1870.41 The fame of General Gallieni is 
largely dependent upon his powerful civil-military role in Mada­
gascar from 1896-1905, as that of Marshal Lyautey is linked to his 
combined duties in Morocco after 1912. Both men were known 
for their independence. In 1897 Gallieni summarily abolished the 
monarchy in Madagascar and deported the Queen, all without 
consulting the Paris government, which later accepted the fait 
accompli.*2 Following in the same tradition, Lyautey took it upon 
himself to expedite part of his troops across the Moroccan border 
from western Algeria in 1904 at a time when France was attempting 
to woo independent Morocco into its sphere of influence. The 
Combes government in Paris reacted angrily, ordering Lyautey to 
withdraw. He replied that he was committed to protect the popu­
lation in the area and would resign before deserting them.43 As 
Lyautey himself often emphasized, colonial service both allowed 
and encouraged a disdain for those qualities of unquestioning 
obedience and careful attention to regulations so typical of the 
French garrison officer.44 
A final example of privileged military domains is drawn from 
World War I, particularly from the period of "military dictator­
ship' under Marshal Joseph Joffre from 1914 to 1916.45 When war 
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broke out with the hated conqueror of 1870, a French union sacree, 
joining socialists, Catholic conservatives, and all between, rallied 
staunchly to the support of the army. Acting on the general though 
mistaken belief that war was still an affair solely for armies on 
battlefields rather than for entire mobilized nations pitted against 
each other, and on the expectation of a brief struggle on the model 
of the Franco-Prussian War, the National Assembly adjourned 
sine die and politicians generally yielded the field to the generals.40 
Initially, parliamentarians heeded the words of Deputy Andre Hess, 
spoken in the Chamber of Deputies in June of 1914: 
. . . When the cannon speaks, it is better that politicians fall 
silent. The outcome of the war depends on rapidity of movement 
and decision, and that rapidity is to be found in a single man 
rather than in the deliberations of a cabinet.47 
Joffre was quite ready to be that man. As the first two wartime 
ministers of war, Adolphe Messimy and Alexandre Millerand, fo­
cused their efforts on protecting him from his critics within the 
government and parliament, rather than on controlling his action, 
the commander in chief withheld from the government information 
regarding current military operations and attempted (successfully 
for a time) to keep parliamentary investigating committees out of 
his jealously guarded "Zone of the Armies." 48 On one occasion in 
1916 Joffre went so far as to force President of the Republic Ray­
mond Poincare to postpone a trip to the front. Poincare character­
ized this action as proof of 
the encroachment of the military power upon the civil, of a power 
which wishes to avoid all supervision and which creates a govern­
ment apart from the real government, the authority of which it 
does not wish to accept.49 
Once Joffre had assumed extensive powers, partially through 
the express intentions of the politicians and partially through their 
inaction, he considered the conduct of the war to be his own 
domain, not to be interfered with by non-professionals. The "dic­
tatorship" exercised by this carefully chosen "republican" general 
was always intended to be temporary and restricted in character. 
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It came to an end sooner than Joffre had anticipated as a result 
of the unforeseen prolongation of the war, his clashes with General 
Sarrail (who had strong political friends), the inadequacy of de­
fenses at Verdun, and finally, the failure of the Somme offensive. 
Parliament turned on the Victor of the Marne in 1916, and when 
his protection by the minister of war weakened, he was forced up 
and out via the "technical adviser" route.50 
Thereafter, military leaders played a more subordinate role, 
first under a temporary parliamentary ascendancy in 1917 and then, 
following the disastrous Chemin des Dames offensive and a flurry of 
sit-down strikes in war-weary army units,51 under the powerful 
leadership of Premier Georges Clemenceau. Cutting deeply into 
such questions as defensive policy, which under Joffre had been 
jealously guarded military terrain, Clemenceau imposed his general 
authority over conduct of the war.52 In 1918 and again at Ver­
sailles in 1919, the Tiger clashed repeatedly with Allied Com­
mander Ferdinand Foch—on one occasion, at an inter-Allied con­
ference in 1918, cutting short his protests against abandonment of 
the Allied general reserve with, "Keep silent! It is I who represent 
France."53 At Versailles Foch raged as Clemenceau, confronted with 
adamant allies, abandoned his hopes for the separation of the 
Rhineland provinces from Germany. For a time in the spring of 
1919 the French commander in Mainz, General Charles Mangin, 
gave behind-the-scenes support to a Rhineland separationist move­
ment, only to be reprimanded and instructed in a government note 
of June 3 to cease all intervention in political matters.54 
At war's end it was Clemenceau, the civilian, who was the First 
of Frenchmen—not Joffre, or Petain, or Foch. The early unpre­
paredness of democratic institutions for prolonged war led to an 
extension of the powers of Joffre and the high command, who 
thereafter were reluctant to give them up. Yet never were demo­
cratic institutions in danger from the military leadership, nor was 
the civilian government prevented from reasserting fuller control 
over the army after 1917. The key problem (one which was never 
fully solved) was that of tracing jurisdictional lines between politi­
cal and military realms in the midst of a total war. Since World 
War I produced serious clashes between military commanders and 
civil authority in Great Britain, as well as in France, it would 
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appear that the unexpected advent of total war and the weakness 
of civil authorities, more than the breakdown of military discipline, 
best account for Joffre's independence.55 
Preferential Obedience 
In none of the instances described thus far was the army as an 
institution required to make an evaluation of the legitimacy of the 
existing government. Though the areas of military independence 
were not always clear, those officers who eventually submitted to 
civilian control in the Dreyfus era or in World War I might well 
have done so simply out of a sense of professional duty, rather than 
out of any personal sympathy for the republic. The few cases fol­
lowing forced military leaders into explicit political choices. 
The coup of December 2, 1851, in which Louis Napoleon did 
away with the Second Republic, sometimes has been mistakenly 
classed as a military revolt in the style of Napoleon Bonaparte's 
18th of Brumaire. In fact, though military personnel helped to 
carry out the 1851 coup, they acted on orders from the President of 
the Republic and Commander in Chief, Louis Napoleon.56 The 
primary issue was not whether a civilian government or the army 
would control the French state; rather, it was whether the legis­
lative or executive branch of the republican government would 
prevail over its rival. Caught in that struggle, the army was forced 
to decide to which of the contesting branches it owed its loyalty. 
Undoubtedly, the bulk of the officer corps had little respect for the 
republic.57 Yet some of the most notable military figures of the day, 
including Lamoriciere, Le Flo, Changarnier, Bedeau, and Cavai­
gnac (a genuine republican) were members of the Chamber. 
Looking forward to the forcible elimination of his legislative 
rival, Louis Napoleon set out well before the coup to recruit officers 
to his cause and place them in key positions.58 Banquets were held 
at the Elysee for thousands of commissioned and noncommissioned 
officers. General Nicholas Changarnier was removed as commander 
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of the army of Paris and replaced with General Bernard-Pierre 
Magnan, who understood what was expected of him.59 Forced to 
seek support below the top echelons of the military hierarchy, the 
President found his key man in Armand Saint-Arnaud, promoted 
him to major general and then, in October, 1851, appointed him 
minister of war. Even Colonel Charles Espinasse, the commander 
of the regiment guarding the Palais Bourbon on December 2, 
1851, was one of the President's picked men.60 
When the moment came in the early morning of December 2, 
republican generals were routed out of bed and arrested along with 
leading legislators, and the troops were formally reminded that "'a 
passive obedience to the Chief of the Government is the rigorous 
duty of the Army from the general to the soldier." 61 Once Louis 
Napoleon had assured himself of the loyalty of key commanders at 
the top, military discipline guaranteed the obedience of those mili­
tary troops sent to clear out the inevitable barricades raised in 
defense of the republic. Though the coup could not have been 
successful without the co-operation of a group of ambitious officers 
of Bonapartist persuasion, the army neither initiated the operation, 
nor, in all probability, would it have followed any but its legal 
commander in chief in such a move.62 
A similar kind of situation might have developed in the early 
years of the Third Republic, since a sharp rivalry developed be­
tween President MacMahon and an increasingly republican Cham­
ber. Yet this time, as indicated above, both President and army 
remained within the bounds of legality. 
Rejection of Civil Authority 
From the history of French civil-military relations in the period 
1815 to 1939, there emerges only a single incident in which a 
prominent military commander clearly and completely rejected the 
authority of the civilian government. In 1870, as a French Army 
suffering from unimaginative and ineffective leadership was being 
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routed by an efficient Prussian military machine, the empire col­
lapsed and gave way to yet another republic. Marshal Achille 
Bazaine, trapped with his troops at Metz, refused to recognize the 
new government of national defense. Referring scornfully to re­
publicans as a handful of adventurers seeking to climb on the 
misfortunes of their country, he announced to his troops that the 
army's duty was to serve the country "with the same devotion in 
defense of its soil against the foreigner and of social order against 
evil passions." 63 
In a fashion which became familiar again after 1940, Bazaine 
felt it his right—indeed, his duty—to determine the legitimacy of 
the government in power. His example was not imitated in 1870. 
After the final German victory he was court-martialed, found 
guilty of abandoning the battle and of treating with the enemy, 
and sent to prison, where he served only eight months of a life 
sentence before escaping to Spain.64 The French Army as a whole, 
revived by a startling defeat, returned to its role as servant of the 
state. Not until 1940 (a tale to be told later) did a French military 
leader again clearly reject the ultimate authority of his government. 
The picture which emerges from French military behavior in 
these years is clearly not one of a coup d'etat army. If the army's 
record of apolitisme was not altogether as pure as some recent 
scholars have suggested,65 it was nevertheless impressively clean 
in view of the variety of regimes which officers were called upon to 
serve. With relatively rare exceptions the French Army from 1815 
to 1939 was, in Dennis Brogan's characterization, "a faithful, even 
a docile servant of the state." 66 
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Chapter 2 
Foundations of Civilian Control 
As France entered a long and vain search for a new and stable 
constitutional consensus in the wake of the Revolution, her army, 
after 1815, remained virtually immune to the temptations of politi­
cal power. What were the primary forces and circumstances which 
account for the surprising loyalty of that army to a variety of re­
gimes from 1815 to 1939? 
Two important fields of inquiry—the social origins and political 
attitudes of military officers—come immediately to mind and de­
mand exploration, even though both eventually will be set aside 
as of secondary importance in the pre-1939 period. Might it be that 
the loyalty of the officer corps in these years resulted simply from 
the recruitment of both military officers and political leaders from 
the same dominant social classes? The relative harmony of British 
civil-military relations in the nineteenth century apparently owed 
something to such social ties.1 In France, however, the officer corps, 
even before the Revolution, was characterized by the diversity of 
social strata from which it recruited. French officers never formed 
a military caste comparable to the Prussian Junkertum: even after 
several attempts in the eighteenth century to restrict officer recruit­
ment to the nobility, on the eve of the Revolution officers of com­
moner origins still made up one-fourth of the officer corps.2 The 
Revolution and the First Empire greatly expanded the social base 
of officer recruitment and promotion; and the Restoration govern­
ment, perhaps three-fourths of whose officers were imperial army 
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veterans, failed to undo that democratization, despite the retire­
ment of the demi-soldes and the return of the emigres.3 
Henceforth until 1870 the majority of French officers were re­
cruited from the ranks. By 1869 officers up from the ranks, mostly 
of rather modest social origin, made up 60 per cent of the total 
officer corps.4 If the wealthy and the noble-born were predominant 
in the highest grades, "rankers" were to be found there, too. In 
1869, 3 of the army's 8 marshals, 11 of its 87 major generals, 27 
of its 163 brigadier generals, and 76 of its 366 colonels were up 
from the ranks.5 Even among those elite officers graduated from the 
Saint-Cyr military academy, commoners far outnumbered sons of 
noble families after 1815. The proportion of nobles among those 
graduates, gauged by the number of noble-type names—names 
containing the partitive de (not all of which are legitimate)6— 
dropped from well over half at the beginning of the Restoration to 
39 out of 148 in 1833, and 65 out of 301 in 1843.7 
Encouraged by a general rise in the prestige of a military career, 
the "enlightened" classes flowed into the officer corps in greater 
numbers under the Second Empire and especially in the two 
decades of zealous Germanophobia following the defeat of 1870-71. 
The proportion of noble-type names among Saint-Cyr graduates 
rose to 89 out of 284 in 1868 and 102 out of 365 in 1878, though 
that proportion dropped off somewhat after 1883.8 By 1898 a 
quarter of all brigadier generals and major generals came from 
aristocratic families.9 Moreover, Saint-Cyr and the Ecole Poly-
technique, open almost exclusively to the fairly wealthy by virtue 
of the prior education and expense they required, contributed 
half of all new officers after 1870, in contrast to approximately 
one-third around mid-century.10 The new attraction of a military 
career for the wealthy middle classes is explicable in terms of 
burgeoning military prestige; however, the influx of sons of noble 
families was partly determined by their exclusion from careers in 
diplomacy and civil administration after 1879. The army became 
something of a refuge for aristocrats, conservatives, and clericals.11 
The number of candidates and graduates at Saint-Cyr fell off 
sharply in the first decade of the twentieth century, picked up on 
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the eve of World War I, then dropped again in the trough of army 
prestige from 1919 until the military revival of the 1930's. As a 
result of numerous wartime commissions and declining recruitment 
from the grandes ecoles, the percentage of officers with Saint-Cyr or 
Polytechnique diplomas dropped to 36 per cent in 1938 from the 
52 per cent level of 1913.12 At the same time the percentage of 
general officers with noble-type names was dropping from 25 per 
cent in 1898 to 7 per cent in 1939.13 
Data concerning recruitment origins and proportions of aristo­
cratic-sounding names, of course, cannot compensate for the ab­
sence of exact statistical evidence regarding the class origins of 
commoner officers. Judging from the best work available on the 
subject, however, we may assume that the officer corps throughout 
this period drew heavily on the landed, the civil service, and the 
liberal-professional segments of the middle class, particularly for 
its military academy cadets.14 Among those recruited directly or 
indirectly from the ranks, many undoubtedly issued from the petty 
bourgeoisie and some (especially among those recruited directly, 
without examinations) from rural and artisan backgrounds.15 In 
periods of high military prestige (the last four decades of the 
nineteenth century, 1910-20, and the 1930's), youth of "good family" 
poured into the officer corps; while in years when the army com­
manded little respect (1815-51, 1900-10, and 1920-30), there was 
a " . .  . shift of the center of gravity of the military community 
toward the middle and even the lower bourgeoisie." 16 
Given the essentially middle-class roots of the officer corps in 
this period, it is not surprising that officers responded obediently 
to orders to put down popular revolts during the June Days of 
1848 and the Paris Commune of 1871. On those occasions the offi­
cer's attachment to order and hierarchy was complemented by his 
class bias.17 Yet in view of the variety of regimes served by officers 
in the nineteenth century and the diversity of the officers' social 
backgrounds, class bias is inadequate to explain military sub­
servience to civilian authority in this period, except insofar as 
internal social diversity tended to neutralize the officer corps as a 
political force. Significantly enough, the influx of wealthy and 
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aristocratic elements into the officer corps after 1870 coincided with 
the decline of the political power of those same elements in French 
society. In the last three decades of the nineteenth century, with its 
classification commissions favoring the conservative outlook in pro­
motions, the army deepened its conservative and aristocratic char­
acter at the very time when the republic was becoming more re­
publican and equalitarian. Yet no threat of military insurrection 
resulted, despite opportunities provided by Boulanger in the 1880's 
and by the national political schism of the 1890's over the Dreyfus 
Affair. In fact, as Professor Girardet has argued, the professional 
military community developed into an order, distinct in outlook 
from the surrounding civilian society and hostile to many of the 
dominant values of a wealth-oriented bourgeoisie.18 
If the social origins of military officers are inadequate to explain 
the general subordination of the French Army to civilian control 
from 1815 to 1939, to what extent is that explanation to be found 
in the political attitudes of the officer corps? A brief examination 
of this question will take us into the difficult and little explored 
problem of the French military mind.19 Investigation of military 
attitudes toward politics is hampered by restrictions placed upon 
military personnel throughout the Third Republic: denial of the 
right to vote, to run for election to the chamber (after 1875) or 
the senate (after 1884), to make speeches or write articles without 
the approval of the minister of war, to belong to political parties, 
to distribute election literature, to serve on election committees, or 
to organize professional associations for political action.20 Even 
when soldiers were allowed to vote—in the Second, Fourth, and 
Fifth republics (and in plebiscites during the empires)—the 
choices of officers as a group are impossible to calculate from 
election results. Legal restrictions on political activity by military 
personnel were strongly seconded before 1939 by an apolitical mili­
tary tradition which frowned upon officers who violated the political 
silence of the "Great Mute." 21 Hence, the political views of pro­
fessional officers on active duty are nowhere clearly recorded, nor 
can it be assumed that veterans organizations and politically active 
retired officers are always representative of officers' views.22 
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To complicate further the problem of determining the political 
sentiments of the French officer corps, available evidence indicates 
that a diversity of political and religious views is to be found 
among officers in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
Among those thirty-four officers elected to the senate in 1876 
(before the enactment of the seriate ineligibility law of 1884), there 
were representatives of virtually all political persuasions, including 
four Legitimists (Bourbon monarchists), two Orleanists, four Bona­
partists, five conservatives, six conservative republicans, seven 
classed as "left-center," and three as "left." 23 Even in the period 
from 1880 to 1900, when a comparatively homogeneous officer corps 
was generally assumed to be ultra-conservative, there were a num­
ber of notable (if exceptional) republican officers, among them 
lung, Pedoya, Andre, and Sarrail.24 There were even some—like 
young Maurice Gamelin, later to be chief of the general staff—who 
believed Dreyfus to be innocent.25 
Yet despite the diversity of officer opinion and the paucity of 
evidence available, it is possible—and necessary—to venture a few 
general characterizations of the predominant tone of military atti­
tudes toward politics in these years. 
On a priori grounds, at least three factors might be expected to 
influence military attitudes: (1) the social origins of officers, which, 
as seen above, were diverse but rooted primarily in the conserva­
tive middle class; (2) the lingering remnants of that feudal and 
aristocratic tradition of military honor, which, in its insistence on 
fidelity, sacrifice, and service, would tend to clash with such 
bourgeois values as security, wealth, and comfort; and (3) the pro­
fessionalization and isolation of the French military community in 
the nineteenth century (a subject to be discussed in a later section 
of the present chapter). Concerning these three factors, military 
honor took on strong political meaning only after 1940,20 and mid­
dle-class ties are inadequate to explain the peculiar stamp of the 
military mind," which leaves us with professional military values 
as the most promising point of departure. 
The functional requisites of military professionalism are best 
described in general terms by Samuel P. Huntington,27 who, in 
his book The Soldier and the State, suggests that the role of the 
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professional officer encourages him to adopt certain attitudes and 
values, among which are the following ones. First, in consonance 
with his professional training and responsibility, the officer tends 
to emphasize the role of force in human affairs. He tends to view 
international politics in military terms; yet, being cautious and 
fearful of losing all, he rarely feels ready for war. Second, the 
professional officer tends to emphasize the group over the in­
dividual, for in institutionalized warfare the esprit de corps of 
the military unit counts for more than isolated individual heroism. 
Skeptical of individualism, the officer honors self-sacrifice, service, 
tradition, and unity. Third, conjoined to a necessarily hierarchical, 
disciplined institution, the officer tends to value hierarchy and 
discipline over debate, challenges to leadership, and democratic 
politics generally. Fourth, the raison d'etre of the military estab­
lishment being the defense of the nation-state, the officer tends 
to harbor strong nationalist sentiments. Fifth, loyalty and obedience 
are necessary to the functional effectiveness of the military estab­
lishment; the safeguarding of those essential qualities imposes a 
professional role of political neutrality upon the officer. 
To what extent were these the values held by French officers 
in the period under consideration? Though much more investiga­
tion remains to be done on this subject, it is probably safe to 
say that all five of the attitudes described were held by the 
majority of French officers from at least mid-century onward. 
For military officers, who by virtue of professional duty and 
self-interest were inclined to think in terms of threats to national 
defense, pacifism was a natural and long-standing menace. One 
of the major irritants in interwar civil-military relations, particu­
larly when General Weygand served as vice-president of the 
Conseil Superieur de Guerre and potential wartime commander in 
chief, was the high priority of international disarmament on the 
calendar of Radical Socialist ministers. Weygand, who had no 
faith in such Utopian schemes and did all in his power to squelch 
French disarmament offers, explained in his memoirs that "charged 
with the defense of these [French] forces, I did my job. I defended 
them."28 Very likely, General Weygand and the majority of his 
fellow officers would have agreed completely, on this occasion, 
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with that young colonel who so often chided the high command, 
Charles de Gaulle: 
Without force, in fact [wrote De Gaulle in 1932], could one con­
ceive of life? Recourse of thought, instrument of action, con­
dition for movement, that midwife is necessary for giving birth 
to progress. Sh'eld of lords, rampart of crowns, battering ram of 
revolutions, it is responsible, in turn, for order and liberty. Cradle 
of cities, scepter of empires, gravedigger of decadence, force gives 
laws to peoples and rules their destiny.29 
True to the Huntington model, French officers, though ever 
insistent on the need for greater military capacity, rarely were 
eager for war, except perhaps in limited colonial engagements. 
General Joffre urged caution on the government in the 1911 
crisis with Germany,30 and the general staff opposed French 
military action (at least without full mobilization) when Hitler 
moved into the Rhineland in 1936.31 
At the heart of typical French-officer attitudes toward politics, 
one finds a pervasive mistrust of republican individualism and of 
government by debate. From the mid-nineteenth century onward, 
it appears that the majority of French officers were antirepublican, 
at least until the republic gained general acceptance after the 
1870's as "that government which divided Frenchmen least." There­
after until 1939, though a vague republican framework was fre­
quently taken as given, military opinion continued to be anti-
parliamentary in tone. 
Though the fact is sometimes forgotten, in 1815 the army was 
despised and feared by most conservatives, but cherished by 
republicans as their best hope for restoration of a republic.32 The 
Restoration monarchs had at their service an officer corps which, 
though obedient, contained an important liberal (if not repub­
lican) element.33 Officer opinion tended to veer to the Right, 
however, especially after the provisional republican government 
established in February, 1848, proceeded to humiliate the army 
by purging the high command and disarming troops stationed in 
Paris.34 Antirepublicanism gained strength among officers when 
the army suffered a thousand casualties in putting down the popu­
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lar uprising of the June Days of 1848, and when socialists in­
filtrated and propagandized the enlisted ranks prior to the legis­
lative elections of 1849.35 In conservative civilian circles the army 
won new esteem as a defender of the establish social order, 
while among liberals Victor Hugo lamented after the December, 
1851, coup: "We had other dreams for you, oh our unfortunate 
soldiers." 36 
By 1851 republicanism was linked with social disorder in the 
minds of many officers.37 Reflecting on the coup of 1851, General 
Francois Charles du Barail later recalled, "I had no political 
opinions whatsoever"; quite simply he continued, " . .  . I nour­
ished against Republican institutions that instinctive antipathy 
which is deep in the soul of every soldier. . . . "3  8 Antirepublican-
ism was becoming so widespread among officers that for Du 
Barail at least, it was simply a military, rather than a political, 
opinion. Already the dissenter, the republican officer sensed the 
unpopularity of his views. One lieutenant called in an enlisted 
man accused of republican propagandizing during the Second 
Republic. First he warned him, "Henceforth you will be watched. 
. . .  " Then he confided: "I am a republican too, but the only 
fortune I have is my epaulet. I am obliged to keep my opinions 
to myself." 39 
Realizing the potential cleavage between the soldier's pro­
pensity toward action, unity, hierarchy, and discipline, and the 
parliamentarian's love of individualism and freedom of expres­
sion, Louis Napoleon reserved two loges in the Palais Bourbon 
for officers in 1851, hoping to deepen their disgust for government 
by argument. An officer leaving an assembly session is said to 
have remarked, "there were only outcries, vociferations, interrup­
tions, to the detriment of the solutions for which the country was 
waiting on economic and social questions."40 Though General 
Cavaignac was apparently a greater favorite among officers than 
Louis Napoleon in the presidential election of December, 1948,41 
it is not surprising that the officer corps responded favorably to a 
Second Empire which promised a strong and stable executive 
plus higher status for the nation's army. 
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With the advent of the Third Republic, no one pretended that 
army officers had been converted to republicanism, despite the 
revival among republicans of those warlike Jacobin qualities of 
the Revolution.42 Three types of evidence tend to support the 
thesis that antirepublicanism was widespread among French mili­
tary officers in the last three decades of the nineteenth cen­
tury. First, there are the political careers of those officers who 
were elected to the National Assembly after either retirement or 
resignation from military service. In the main, these officer-deputies 
felt most at home on the political Right, where civilian colleagues 
shared their doubts concerning the wisdom of popular rule.43 
Their outlook, though "traditionalist" and somewhat authoritarian, 
tended however to be less hostile toward social reform than that 
of business representatives.44 Of course the officer-deputy was not 
fully representative of the officer corps, for he was almost in­
variably an academy graduate and issued generally from a wealthy 
or noble family.45 
A second and somewhat more reliable indication of the political 
sentiments hidden behind the army's generally faithful exterior in 
the last quarter of the nineteenth century is to be found in the 
remarks of those relatively rare republican officers who attained 
the rank of general. Looking back on those years, General Pedoya 
wrote in 1908: "One dared not declare oneself a republican unless 
one wished to be banished and left in the lurch, even by direct 
associates."4<! In 1892 a kindred soul, General lung, recalled the 
not untypical general officer who told him in the early years of 
the Third Republic: 
I want no red donkeys in my regiments. In any case, I rate them 
in such a manner as to insure that they will never succeed.47 
Reminiscing on the 1870's, lung remarks: 
Only one who has lived through those dismal hours can have any 
idea of the furious tenacity with which certain military circles 
hound down by every means the unfortunate officer suspected of 
the least sympathy for the new government. A whole book could 
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be written, a book of poignant timeliness, on the existence of 
a republican officer, of a red donkey, under the Republic.48 
Even in 1891, lung notes: 
. .  . In special circles, principally in certain military circles, 
one is accused of politicking if one has the effrontery to declare 
oneself a defender of the republican state.49 
Still another noted republican officer, General Sarrail, entered 
Saint-Cyr a liberal and non-believer. Upon his arrival he was 
greeted by the school commandant with the query, "Have you 
been brought up as one of us?" 50 
A third source of evidence is to be found in the recently un­
covered private files on officer attitudes prepared in 1876 and 1878 
for Leon Gambetta, the prominent republican leader in the early 
years of the Third Republic.51 Apparently at Gambetta's request, 
two anonymous memoranda were drawn up reporting on the 
professional qualifications and political attitudes of some 700 army 
officers. From his perusal of the first of these memoranda, which 
reports on unit commanders, including 187 of the 234 general of­
ficers then serving as commanders of units at the brigade level or 
above, the French historian Francois Bedarida counts a total of 
131 generals, or 70 per cent of those listed, who are labeled "con­
servatives," "reactionaries," "Bonapartists," or "royalists." 52 Of the 
remainder, 13 per cent are rated "neutral or indifferent," 8 per cent 
"unknown," and only 9 per cent "republican."53 Among the 72 
colonels, all of whom were unit commanders, only 6 republicans 
were found.54 
The picture of nearly universal antirepublicanism which emerges 
from the first memorandum is seriously disturbed by the second, 
which reports on staff officers and military school instructors, the 
great majority of whom were in the grades of major and below. 
According to Bedarida's statistical summary, covering 311 of the 
411 officers mentioned in the second memorandum (retired of­
ficers and a few others are eliminated from his compilations), 32 
per cent were rated as hostile to the republic, 63 per cent as 
republican or liberal, and 5 per cent as unknown.55 If Gambetta's 
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anonymous informers reported accurately,56 there were a surpris­
ing number of republican and liberal officers in staff and teaching 
positions in 1878. Even 7 of the 18 generals in the total of 311 
were rated as "republicans" or "liberals." 57 Interestingly enough, 
however, friends of the republic were less numerous among cap­
tains (77 of 132 or 58 per cent) and lieutenants and second 
lieutenants (24 of 43, or 56 per cent) than among majors (37 of 
51, or 72.5 per cent).58 Perhaps the recruitment of officers from 
increasingly conservative backgrounds after 1870 was beginning 
to have its effect. More important, it must be borne in mind that 
those officers in command of. troops were overwhelmingly anti­
republican, especially at the higher levels. Whereas 5 of the 11 
colonels in the staff and instructor group were listed as liberals 
or republicans, only 6 out of 71 colonels in the unit-commander 
group were so rated.59 Apparently the difference between the two 
samples is one based on function as well as rank, with the combat 
officer far less sympathetic to the republic than his colleagues in 
teaching and staff positions. Unfortunately, the contrast cannot be 
pursued very far since the first memorandum gives us no informa­
tion on combat officers below the rank of colonel. 
Surveying the configuration of political attitudes among mili­
tary officers in the early Third Republic, it seems clear that general 
officers were overwhelmingly hostile to republicanism. Below the 
grade of general, the "red donkey" was a relatively rare species 
in the infantry and especially in the cavalry, but more common 
among staff officers, military instructors, and officers in the tech­
nical arms, particularly among graduates of the Ecole Polytech­
nique.60 Political attitudes were related not only to rank and arm 
of service, but also to social origin, as the second Gambetta memo­
randum indicates. Of the 62 officers with noble-type names in the 
staff and instructor group, only 4 were listed as republicans, 
whereas among former recipients of state scholarships in the same 
group, republicans outnumbered antirepublicans 53 to 7.61 
Even after the republic had finally taken root in France, the 
official military elite and many of their subordinates would have 
concurred with the judgment of Lieutenant Colonel Ardant du 
Picq, expressed during the Second Empire, that " . .  . whoever 
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speaks of democratic society speaks of a society antipathetic to all 
that which makes up the military spirit." 02 The same theme recurs 
in the work by General Gaston de Gallifet and Eugene Lamy, 
VArm.ee et la democratie (published in 1885) 63 and again, in oft-
quoted form, in the memoirs of General du Barail published in 
1897: 
. . . For whoever wishes to reflect a bit, the republican spirit 
and the military spirit are two contradictory and incompatible 
states of mind. The army is a sort of hierarchical pyramid, capped 
by an absolute chief, who is joined to the masses who form the 
base through the tiered elites by the bonds of passive obedience, 
submission, and respect. The Republic is the sovereignty of public 
opinion, the absolute equality of all. It is free examination of all acts 
of authority. It is the crushing of the elite by numbers. It is the in­
version of the pyramid. By its motto alone the Republic is die 
negation of the Army, for liberty, equality and fraternity mean in­
discipline, lack of obedience and the negation of hierarchical 
principles.64 
Disgusted and angered by the ideological battles which peri­
odically split the French nation, officers probably tended to be­
lieve, as did Colonel de Gaulle, that "in military honor there is a 
breakwater which does not yield to confusions of opinion." 65 
Tension between French military values and French parlia­
mentary democracy continued even after conservative officers like 
Lyautey (in 1897) and Weygand (in 1930) asserted their ac­
ceptance of the republic as a permanent fixture.66 In a letter dated 
February 26, 1897, Lyautey spoke of " . .  . the vice of our insti­
tutions, of this omnicompetent, incompetent, unstable and irre­
sponsible parliamentarism." 67 A month earlier Lyautey had spelled 
out his complaint against assembly government in these terms: 
It is a challenge to good sense, this regime where almost the entire 
executive has passed into the hands of a parliamentarism issuing 
from universal suffrage. People who don't know the first word of 
governmental affairs and who last only three years. And that 
being the only effective government, at the mercy of which are, 
Ministers, Bureaux, established corps of public servants, profes­
sionals of all categories!—no fixed, stable element independent of 
popular caprice.68 
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Officers like Weygand continued through the interwar period to 
bemoan the instability, the inconsistency, and essential weakness 
of French parliamentary democracy in the face of external and 
internal enemies.89 Moreover, military leaders often felt them­
selves muzzled by politicians who opposed all increments in de­
fense spending. On his final retirement visit in 1935 to the Presi­
dent of the Republic, General Weygand remarked that our 
political system made it impossible for the responsible military 
chief to make himself heard.  "7  0 
The eloquent Colonel Charles de Gaulle grasped an important 
cause of these tensions between soldiers and politicians in his 
lectures (published in book form as The Edge of the Sword): 
The politician and the soldier therefore bring to their common en­
terprise very different characters, procedures and concerns. The 
former achieves his goal by covert means; the latter goes directly 
to it. The one, who sees dimly from afar, judges realities to be 
complex and applies himself to grasp them by ruse and calculation; 
the other, who sees clearly but from close up, finds them to be 
simple and believes that one dominates them if only one is resolved 
to do so. Faced with an immediate fact, the first thinks of what 
people will say, while the second consults principles. 
From this dissimilarity results some lack of understanding. The 
soldier often considers the politician to be unreliable, inconsistent, 
eager for popularity.71 
The future political giant of contemporary France perhaps gives 
short shrift to the politician and exaggerates the power of prin­
ciples over the officer's conduct. He is quite correct, however, in 
pointing out the officer's penchant for direct action in situations 
which he takes to be less complex than does the politician. Yet 
though officers like Weygand preferred direct, authoritarian solu­
tions, they rarely had a clear conception of the kind of political 
system which they would prefer in place of French assembly 
government. 
The army's republican wing seems to have grown slightly after 
1900. Prompted in some cases by sincere belief, in others by 
ambition, a minority group of officers responded to the intermit­
34 The "Great Mute" and the Beginnings of Its Demise, 1815-1945 
tent appeals of post-Dreyfus governments for a "Vepublicanized" 
officer corps. A few of the more famous among them were General 
Louis Andre, who as minister of war built up extensive files on 
supposedly clerical and antirepublican officers, General Maurice 
Sarrail, the darling of the Left in the 1910's and 1920's, and Gen­
eral Maurice Gamelin, whose appointment in 1930 as deputy chief 
of the general staff under General Maxime Weygand was Premier 
Andre Tardieu's condition for the prospective appointment of 
Gamelin's conservative chief.72 Unquestionably political contacts, 
especially with Radical Socialists, played a part in a number of 
appointments from 1900 to 1939, particularly at higher levels.73 
Yet their frequency must not be exaggerated. In the four years 
from 1931 to 1935 General Weygand reports that the minister of 
war appointed only three officers to the grade of general whose 
names did not appear on the usual list of eligibles.74 To be sure, 
Weygand put up strong resistance to political promotions. 
Closely related to the widespread mistrust of democratic politics 
among officers was a deep attachment to social and political order, 
and an aversion to those on the Left whom General Trochu labeled 
under the Second Empire as "the eternal enemies of order."75 
Among the primary reasons for the unpopularity of the Second 
Republic among officers was that it was born of popular revolt 
and that it bred more of the same. For General Saint-Arnaud, 
Louis Napoleon's key man, the republic signified "disorganization, 
disorder, anarchy."7(i Disillusionment was common even among 
those officers who initially rallied to the republic. General Cavai­
gnac, the republican general who was given full powers to smash the 
June Days riots of 1848, once faced a disorderly crowd in Oran 
and was prompted to remark, "This is not how I understand the 
Republic." 77 General Bosquet as well, another of the early army 
rallies," by June of 1848 was regretting the corruption of repub­
licanism into "disorder." 78 
Educated to respect authority and to accept rigid discipline, 
the officer was often disturbed by the raucous character of French 
democratic politics. Writing in 1929, Major Lucien Souchon ar­
gued that military men must have confidence in themselves and 
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in their mission: "It is for love of organized power that one em­
braces a career of arms at twenty years of age. Military faith 
cannot put up with social, political and moral instability, that is 
to say with the reign of the parties." '''•' Undoubtedly Souchon was 
far more extreme than the majority of his fellow officers when 
he foresaw the day when certain military friends of order and 
authority' might have to "bring the parties to their senses." 80 The 
repugnance for disorder which he evidences, however, was a 
sentiment widely shared in the officer corps. 
In the interwar period, and particularly in the 1930's, the army's 
tradition of abstention from political activity was seriously tested 
by the appearance of a new type of enemy—international com­
munism—who shocked, not only the officer's respect for order, 
but also his deep-seated nationalist sentiments. In the decade of 
the 1930's, as the Third Republic watched its authority eroded 
away by depression, political scandal, government immobility, and 
violent social conflict,81 'right-thinking" conservatives frequently 
came to fear communism more than Hitler Germany.82 Though 
the evidence is still spotty, it would appear that the army was 
affected by these conditions and by the conviction in conservative 
circles that French parliamentary democracy was incapable of 
halting the red wave.83 Apparently the equally vehement anti­
communist and antirepublican diatribes of L'Action frangaise 
reached the eyes of a large number of officer readers in these 
years.84 The staunch nationalism, the authoritarianism, and the 
militant anticommunism of Charles Maurras and his Action 
Francaise, if not his monarchist leanings, were probably appealing 
to a large number of officers. 
In 1920 communism was already a familiar foe to those hun­
dreds of French officers who had been involved in Allied military 
interventions against the Bolsheviks in Siberia, Odessa, the Crimea, 
and Poland from 1918 to 1920. Then, with the creation of the 
French Communist Party in 1920, the French extreme Left came 
for the first time to represent a hostile foreign power as well as a 
violent revolutionary movement. Military leaders felt the sting 
of communist agitation during the punitive French occupation of 
the Ruhr in 1923, when the French Communist Party and the 
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communist youth movement led a campaign of protest to the 
occupation and extended their propaganda and agitation into the 
very ranks of the French occupying army.85 Until 1935, when 
Hitler could no longer be ignored, the Communist Party (with 
frequent support from the socialists) was a dedicated antimilitarist 
force. 
It is probably safe to say that most army officers shared the 
fears of the bourgeoisie in general when the Communists rose 
from ten to seventy-two parliamentary seats in the 1936 elections, 
when a popular-front government was formed in that same year, 
and when Maurice Thorez announced to a communist meeting at 
the Palais des Sports: "The Communist Party will soon be in 
power. I tell you, comrades, soon." 86 Throughout the 1930's ex­
tremists of the Left and of the Right fed upon the threat each 
presented to the other. How directly was the army allied with 
emerging movements of the radical Right? Veterans groups, and 
especially the Croix de Feu (led by Colonel de la Rocque), were 
an active and militant antirepublican force. Yet, as Rene Remond 
has suggested, veterans organizations probably tend to attract 
those men who have the greatest difficulty in finding a satisfying 
place in civilian society. They are not necessarily typical of 
enlisted men and officers on active duty, nor of all veterans.87 
Let us look first at some of the most illustrious military leaders 
of the day, all of whom were retired, though some still sat on the 
Army Council. Following the violent antigovernment riots of 
February 6, 1934, Marshal Lyautey threatened to lead a march 
on the Chamber of Deputies unless the Daladier government re­
signed (which it did).88 Marshal Franchet d'Esperey, reaching 
senility at eighty years of age, was one of two living marshals of 
France after Lyautey's death in 1934. In the 1930's he was a 
leader in the Action Francaise and an active supporter of the 
Cagoule, a Right-wing conspiratorial network of confused mon­
archist and fascist leanings, led by Eugene Deloncle.89 The other 
living marshal, Philippe Petain, was more discreet, though he kept 
informed of the clandestine activities of the Right wing. His public 
statement on the eve of the 1936 election clearly revealed his 
Rightist sympathies,90 and he was aware that members of his staff 
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were organizing underground anticommunist networks within the 
army.91 Nonetheless, he refrained from involving himself per­
sonally.92 Another venerable and conservative officer, General de 
Castelnau, leader of the ultra-nationalistic "Catholic National 
Federation," apparently viewed fascism as no threat in August, 
1936, when he said of the Spanish Civil War: " There are no 
longer, as formerly, two factions struggling for the prestige and 
the advantages of political power; today it is war between Mus­
covite barbarism and Western civilization." 93 After General Wey­
gand's retirement in 1935, that devout Catholic officer revealed in 
a series of speeches and articles his alarm at the social fragmenta­
tion and moral decay of French society, which he attributed 
primarily to the subversive efforts of Masons, foreign agents, and 
above all, communists.94 A more active conspiratorial role was 
played by General Duseigneur, an air force officer who retired in 
1936. His activities with the Cagoule landed him in prison follow­
ing the Cagoulard assassination of two antifascist Italian jour­
nalists in 1937.95 The officers mentioned so far were all in retire­
ment.96 What of those on active duty? 
The Cagoule was primarily a civilian organization, though it had 
drawn Marshal Franchet d'Esperey, General Duseigneur, and a 
few other officers into its net. Another underground network, this 
one also violently anticommunist though less revolutionary in ob­
jectives than the Cagoule, was created within the army itself by 
a member of Petain's staff, Major Georges Loustaunau-Lacau. A 
former classmate of Charles de Gaulle at the Ecole Superieure de 
Guerre, Loustaunau-Lacau was determined to mobilize the army 
against the communist threat, which he felt the Third Republic 
was too weak and too pacifistic to handle. The major created the 
secret "Corvignolles" network among active and reserve officers 
for the purpose of purging communist influence within the army 
and bolstering military morale.97 The extent of the Corvignolles 
network is extremely difficult to determine. Loustaunau-Lacau 
claimed to have met with considerable success in his efforts to 
place or recruit agents in each military unit.98 He claimed in the 
Petain trial that "the great chiefs of the army were fully aware 
of our action: General Georges even told me of his satisfaction 
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with it one day."" Loustaunau-Lacau denied having "worked 
with" the Cagoule, though he admitted having met with General 
Duseigneur in 1936, on the suggestion of Petain, and with Deloncle 
in 1937, the latter meeting having been arranged by Marshal 
Franchet d'Esperey.100 On the urging of Franchet d'Esperey, the 
major then received from Deloncle the names of officers who had 
been recruited into the Cagoule, as well as information regarding 
communist activities within military garrisons.101 
The presence of clandestine anticommunist activities within the 
army did not go altogether unnoticed by the government. After 
General Duseigneur's arrest in 1937 all members of the Army 
Council were asked whether they were in contact with the Cagoule. 
The uniformly negative replies were not altogether frank.102 Major 
Loustaunau-Lacau himself was released from active duty in 1938, 
after a reserve officer within his network informed on him.103 He 
was reactivated in 1939 after the outbreak of the war, was wounded 
in combat, and spent much of the war in German military and 
police prisons. 
Undoubtedly, the currents of antiparliamentarism and anticom­
munism within the officer corps were strengthened during the 
1930's; yet one must beware of exaggerating the "politicization' 
of the army before 1939. Most probably the Cagoule and the 
Corvignolles never reached more than a small minority of officers. 
The army as an institution obeyed the popular-front government of 
Leon Blum in 1936, just as it had obeyed all legally constituted 
governments for over a century. The army was in no mood for a 
military coup, even though the Cagoule apparently attempted to 
inspire one in November, 1937.104 In fact, the underlying strains 
of antiparliamentarism and anticommunism within the army posed 
a serious threat to civilian control only in 1940, when the Third 
Republic was crumbling under defeat, and again after 1946, when 
the Indochinese war began. 
Still, we are left without a solid explanation of the French 
Army's subordination to civilian control before 1939. Such typical 
French military attitudes as antipacifism, antiparliamentarism, and 
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anticommunism hardly suffice to explain civilian control under the 
Third Republic, even though the officer's respect for order gives 
some clue to his reluctance to join with revolutionaries of any 
color. For a first substantial glimpse into the foundations of civilian 
control before 1939, we must turn to the last of those attitudes 
which Huntington found to be typical of professional officers: fear 
of embroiling the army in the vicissitudes of politics. 
As the Italian student of political affairs, Gaetano Mosca, noted 
over seventy years ago, the nineteenth century saw the emergence 
of a new kind of relationship between military officers and civil 
authority.105 In what Mosca regarded as Ja most fortunate excep­
tion, military officers in Europe tended to become an obedient, 
"bureaucratized nobility, combining the orderliness and conscien­
tiousness of the civil service employee with the chivalrous spirit 
and the high sense of honor that were traditional in the well­
born." 106 Formerly, under the Old Regime, French officers had 
customarily obeyed the king and his ministers because their class 
interests or their personal careers were wedded to the monarchy; 
now, in the nineteenth century, they were willing to serve any 
government, be it Rourbon, Orleanist, Ronapartist, or repub­
lican.107 
The army officer in France after 1815 gradually came to con­
ceive of his role as requiring unquestioning obedience to civil 
authority.10M He tended to value obedience even more than the 
older warlike qualities of courage and initiative, though these 
latter values were preserved in the colonial service. In 1835 the 
eloquent soldier-poet, Alfred de Vigny, reflected the changing 
values of the home-garrison army in his tribute to the military 
estate, Military Grandeur and Servitude: 
Military grandeur, or the beauty of military life, seems to me to 
be of two parts: there is that of command and that of obedience. 
The first, completely external, active, brilliant, proud, egotistical, 
capricious, will be rarer and less desired with each passing day, as 
civilization becomes more peaceful. The second, completely inter­
nal, passive, obscure, modest, devoted, persevering, will be each 
day more honored; for today, as the conquering spirit withers, the 
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only greatness which a noble character can bring into the military 
profession appears to me to be less in the glory of fighting than in 
the honor of suffering in silence and of accomplishing with stead­
fastness duties which are often odious.108 
Duty, obedience, and abnegation became pre-eminent ideals in 
the French officer corps after 1815. One of the more famous mili­
tary leaders of the nineteenth century, Marshal Victor de Castel-
lane, voiced a widely accepted truth when he warned: "A soldier 
must not even believe in the possibility of acting in a manner 
other than that which is prescribed for him."110 
High military regard for obedience permeated not only the 
internal hierarchy of the army in this period but extended upward 
to include most relations between generals, on the one hand, and 
the minister of war and the commander in chief (representing 
civilian government), on the other. At the beginning of the 
twentieth century Major Ebener, a military instructor at Saint-Cyr, 
verbalized that military ethic of obedience when he taught: "The 
loyalty and devotion of the army to the legal government of the 
country must be absolute. 1 defy a military man to find another 
formula which will permit him as surely to safeguard his honor."111 
Closely related to the military ethic of obedience to civil au­
thority was the emergence in the early nineteenth century of 
modern military professionalism. Samuel Huntington traces the 
roots of that professionalism to four major conditions: 112 first, the 
development of urbanism, industrialism, and technology, which 
produced a more complex and highly specialized war machine; 
second, the growth of the nation-state, which created a permanent 
need for a national army and offered adequate resources to sus­
tain a professional officer corps; third, the rise of democratic ideas 
and parties, which encouraged the open recruitment of officers on 
the basis of merit and created a balance between democratic and 
aristocratic parties and values which favored the compromise 
solution of a politically neutral officer corps which no group would 
control; and fourth, the existence of a single source of legitimate 
civil authority over the military forces. 
As the nineteenth century progressed, all but the last of these 
conditions were present in France. For reasons to be considered 
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below, continuing uncertainty over the legitimacy of changing 
political regimes had only a slight deterrent effect on the profes­
sionalization of the French Army. To Huntington's discussion of 
the nation-state needs be added a further factor: the Revolution 
and the Napoleonic Era endowed France with a vigorous na­
tionalism which allowed French officers to fasten their loyalties 
upon permanent service to the nation, whether temporarily or­
ganized as a monarchy, a republic, or an empire. 
Only after 1815 did French officers begin to take on most of 
the characteristics of a modern professional corps. Military service 
became a full-time career for most officers, whereas under the Old 
Regime, aristocratic officers (who were nobles first and officers 
second) 113 customarily returned to their manors or to the court 
for several months out of the year during peacetime.114 The 
Saint-Cyr military academy, founded by Napoleon, produced a 
trained military elite who had more claim to expertise than had 
most of their Old Regime predecessors, though France lagged far 
behind Prussia in this respect until after 1870. Under Ministers 
of War Laurent Gouvion-Saint-Cyr (during the Restoration) and 
Nicolas Soult (under Louis-Philippe), officer promotions were 
regularized and grades rendered permanent, thus lessening the 
officer's vulnerability to political pressures.115 The army discovered 
a new unity and discipline which had been lacking both under 
the Old Regime, when each officer recruited his own men and 
considered his unit as personal property,118 and under Napoleon, 
when "collective demonstrations, individual rebellions, mutinies 
were everyday affairs."m At last French officers came to view 
obedience to the government as a professional duty, rather than 
simply a personal fealty due the person of the commander in chief. 
Once the officer became a professional, a technician in the 
employ of the state, he was more easily persuaded that his art 
should be at the service of statesmen, whose responsibility it was 
to determine the ends toward which that art would be used. Karl 
von Clausewitz, who participated in the Prussian Army reforms 
which produced the first modern professional officer corps after 
1809, defined the limited professional role of the soldier for many 
succeeding generations of officers who studied him: 
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Now if we reflect that war has its origins in a political object [he 
writes], we see that this first motive, which called it into existence, 
remains the first and highest consideration to be regarded in its 
conduct. 
The political design is the object, while war is the means, and the 
means can never be thought of apart from the object.118 
From this point it is only a short and natural step to a professional 
military code which accepts ultimate civilian control as a conse­
quence of professionalism, which "exalts obedience as the highest 
virtue of military men."119 
Once stated, the "professionalism equals obedience to civilian 
government" equation must be qualified to indicate its necessary 
limitations and supporting conditions. First, it should be obvious 
that no officer corps is motivated solely by professional values. 
Members of the military establishment have other corporate inter­
ests, including status, income, and power. It was partly through 
his attention to interests of this nature that Louis Napoleon was 
able to woo a number of key officers into his camp in 1851.120 
Even when acting as professionals, moreover, military officers may 
clash with their civilian superiors. One cause of conflict (as in 
World War I) is the difficulty of tracing a clear and obvious line 
between the political and military realms; another is serious dis­
agreement regarding the demands of national security. Acting 
as professionals, military men will value obedience so long as it is 
necessary to the maintenance of military unity and effectiveness. 
Yet if a civilian government, in military eyes, is guilty of endan­
gering the security—even the very existence—of the nation-state, 
professional military men may feel obliged, qua professionals and 
in order to preserve their unity, to disobey rather than to obey.121 
There were seemingly good reasons for fearing a clash between 
the French government and its army in those formative years 
from 1815 to 1851, when civilian and military values were so 
strongly opposed. Stendahl's Julien Sorel of The Red and the 
Black, electing against a military career, was fully aware that 
military values were no longer in style.122 Yet the army accepted 
its plight of relative social isolation; indeed, it often came to look 
upon that isolation as a condition necessary for the maintenance 
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of unity and discipline.123 It did so—and the point deserves 
emphasis—because in this period there were no serious threats 
to national security, no crises which might have thrown into relief 
the standing tension between civilian and military values. From 
the end of the Napoleonic Era in 1815 to the Franco-Prussian War 
in 1870, there were no protracted wars and none involving the 
defense of vital national interests. The Algerian conquest in 1830 
(and its consolidation thereafter) required no wartime sacrifices 
on the part of the metropolitan population. The Second Empire 
saw a flurry of military activity accompanied by a rise in military 
prestige after a long forty-year eclipse; yet the Crimean War, the 
Italian campaign, and the Mexican expedition were all relatively 
limited in length and in the extent to which they involved the whole 
nation.1-4 It was only in 1870 and in 1914 that war captured the 
attention of the nation as a whole; in both cases the army was 
temporarily retrieved from its isolation. 
When antimilitarist civilian values clashed with those held by 
most military men, civilian control was assured (as it often was 
in the United States before World War II) simply by isolating the 
military community from political power.125 To be sure, France's 
continental location forbade a solution like that found in the 
United States, where the army was reduced almost out of existence 
(to a mere 25,000 men) after the Civil War. Strength limitations 
on the French Army rose from 240,000 in 1818 to 400,000 in 
1824.126 Nevertheless, the absence of serious security threats in the 
mid-nineteenth century, coupled with the relative isolation of the 
military community, tended in effect to limit severely the political 
power of the military within France proper. 
In this setting of relative security it appears that social isolation 
served to intensify military concern with army discipline and 
unity: in its isolation, imposed by an initially unsympathetic 
society, the army turned inward for inspiration. "If a soldier is to 
do his duty well, he must not have too many contacts with the 
bourgeois,'' one general insisted toward the end of the century.127 
Such contacts were systematically discouraged. Units were moved 
every two years, and the majority of officers remained unmarried. 
Few notations on an officer's record were as disastrous for a career 
as the one, "frequents civilian circles." 128 
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Given this intense concern with unity and discipline within 
the military order, officers found an additional reason for obeying 
the government currently in power—the diversity of social origins 
and political opinions within the officer corps. As a professional, 
the officer knew that military effectiveness depended upon safe­
guarding army unity. Since political action of any type would risk 
a split within the army, the safest course for officers intent on 
preserving army unity in the face of changing political regimes 
was that of strict abstention from politics and faithful obedience 
to the government of the day. As governments rose and fell in 
the nineteenth century, the officers who served them in turn were 
encouraged to look beyond the sovereign of the day as a focus 
of their loyalty to the abstract notion of the state, whoever might 
be at its helm.129 Then, when France turned again to a republic 
after 1870, when conscription extended finally to the entire popu­
lation, it became increasingly clear that army unity could be 
preserved only if officers kept "aloof" from all politics.130 Many 
officers undoubtedly shared the sentiments of the captain who, on 
discovery that one of his sergeants was a socialist candidate in 
the 1849 parliamentary elections, asked: 
Why in the devil do you draw attention to yourself? . Do you 
believe I have no opinions? I never talk about them. That allows 
me to serve all governments. I am not the soldier of Pierre or of 
Paul; I am the soldier of France.131 
In a mid-century setting of a professional army living in com­
parative isolation, the spirit of discipline tended to permeate the 
enlisted as well as the officer ranks. The law of 1818 provided for 
selection by lottery (with the possibility of paid replacement) 
of those rather few unlucky youths who would be required to 
serve seven years. Substitution was abolished in 1872; but it was 
not until 1905 that all young men, without special exemption, 
were required to serve a full term of service, then set at two 
years. Throughout the nineteenth century the enlisted ranks were 
filled largely with men of humble origins, who served long terms, 
even as conscripts.132 Yet with the exception of temporary disorder 
in some regiments in 1830 and 1848, military discipline generally 
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held firm among enlisted men, even when regular troops were 
thrown against popular Parisian uprisings in June of 1848 and 
May of 1871, and against striking workers in 1910-11.133 As op­
posed to the rebellious behavior of the national guard, which 
played a key role against the government in the insurrections of 
1830, 1848, and 1871 (after which it was definitively dis­
banded),134 the regular army could be counted upon to obey the 
government in civil disturbances as well as in foreign wars. There 
was good reason why political leaders of the Left, from Rousseau 
to Jaures and beyond, who were hostile to the existing political 
and social order, developed a strong fear of professional troops, 
as opposed to the militia and reserves of the "nation-in-arms." 135 
Supported by a long period of only briefly interrupted peace 
from 1815 to 1870, by an inhibiting diversity of social origin and 
political attitudes among officers, and by a formative period of 
enforced introversion from 1815 to 1851, the French military 
community developed a strong tradition of professional obedience 
to civil authority. That tradition lived on to help guarantee civilian 
control even when some of the original conditions which produced 
it ceased to exist. 
Despite a developing professional military tradition of political 
neutrality, the temptations for military intervention offered by a 
relatively unstable political situation and a weak constitutional 
consensus might have proven too great in the period from 1815 
to 1939 had it not been for the safety valve of colonial service. 
From the time of the Algiers expedition in 1830 until World War 
II, French military officers whose thirst for action and power was 
unslaked by home-garrison duty could usually find both in the 
colonies. The extensive political, as well as military, powers of 
the colonial officer, as well as his independence from tight civilian 
control, have already been described.136 Ambitious and daring 
officers who might otherwise have turned their energies loose in 
political adventures in France itself were able to find exciting 
substitute satisfactions in the colonial army. Soon after that great 
colonial officer, the future Marshal Lyautey, arrived in Indochina 
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for his first colonial assignment in 1894, his letters began to sparkle 
with excitement over the officer's life in the colonies: 
What a shame I did not come here ten years earlier! [he wrote to 
his sister in December, 1894] What careers there are to be estab­
lished and led here! Here there is not one of these little lieutenants, 
post and reconnaissance commanders, who does not develop more 
initiative, will, endurance and personality in six months than does 
an officer in France in his entire career.137 
Here in the colonies, free from the metropolis "deadly adminis­
tration, the iron-bound hierarchy . . . which watches, ready to 
cut short all vigour, all spontaneity,"138 the officer was free to 
throw away the book of regulations (as Gallieni literally did for 
Lyautey) 139 and realize his full potential for action and respon­
sibility. For the lieutenant as for the general, adventure, inde­
pendence, power, and even glory were much more abundant in 
the colonies than in the peacetime home-garrison army. Without 
this colonial outlet for military energies and ambition, it is likely 
that the army would have been more of a threat at home. 
Those foundations of civilian control so far discussed—notably 
professional political neutrality supported by the absence of serious 
security threats in the formative years and by the colonial outlet 
for restive military spirits—still do not account fully for the com­
parative docility of a sizeable standing army in the face of unstable 
political regimes. One persuasive theory of civil-military relations 
holds that the single most powerful factor which has always 
tended to draw armies into politics has been political instability 
stemming from the absence of consensus and authority within a 
given society.140 If there is any power in this theory (and I believe 
there to be), how did the French Army avoid the praetorian path 
in the nineteenth century? It did so partly because French society 
was more stable than the parade of constitutions would indicate. 
Shifts in political power took place among the various segments 
of the bourgeoisie. The growing urban working class, to be sure, 
was aware of its alienation from political power after 1848. Yet 
the bulk of French society, bourgeois and peasant, accepted the 
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authority of each succeeding regime. There was no consensus 
rivaling that which allowed peaceful and constitutional change in 
British society in the same period; yet in comparison with Spain, 
France appeared rather orderly. 
Spain, in fact, offers a revealing contrast to French military 
discipline in the nineteenth century, though unfortunately no 
thorough studies have been made of Spanish civil-military rela­
tions in this period. It is clear, however, that Spanish military 
officers time and time again entered the political fray in support 
of civilian political antagonists. The Spanish Army became a 
political arbiter—though sometimes divided within its own house.141 
The Spanish pronunciamiento was closely related to the break­
down of authority after the Napoleonic Wars, when Spanish politics 
was plagued by the active counterrevolutionary movement which 
produced the bitter seven-year Carlist war of the 1830's. In France, 
on the contrary, the bourgeoisie easily dominated aristocrats of 
the Old Regime, and the French avoided the political chaos 
which Spain reaped from her civil war.142 Moreover, the French 
bourgeoisie, though divided, was neither so quarrelsome nor so 
ready to call for regular army intervention against other bourgeois 
factions as was the Spanish middle class.143 Most probably the 
French Army would have been drawn more deeply into politics 
in the nineteenth century, as was its Spanish counterpart, if politi­
cal instability had been as profoundly rooted in France as it was 
in Spain. 
Again, during most of the Third Republic's seventy-year life, 
French political institutions enjoyed at least a fat/tc de mieux 
kind of support from most segments of the middle class and the 
peasantry on the premise that the republic was less likely to disturb 
their preferred styles of life than any probable alternative regime. 
Yet that tenuous "stalemate consensus," as one writer has baptized 
it,144 emerged shaken from the Dreyfus era—only to be battered 
even more seriously in the 1930's by depression and vicious 
political warfare over domestic communism. Two years before 
Hitler's march into Poland, one of the Third Republic's more 
moderate military critics, former Chief of Staff General Debeney, 
warned his compatriots that the nation was fast losing its capacity 
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for another union sacree as a result of the antipatriotic preachings 
of many state school teachers, of the progressive enfeeblement of 
the executive at the hands of quarrelsome party politicians, and 
of the eclipse of public respect for the general interest.145 Though 
Debeney refrained from marking out the nation's political institu­
tions as the primary culprit, many officers undoubtedly did just 
that. It is hardly reasonable to expect military officers to maintain 
undimmed respect for the government of the day when the civilian 
population is fast losing faith in it. The new collapse of France's 
tenuous republican consensus in the dying decade of the Third 
Republic was clearly a factor—along with the trauma of sudden 
defeat—in attracting the majority of Frenchmen, civilian and 
military, to Marshal Petain's authoritarian government in the 
summer of 1940. 
In summary, it would appear that the social and political diver­
sity of the officer corps tended to inhibit united political action, 
and its predominantly middle-class attachments and its respect 
for order made it a natural ally of any government preserving 
order, particularly against a proletarian uprising. However, neither 
the social origins nor the political attitudes of military officers 
afford adequate explanation of effective civilian control over the 
French Army in the period from 1815 to 1939. Of far greater 
importance was the officer's strong professional commitment to 
political neutrality and to military subordination to the government 
of the day. Developed in a mid-century period, when security 
threats were few and inconsequential and when the military 
community lived in semi-isolation from civilian society, the military 
tradition of obedience to civil authority provided a means of 
preserving army unity amid changing political regimes, despite the 
diversity of social origins and political attitudes within the officer 
corps. When the officer corps developed greater social and political 
homogeneity (in the last three decades of the nineteenth century), 
the influx of shorter-term conscripts into the enlisted ranks fur­
nished another restraint against potential praetorian inclinations. 
The professional military tradition of political neutrality was 
further supported by a modicum of social consensus which, until 
the 1930's, lent greater stability to French society than surface 
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political turbulence would indicate. Finally, the faithfulness of 
the army within France was strengthened by the colonial outlet 
for ambitious and restive officers, who could find in Indochina, 
Madagascar, or Africa the independence, power, and status which 
were often denied them at home. 
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Chapter 3 
Disgrace through Discipline, 1939-1945 
World War II was the beginning of the end for the French mili­
tary tradition of unquestioning obedience to civilian authority. 
The rapid and humiliating defeat of 1940 produced a series of 
events which badly eroded the foundations of military discipline. 
The commander in chief, General Maxime Weygand, first refused 
to continue the war in North Africa and contributed mightily to 
the fall of the Reynaud government, which favored that policy. 
General de Gaulle then rejected the authority of the new Petain 
government and appealed to the army and nation to follow him. 
As Vichy was drawn ever more tightly into the Axis net, many 
French military officers were forced into an agonizing choice 
between traditional military discipline, on the one hand, and the 
Gaullist crusade, on the other. The final liberation of France and 
the purges of "collaborators'' which followed seemed to prove 
that unquestioning obedience to the government of the day was 
no longer the surest formula for safeguarding a military man's 
honor. 
With the exception of General Weygand's clashes with economy-
minded ministers, there was little in the comparatively peaceful 
nature of official French civil-military relations in the 1930's which 
foreshadowed the crisis of June, 1940. Such fundamental principles 
of military policy as the primacy of defense and reliance on a short-
term conscript army found general support both in the general staff 
and among political leaders. With the outbreak of war, however, 
tensions mounted as the weakness of the French military machine 
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gradually became apparent. Even at the highest levels the army 
evidenced the debilitating effects of such common peacetime mili­
tary maladies as formalism, lack of imagination, promotion by 
strict seniority, and factionalism.1 
The problem of command articulation, which the long-delayed 
act of 1938 governing the "Organization of the Nation in Time of 
War" had supposedly solved, now came to the fore. In an attempt 
to avoid the tensions which had developed between government 
and high command in World War I, the National Assembly had 
given responsibility for "operations" to the high command and 
clearly reserved general conduct of the war to the government and, 
ultimately, to the National Assembly.2 Yet fear of concentrated 
military authority, added to navy and air force pressures, had 
forestalled the completion of Paul Reynaud's plan for a tight cen­
tralization of defense organization under a Ministry of Defense and 
a chief of staff of national defense.3 The titles were adopted, but 
not the accompanying centralized powers which Reynaud advo­
cated. One unfortunate result was serious confusion in the spring 
of 1940 concerning the respective powers of the chief of staff of 
national defense, General Maurice-Gustave Gamelin, and General 
Claudel Georges, commander in chief of armies of the northeast:4 
a bitter rivalry quite naturally developed between Gamelin and 
Georges.5 
French conduct of the war was thrown into further disarray by 
the entanglement of political and military rivalries. All went 
smoothly between Gamelin and the government so long as Daladier 
was Premier, for the two men were close associates and in full 
agreement on the primacy of defense. But when Paul Reynaud 
replaced Daladier as Premier in March, 1940, during the Norwegian 
campaign, tension mounted rapidly. Reynaud had no confidence in 
Gamelin; yet he dared not replace him because of the govern­
ment's dependence on the support of the Radical Socialist party, 
which was led by Daladier, Gamelin's defender.6 Reynaud at­
tempted to intervene over the conduct of the campaign in Norway, 
only to meet a firm protest from Gamelin that this was an 
encroachment on his powers over "operations." 7 The law of 1938 
had not settled the old and ticklish problem of distinguishing be­
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tween "policy"' and "strategy," especially at a time when civil-
military relations were characterized by mutual distrust. 
French defeat in the Netherlands enabled Reynaud to remove 
Gamelin as well as Daladier, who had been kept on as minister of 
national defense for political reasons. However, in replacing Game­
lin with General Maxime Weygand on May 19, 1940, Reynaud 
unknowingly enthroned a much more dangerous rival than Game­
lin had ever been. Only the day before Reynaud had invited 
Marshal Philippe Petain to join the government as vice-president of 
the cabinet. Thus, the two men who were to contribute most to the 
fall of the government were brought into the fold by the Premier 
himself. 
Weygand, a militant Catholic, was obsessed by a hatred for 
Free Masonry, a fear of communism, and scorn for politicians and 
partisan politics. His experiences as chief of staff under Foch in 
World War I, and again as army chief of staff in the 1930's in the 
face of an economy-minded parliament, had instilled in him an 
abiding distrust for the French political game and those who played 
it.8 The election of 1936 and the popular front government which 
issued from it only reinforced his conviction that the republic 
offered little defense against the dread communist menace. Wey­
gand's known contempt for politicians had earlier led to suspicions 
in parliamentary circles that he was a Fascist. Such reports ignored 
the Christian aspect of Weygand's thought and mistook his authori­
tarianism for totalitarianism; yet the general hardly conformed to 
the "apolitical" label which he preferred to wear. On June 28, 1940, 
after defeat and armistice had forced the republic to its knees, 
Weygand sent a memorandum to Petain which reveals the extent 
of the commander in chief's antipathy toward the republic: 
The old order of things, that is to say a political regime of 
Masonic, capitalist and international compromises, has led us to 
our present straits. France wants no more of it.9 
Weygand proposed a new order, led by a small group of disinter­
ested and untainted men under Petain, built on the ideals of "God, 
Country, Family," and capable of curing the nation of materialism 
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and social conflict. With these lines, which he himself character­
ized as portraying "the guiding ideas" of "my line of conduct," 10 
Weygand revealed his ideological affinity with those authoritarian 
elements of the French Right which had never accepted either the 
French Revolution or the French Republic. 
Marshal Petain fully shared Weygand's antipathy toward the old 
order, though the two men were known before June, 1940, to be 
bitter enemies.11 Petain had never plotted against the republic, nor 
had he participated personally in the activities of Right-wing or­
ganizations during the interwar period, as had Marshal Franchet 
d'Esperey, though he had kept well informed regarding their activi­
ties.12 "Too proud for intrigue," as De Gaulle had described him,13 
the marshal was nevertheless ambitious and eager to exercise power 
despite his eighty-four years. 
On May 10, 1940, the Germans launched a blitzkrieg offensive 
which broke through the French front in Belgium and again near 
Sedan in France; within six weeks the battle of France was con­
cluded. The German advance came with such bewildering rapidity 
that Weygand soon became convinced that defeat was inevitable 
and an armistice was the only hope of French salvation from 
anarchy and communism. Reynaud, though lacking in both poli­
tical support and personal forcefulness, was determined to carry 
on the war—from North Africa, if necessary. A bitter struggle 
between Reynaud and his commander in chief, a struggle which 
had been building since soon after Weygand's assumption of com­
mand, now broke into the open during a series of critical and 
dramatic cabinet meetings between June 12 and June 16. With 
Petain's support, Weygand reported that only an armistice could 
save the army from complete disintegration and the nation from 
anarchy.14 On June 13 both Weygand and Petain announced flatly 
that they would not leave France if the government decided to 
remove to North Africa. When the commander in chief was in­
formed by a cabinet member that removal of the government across 
the Mediterranean was a political question beyond the competence 
of the military, he retorted angrily: "I have had enough of these 
fire-eaters who want to fight and still high-tail it out of the country. 
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As for me, I will not leave the soil of France even if they put my 
feet in irons." 13 Two days later Weygand went a step further. 
When Premier Reynaud suggested that the army in the metro-pole 
might capitulate while the government moved to North Africa 
to carry on the battle, the general bluntly replied, "I will refuse 
to obey an order of that nature." lt; Not only did Weygand refuse 
to take the army to North Africa; he now refused to allow the 
government to leave France without calling for an armistice. And 
this he did in the name of the honor of the army. The very concept 
which had for so long suggested unquestioning obedience to 
civilian authority was now twisted to justify open rejection of 
that authority. 
The harried Premier dared not replace his insubordinate but 
politically powerful military chief, fearing the fall of the govern­
ment would ensue. He finally surrendered to the capitulators dur­
ing the stormy cabinet meeting of June 16, when he resigned upon 
losing majority support in his cabinet to the prestigious Petain 
and the military chiefs. President of the Republic Albert Lebrun 
delayed briefly, then, on Reynaud's advice, appointed Petain as 
Prime Minister. The marshal's list of ministers, which was ready 
in advance, included Weygand as minister of national defense, 
General Colson as minister of war, and Admiral Darlan as minister 
of the navy.17 The following day Petain announced to the nation 
that the government had addressed a request to the enemy for 
armistice negotiations.lfS The armistice and the abdication of par­
liament to Petain followed shortly. 
Throughout those critical days when German panzer divisions 
were driving south through France with little opposition, Reynaud 
fought a losing political battle with Weygand and Petain largely 
because of the government's tepid support in the National Assembly 
and the tremendous prestige of the two military men in a time of 
national peril. Petain's appointment as vice president of the cabinet 
on May 18, 1940, had been greeted by virtually unanimous praise 
in the press from Left to Right. The presence of the military hero 
in the government produced some sense of security among poli­
ticians as well as among the population at large. The president of 
the senate in the spring of 1940, Jules Jeanneney (who strongly 
opposed the armistice), later recalled that in June, 1940: 
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It was incontestable that at that moment all eyes were turned 
toward Marshal Petain. He was like a life-buoy toward which all 
hands reach out. His was certainly the only name around which 
union and concord could be achieved in our country.19 
Despite rumors of a threatened military coup in June, 1940, it 
was political strength—not threat of violence—which tipped the 
balance toward Weygand and Petain. Reynaud later argued that 
Petain and Weygand were prepared to resort to a military coup 
if legal methods had proven insufficient for the overthrow of the 
government; Reynaud's evidence, however, is indirect and uncon­
vincing.20 The prosecution in the Petain trial eventually withdrew 
its initial charge that the marshal had "plotted" the overthrow of 
the republic, while retaining the charges that he had not silenced 
antirepublican conspirators who shouted his name and later drew 
a number of them into the Vichy government.21 In the case of 
Weygand as well, investigations for the high court of justice 
found no evidence of a plan for a military coup in 1940.22 The 
thought that the army might prevent continuation of the war by 
a coup never seems to have entered the mind of the last President 
of the Third Republic, Albert Lebrun, who in his memoirs blamed 
the armistice rather on the lack of boldness of the Reynaud cab­
inet.23 There is little reason to believe that Weygand would not 
have accepted an order for his replacement had Reynaud's political 
position been strong enough to allow the Premier to issue one.24 
However, he probably would have refused to resign if Reynaud had 
asked him to do so rather than ordering his replacement outright.25 
If Reynaud had enjoyed the support of a strong parliamentary 
majority, or failing that, had he been capable of matching his con­
viction with the forcefulness of a Clemenceau or a Churchill, the 
military chiefs would have been no match for him, and Weygand 
would not have appeared so utterly irreplaceable in June of 1940.26 
The handmaiden of praetorianism—governmental weakness—was 
on hand to tempt military leaders into the game of politics. 
Violence, even if it had been intended, was quite unnecessary, 
for French political society was badly divided and demoralized 
from the bitter social and political struggles of the 1930's and from 
the irresistible force of the German military offensive. The historian 
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Marc Bloch, who was called to active duty on the outbreak of the 
war and later killed in the resistance, left this picture of the state 
of morale among his fellow reserve officers: 
They received orders from a political system which seemed to 
them to be corrupted to the very marrow. They were defending a 
country which they judged in advance to be incapable of resistance. 
The soldiers whom they commanded issued from the masses which 
they believed to be degenerate.27 
Another union sacree was out of the question in 1939. The Molotov-
Ribbentrop pact had aligned the Communist Party against the war 
effort, and much of the extreme Right, despite its professed Ger­
manophobia, was only too eager to see the collapse of the republic. 
Even among democratic parties partisan rivalries continued to 
hamstring governmental leadership.-8 
The sharp contrast between the British and French reaction to 
extreme national peril in World War II throws into relief the close 
relationship between civilian control of the military, on the one 
hand, and the solidarity of the political system and firm govern­
mental leadership, on the other. Especially after Churchill's acces­
sion to the office of the Prime Minister, there were no serious ten­
sions between soldiers and statesmen in Great Britain during World 
War II.L"J Britain, of course, did not suffer invasion and defeat 
within the homeland itself, as did France. Nevertheless, tensions 
in French civil-military relations appeared before German soldiers 
ever set foot on French soil. The behavior of Weygand and Petain 
in June, 1940, would have been unthinkable on the part of military 
chiefs in Churchill's Britain, even if the British Isles had been 
overrun by the enemy. 
The infirmities of the French political system provided the back­
ground for the victory of civilian and military advocates of sur­
render in June and July of 1940. But the more immediate cause 
was the powerful psychological shock experienced by the army 
and the nation as a whole as a result of the totally unexpected style 
and speed of the German blitzkrieg offense. Its paralytic and de­
moralizing effects were seen in military headquarters as well as on 
the front, where the panic produced by Stuka dive-bombing attacks 
was out of all proportion to the casualties they inflicted.30 Surprise, 
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more than defeat itself, took a terrible toll on political and military 
command centers as General de Gaulle describes them in May, 
1940: 
The collapse of the whole system of doctrine and organization to 
which our chiefs had attached themselves deprives them of their 
resilience. . In the midst of a prostrated and stupefied 
nation, behind an army without faith or hope, the government 
machine turned in an irremediable confusion.31 
It is not surprising that in this situation Weygand, never a revo­
lutionary strategist, could not envisage continuation of the war from 
Africa. Nor, when one recalls that the National Assembly on July 
10, 1940, completed the burial of the Third Republic by a vote of 
569 to 80, is it so very surprising that Weygand renounced a long 
tradition of military obedience to civil authority by refusing to 
continue a war which he was convinced was over? 32 
De Gaulle once described the French as " a people whose 
genius, whether in eclipse or in glory, has always found its faithful 
reflection in the mirror of its army." 33 The army and its leaders 
in 1940 were indeed a "reflection," if not a passive or even totally 
accurate one, of a defeated and demoralized nation. But unlike the 
faithful mirror, Petain and Weygand actively led the nation into 
capitulation and political metamorphosis.34 The trauma of sudden 
defeat served not only to paralyze the army's will to continue 
resistance: it also activated and exaggerated the latent antiparlia­
mentarism which had long been part and parcel of the average offi­
cer's mental equipment. In the past, officers had often been hostile 
to republicanism without questioning their duty to serve the repub­
lic; now,' however, a defeated army looked eagerly to "Marianne" 
(the Third Republic) and her politicians for a scapegoat.35 Within 
two weeks after assuming the post of commander in chief, Weygand 
was convinced that the government had blundered in taking an 
unprepared nation into war and had now called him to military 
leadership simply to slough off onto him the blame for defeat. Wey­
gand conveniently forgot that only the previous summer he had 
described the French Army as having "a greater value than at any 
moment of its history." 3S 
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The key role of military leaders in June of 1940 owes a great 
deal to the particular personalities—Weygand and Petain—who 
happened to occupy important posts. Although the military mold 
clearly favored antipathy toward republican politics and politicians, 
the officer corps was by no means a monolith with regard to poli­
tical attitudes. Moreover, the tradition of unquestioning obedience 
to civilian authority was still quite alive, as officer behavior in the 
next few years was to demonstrate. General military hostility to the 
regime des partis provides the background for the behavior of 
Petain and Weygand in June, 1940, but not its full explanation, for 
most officers at the time likely would not so easily have defied the 
legal government of the day.37 
Despite the gravity of Weygand's indiscipline, the French mili­
tary tradition of subservience to civilian authority suffered more 
in the years to follow from General Charles de Gaulle's famous 
appeal from London. Petain's political victory over Reynaud had 
spared Weygand from acting on his threat to disobey an order 
to surrender the army if the government should remove to North 
Africa. De Gaulle, on the contrary, as under secretary of state for 
national defense after June 5 and as a firm supporter of Reynaud, 
found himself on the losing side in the struggle for control of the 
French government. On the morning of June 17 the recent briga­
dier, perhaps in danger of arrest, left Bordeaux by plane for London 
in the company of General Edward Spears, Churchill's personal 
representative to the French Ministry of War. The following day, 
June 18, before a BBC microphone, De Gaulle launched an appeal 
to French soldiers and technicians to join him in England to keep 
alive "the flame of French resistance." 38 
The historic radio appeal of June 18 was more than a simple call 
for volunteers for a French expeditionary corps. It was the first 
step in De Gaulle's campaign to turn the French Army and nation 
against their new government leaders and the armistice policy.39 
On June 19 De Gaulle appealed by radio to the governors of 
France's colonies to reject the armistice then under negotiation.40 
He then refused to comply with a direct order from General Wey­
gand, now minister of national defense, instructing him to return 
to France.41 By mid-July De Gaulle was publicly accusing Petain 
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of treason;42 the Petain government, in return, was quick to brand 
De Gaulle as a mutineer and, on August 2, 1940, to condemn him 
to death in absentia. 
"Le Grand Charles" owes his dominant position in contemporary 
French history to that fateful decision to reject the authority of the 
Petain government in June of 1940. Praiseworthy as that decision 
was from the standpoint of Hitler's foes, an example was thereby 
set of a soldier who decides for himself where the interests of his 
country lie and revolts against constituted authorities if they see 
those interests differently from himself. Despite the climate of de­
moralization and fear that prevailed in France in the last weeks 
of the Third Republic, it is clear that Petain enjoyed wide support 
in the National Assembly, as well as in the nation as a whole.43 
Moreover, the government's armistice policy was not so obviously 
treasonable as Gaullists have pretended in view of the alternative of 
a harsh German occupation. A recent writer on the subject of 
stategic surrender argues that "when concluded, the French armi­
stice represented a successful bargain for both sides." 44 The bar­
gain could be viewed as "successful," of course, only by those who 
believed that British defeat was imminent and that the United 
States would not enter the war. Such a view of reality in June 
of 1940, though wrong, could not fairly be described as treasonable. 
If De Gaulle acted correctly in terms of the long-range interests 
of Frenchmen, he nevertheless dealt a heavy blow to the old— 
and useful—French military tradition of subservience to civilian 
authority. 
Faced with the contradictory appeals of Petain and De Gaulle 
in the summer of 1940, the vast majority of officers unhesitatingly 
accepted the authority of the marshal and his government. In the 
three summer months following the appeal of June 18, the Gaullist 
movement attracted only three generals (all from the colonies), 
one admiral, and three colonels, plus a scattering of junior officers.45 
Even among those French troops located in Great Britain at the 
time of the armistice, De Gaulle succeeded in recruiting less than 
a quarter of the enlisted men and an even smaller proportion of the 
officers, giving him a total of only seven thousand men by the end 
of July, 1940.46 The Free French Army which was gradually as­
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sembled grew primarily through occupying French Equatorial 
Africa (with British help), then North Africa (with American help), 
where "armistice army" units were absorbed intact. In the summer 
of 1940, however, the Petain government managed to assert its 
authority over all civil and military colonial governors with the 
exception of General Catroux (governor general in Indochina), 
General Legentilhomme (commander of French troops in French 
Somaliland), and M. Eboue (governor general of Tchad). Both 
Catroux and Legentilhomme were easily replaced, though Tchad 
rallied to De Gaulle, giving him a toehold in French Equatorial 
Africa. When the Free French, with British help, tried to win over 
French West Africa in September, 1940, they were held off by 
French guns still in the loyal service of the marshal.47 
Three factors help to account for De Gaulle's limited success. 
First, the Petain government had the advantage of apparent legality 
and hence profited from the power of military discipline and the 
officer's desire to be "covered." After all, had not the marshal's lead­
ership been accepted by public opinion and by the majority of poli­
ticians? "We executed the orders of a Blum because he was Presi­
dent of the Council," the tragic officer hero of Jacques Weygand's 
he Serment is made to say; "by what right would we refuse to rally 
to the one who is best among us when he is the one who exercises 
power?"48 In the next few years De Gaulle was time and time 
again to be frustrated in his hopes by the "stupid sterility" of French 
military discipline, despite a continuing hatred of the Germans 
within the army.49 
Second, military discipline was supported by an Anglophobia 
which thrived in the navy and had lately appeared as well in the 
army, where Great Britain was resented for failing to throw all of 
her military strength into the battle of France, and, later, for sup­
posedly coveting French colonies.50 Convinced (as were most 
Frenchmen) that Germany had won the war, the majority of 
French officers saw little reason for deserting their native land in 
order to wage a delaying action in favor of the British and their 
empire.51 Navy Chief of Staff Admiral Darlan and his senior offi­
cers were known to be intensely anti-British, a sentiment which 
was strengthened by the British attack on the French fleet at Mers­
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el-Kebir on July 3, 1940. In the wake of that attack, undertaken in 
the fear that the French fleet might fall into German hands, Darlan 
was prepared to open hostilities against Great Britain.52 
Officers found another good reason for obeying the Petain gov­
ernment in the congeniality of the values which it represented. A 
discredited French Republic suffered repeated calumnies and dis­
grace at the hands of the armistice government, even to the re­
placement of its once cherished motto. Predictably enough, "'work, 
family, country" rang more true to the military ear than "liberty, 
equality, fraternity" had ever done. The political philosophy of 
the Vichy government, bearing the stamp of the marshal himself, 
was comfortably compatible with the dominant values of profes­
sional military officers. With a soldier's taste for discipline, author­
ity, and hierarchy and a disdain for ambiguity and disorder, the 
marshal laid out the job of French education under the new order: 
The French school of tomorrow will teach respect not only for 
the human person, but also for family, society and country. It will 
no longer make any claims of neutrality. Life is not neutral: it 
consists of vigorously taking sides. There is no neutrality possible 
between the true and the false, between good and evil, between 
health and sickness, between order and disorder, between France 
and anti-France.53 
Petain again spoke as a soldier when he lashed out at "blind and 
egoistic capitalism" and vowed to free his country from "the most 
despicable tutelage: that of money."54 The same values which 
Marshal Lyautey had proposed that army officers inculcate in 
French youth in 1891—discipline, respect, sacrifice, patriotism, so­
cial solidarity—now reappeared in the statements of the venerable 
marshal, who defined the new regime as "national in foreign policy, 
hierarchical in domestic policy, coordinated and controlled in its 
economy, and above all social in its spirit." r'5 
Many military officers fully agreed with Petain's view that 
France in defeat had revealed moral weaknesses attributable to the 
anarchy of the "regime des partis," and, more particularly, to its 
educational system.50 In the summer of 1940 the Vichy government 
created the Chantiers de la Jeunesse, an organization designed 
68 The "Great Mute" and the Beginnings of Us Demise, 1815-1945 
largely to effect the desired patriotic and moral transformation in 
French youth, who were required to serve for terms of six, then 
eight months. When French military forces in the metropole were 
cut to the one-hundred-thousand-man maximum set by the armistice 
terms, a number of those officers released from active duty were 
assigned to the Chantiers under the command of General de la 
Porte du Theil.07 A massive veterans organization, the Legion des 
Combattants, was also originally formed, in lieu of a single political 
party, to develop and maintain a high sense of patriotism among 
veterans. The Legion, however, soon became the tool of collabora­
tionist elements and a recruiting ground for the pro-nazi Service 
d'Ordre Legionnaire and its offspring, the infamous Milice.58 
The full extent of the ties between the Vichy regime and the 
armed forces—and especially the navy—is seen in the vast number 
of officers recruited for political and administrative posts. Army 
and air force officers were only slightly more in evidence than under 
the republic, though military officers now permanently recaptured 
the Ministry of War, which had been almost exclusively a civilian 
domain since 1918.59 General Weygand served as minister of defense 
only until September, 1940; then he was delegate general of the 
Vichy government in French Africa until German protests against 
his fierce anti-German attitude forced the cautious Petain to remove 
him from public office in late 1941.60 Other army and air force 
officers were used almost exclusively in the administration of their 
branch of service. Generals Colson, Huntziger, and Bridoux served 
successively in the Ministry of War, while Generals Vuillemin, 
Bergeret, and Jennekeyn performed similar functions in the Air 
Ministry.61 
With the help of Admiral Darlan, the opportunistic, ambitious, 
and fiercely Anglophobe vice-president of the cabinet after Febru­
ary, 1941, the government and administration were flooded with 
admirals. Admiral Esteva served as resident general in Tunisia, 
Admirals Abrial, Decoux (General Catroux's authoritarian succes­
sor), and Robert were governors general in Algeria, Indochina, and 
Martinique, respectively; Admiral Auphan directed the merchant 
marine; Admiral Fernet served as secretary general of the presi­
dency of the cabinet; and Admiral Platon headed the Ministry of 
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Colonies. Moreover, admirals served as prefect of police in Paris, 
head of a new police school, and prefects of some seven depart­
ments.62 The influx of naval officers into important posts was so 
overwhelming that a Catholic cardinal was prompted to remark, 
"I wonder if after my death they will find still another unplaced 
admiral to replace me."63 Spurred on by their near unanimous 
antipathy toward the British (especially after the British attacks 
on French naval vessels at Mers-el-Kebir and then at Dakar), 
Darlan and his naval colleagues at times brought France danger­
ously close to active military collaboration with the Germans.64 
Along with greater access to public office, military officers who 
had long felt themselves unjustly criticized, mistrusted, and denied 
their due respect,65 now enjoyed a privileged place in official French 
society. With the chamber and the parties dissolved and the 
marshal in power, the infuriating voices of antimilitarism were 
finally silenced. A flurry of parades and military ceremonies helped 
officers to forget their recent humiliation in battle.™ For those 
numerous armistice army officers who later recalled these years 
as "the most fervent period of my life," r'7 obedience to civil author­
ity was no longer simply a passive, professional duty, as it had been 
under the Third Republic: the officer's subservience to govern­
mental control now took on a more positive, political character.68 
Contrary to the universal expectation in Vichy in July, 1940, the 
British did not collapse, and the French armistice policy soon began 
to lose the aura of self-evident wisdom which had previously sur­
rounded it. The Vichy regime, fearing the ultimate effects of De 
Gaulle's appeals from London, decreed in Constitutional Act Num­
ber Eight of August 14, 1941, that all military personnel would 
henceforth be required to swear an oath pledging loyalty to the 
person of the chief of state.69 The military oath of allegiance had 
been abandoned since 1870; its revival now had the effect of 
intensifying the crise de conscience undergone by many officers who 
were forced to choose between traditional discipline and renewed 
resistance against the occupying power. Yet the majority of armi­
stice army officers had no need of an oath to insure their obedience 
to the congenial Petain regime. Most felt as did the major in 
Jacques Weygand's narrative: 
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It isn't just any leader who is making us take an oath of allegiance; 
it's the Marshal. If there is anyone to whom we can swear 
allegiance with our eyes closed, he is certainly the one.70 
Many of those officers who, for whatever reason, adhered rigidly 
to the military dictum of unquestioning obedience found themselves 
purged from the officer ranks following the liberation.71 The typical 
Gaullist response to the problem of disobedience was to point out 
that the Vichy government was not a free agent and therefore was 
devoid of authority over the armed forces. But at least until after 
November, 1942, such a judgment was too deeply political to be 
reached comfortably by most professional soldiers, especially in 
the face of political-military leaders like Petain and Darlan, who 
insisted that to obey was still to serve France. 
Vichy complemented the oath with vigorous punitive measures 
against those who joined De Gaulle. A law of July 23, 1940, had 
proclaimed the death penalty for all military personnel who left 
French territory between May 10 and June 30, 1940. General 
Catroux, General Legentilhomme, and Colonel de Larminat, along 
with De Gaulle himself, were condemned to death in absentia at 
the hands of military tribunals. Other sentences followed.72 
The early war years were fraught with disappointments for 
the proud creator and leader of "La France Combattante." Con­
demned by his peers in France,73 accused of attempting to split the 
army, incapable of persuading military commanders in French West 
Africa and Syria to renounce their loyalty to Vichy, General de 
Gaulle was forced to live out a soldier's nightmare in denouncing 
discipline among Vichy's loyal troops and appealing to the British to 
join him in attacking his own compatriots and fellow soldiers. The 
first serious military encounter between the troops of De Gaulle and 
those of Petain took place in late summer of 1940 in Gabon, where 
the Free "French"—mostly Foreign Legionnaires and Africans— 
subdued Vichy forces and occupied Libreville with a total loss of 
twenty men killed.74 
Following the unsuccessful Free French and British attack on 
Dakar in September, 1940, there were no major fratricidal battles 
until the tragic Syrian campaign, which left an indelible mark on 
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the French military conscience. Vichy sparked an Allied attack on 
the French Syrian protectorate when German planes were allowed 
to use Syrian air bases. De Gaulle had long favored an attack on 
Syria, and the British now rallied to his point of view. To the 
surprise of General Catroux, commander of the 6,000 Free French 
troops joined to four or five times that number of British and 
Australian troops, General Dentz and his officers, as well as most 
of the 40,000 Vichy troops in their command, considered De Gaulle 
a rebel and remained loyal to Petain and to the Vichy government. 
Obeying orders from Vichy, Dentz put up stiff military resistance 
to the Allied invasion. Despite his animosity toward the Germans, 
he finally recommended resort to German air support as the only 
hope of holding Syria, though hesitation at Vichy and the signing 
of an armistice on July 14, 1941, kept German aircraft out of the 
battle. When the fighting ceased, over a thousand Vichy soldiers 
and eight hundred Gaullist soldiers had been killed.75 The con­
tinuing sense of discipline and loyalty to Petain was evidenced by 
the choices of the officers and men of the Vichy troops: only 5,668 
out of a total of 37,736 joined De Gaulle.711 
Following the liberation of France, General Dentz was tried and 
condemned for his role in the fratricidal Syrian conflict. To Dentz's 
simple—and truthful—defense of "I obeyed orders, the public 
prosecutor replied: "At the grade you hold and in the functions 
you fulfill, one is judge of the orders he receives." 77 The French 
Army did not soon forget the lesson. 
At the time the Syrian campaign did not seriously shake the 
traditional discipline of the Vichy army, for the great majority of 
officers and men returned to France in unbroken units, still con­
vinced that a soldier's duty was to obey his superiors and his gov­
ernment. Such an escape was more difficult, though still not im­
possible, in the confusion of November, 1942, when the American 
invasion of North Africa and the subsequent German occupation of 
the Vichy zone critically undermined the authority of Marshal 
Petain. 
Weygand's successor as commander of French troops in North 
Africa and French West Africa, General Alphonse Juin, continued 
to prepare patiently for an eventual resumption of hostilities against 
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Germany. Yet when the Allies landed along the North African 
coast in the night of November 7-8, 1942, it so happened that 
Admiral Darlan, second in authority only to the marshal in the 
Vichy government, was visiting his son in Algiers and hence took 
direct command of French forces. All but a small minority of those 
forces remained loyal to Petain in the face of the Allied invasion, 
forcing the American commanders to deal with Darlan. 
The Allies had hoped that French troops would rally to their 
cause without resistance. Contacts had been made with a non-
Gaullist clandestine resistance organization in North Africa led by 
a civilian "group of five," which had attracted the participation of 
such important military figures as General Mast, commander of 
the Algiers Division, General Bethouart, commander of the Casa­
blanca Division, and General Giraud, a famous escapee from a 
German prison.78 Yet the "five" had been given only partial and 
delayed information regarding American invasion plans. General 
Mast and his resistance group were able to gain control of Algiers 
for a few hours on November 7, 1942, but they moved too soon and 
were overpowered by loyal mobile guards before the arrival of 
American troops.7y In Morocco, General Bethouart arrested General 
Nogues, resident general in Morocco; but again the move came too 
soon, for loyal Vichy troops arrived at Rabat and freed Nogues in 
time for him to order armed resistance to American landings. In 
Algiers, Darlan ordered a local cease-fire soon after the arrival of 
American troops. However, despite pressure from the American 
diplomatic representative, Robert Murphy, and from General Juin, 
for two days he left standing the order for resistance elsewhere in 
North Africa/" As a result, over five hundred Americans and almost 
seven hundred French soldiers were killed, most of them in the 
fighting in Morocco/1 
The Allies had refused Free French participation in the landings 
on advice from the "five' that their presence would impede an 
arrangement between French troops and the Allies.82 In fact, how­
ever, the presence of Darlan in North Africa and the loyalty of 
French troops to Petain prevented any such agreement until after 
much blood had already been shed. General Giraud, who in the 
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plan of the "five" was to take command of the French African army, 
belatedly arrived in Algiers on November 9. To his chagrin, the 
army made no move to rally to his leadership.83 
These first few days following the Allied invasion were days of 
terrible confusion within the French African army. Petain's imme­
diate and public response to a request from President Roosevelt 
for French co-operation in North Africa was direct enough: "We 
have been attacked; we will defend ourselves. That is the order I 
am giving." 84 Yet the marshal's cable of November 8 to Darlan 
indicated that the admiral was free to act as he saw fit.85 For the 
next several days Vichy continued to emit belligerent orders, largely 
from fear of German reprisals against the metropole, while appar­
ently reaffirming Darlan's free hand in a series of secret coded 
cables.8" The effect on the army was one of confusion, especially 
when on November 11, in the wake of an armistice accord between 
Darlan and General Mark Clark, Vichy transferred authority over 
North Africa from Darlan to General Nogues and, by cabinet vote, 
ordered French forces to fight "to the limit of their strength." 87 
Petain was now weaker and more ineffective than ever, while 
Laval gained the upper hand at Vichy. Nevertheless, German occu­
pation of the Vichy zone after November 11, as well as the secret 
cables, eventually allowed Darlan to regain control over the African 
army. Vichy continued to condemn the November 10 armistice 
and the new commander in chief of the African army, General 
Giraud, who was described as having "forfeited his honor and be­
trayed his duty as an officer." 88 
Confusion was particularly marked in the bewildered French 
military command in Tunisia, headed by Resident Minister Admiral 
Esteva, General Barre, and Admiral Derrien. Conflicting and rap­
idly changing orders from Vichy and from Admiral Darlan and 
General Juin in Algiers left the Tunisian commanders at a loss to 
know whether duty required them to fight the Americans, the 
Germans, neither, or both.89 Confronted with final orders from the 
collaborationist minister of war in Vichy, General Bridoux, to allow 
German troops to land, and with contradictory and uncertain orders 
from Algiers, Admiral Esteva (who had opposed the armistice in 
74 The "Great Mute" and the Beginnings of Its Demise, 1815-1945 
June, 1940) and Admiral Derrien dared not take responsibility for 
opening fire on the Germans. By November 13 German troops had 
arrived in force to take command of Tunis and the adjoining port 
of Bizerte. On that date, when firm orders finally arrived from Gen­
eral Juin to open fire on the Germans, it was too late for all but 
General Barre and his troops, who had fled Tunis on earlier orders 
from General Juin.90 
Military commanders stationed in French West Africa in No­
vember, 1942, were equally fearful of breaking with formal disci­
pline. They finally rallied to Darlan with their one hundred thou­
sand troops only on November 22, after having been assured by 
Algiers emissary General Jean Bergeret that the secret cables from 
the Vichy government had indeed vested the admiral with full 
91 powers.
Nothing in the training or past experience of the French officer 
prepared him to decide at what point duty and honor ceased to 
require unquestioning obedience to orders from above. It is not 
surprising that Admirals Esteva and Derrien in Tunis were unwil­
ling to disregard clear orders from Vichy on November 11, 1942, 
even though they were aware that the Germans had broken the 
armistice agreements by occupying the Vichy zone. The two ad­
mirals paid for their decision (or indecision) with lifetime prison 
sentences.92 Again, as in the case of General Dentz in the Syrian 
campaign, future generations of military officers were unwittingly 
taught that in some circumstances (but which ones?) obedience 
may dishonor the obeyer. 
In Algiers, Darlan was extremely careful to present himself as the 
continuing embodiment of legality and loyalty to the marshal. He 
explained on November 15 and again by radio on November 20 
that the marshal was no longer free, hence, the oath of allegiance to 
him was no longer binding. "Our patriotic duty remains the same: 
liberate the Mctropole and the Empire and, I will add, liberate the 
Marshal, living incarnation of imperial France." 93 Curiously enough, 
Darlan's argument, with the exception of his reference to the mar­
shal, had a distinctly Gaullist ring to it. For over two years De 
Gaulle had been arguing that the soldier owes obedience only to a 
free and independent government. Now, however, after German 
occupation of all of France on November 11 and the arrest of 
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General Weygand on November 12 (despite French government 
protests), the "government in chains" argument was more obviously 
true. 
One can catch a more vivid glimpse of the impact of these No­
vember days on the unity and discipline of the French African 
army through the eyes of Jules Roy, an air force officer stationed 
in Algeria at the time. Roy, like his fellow officers, was still there 
because he had pledged his loyalty to the marshal, "'who had 
spared my country from total occupation and had obtained the 
maintenance of the army in which I remained." 94 Was not disci­
pline the first of military virtues and disobedience a certain road 
to chaos?95 Then the Americans landed in North Africa. Roy's unit 
was the object of rapidly changing orders: first to attack roads 
leading from the coast in order to halt an American advance; then 
to allow Axis planes to land; and finally, at dawn, to maintain "abso­
lute neutrality." Meanwhile, Vichy continued to call by radio for 
resistance against the American invaders: 
Each of us was suspended on the word of his commander and 
separated from the rest of the army. All the generals who 
insulted and threatened each other on the radio and on the tele­
phone disconcerted me. The generals had broken relations with 
each other because each suspected the other was not free. 
We had lost confidence in our chiefs and in ourselves.96 
In the presence of such a confusion of goals and authority, Roy 
found that his discipline du caporal was inadequate. "I needed to 
know and to watch over my personal reasons for fighting. In that, 
the professional soldier that I was felt he was wrong." 97 
Along with the majority of his fellow officers in the African army, 
Roy avoided the moral agony of actual disobedience by simply 
following orders from superiors. This was the predominant pattern 
all the way up to Darlan, who finally absolved all from their oath 
to "the old one." The conflict between discipline and honor was 
thereby dulled, but not resolved. As in the Syrian campaign, endur­
ing lessons were learned in North Africa in November, 1942. Nearly 
two decades later, in the trial of officers involved in the April, 1961, 
"Paris plot" to overthrow the Fifth Republic, General Royer de la 
Tour, a defense witness for Colonel Vaudrey, testified (with some 
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exaggeration) that the traditional concordance of military discipline 
and honor had been irreparably broken during World War II: 
In 1942, at the time of the American landings in North Africa, 
I had organized a clandestine group of Moroccan troops. I received 
the order to march against the Americans. I refused. If the land­
ings had not succeeded, I would have been a rebel.08 
But of course the landings did succeed, and in the aftermath of 
war the French nation tended to judge its officers according to the 
earliness of their hour of rebellion. 
Throughout the armistice army, in France as well as in Africa, 
officers demonstrated a rather consistent reluctance to disobey 
their superiors, despite the confusion and tensions of those Novem­
ber days. Armed resistance was universally considered to be futile 
among senior officers in the metropolc, though plans were laid for 
preserving the armistice army in case of German occupation of 
the Vichy zone." On November 9 the order went out to all army 
units to retreat to designated points in case of German advances 
across the Vichy border.100 The next day, however, orders for dis­
placement were annulled, leaving French units sitting peacefully 
within their garrisons when the Germans swarmed into the Vichy 
zone on the eleventh. With one exception, all armistice army com­
manders complied with orders received: only General de Lattre de 
Tassigny, commander of the Montpellier Division, vainly attempted 
to lead his troops to a predetermined mountainous retreat. He was 
betrayed by a subordinate, captured, and imprisoned, though he 
later escaped and joined De Gaulle in time to become the illustrious 
commander of the First Free French Army.101 Plans to keep the 
armistice army away from the Germans collapsed in the face of 
Petain's hesitation and weakness, Bridoux's determined collabora­
tionist policy, and the army's continuing loyalty to the weak old 
man who was still "The Marshal." From the dissolution of the 
armistice army by German order on November 27, 1942, until 
June, 1944, France was left without a French Army on French soil. 
The navy followed suit, though here the ties of military discipline 
were strongly seconded by the fierce Anglophobia of the Toulon 
fleet commander, Admiral Count Jean de Laborde. Laborde and 
Admiral Marquis, maritime prefect of Toulon, rejected Admiral 
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Darlan's appeals of November 10 and 11 for the fleet to sail for 
West Africa.1"2 In response to German demands Laborde and 
Marquis asked their officers to pledge in writing never to fight 
against the Axis and to resist an Allied attack. Even though the Ger­
mans had recently snuffed out the last vestiges of French independ­
ence apart from French control of the fleet, all but one officer signed 
the pledge. In the early morning of November 27, 1942, in accord­
ance with standing orders, the French fleet at Toulon—the pride 
of the helpless Darlan—was sunk by its crew when German troops 
moved into the port.103 
Discipline was perhaps more seriously shaken in the African 
army; yet here, too, there were numerous proofs of a lingering 
faith in unquestioning obedience. The behavior of Admirals Derrien 
and Esteva in Tunisia is one example. Continued military obedience 
to Darlan is another.104 After the worst of the confusion had passed 
—temporarily at least—Darlan remained the political and military 
chief of French North Africa. General Nogues yielded the powers 
transferred to him by Vichy back to Darlan on learning of the 
secret cables and discovering that the admiral was not a prisoner 
of the Americans. Even General Giraud, who quickly discovered 
the loyalty of the army to Darlan, now accepted the post of military 
commander in chief under the admiral. Those officers who had 
attempted to facilitate the American landings of November 8 were 
subjected to rough treatment: General Bethouart and Colonel 
Magnan were arrested and almost shot on order of General Nogues; 
General Mast and Colonel Baril fled to the French Levant. Though 
later officially pardoned for their manquement a la discipline, 
they continued to be treated with some disdain by their colleagues 
and with the exception of General de Montsabert, who was placed 
in charge of a small group of civilian volunteers, were shunted off 
into liaison rather than command assignments.105 Indeed, the Afri­
can army had not ceased to fear and reproach acts of military 
indiscipline. 
Confusion in the leadership of the African army was not at an 
end. First, on December 24, 1942, came the assassination of Admiral 
Darlan at the hands of a young monarchist.100 Within a matter of 
hours General Giraud was designated as the new high commissioner 
by the Empire Council, composed of Generals Bergeret, Nogues, 
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Giraud, and Governor General Boisson from Dakar. With Darlan 
removed from the scene, Giraud could now replace him without 
disrupting army unity and discipline. The end of the power strug­
gle was not yet in sight, however, for eventually Giraud was forced 
to deal with De Gaulle, who won an increasingly strong loyalty 
from French resistance groups in the metropole. The intricacies of 
the struggle between Giraud and De Gaulle need not concern us 
here. Suffice it to say that Giraud was sorely outmatched in both 
political interest and acumen. While De Gaulle viewed his role as 
one of broad political leadership over the entire French nation, 
Giraud is reported once to have told General Mark Clark, "I am 
not a politician. I am a soldier. All I want is the post of commander 
in chief." 107 Outmaneuvered at every turn, Giraud found himself 
successively: a copresident with De Gaulle of the Comite Frangais 
de la Liberation Nationale (June, 1943), commander in chief of 
French armed forces with limited powers as a member of the 
government (late July, 1943), and a theoretical commander in 
chief without membership in the government (November, 1943). 
Finally, in April, 1944, Giraud suffered the retraction of even his 
theoretical powers as commander in chief and, in preference to the 
classic inspector general's post reserved for displaced commanders, 
opted for retirement.108 
It is not surprising that continuing confusion and rivalry in 
Algiers had a corrosive effect on the morale and discipline of the 
African army, which was now preparing to play an active role in 
the North African campaign. Colonel Jules Roy was one of those 
unit commanders who waited impatiently for the arrival of new 
weapons needed to prepare his ill-equipped troops for combat. 
His impressions of Algiers in the spring of 1943 are revealing: 
When I rushed to Algiers to discover how long it would be be­
fore we would have our weapons, I returned crushed. Generals 
and politicians were fighting among themselves and attempted their 
own little revolutions within government and military head­
quarters. Odds and ends of armies shut themselves up within 
dissident bastions and tried to enlist supporters. Their recruiting 
sergeants set up their platforms on the street corners. They did 
not say that they were better equipped than us, nor that they 
worked more than us. They simply boasted about their pay, their 
uniforms, or the prestige of their leaders.109 
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With Giraud, De Gaulle—and Petain—all claiming to represent 
governmental legitimacy, the tradition of military obedience to 
civil government quite naturally gave way to a new style of feudal 
loyalty to a powerful patron. The old formula was no longer 
relevant. 
The rapid ascendancy realized by De Gaulle, the brigadier gen­
eral, over Giraud, his four-starred rival, united in the summer of 
1943 the political and military command of the African army with 
that of Free French troops, which had been battling against the 
Axis armies in North Africa ever since January of 1941. Unity of 
command, however, did not cushion the tradition of military obe­
dience from further erosive blows when army and nation again 
finally met amidst an atmosphere of hostility, rivalry, and purge. 
The French troops which fought with their British and American 
allies across Tunisia, up through Italy, and then up through the 
south of France, were often denied the hero's welcome which they 
merited. The regular army, especially in the eyes of the internal-
resistance forces, was the army of defeat, the army of Vichy and 
the armistice. The early exploits of the Free French did not redeem 
the African army; and it was the African army—not the Gaullists of 
1940 and 1941—who made up the bulk of liberating French forces. 
Moreover, Free French forces were too few to spare Frenchmen 
the humiliation of owing their liberation to foreign troops. Even 
Gaullists of the earliest hour met reserve and apprehension on the 
part of the internal resistance, particularly in the case of commu­
nist resistance elements which had entered the fray only when 
Russia—not France—was in jeopardy. 
The Gaullist provisional government, as well as the regular army, 
was occasionally the object of abuse at the hands of the internal 
resistance. The most serious clash was occasioned by the Vercors 
disaster in July, 1944, when several hundred guerrillas of the Forces 
Francaises de 1'Interieur (F.F.I.) were killed in a mountainous area 
southwest of Grenoble. At the height of the battle, which had been 
launched prematurely, though with the accord of London, the 
leaders of the Vercors resistance radioed messages to Algiers and 
London stating that if aid were not sent immediately (it was not), 
leaders of the provisional government would be considered 'crim­
inals and cowards." n  o In Algiers one of the two communist mem­
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bers of De Gaulle's government, Fernand Grenier, commissioner for 
air, accused the government in a press conference of failing to sup­
port the Vercors guerrillas, many of whom were members of the 
communist-led Franc Tireurs et Partisans (F.T.P.).m The Vercors 
disaster demonstrated and reinforced the justified mutual suspicion 
of the Gaullist and communist camps.112 
Mutual distrust characterized, not only relations between Gaul-
lists and communists, but also those generally between regular 
army troops and the F.F.I. Professional officers tended to under­
estimate the military value of amateurs and guerrillas, though one 
of the three branches of the F.F.I., the Organisation de la Resist­
ance de l'Armee, was composed primarily of regular officers and 
enlisted men from the armistice army after its dissolution in Novem­
ber, 1942.113 The guerrillas, in return, had little sympathy or respect 
for professional soldiering.114 General de Lattre de Tassigny, com­
mander of the First Free French Army (which fought its way north 
from the Mediterranean), was one of the first to realize that an 
amalgame of regulars and irregulars was essential to national unity 
as well as to military efficiency.115 De Lattre exercised masterly 
skill in synthesizing some 137,000 irregulars from the F.F.I, with 
his own 250,000 regulars within the First Army. Yet the amalgame 
did not succeed in reuniting army and nation. As this army fought 
its way into Alsace in the fall of 1944, De Lattre noted a serious 
decline in the morale of his troops. He analyzed the morale prob­
lem perceptively in a report to De Gaulle: 
From one end of the hierarchy to the other, the general impres­
sion is that the Nation is ignoring and abandoning them. Some go 
so far as to imagine that the regular army, coming from overseas, 
is being deliberately sacrificed. The profound cause of the malaise 
resides in the non-participation of the nation in the war.116 
Already, even before the hated bodies had been defeated, the 
French Army became acquainted with its new and embittering 
role of servant to an ungrateful and disinterested nation. Even 
De Gaulle's recurring battles with his allies for the purpose of 
salvaging the pride of Frenchmen in their nation and their army 
failed to save French military men from social isolation and 
degradation.117 
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Just as the last year of war revealed a new and enduring estrange­
ment of army and nation, so it was in that period that a final serious 
blow was struck against the military tradition of unquestioning 
obedience. Liberation was the occasion for a massive reglement des 
comptes as communist partisans took control in many areas. There 
were undoubtedly some regular armistice army officers among the 
estimated thirty to forty thousand victims of summary executions.118 
More significant for the future of the army, however, were the 
sanctions taken against all military officers who had not joined 
the resistance by the time of the Normandy invasion on June 6, 
1944. In the fall of 1944 all such officers who could not present proof 
of acts of resistance outside the maquis were placed on inactive 
status. By the end of 1947 almost three thousand army officers had 
been purged or "separated" from the active roles for collaboration 
or failure to join the resistance.119 Among them were at least a few 
like the Captain Champcourt of Jacques Weygand's narrative, who 
felt honor bound by his oath of allegiance to the marshal.12" More­
over, the attitude of officers during the occupation was likely a 
factor in selecting others of the more than twelve thousand army 
officers separated from active duty in the three years following 
liberation. The often capricious nature of the purges and separa­
tions produced widespread protests and resentment, not only 
among the victims, but also among their friends and fellow officers 
who remained on active duty.121 
Officers drawn deeply into politics in the years from 1958 to 
1962 frequently explained that their experiences in World War II 
had proven the inadequacy of unquestioning obedience as a trust­
worthy safeguard of military honor and had demonstrated the 
necessity of reflection and political choice in the exercise of military 
duty. "Since the Second World War no one in the navy still believes 
in unquestioning obedience," I was told by one navy commander. 
Indeed, had not the new legitimacy identified military duty and 
honor with rebellion of the earliest hour against the old Petainist 
legitimacy? Are we to conclude then that the primary causes of 
postwar civil-military clashes are to be found in the collapse of 
military discipline in World War II? I should think not, though 
those World War II experiences undoubtedly lowered military 
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resistance to a praetorian urge produced primarily by other factors. 
Military discipline was hardly in ruins in 1945, despite the fre­
quent confusion of the war years. Throughout the war, most French 
officers had simply followed orders from their superiors at each 
turning. The core of the postwar French Army was the 120,000-man 
armistice army of Africa, which provided the great majority of 
important commanders during the liberation and after.122 Looking 
back over the conflicting backgrounds of the regular army and 
internal resistance contingents in his First Free French Army, Gen­
eral de Lattre de Tassigny later recalled that in 1944-45 there was 
"nothing . . . more representative of traditional military virtues" 
than the regulars who made up two-thirds of his troops.123 Had 
there been no lengthy and frustrating colonial wars after 1945, 
civilian control could have been restored over a disciplined military 
establishment. 
Yet if World War II experiences did not force the French Army 
into its postwar political adventures, they undoubtedly played a 
supporting role. In an institution as attuned to tradition as the army, 
precedents are important. And the lesson of World War II seemed 
clear: De Gaulle the rebel had emerged a national hero, while 
discipline-bound officers of the armistice army often found them­
selves the objects of purge and disgrace. Apparently there were 
times when military men were obliged to decide who represented 
the true interests of the nation. Once the military tradition of un­
questioning subordination to governmental authority was crippled, 
there could be no certainty—in Algeria or after—that the nation's 
military arms would not be turned against herself. 
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The Army and the Nation: 




The years following 1945 in France might be described as the 
"postwar' period by a French civilian, but hardly by a French 
soldier. If France as a nation escaped from war in 1945, her army 
did not, or at least did only briefly until the outbreak of the Indo­
chinese war in 1946. From that time forward until 1962, with the 
exception of a four-month respite in 1954, the French Army was 
continuously at war. A French Army which wanted desperately 
to be national in character found itself left like an army of mer­
cenaries to fight wars which attracted neither the active support 
nor the continued interest of Frenchmen at home. 
Bitterness and anger smoldered within the army until May, 
1958, when military support for a revolt led by civilians in Algiers 
finally destroyed the Fourth Republic. Only nineteen months later, 
in the Week of the Barricades, the new De Gaulle republic was 
itself threatened by a civilian revolt in Algiers. Again, as in 1958, 
the revolt won some military support, especially among paratroop 
and psychological-action officers. But in the face of a strong and 
popular President of the republic, the officer corps was now 
hesitant and divided, and De Gaulle regained control in Algiers. 
In April, 1961, a new revolt was launched, this time led entirely 
by professional officers. Again, however, De Gaulle was too strong, 
the officer corps hesitant; and in contrast to their attitude of May, 
1958, the large body of conscripts in Algeria developed a con­
sciousness of their power and rejected the authority of the muti­
neers. The putsch failed, but the Secret Army Organization lived 
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on as a threat to the Fifth Republic and as a fomenter of sedition 
in the officer ranks. 
After 1945 the French Army was drawn deep into politics: 
henceforth our attention will be directed to an examination of 
the multiple and interrelated factors in the period from 1945 to 
1962 which contributed to that politicization. The events of May, 
1958, January, 1960, and April, 1961, are described in Chapter IX. 
Since 1815 the normal life of the career officer in France had 
been one of semi-isolation from civilian society, a separateness 
viewed from the military side with an ambivalent mixture of pride 
and resentment. In the years from 1940 to 1944 that isolation of 
the military community was deepened as a result of a new wave 
of antimilitarism in the civilian population which was inspired by 
the armistice army's humiliating defeat in 1940, its pretentious 
claims to elite status and national leadership from 1940 to 1942, 
and, for those officers stationed in the metropole, its docile sub­
mission when the Germans swarmed into the Vichy zone in 
November, 1942.1 Even though the armistice army of Africa fought 
valiantly in the second battle of France, the professional officer's 
share of the victor's glory was limited severely by the popularity 
of the internal resistance and the spectacle of the napthalinards— 
those armistice army officers who took their uniforms out of moth­
balls just in time to appear at the hour of liberation. 
Yet if the French Army's hour of glory was restrained and brief 
in 1944, career soldiers soon discovered that defense of the imperial 
frontiers was an even more thankless task than defense of the 
homeland. The professional soldier won little fame in defending 
French Indochina against a determined revolutionary enemy; 
rather, he soon heard from the mouths of French Communist Party 
spokesmen, and from non-communists as well, that he was engaged 
in a "dirty war, a shameful war, a "war which dares not speak 
its name." ­
The French Communist Party emerged from World War II 
having dimmed the French voter's memory of the Molotov-Rib­
bentrop pact with a brilliant communist resistance effort. The 
party now controlled over a quarter of the French electorate and, 
until 1947, participated in the tripartite government coalition. 
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Even beyond the Party's electorate the peace' theme of communist 
propaganda after 1945 struck resoundingly against the war-weari­
ness of a population which had lost faith in its army and saw 
no more useful function for it.3 In the face of a communist-led 
revolutionary movement in Indochina, it is not surprising that 
French political opinion was seriously divided. The Vichy years 
had weakened and discredited the nationalistic Right, leaving the 
defense of the French Empire to socialists and Popular Repub­
licans (the new French Christian Democratic party). The Com­
munist Party drew, in its 'pacifist" and "anticolonialist" wake, a 
small group of Progressistes (fellow-travelers), who, as antination­
alists without the excuse of dogma, became the blackest of all 
villains in French military literature.4 Moreover, though in the 
early years of the Indochinese war the majority of Frenchmen 
clearly favored French retention of the colony, non-communist 
opinion regarding the war was marked from the beginning by 
hesitation, indifference, and a goodly tinge of guilt.5 Throughout 
the postwar world, colonialism was being stripped of its defenses. 
And the French, so we are told by numerous military writers, are 
plagued, not only by a declining patriotic spirit, but also by an 
immobilizing susceptibility to guilt.6 
The army was not completely without defenders, however, 
especially as the traditionally nationalist Right slowly regained its 
strength. Again, as in the Dreyfus Affair, the profound cleavages 
within French political society provided the army, willing or 
unwilling, with eager civilian defenders from among the enemies 
of the government. Serious political conflict regarding the goals 
and conduct of war often has a pernicious effect on civilian control 
of military forces. Even in the United States, where political 
cleavages are not so deep as in France, government control over 
American military forces was weakened during the Korean War 
as a result of the antiadministration political support eagerly 
proffered to General Douglas MacArthur by the conservative wing 
of the Republican party." Conservative Republicans, like French 
ultra-nationalists during the Indochinese and Algerian wars, cried 
out against the "sellout" of national interests, "softness'' on com­
munism, and the presence of communists and fellow-travelers in 
government circles. Like their American counterparts, French 
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officers did not all, by any means, accept permanent alliance with 
the political Right. Nevertheless, in 1958, 1960, and to a lesser 
degree in 1961, civilian discord clearly encouraged the entry of 
factions of the French Army into the political arena. 
Condemned to fighting and losing unpopular wars, the French 
officer watched with mounting resentment as his prestige dropped 
from an already depressed level in 1945 to a position of social 
neglect and scorn unknown to his rank since the Bourbon restora­
tion. Already in 1946 officers were regretting the "deep trench" 
which separated them from civilian society.s The material signs 
of the officer's declining prestige were obvious. In 1947 and 1948 
a government commission dealt military morale a double blow: 
first, in bringing officers within a general salary plan for civil 
servants; and secondly, by assigning pay-index numbers somewhat 
below their earlier comparative standing to military cadre. Officers 
were generally incensed at being considered ordinary fonction­
naires. To the officer who conceived of the requirements of his 
profession—physical courage in particular—as antithetical to the 
government-clerk mentality, the new legal pay status of military 
cadre was simply another galling reminder that, like the republics 
of the ancient world when in decline, the French nation preferred 
a mercenary army to a truly national military force.9 
In the words of Rene Pleven, minister of national defense in 
1954, the pay scales set in 1947 and 1948 were "very unfavorable 
to the cadre of the Army." 10 It was the stated intention of the 
Laine Commission of 1947 to downgrade military pay with respect 
to formerly comparable salaries in the judiciary and the state 
schools.11 In a recent study of the French officer corps, Girardet, 
Thomas, and Bougu have taken the years 1890-1960 and traced 
the comparative salaries of seven officer grades from second 
lieutenant to brigadier general and twenty-one civil service ranks 
from elementary teacher to dean of a university faculty. While 
the rank order of brigadier general never dropped below third in 
the list of 28, the position of colonel fell from third place in 1945 
to ninth in 1950 to thirteenth in 1960, that of lieutenant colonel 
from seventh in 1945 to fourteenth in 1950 to fifteenth in 1956 and 
1960, and that of major from eleventh in 1945 to twelfth in 1950 
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to fourteenth in 1956 and 1960. Lesser comparative drops were 
experienced by lieutenants (from twentieth in 1945 to twenty-third 
in 1950) and second lieutenants (from twenty-fourth in 1945 to 
a tie for bottom place in 1950 and thereafter).12 To take a few 
of the more striking comparisons, a newly promoted lieutenant 
colonel earned a base pay of 185,000 francs in 1945, as opposed 
to the 165,000 franc annual salary of a beginning university 
professor outside Paris. By 1950 the professor, with a salary of 
759,000 inflated francs, had passed by the lieutenant colonel, who 
now earned 620,000 francs per year; in 1960 the professor had 
widened his lead—18,338 New Francs to 13,666 New Francs.13 
Similarly, a major at the top pay step within his grade earned 
168,000 francs per year in 1945, as opposed to the 150,000 francs 
to which a beginning principal collector of customs was entitled. 
By 1950 their annual salaries were identical at 651,000 francs; by 
1960 the customs collector had jumped to 18,338 New Francs, 
leaving far behind the major with his 14,834 New Francs.14 
While the military officer was partially compensated by a wide 
variety of allowances, this type of fringe remuneration was also 
awarded generously to civilian civil servants after 1945 in prefer­
ence to more permanent and more politically delicate revisions of 
base-pay scales.15 Even when military allowances compensated 
for the officer's low base pay (as in the case of officers on overseas 
combat duty), he typically advanced in grade and pay more 
slowly than his civilian civil service counterparts and was forced to 
retire much earlier.16 
In comparison with his counterparts in foreign armies, the French 
officer was even more impoverished. Another government com­
mission in 1953 studied relative pay in various armies and dis­
covered that the 95,000 francs per month, including allowances, 
then paid to a French major was only a third of the equivalent 
of 280,000 francs per month received by an American major, and 
well below the equivalent of 120,000 francs due a British major.17 
Two French captains remarked in 1959 that they were no better 
paid than British second lieutenants.18 After 1948 the base pay 
indexes of military officers remained unchanged, though slight 
increases in allowances (notably, the bonuses established in 1954 
for holders of military citations and military school diplomas) 
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provided limited relief, especially in the higher grades.19 Neverthe­
less, the embittered correspondent whose letter burned the pages of 
the Message des forces armees was undoubtedly not alone in 
dismissing such measures as "tips" thrown to pacify an officer corps 
caught in the throes of pauperization.20 
War bonuses were partial compensation in monetary matters, 
inasmuch as a captain's pay in Indochina could be as much as 
tripled by special combat allowances. The officer's malaise was 
not thereby alleviated, however: he was all the more struck on 
his return for a tour of duty in the metropole by the meagerness of 
his base pay. Moreover, war bonuses were cut in Algeria to a 
maximum of 50 per cent of base pay,21 a move which provoked 
one officer to remark that the government's "psychological error" 
in this matter had caused "profound disappointment" among of­
ficers in Algeria.22 "Military service," that officer noted in his 
Journal de marche, "is tending to become simply ordinary servi­
tude, scarcely superior in a moral sense (since it is not in a 
material sense) to that of a prefecture clerk." 23 The officer's pay in 
Algeria remained sufficiently higher than his base pay so that he 
not infrequently found in the prospect of returning to relative 
poverty in the metropole yet another reason for clinging desper­
ately to the cause of French Algeria. In 1960, when military 
allowances often amounted to 100 per cent or more of an officer's 
base pay in Algeria and only 35 to 50 per cent in the metropole,2* 
one second lieutenant opined that four-fifths of the army malaise 
would be solved if salaries at home were raised to the equivalent 
of those across the Mediterranean.25 He was wrong, but not entirely. 
Added to the officer's financial problems, and partly a function 
of them, were the grave consequences of an acute national housing 
shortage. In the spring of 1959 a mixed civilian and military 
"military sociology committee" at the Ecole Superieure de Guerre 
conducted a survey which reached 700 officers, among them a 
sample of 235 married officers who each had at least 13 years of 
service.26 Within this latter group the average family had moved 
5 times in the 13-year period from 1946 to 1959, and a fourth of 
the families had moved 7 or more times.27 Moreover, the average 
married officer in this sample spent almost 4 years of the 13 sepa­
rated from his family.28 Government controls which held rent on 
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permanent housing at relatively low rates offered little protection 
to the highly mobile officer corps. The private and volatile military 
review, Message des forces armees, conducted a questionnaire 
survey in 1956 concerning the "crisis of the army," addressing its 
inquiry to members of a Saint-Cyr military academy class which 
graduated during World War II.2U The 76 respondents, the editors 
report, were even more disturbed by housing problems than by 
mediocre pay. 
Even when the officer returned for a brief tour of duty in the 
metropole, he sometimes could not find or afford housing that 
would allow him to live with his family. The Ministry of National 
Defense estimated in 1956 that sixty-two thousand professional 
commissioned and noncommissioned officers in the three military 
services were in substandard housing—mostly in hotel rooms and 
units with poor sanitary facilities.30 The government "Moderate 
Rent Housing" plan, under which some military personnel were 
included, placed officers into housing far inferior to that enjoyed 
by their former lycee friends who had chosen civilian careers.31 
Many shared the plight of Major Robert Lagrange, who, when 
assigned to Paris, was forced to live in a hotel room while his 
wife and children remained in Brittany with his parents-in-law.32 
The extent of the problem and its effect on morale is seen in the 
frequent attention given to it in Message and in the official Revue 
militaire d'information, which printed numerous reassuring reports 
of plans for military housing construction.33 
Were material factors, particularly low pay and an acute housing 
problem, of fundamental importance, then, in creating the famous 
malaise of the French Army? I should think not, though they were 
undoubtedly significant, as they had been in the twenties,34 as 
evidence of the degradation of the military estate. The Saint-
Cyriens who responded to the questionnaire sent out by Message 
in 1956 shared a feeling that the officer had been materially and 
morally declasse; yet their primary concern was with the "moral 
climate" associated with the salary and housing problems.35 For 
at least a few, however, material factors were undoubtedly crucial, 
as in the case of the angry unnamed officer stationed in a "large 
city in the metropole" who unleashed his bitterness (as did many 
of his colleagues) in the pages of the Message des forces armees.30 
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He chided former contributors and correspondents for attributing 
the trouble moral in the army exclusively to such factors as suc­
cessive defeats, the indifference of the nation, and unwise leader­
ship: 
As for me, I have no false shame in denouncing our mediocre 
material condition as the essential cause of the profound crisis 
which the army is undergoing. Of course, there are other causes 
of that crisis; if, however, the betterment of the standard of liv­
ing of military cadre is not a sufficient condition for resolving it, 
it is incontestably a necessary condition. 
Gentlemen, you desire a faithful and obedient army? Pay it.37 
The editors of Message hastened to add in defense of military 
honor that, though declining material rewards were regrettable 
and worthy of attention, " . .  . For us, faithfulness and obedience 
cannot be purchased. They must be merited." 38 The great majority 
of the leaders of military revolt in the late 1950's and early 60's 
would undoubtedly have shared this editorial view. In fact, one 
could expect most paratroop officers (so often in the vanguard of 
French military revolt in recent years) to denounce the materialist, 
bourgeois, desk-officer mentality of the correspondent, who was 
sheltered from war in a city of the metropole.3® His irritation 
at being unable to entertain properly and at being forced to man 
a vacuum cleaner (in order to lighten the burden of his maidless 
wife) could only heighten the combat officer's contempt for certain 
noncombatant colleagues. Those officers who were most concerned 
about pay per se, and not as a symbol of abandonment by the 
nation, likely would have shied from the risks of military revolt. 
Material impoverishment was only one of many signs of the 
neglect and scorn which were now the officer's lot. Uniforms 
became increasingly rare in French cities, as most officers preferred 
to promenade in more respectable civilian attire. Even at the 
prestigious Ecole de Guerre in Paris, similar to the American War 
College, officers frequently changed into civilian clothes before 
returning home at night, perhaps through a communist working-
class district where a uniform might draw comments. One day in 
the early years of the Algerian war a French major in uniform 
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prepared to board a bus in Paris. "Come on, lieutenant, all aboard," 
the conductor called to him, only to draw the rebuke from a lady 
passenger, "But don't you see, he's a foreigner."40 And indeed, the 
major and his colleagues often felt themselves to be foreigners, 
or worse, when they returned to the metropole. Another important 
sign of declining military prestige was the startling drop in the 
number of applicants to Saint-Cyr. The wealthier classes generally 
were now discouraging their sons from a military career.41 
The decline in military prestige was particularly galling to those 
very capable men who entered the officer corps just prior to World 
War II, when applicants to Saint-Cyr were particularly numerous. 
After fifteen to twenty years of service, most of these men found 
themselves still blocked in the grades of captain, major, and 
lieutenant colonel, understandably resentful at seeing their former 
lycee comrades of similar or lesser ability now far above them in 
status and in salary.42 The problem of blockage was probably less 
serious than after World War I, and as a result of numerous 
casualties among lieutenants, it was nonexistent in the lower 
grades. By the mid-1950's, however, a discouraging "hump" had 
developed in the middle grades, retarding or blocking ready 
access to positions of high status and responsibility.43 From 1948 
to 1955 the average age of all colonels rose from forty-seven years 
and seven months to fifty years and seven months, and that of all 
captains from thirty-two years to thirty-four years and eight 
months.44 It is not surprising that military disobedience and revolt 
in the years 1958 to 1961 drew much of their impetus from able 
officers in the middle grades.45 
The social and psychological isolation of the army from French 
civilian society was deepened by physical isolation occasioned by 
colonial wars. The above-mentioned survey conducted in 1959 
by the military sociology committee" of the Ecole de Guerre 
found that among those 395 married and unmarried officers in the 
sample with at least 13-years service, 72 per cent had spent less 
than 6 of the previous 13 years in the metropole.48 In 1958, the 
year of the treize mai crisis which overthrew the Fourth Republic, 
the average army officer in the middle grades had spent at least 
one 30-month tour of duty in Indochina, 2 to 4 years in Algeria, 
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and frequently one additional tour of duty in Germany.47 Such 
radical nomadisme, now the lot of almost the entire officer corps 
rather than simply the semi-specialized "colonial officers" of the 
pre-1939 period, inevitably disturbed the officer's family life; more 
important, however, it encouraged the military community to at­
tach itself deeply to colonial lands at the very moment when 
empires were crumbling, to fashion a system of military values that 
rejected the search for security and comfort which dominated a 
rapidly evolving homeland.48 Indochina in particular left many 
officers with the mal jaune—attachment to the oriental colony and 
bitterness at its loss.49 Officers returning home after long colonial 
tours often felt themselves strangers in their own country. 
A paratroop officer turned novelist re-creates that vivid reaction. 
Jean Larteguy, now a journalist and writer of three best selling 
military novels, follows a group of French officers returning to 
France after their release from Vietminh prison camps: 
They were all there, pressed one against the other, leaning against 
the rail. The paradise of which they had dreamed so much in the 
camps was slowly approaching and already they no longer wanted 
it. 
They dreamed of another lost paradise, Indochina; it was about 
that paradise that all of them were thinking. They were not suffering 
sons who were returning home to have their wounds cleansed, but 
strangers. Bitterness mounted within them.50 
Isolation from the metropole sometimes deepened the officer's 
attachment to the colonies, but also it often led to estrangement 
and embitterment with regard to French civilian society, especially 
in the case of younger combat officers, who bore the brunt of the 
colonial wars. 
The army could have borne loss of status more gracefully had 
it not felt that in Indochina, and again in Algeria, the country 
whose flag it bore had abandoned, and worse, betrayed the cause 
for which the army was fighting. The "abandonment" theme, so 
common in French military literature,51 is not without a factual 
base. Following the advice of "leathernose" Colonel (then Deputy) 
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Robert Thomazo, we shall look first to Indochina in an attempt 
to understand "the motive and the revolt of certain centurions.""'2 
Some insight into French civilian disinterest in Indochina can 
be gained through examination of national-opinion polls conducted 
by the Institut Francais d'Opinion Publique, though changes in 
question format during the time period make it difficult to trace 
opinion trends with confidence. In February, 1947, when the Indo­
chinese war was still young, an Institut national poll found that 
a small majority of those respondents who offered an opinion 
favored the use of force to put down the Yietminh rebellion.53 
But two months later 55 per cent of all respondents favored nego­
tiations (which the government also hoped for at that time), as 
against 29 per cent who favored continued use of force.54 The most 
striking feature of those responses was the party cleavage they 
revealed: nine-tenths of communist and two-thirds of socialist 
respondents opposed continuation of the war. Radicals and Popular 
Republicans were very divided," while the Right was the war-
party stronghold.'1 Opinion was still badly divided in April, 1951, 
with 51 per cent favoring reinforcement of French troops and 41 
per cent preferring withdrawal of all troops."'" By May, 1953, 65 
per cent of respondents in a national sample who offered an 
opinion favored an end to fighting in Indochina, either by negotia­
tion (46 per cent) or by withdrawal (19 per cent)."'7 Yet French 
forces there continued an increasingly violent war for more than 
a year. 
The same pattern of wavering public support for colonial war is 
evident in polls conducted by the same institute during the 
Algerian war. In polls taken between April, 1956, and January, 
1958, about half of those persons expressing an opinion felt that 
the cause was hopeless and that France would be out of Algeria 
within five to ten years.58 As for preferences in conduct of Algerian 
policy, by January, 1958, 56 per cent of all respondents favored 
negotiations with the rebels (a solution which was unacceptable 
to the army), while only 26 per cent opposed such negotiations.59 
Opinion polls do not reveal the intensity of feeling, which was 
remarkably low on the subject of colonial wars. Except during the 
battle of Dien Bien Phu in 1954 and during the years 1955 and 
1956, when reservists and draftees were first thrown into the 
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Algerian war, only the extreme Right and the extreme Left gener­
ated much excitement over Indochina and Algeria. Officers like 
Captain Bernard Moynet were annoyed on returning home on 
leave to find films being shown everywhere on the exploits of 
American and Russian troops in World War II, but none regarding 
the French Army in Indochina or Algeria.60 Nor did the press 
contribute materially to developing public support for French 
forces in the colonies, though journalistic attacks on army brutality 
were common, as will be shown shortly. 
More tangible evidence of "abandonment" was also abundant. 
The government decided in 1948 that military citations earned in 
Indochina would no longer appear in the Journal officiel. In 1951 
it was officially announced that blood donated to the Office 
d'Hygiene Sociale would not be used for the wounded in Indochina. 
It was only in July, 1952, after six years of war, that a law was 
passed finally entitling veterans of Indochina to veterans' benefits. 
Those veterans waited another eighteen months before the law 
became effective. In 1953 only fifty to a hundred deputies appeared 
on the floor during important parliamentary debates on Indo­
china.01 Early in 1958 several federations of civil servants pro­
tested against a government suggestion that government employees 
might be attached or assigned outside France proper. An officer-
editorialist for Message barked back threateningly: 
Let us say it clearly: If the Nation were to disinterest itself in 
the Algerian War as it disinterested itself in the Indochinese War, 
the Army could not alone support the weight of the struggle with­
out grave risk for our institutions themselves.62 
At the time of writing the editorialist and the angry young officers 
for whom he spoke were only two months away from the crisis 
of May 13. 
If there had been any doubt in the minds of French officers in 
Indochina about the unpopularity of the war effort, it was definitely 
erased by the government's staunch refusal, on firm political 
grounds, to send conscripts into the battle. Any government which 
might have dared to do so likely would have been swept aside 
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by a solid Left and a split Center in the National Assembly. 
French officers in the field, though professional soldiers, were em­
bittered at the realization that, like mercenaries, they were being 
called upon to fight a war that was not national in character. A 
Message editorialist wrote in 1955: 
It is too simple to pay at the rate of an average civil servant 
people whom one flatters so that they will let themselves be killed, 
while on the home front the country goes off on a week-end jaunt 
between two good beet sales and with the blessing of deputies who 
call themselves "national." 03 
Hope was rekindled among military officers in 1955 and 1956 as 
the government decided to recall conscripted reservists and to 
extend the length of military service as necessary beyond the 
normal eighteen months. The largest groups (fifty thousand in May, 
1956) were recalled by the Socialist-led government of Guy 
Mollet.84 What greater proof could one ask of national support 
for the army in Algeria? Even Message rejoiced and complimented 
conscripts for their performance in Algeria.65 Ministers of national 
defense General Pierre Billotte in 1955, then Maurice Bourges-
Maunoury in 1956, insisted on the importance of the army's task 
in Algeria and of the need for an unshakable will" against the 
rebels.06 
Yet military euphoria, such as it was, was short-lived. The 
rappeles protested, violently in some cases, against their recall 
to active duty. There were demonstrations—near riots—and some 
mistreatment of officers occurred in Paris and Rouen and aboard 
a few trains carrying reservists.'17 In military circles these incidents 
were often blamed on "'communist militants, as was the later 
indiscipline of conscripts against the April putsch of 1961. Yet at 
least one eyewitness, a unit commander, reports that poor military 
organization and the reservists' distaste for military life were more 
important than politics.'8 For certain French military "defenders 
of Western civilization'' the communist bogeyman and his dupes 
were responsible for all manifestations of antimilitarism and anti­
colonialism."9 
Reservists and conscripts soon accepted military discipline and 
carried out their assigned tasks, but usually without great enthu­
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siasm. There were indeed numerous tales of dramatic conversions 
of skeptics and even communists to the cause of French Algeria.70 
Yet conscripts, like the French population generally, lost enthusiasm 
over the war as it dragged on. Message editorialists returned with 
heightened anguish to their attack on public apathy in regard to 
the war.71 Conscripts did not oppose the May 13 movement in 
1958 (nor did the country as a whole); but they played an in­
strumental role in defeating the attempted April putsch of 1961. 
One anti-putsch conscript leader at that time described the attitude 
of his fellows in these terms: 
The soldiers don't have the feeling of being at home here and 
of defending a French territory as they would have done if the 
battle had taken place on metropolitan soil. . .  . I have never 
heard a conscript from the metropole say "Algeria is France." For 
these men, Algeria is a foreign theater of operations.72 
A questionnaire survey of recently returned Algerian veterans con­
ducted by La Vie catholique in late 1960 revealed that 359 out 
of 607 respondents felt themselves "in a foreign country" in 
Algeria.73 In the main, the army failed to convert French youth 
temporarily in uniform.74 
An army-youth committee formed in 1953 by Minister of Defense 
Rene Pleven to improve relations between French youth and the 
army served in practice more as a battleground between officers 
and youth-organization representatives.75 General Jacques Faure, 
who became the most notorious antigovernment conspirator of the 
French Army, attempted as president of the committee to make 
it an instrument for guiding French youth. His disapproval of the 
major French student association's ties with a pro-rebel Moslem 
student association led finally to a crisis. In January, 1957, the 
representatives of five large youth organizations withdrew from 
the committee.70 The committee survived as a liaison tool, but did 
not succeed in committing French youth organizations to a war 
to the finish in Algeria. On June 2, 1960, representatives of fifty-
three youth organizations expressed their desire "to see ended a 
war which opposes the youth of two countries." 7T The presence 
of draftees in Algeria—some one million of them over the years 
from 1954 to 1962—did not suffice to turn a colonial war into a 
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national war or to seal the breach between the army and civilian 
society. 
Throughout the two colonial wars France remained more on a 
peacetime than a wartime footing 78—while over twenty thousand 
French soldiers from the metropole, mostly officers and noncom­
missioned officers, lost their lives in battle in Indochina, and 
another nine thousand in Algeria, not to speak of the tens of 
thousands of Legionnaires, Vietnamese, and Moslems who were 
killed fighting with the French Army.79 Though the number of 
casualties among Frenchmen from the metropole was rather 
limited in comparison with those among non-French troops, French 
officer and noncommissioned officer ranks suffered heavy losses. 
In the years 1945 to 1954 almost two hundred officers were killed 
each year, or the equivalent of three-fifths of an average graduating 
class at Saint-Cyr.80 Hundreds more died in Vietminh prison 
camps.81 In view of the magnitude of sacrifices among French 
military cadre, it is not surprising that by the late 1950's officers 
like one field-grade paratroop officer in Pau, fearful of another 
defeat in Algeria, cried out in warning to his compatriots, "Halte a 
l'abandon!" 82 
To the charge of abandonment, the military press joined that of 
betrayal on the home front, again not without reason. Documents 
discovered in 1952 and 1953 clearly revealed that the French 
Communist Party and the Communist-controlled General Con­
federation of Labor (C.G.T.) were intent upon sabotaging French 
defenses in Indochina.83 In fact, the communist position was quite 
openly stated. Maurice Thorez, secretary general of the French 
Communist Party, addressed the twelfth congress of the Party 
in April, 1950, with these words: 
For three and a half years, an unjust war, a criminal war has 
been carried on against the people of Vietnam. This war of colonial 
plunder is sowing devastation and death on a people who ask 
only to live in peace and in fraternal union with the people of 
France.84 
On March 3, 1952, the communist parliamentary leader, Jacques 
Duclos, sent a telegram to the Vietminh leader, Ho Chi Minh, in 
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the name of the French Communist Party, congratulating him on 
his successes (against the French!) and assuring him of the sup­
port of the French working class in this criminal war." 85 
In May, 1952, Communist Deputy Francois Billoux urged that 
"the action of the masses must support and aid the dockers, 
sailors, and all those who are acting effectively against the trans­
portation and manufacture of war materials."86 In that same 
month another prominent Communist Party leader, Andre Marty, 
wrote in the party newspaper, L'Humanite, "Our duty is to organize 
the struggle of the masses against the manufacture and transporta­
tion of war materials." 87 The Communist Party distributed litera­
ture among French troops, and according to General Navarre, 
commander in chief of French forces in Indochina at the time of 
the battle of Dien Bien Phu, the Party was also guilty of the 
sabotage of those motors, ball bearings, batteries, parachutes, and 
other equipment which arrived in Indochina in defective condi­
tion.88 Andre Stil, the editor of L'Humanite, and Lucien Molino, 
a C.G.T. leader, were arrested and held for a few months in 
connection with the communist antiwar campaign.89 The parlia­
mentary leaders of the Communist Party, however, retained their 
parliamentary immunity against a government request for their 
removal in an assembly vote of 302 to 291.90 General Navarre, by 
no means the first French military commander to explain military 
defeat in terms of "betrayal," pointed out quite accurately that 105 
Socialists, 13 Radical Socialists, 9 UDSR's, 53 Popular Republicans 
and even a scattering of conservative Independents joined with 96 
Communists and 4 Progressistes to protect the communist 
deputies.91 
The rapporteur for the Parliamentary Immunities Committee 
viewed the question as one for the government, not the com­
mittee, to decide: either the Communist Party should be outlawed 
as "an enterprise of demoralization and treason, or, if its action 
and means were considered to be within the framework of 
"republican legality, its members should be left free to pursue 
their ends.92 General Navarre might well have agreed with this 
analysis, but not with the committee's recommendation against 
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lifting parliamentary immunity. He would have proceeded to the 
conclusion that in wartime (and France was indeed engaged in 
war in Indochina in 1953), any party dedicated to the defeat of 
the nation's armies was obviously beyond the pale of "republican 
legality.' In 1939 the step had seemed obvious enough; but in 
1953 public opinion and political leadership, even outside the 
Communist Party, were so seriously divided concerning war goals 
that "treason" was exceedingly difficult to define.93 
And so antiwar propaganda, sabotage, and free circulation of 
military secrets continued further to impede a military effort in 
Indochina which was already futile. After the armistice in July, 
1954, the army was made aware of the extent of security leaks 
within the government in the affaire des fuites ("leaks"), an affair 
which prompted a representative of the militant Veterans of 
Indochina to proclaim: "Now we know that a French Army, on 
no matter what territory it fights, will always be stabbed in the 
back." 94 Beginning in July, 1953, it became increasingly apparent 
that information discussed in meetings of the policy-making Na­
tional Defense Committee was leaking out. In France-observateur 
of July 30, 1953, there appeared an article by Roger Stephane 
entitled, "In a Doubtful Fight," in which General Navarre was 
quoted (correctly) as having reported that French forces were 
presently incapable of defending Laos. In September, 1954, police 
investigations finally revealed that two progressiste high civil 
servants in the Permanent Secretariat of National Defense, 
Messieurs Turpin (chef de cabinet of the director of the Secre­
tariat) and Labrusse (chief of the civil defense service), were 
guilty of passing out security information for ideological reasons 
to one Andre Baranes, a journalist with the progressiste news­
paper, Liberation, and also a double agent linked with the Com­
munist Party on the one hand and an anticommunist parallel 
police system on the other. 
Like any proper French affaire, this one was bewilderingly 
complicated and turned into a massive political melee.95 Baranes 
was eventually acquitted after the evidence against him proved 
contradictory; the France-observateur case was withdrawn by gov­
110 The Army and the Nation 
ernment decision from the jurisdiction of the military tribunal 
which handled • the affair; and Turpin and Labrusse went to 
prison.1"5 In military circles the fuites affair was taken as definitive 
proof of treason from within and of lack of governmental vigor 
in dealing with those responsible.97 It served as well to reinforce 
that long-standing military hostility toward the press which had 
already been strengthened in Indochina.98 
The French Army's battles with the press were only beginning 
in 1954. The Algerian revolt which began on All Saints Day in 
November of that year had a dual effect on army-press relations. 
On the one hand, the French Army developed a concept of revolu­
tionary war and psychological action which required that the press 
be cultivated so that it might be used as an instrument in war 
for the minds of men. On the other hand, important elements 
within the army, in their frustration and eagerness to win, resorted 
to summary executions, mass reprisals, and torture of prisoners— 
tactics which unleashed upon the military the full fury of a large 
segment of the press.99 The Algerian war was more than two 
years old when, in 1957, the Ecole de Guerre added lectures on 
the press to its regular curriculum and the military journals opened 
their pages to discussion of army-press relations. The Revue mili­
taire d'information, published by the Ministry of National Defense 
under the direct guidance of the Service of Information and Psycho­
logical Action, devoted an entire issue to the problem.100 Even 
when the army put on its courting clothes, however, a lurking 
hostility was still evident in its attraction-repulsion posture with 
regard to the press.101 
Repulsion soon gained a clear upper hand when, in the wake 
of the infamous "Battle of Algiers," led by the Tenth Paratroop 
Division in early 1957, the army faced a barrage of criticism, not 
only from the communist press, but also from UExpress, 
Temoignage chretien, France-observatcur, and the prestigious 
Le Monde. On March 21, 1957, Jacques Soustelle attacked these 
four newspapers on the floor of the National Assembly as "the 
four 'grands' of French counter-propaganda." 102 Minister of Na­
tional Defense Maurice Bourges-Maunoury came to the defense of 
his troops, proclaiming: 
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The attacks of which the Army is the target are only the counter­
attacks of the fellagha [rebels] led by certain governmental and in­
tellectual circles. We have entered into battle and we shall con­
tinue it to the end.103 
The minister's identification of critics of the army with enemy 
"counterattacks' fell on receptive military ears.104 Yet, despite 
government seizure in the course of the Algerian war of over 30 
books, 265 newspaper editions in the metropole and 586 more in 
Algeria, plus a number of fines levied against offending news­
papers, neither the governments of the Fourth Republic nor that 
of the Fifth Republic suceeded either in ending the antiarmy 
campaign or in satisfying outraged officers.105 Government seizure 
of all unsold copies of a book or article dealing with a delicate 
subject like torture sometimes had the reverse effect of arousing 
popular curiosity. Such was the case with La Question, Henri 
Alleg's nauseating description of his treatment at the hands of 
paratroopers in a "placement center' in Algeria.106 
The military press reaction to the attacks upon the army for 
brutality and torture was rapid and violent, especially in he Bled, 
the military weekly in Algiers with a mass circulation among 
French troops.1"7 There is no question but that frequent attacks 
on the army in the press and in Left and Left-Center political 
groups in the metropole contributed materially to that angry mili­
tary state of mind which prevailed in Algeria, and especially in 
the paratroop units, in the spring of 1958.1<ls The state of mind 
is evident in the interview given by General Jacques Massu, com­
mander of the Tenth Paratroop Division, to an Italian journalist 
in December, 1957: 
It is evident that in Paris an attempt is being made to discredit 
the army in order more easily to reach an agreement with the 
F.L.N.; it is an old tactic which I have known since Indochina. 
Now it must be known that the army will no longer permit the 
intriguers to betray France. Algeria will remain French, I assure 
109 you.
The cause of French Algeria is taken by Massu as unchallengeable. 
Hence, as other military officers have argued, the "subversive press," 
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"whose every article wounds or kills" through strengthening 
the enemy, must realize that "every blow struck against the army 
is struck against the nation itself."110 
The cry of "treason" in the military press quieted only briefly 
after the May 13 crisis, to be revived again in 1959 and 1960, 
focused this time on intellectuals of the Left.111 A clandestine bul­
letin entitled Verite Pour began appearing, especially in university 
circles, in September, 1958, and moved within a year and a half 
from general opposition to the Algerian war to active support 
for the F.L.N. (the rebel National Liberation Front).111' In 
February, 1960, French security police discovered a network of 
intellectuals, artists, and students, led by Professor Francis Jeanson, 
which provided aid of various sorts to the Algerian rebels and 
was involved in the publication of Verite pour.113 The "Jeanson 
trial" provided the occasion, both inside and outside the court­
room, for an impressive number of condemnations of the French 
position in the Algerian war.114 On September 6, 1960, a group 
of 121, soon joined by many others, published a manifesto which 
encouraged men called to military service to refuse to serve.115 A 
week later the party of Mendes-France and of Andre Philip, the 
Unified Socialist party, announced its desire to "render homage 
publicly to the courage and to the disinterestedness of the accused, 
who have chosen a particularly dangerous form of combat in their 
struggle against the Algerian War." 116 
In the course of the trial itself a letter from Jean-Paul Sartre 
was read, a letter affirming the writer's "total solidarity'' with the 
accused, whom he described as working for "a true democracy" 
and as representing thousands of others who were ready to take 
up their work. "If Jeanson had asked me to carry letter bags or 
shelter Algerian militants, Sartre wrote, "'and if I had been able 
to do so without risk to them, I would have done it without 
hesitation."m Another sensational testimony was given by Paul 
Teitgen, a former director of police in Algiers. Teitgen told the 
court that he resigned from his position in Algiers because of 
uncontrolled use of torture and resort to abuses of justice. He did 
not approve of the actions of the Jeanson group, but "taking into 
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account all that I know and what I learned in Algeria, I excuse 
them." n  8 
Military activists were aroused by the moderate government 
attitude toward the "121." 119 The meaning of treason was more 
elusive than ever at a time when Algerian independence was 
fast becoming government policy. 
These numerous examples of public apathy, abandonment, and 
betrayal in regard to defense of the empire had the effect of 
deepening the isolation of the French military community, an 
isolation in which military men, incapable of admitting the futility 
of their efforts and sacrifices, created their own vision of the world. 
French military defeats were seen as primarily the result of weak­
ness and treason on the home front; yet military thinkers were at 
first reluctant to assign primary blame to national decay, for that 
would mean the end of the grandeur of France. Rather, like 
General Navarre, many tended to view the "real country," though 
misled by the "regime, as profoundly healthy.120 The idea was 
by no means new to French military men. In the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries—and especially after 1870—aristocratic 
and antirepublican officers had often distinguished between the 
regime, which they despised, and the nation, which they served. 
Weygand, and especially Petain, demonstrated in 1940 that the 
distinction could serve praetorian ends. However, it was only after 
World War II that the dangerous possibilities inherent in the 
conception were fully revealed. Navarre's analysis added to that 
revelation: 
It is unfortunately with the "legal country"—that is to say with 
the oligarchies which dispute the power and profits of the regime— 
that we must deal. It is the "legal country" which not only is 
revealing itself to be incapable of arousing within the nation the 
reactions necessary for salvation, but which also prevents them 
from being born spontaneously.121 
From Navarre's distinction between the "legal country' and the 
"real country," it is only a short step to future premier Michel 
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Debre's position in 1957: "A legal Government might well be 
illegitimate; an illegal authority, legitimate." 122 
Just as General Douglas MacArthur, after his removal from the 
command of American and United Nations forces in Korea, saw 
the soldier's primary loyalty as due "the country and the Consti­
tution . . . [rather than] those who temporarily exercise the au­
thority of the Executive Branch of government,"123 so Navarre 
and others like him challenged the legitimacy of the Fourth Re­
public's legality. In Navarre's eyes the leaders of France's govern­
ment were "quacks and charlatans" who, if the ailing nation was 
to be cured, would have to make way for the "great surgeon." m 
The "great surgeon" arrived in May, 1958, and on the shoulders 
of the army. The chief of staff of national defense who resigned 
during the crisis and later was restored by De Gaulle, the man 
who was often called "the conscience of the Army," General Paul 
Ely, reviewed the crisis in these terms in the summer of 1958: 
" . .  . While France appeared on the edge of collapse, she [the 
army] was the one who demonstrated, with the highest discipline, 
profound respect for a 'genuine legality.'"125 "Genuine legality," 
like the "real country," was apparently a concept which the army, 
in its infinite patriotism, was capable of interpreting. General 
Maurice Challe apparently thought so when, as leader of the April 
putsch of 1961, he announced by radio from Algiers: 
The high command reserves the right to extend its action to the 
metropole and to reconstitute a constitutional and republican order 
which has been gravely compromised by a government whose 
illegality is manifest in the eyes of the nation.126 
And this despite the massive "yes" vote for De Gaulle's Algerian 
policy in the recent referendum of January 8, 1961. 
In fact, the notion of the pays reel, as borrowed from the 
tradition of the antirepublican Right, entailed leadership and 
education of the nation, as well as its "liberation" from the system 
which distorted and bound it. The underlying national health of 
which Navarre spoke increasingly appeared to the abandoned and 
embittered officer (as it had appeared to the armistice army under 
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Petain) as a potential health to be recovered only under the care 
of a pure and strong military physician. The point is made quite 
boldly in an article entitled "On the Historical Role of the Army" 
written in 1956 by that curious figure, air force General L. M. 
Chassin, a prolific military writer, historian, grand strategist, stu­
dent of Mao Tse-tung, and plotter against the regime.127 Chassin 
discusses the stages of civilization in an analysis probably inspired 
by Toynbee. Following a description of the Eastern Roman Empire 
in decline, he proposes a remedy obviously intended for his own 
times: 
Whatever the extent of disorder and internal anarchy, all can be 
saved so long as one disposes of a solid and sufficiently national 
army capable of fulfilling two historical functions in a period of 
disintegration: defend the empire without and place in power 
within a leader capable of effecting the necessary rectification in re­
establishing order and authority.128 
A wide variety of military writers shared Chassin's view that 
only the army could save a sick French society, though few 
couched their argument in such scholarly terms. For one con­
tributor to Message the army was the buttress of the nation's unity 
as well as its conscience.129 For General Ely (who is apparently 
then the conscience of a conscience, a responsible position indeed), 
the army, aided by her obsession for unity, her breadth of social 
origins, her high conception of the role of France, was not a threat 
to the nation but rather "'an element of wisdom and continuity." 13° 
For other military writers, including army Chief of Staff Andre 
Zeller, the army was a crucial bulwark against communism, a 
rare remaining embodiment of the values of patriotism, courage, 
discipline, sacrifice, and solidarity—an example and guide for the 
nation.131 
Again as in the wake of the 1940 defeat, military attention 
turned to French education and its failure to inculcate a civic 
spirit into French youth.131' The army's fascination with "'psycho­
logical action'' was largely inspired by the notion that French 
education and French political leadership had failed, leaving the 
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army a precious remnant of health and vitality with a vital educa­
tional and unifying role in a decaying nation.133 Discussion of 
that role became particularly frequent in the aftermath of the 
May 13 crisis of 1958, which placed De Gaulle in power. An edi­
torialist for Message was filled with hope and enthusiasm: 
Finally the hour has sounded which we waited for ardently. 
. . . Finally the Nation as a whole is rediscovering the face of the 
Army at the same time that it is rediscovering its strength, the 
grandeur of its destiny, the legitimacy of its cause.134 
All of this was made possible, he continues, only through the 
unity of the army, an army which responded joyously and spon­
taneously to the call for abolition of the "system." 135 The army 
newspaper in Algeria, Le Bled, sounded a similar note. The "sys­
tem" had led France to doubt herself, its editorialist argued, but 
now "the era of Byzantine discussions is closed. Once again [in the 
fall referendum] the French soldier will know how to give the 
Country an Example of Civic Spirit." 136 
One fact received insufficient attention from the military press 
after treize mai: the exemplary unity of the army in May, 1958, 
was turned against the legal government of France, even though 
officers like Ely may have felt themselves to be respecting a 
"genuine legality." Ely's resignation and the open sympathy which 
the Algiers coup provoked in military units in the metropole 
served primarily to leave the government defenseless and with no 
alternative but De Gaulle or civil war. 
How were political actions by military officers to be reconciled 
with the traditional maxim that 'Tarmee ne fait pas de politique"? 
The saving formula was hardly new to the French political scene: 
"Patriotism knows no politics." General Maxime Weygand, whose 
critical role in the 1940 armistice we have seen, stated with all 
seriousness in the Petain trial in 1945, "I dare anyone to find a 
political act in my life." 137 Following the May 13, 1958, uprising 
in Algiers which felled the Fourth Republic, General Jacques 
Massu, president of the dissident committee of public safety, in­
sisted in similar fashion that he had led an assault on the republic 
without in any way engaging in politics. General de Gaulle 
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arrived in Algiers on June 4, 1958, as the newly invested Premier 
of France and heard from Massu's lips that the committee of 
public safety had wanted only to prevent the abandonment of 
Algeria and the decadence of France through the "fatal and 
thoughtless action of irresponsible governments. . . . "  1 3  8 Massu, 
claiming to be "maintaining a strictly apolitical attitude" ["dans un 
apolitisme absolu"], then urged De Gaulle to "eliminate the rem­
nants of the system and its leaders." 139 Only five months after the 
events of May, 1958, one military writer argued that the army was 
eminently suited to direct French "psychological-action" efforts— 
within the army and, presumably, outside it as well—primarily 
because of its "apolitical" character, which allowed it to reach 
above narrow political quarrels to "a correct notion of the 'superior 
interests of the country.'" 14° 
In the April putsch of 1961 open military revolt was explained 
by General Challe as strictly "apolitical" in nature.141 When the 
revolt failed, Challe surrendered, but General Raoul Salan escaped 
to take the lead of the Secret Army Organization. Salan later told 
the court in his own trial, 
At the moment when I was withdrawing into the night with Gen­
eral Jouhaud, I thought that nothing was more foreign to my life 
than politics. In agreeing to lead the clandestine struggle, it was 
not a political decision that I was taking. I was simply recalled to 
service, not by an official convocation but by the oath which I had 
taken.1*2 
For Weygand, Massu, Challe, Salan, and numerous other military 
men, patriotic motives and actions placed one above the tainted 
world of politics. The question now as always was, Whose 
patriotism? When the official government version strayed from the 
doctrine of French Algeria in 1959 and 1960, and when the French 
electorate heartily approved that government version in the refer­
endum of January 8, 1961, hard-core military activists concluded 
that the army should save the French despite themselves. But 
the path of military revolt against a popular government led only 
to failure, disgrace, and a widened gap between the French nation 
and its embittered and humiliated army.143 
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Chapter 5 
Social Origins and Politics 
Among the aspects of democratic society which most concerned 
Alexis de Tocqueville was its tendency to democratize the military 
officer corps, to throw open the officer ranks to comers of all social 
origins.1 In armies where the officer corps is the near exclusive 
preserve of a well-defined aristocracy, he observed, the soldier 
has no hope of one day wielding a marshal's baton and is thereby 
shielded from dangerous ambitions; similarly, the aristocratic of­
ficer's ambition is limited, voluntarily in this case, because his 
prestige and power stem from his rank in society, rather than in 
the army.2 Democratic armies, De Tocqueville feared, would be 
tempted by unrestained ambition into belligerent and rebellious 
habits. Probably he would have rejected vigorously the later 
socialist doctrine, enunciated by Jean Jaures, that a democratic 
nation has nothing to fear from an officer corps drawn from all 
social classes.3 The restlessness of non-aristocratic armies in under­
developed areas in the face of traditional ruling elites would appear 
to add some credence to De Tocqueville's analysis.4 Morris Jano­
witz, in his study of the American military, has voiced a similar 
concern that democratization of the officer corps may undermine 
civilian supremacy through weakening professional and traditional 
restraints on ambition.5 
The problem of democratization of recruitment deserves at­
tention in the French context, for clearly the French officer corps 
has lost much of the aristocratic tone which characterized it at 
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the time of the Dreyfus case. It has been argued above that the 
French officer corps in the nineteenth century formed an order 
which tended to blur and to dominate the diverse original class 
loyalties of its members. The same phenomenon is evident in the 
officer corps since World War II. And yet the question of demo­
cratization cannot be ignored. 
As we indicated earlier, during the immediate postwar years the 
army officer corps experienced a heavy personnel turnover. Between 
1945 and 1948, 14,000 officers (or close to 50 per cent of all army 
officers) were released from active duty, and 4,700 new officers, 
mostly from the French Forces of the Interior (F.F.I.), were inte­
grated into the corps.'' Yet the impact of this turnover on the army 
as an institution must not be exaggerated. With few exceptions, 
newly integrated officers came in as lieutenants or captains at best, 
and in the case of officers of F.F.I, origin, few got beyond the 
company-grade ranks.7 There is good evidence to indicate that in 
1946, at least, extremely few newcomers had made their way into 
the higher grades (from major on up). In that year all 139 of the 
army's remaining generals had been regular army officers in 1938, as 
had all but 9 of 259 colonels, all but 18 of 485 lieutenant colonels, 
and all but 8 of 940 majors in the infantry and 20 per cent of majors 
in the cavalry, where wartime advancement had been more rapid.8 
In the lower grades, however, the years 1942-48 saw an important 
influx of new officers, many of them up from the ranks.9 
The flood of young, new army officers continued through the 
fifties as a result of combat losses averaging over 130 officers per 
year, resignations rising from 172 in 1950 to 452 in 1958, retirement 
losses of some 350 per year, and scattered eliminations of suspect" 
elements, .especially those of F.F.I, origin.10 Moreover, the pressure 
of colonial war, especially in Algeria, pushed the size of the regular 
army officer corps from a total of 22,500 in 1951 to 31,000 in I960.11 
Where were officer recruits found and how did they alter the 
composition of the officer corps? Restricting our attention to the 
regular army officer corps, the pattern of recruitment in the years 
1950 (after the postwar purges and separations had ended) to 
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1957 (a few months before the treizc rnai) is shown in Table I.12 
The first striking feature in this recruitment pattern is the very 
small percentage of Polytechniciens, less than twelve per year, who 
chose a regular army career in these years.13 Graduates of the 
prestigious Ecole Polytechnique were still fairly numerous in the 
higher grades, though even here their numbers had fallen from 19 
per cent of all colonels and lieutenant colonels in 1938 to 14 per 
cent in 1958.14 In the army officer corps as a whole the proportion 
of Polytechniciens dropped from 8.4 per cent in 1938 to 2.8 per 
cent in 1958.15 In the lower grades they were disappearing almost 
TABLE 1 
RECRUITMENT ORIGINS OF REGULAR ARMY OFFICERS, 1950-57* 
Origin Per Cent 
Ecole Polytechnique 1.0 
Saint-Cyr 27.5 
Corps de Troupe (officer-candidate school) 28.0 
Reserves 8.0 
Ranks 28.5f 
Examinations within single branches 7.0 
* Girardet et al., Crise militaire, p. 27. 
t Including 3M; per cent who were commissioned after cursory examinations and 
brief training. 
entirely, even in the artillery and combat engineers, where they 
once constituted a majority.16 Despite the Ecole Polytechnique's 
being a military school, its graduates found little appeal in the 
low prestige and guerrilla-warfare tasks of a military career in the 
1950's. 
A second significant feature of officer recruitment in the 1950's is 
the high percentage of direct commissions from the ranks, almost 
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triple the 10 per cent of all new commissions theoretically reserved 
for adjutants and chief adjutants.17 Recruitment from the ranks 
tends to be high in periods like the mid-nineteenth century and 
the 1920's, when declining military status reduces the number of 
academy applicants. In the 1950's as in the 1920's, recruitment from 
the ranks helped to fill the vacancies left by Polytechniciens who 
chose more prestigious civilian careers and the vacancies created 
by combat loss. The great majority of officers up from the ranks 
had already served several years as enlisted men and could hope 
to rise only to the rank of captain before reaching the retirement 
age for their grade.18 Among captains in the combat arms the 
proportion of officers up from the ranks rose from 5.4 per cent in 
1948 to 35.8 per cent in 1959.19 
Figures for officers commissioned directly from the ranks, of 
course, do not include another 28 per cent of officer recruits in the 
1950's who passed, after an average of five years of service, from 
the enlisted ranks into officer-candidate school and then into the 
officer corps.20 The several specialized officer-candidate schools, 
like those of Saumur, Saint-Maixent, and Versailles, were united 
in 1945 into a single Corps de Troupe division which, along with 
the Saint-Cyr military academy, made up the Ecole Superieure 
Militaire Interarme at Coetquidan.21 In October, 1961, the two 
divisions became separate schools, with the Corps de Troupe divi­
sion thereafter taking the name Ecole Militaire Interarme, and the 
Saint-Cyr division that of Ecole Speciale Militaire de Saint-Cyr. 
Unlike their less prestigious Corps de Troupe colleagues, who all 
came from the enlisted ranks, Saint-Cyriens were required to pass 
both state examinations for the baccalaureat (the French secondary 
diploma) before they were eligible for the competitive admissions 
examination. Most applicants to Saint-Cyr also spend one to two 
years beyond the baccalaureat attending courses designed specifi­
cally to prepare them for the academy's entrance examination. The 
length and expense of preparation for Saint-Cyr is one factor in 
discouraging applicants from the lower classes, though preparatory 
classes within the service are now easing this problem. 
Popular disinterest and distaste for things military has again 
been reflected in a declining number of applicants to Saint-Cyr.22 
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The number of applicants who presented themselves for the 
entrance examination dropped from an average of 1,616 in the rela­
tively fat years of 1930-38 to an average of 860 in the period from 
1945-58; yet even that figure is above the 840 annual average of the 
1920's and equal to the 1907-13 average.23 In order to keep the 
number of applicants at that level, however, the army was forced 
to raise the age limit for applicants from 22 to 23 years, allow 
examination options in history and languages in addition to the 
science option formerly required of all, and provide preparatory 
classes for prospective candidates in the enlisted ranks. In view of 
the small number of applicants and the strong majority view among 
them that the Saint-Cyr entrance examination was among the 
easiest of all those numerous concours required for admission to 
civilian and military schools, it is quite unlikely that the quality of 
applicants accepted declined in comparison with the interwar 
24 year.
When one looks at the total officer corps in 1958, it appears 
rather similar in recruitment origins to the corps of 1938 (Table 
2). Yet in 1938 the tide had just turned and Saint-Cyriens and 
TABLE 2 








1913 12.1 40.0 43.9 4.0 
1938 8.4 27.5 30.3 24.3 9.3 
1958 2.8 31.1 31.5 21.8 12.8 
* Girardet et al., Crise militaire, pp. 19, 25. 
Polytechniciens were beginning to flow into the corps at an accel­
erated rate, while in 1958 the recruitment crisis continued unabated. 
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The over-all picture, then—especially when one looks at the recent 
recruitment pattern—is that of a declining percentage of officers 
from the grandes ecoles and an increasing number up from the 
ranks. 
The appearance of "democratization' given by recruitment data 
is substantiated by postwar trends in the social origins of newly 
recruited officers.25 On closer examination, however, the democrat­
ization phenomenon proves to be largely the result of increased 
officer recruitment from within the military community, and espe­
cially among sons of noncommissioned officers. 
Starting with officers recruited directly from the ranks, a group 
about which very little is known in regard to social origins, one 
can assume without too great a risk that the peasantry, the working 
class, and the lower middle class are more heavily represented here 
than among school-trained officers. Officers commissioned from the 
ranks have normally spent over eight years as enlisted men, a role 
which carries material and status rewards of such a low order that 
it holds very limited appeal as a career for middle-class youth. 
The Saint-Cyr academy has in the past enjoyed considerable 
prestige and has provided a large majority of the army's generals 
and field-grade officers.26 The results of a recent comprehensive 
study clearly indicate that Saint-Cyr is attracting fewer sons of 
civil servants and members of the liberal professions: whereas in 
1945-48, 21 per cent of the cadets admitted to Saint-Cyr were sons 
of civil servants (and 8 per cent among these were sons of high 
civil servants), in the period 1954-58 those figures had dropped to 
14 per cent and 4.7 per cent, respectively.27 The slack was more 
than taken up by a rapid increase in the proportion of sons of non­
commissioned officers, rising from 5 per cent in 1939 to 7.5 per cent 
in 1945-48 and to 14 per cent in 1954-58. When that 14 per cent 
is added to another 30 per cent who were sons of officers in the 
1954-58 period, the full proportions of self-recruitment within the 
military community are evident.28 
The pattern of social origins among cadets in the Corps de 
Troupe division of the E.S.M.I.A. sits somewhat lower on the 
status scale, though it is not radically different from the pattern 
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among Saint-Cyr cadets.29 Again the number of sons of officers and 
noncommissioned officers rose significantly from 28 per cent in 
1945-48 to 36.5 per cent in 1954-58. And again the increase was 
primarily among sons of noncoms and gendarmes, who constituted 
10.5 per cent of all cadets in 1945-48 and 18.5 per cent (or as 
many as officers' sons) in 1954-58.30 Sons of civil servants de­
clined in the same years from 22.5 per cent to 14.5 per cent, 
including a decline in sons of high civil servants from 5.2 per cent 
to 2.4 per cent.31 Sons of workers and clerks were slightly more 
numerous here than at Saint-Cyr, and their numbers increased in 
both schools in the period 1945-58 to an average of 7.2 per cent 
at Saint-Cyr and 15.6 per cent at Corps de Troupe.32 
Students at the Ecole Navale, as opposed to those at Saint-Cyr, 
and in keeping with the navy's aristocratic" tradition, are more 
frequently sons of business and government administrators and 
members of the liberal professions.33 The Ecole Navale, moreover, 
furnishes the navy with all of its regular naval officers. Another 
distinct corps of "crew officers," composed of officers mostly up 
from the ranks, performs duties of lesser responsibility. Clearly, 
the regular naval officer corps draws more heavily from the middle 
and upper bourgeoisie than does the army officer corps. In direct 
contrast the air force officer corps, like the U.S. Air Force and the 
RAF officer corps,34 has a lower social base of recruitment than 
either the army or navy. Lacking a bourgeois tradition, the Ecole 
de l'Air draws more sons of workers and clerks than the other 
service academies.35 
In view both of the increasing number of officers recruited from 
the ranks and of the shifting social composition of military-school 
classes, it is possible to speak of "democratization" of the French 
officer corps, though hardly, as at least one French journalist has 
done, of a "proletarian" officer corps.36 In regard to social origins 
the center of gravity for the army officer corps as a whole, following 
a pattern typical for periods of low military prestige, had probably 
sunk to the lower middle class by the late 1950's.37 Yet in the 
higher grades the middle and upper bourgeoisie, and to a lesser 
degree the noble aristocracy, were still well represented, though in 
decline.38 
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Returning to De Tocqueville and Janowitz, two questions must 
be posed. To what extent can the politicization of the French officer 
corps in recent years be attributed to the unbridled ambitions of 
officers from humble social origins? In what degree is military 
indiscipline and revolt in the late 1950's and early 1960's attribut­
able to a style of "'military Poujadism,' itself rooted in subaltern 
and middle-ranking officers drawn from the lower middle class, 
the frequent breeding ground for fascism?39 
The causal pattern with which we are dealing is too complex to 
allow complete and definitive answers to these questions. The 
weight of the evidence so far available, however, tends to mini­
mize the role of social class as a predominant factor contributing 
to military disobedience and revolt in contemporary France. Let 
us examine some of the evidence which can be brought to bear on 
the democratization hypothesis. The naval officer corps, which 
recruits from a higher social base than the army officer corps, pro­
vided remarkably few of the officer participants in the crises of 
May, 1958, and January, 1960, or in the putsch during April, 1961, 
and the ensuing Secret Army Organization (O.A.S.) activities. One 
of the more aggressive participants in the April putsch, naval Lieu­
tenant Pierre Guillaume, was conspicuous because of the absence 
of other officers from his branch. Yet class considerations were 
likely not the primary reason for this general restraint. The navy 
had been deeply involved in politics during the Vichy regime and 
had been badly burned: those officers who remained in the navy 
after the war were understandably wary of another risky political 
involvement. 
More importantly, the navy did not participate so fully as the 
army in the Indochinese and Algerian wars and hence did not 
develop as intense a feeling of vain sacrifice and betrayal. Similarly, 
the air force was not so deeply involved in colonial wars as the 
army, though more so than the navy. Similarly again, the air force 
provided relatively fewer military activists than the army, though 
more than the navy.40 And the air force, of course, draws from a 
lower social base than either the navy or the army. Significantly, 
those air force officers who did participate in military revolt— 
notably, Generals Maurice Challe and Edmond Jouhaud, both 
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leaders in the April putsch—often had been more deeply involved 
in the Algerian war than the majority of their colleagues.41 
Again in defense of the "democratization equals politicization' 
thesis it might be argued that the strongest antigovernment ferment 
within the army has come from the middle and lower ranks of the 
officer corps, and much less often from the normal military elite.42 
Could it be that the greater restraint of the high command is 
explicable in terms of its more aristocratic class background? This 
is likely a partial, but hardly a total explanation. The field-grade 
officers who provided effective leadership for the military activists 
in this period mostly entered the army in the boom years shortly 
before and during World War II, hence, before the "democratiza­
tion of the postwar years began. If there were ambitious officers 
of modest social origins among those who flouted the sanctity of 
military obedience,43 there were also a considerable number of 
aristocrats. Among a total of something over one hundred fifty 
officers arrested as a result of antigovernment activities in the 
April putsch or in the O.A.S., at least fifteen bore noms a particule.4* 
Artistocrats were well represented in the camp^of military rebellion, 
since officers with noms a particule constituted only approximately 
5 per cent of the officer corps in 1958.45 
In view of the relative isolation of the military community in the 
years following World War II, it is not surprising that military 
experiences should continue to shape the political values and per­
spective of the French officer, whatever his social origins. One of 
those subordinate officers who returned from Indochina to instruct 
his colleagues and superiors on revolutionary war describes the 
French military in these terms: 
No decisive characteristic allows one to fix with certitude the place 
of the army in the social structure if one tries to integrate it into 
the usual social stratifications. For this milieu presents a definite 
diversity and originality. Socially it is a world apart.46 
And in that "world apart," the army's unrewarded efforts and sac­
rifices produced bitterness against the bourgeoisie from which most 
officers had sprung. The point was made forcefully by an editorial­
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ist writing for he Bled on the eve of treize mai who described 
French officers in the following terms: 
They feel themselves closer to a proletarian attached to his soil 
and to his flag than to a capitalist ready to sell his soul to save 
his money and his prebends. 
To the intellectual masochism of the decadent bourgeois they 
still prefer the intuitive wisdom of the modest peasant. 
Often sprung from the bourgeoisie, military cadres have long 
since been without wealth. If they have been fighting, however, 
for over 20 years, it is in defense of a priceless patrimony: their 
Fatherland and their Honor.47 
And yet if the French Army was now a "people's army," it was 
decidedly not of the sort envisaged by Jaures or by Guy Mollet, 
the modern-day leader of the French Socialist party.48 When the 
"modest peasant" in France proper, and the urban worker as well, 
exercised his "intuitive wisdom" and voted in support of Algerian 
self-determination in January, 1961, officers of the stamp of he 
Bled's editorialist denounced that decision and turned to their mili­
tary fellows as the only hope of national salvation. 
Where esprit de corps was strongest, particularly in paratroop 
units and in the Legion, common war experiences and remoteness 
from the concerns of civilian France tended to wean the officer from 
his former class prejudices and predispositions when these con­
flicted with military-group interests. We have seen that aristocrats 
participated in military revolt. One such case is described by Jean 
Larteguy, whose personal experience in, and continued familiarity 
with, the paras lends credence to his fictional tale. Captain (and 
Count) Jacques de Glatigny, a central figure in Larteguy's Les 
Centurions, returns from a Vietminh prison camp to shock fellow 
aristocrats in Paris with his defense of a colleague now enflamed 
with the theory of revolutionary war. A colonel chides him gently: 
My little Jacques, I don't doubt the value of your judgment, but 
perhaps it has been distorted by the ambiance of the camps and 
that incessant propaganda to which you were subjected. The army 
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is one thing, politics is another, and the word revolutionary war is 
the negation even of all our tradition. 
Every war, sir, [Glatigny retorts] will become political, and an 
officer who has no political education will soon lose all effectiveness. 
Often the word "tradition" serves only to hide our indolence.49 
De Glatigny went on to plot against the Fourth Republic and to 
assist in its overthrow before finally returning to the disciplined 
path of the traditional officer. 
De Glatigny, of course, was not representative of all aristocrats 
in uniform. Those at the higher echelons, and especially those who 
held mostly staff, rather than combat assignments, were often 
loyal to the traditional maxim that the military man in politics 
cannot safeguard his honor. The aristocratic military tradition very 
likely bolstered the discipline of soldiers such as General (and 
Marquis) Henri de Pouilly, who was one important reason why 
the putsch of April, 1961, failed to win over western Algeria.50 
Even among the most traditional officers, however, the army's 
new role of maintaining order posed challenges to discipline. The 
case of General Paris de Bollardiere is particularly interesting for 
the light it sheds on traditional military honor.^1 As a combat com­
mander in Algeria in 1956 and early 1957, Bollardiere protested 
against summary executions and the use of torture by the army and 
approved the publication of Servan-Schreiber's account of these 
abuses.52 The traditional sense of honor of this Breton nobleman 
led him knowingly to an act of indiscipline and then to a punish­
ment of two months of fortress arrest.53 It is quite likely that the 
"dirtiness" of the army's role in counterrevolutionary war was a 
factor in the growing disaffection of the French titled aristocracy 
for the military.54 In view of the number of titled officers who 
ignored the requirements of traditional military discipline, however, 
it would appear that once a man had become an officer, the com­
mon experiences of an isolated military community and military 
esprit de corps were frequently more powerful factors than tradi­
tional class ties. 
Of related interest here are the findings of Kurt Lang in a study 
of those German generals who conspired against Hitler during 
World War II. Class factors, he found, were less important than 
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civilian contacts and career involvement in political tasks in dis­
tinguishing conspirators from the non-committed.55 Similarly again, 
Janowitz finds: 
In the United States, to an even greater extent, differences in poli­
tical behavior between services or within services cannot be ac­
counted for by social background. . . . Analysis of social origins of 
the military elite demonstrates that there has been a progressive 
decline in the importance of social heritage and a rise in die im­
portance of organizational experiences.56 
In the case of French Army praetorians, one can hardly overesti­
mate the importance of the peculiar and political nature of recent 
French military experiences, a topic to which we will turn in the 
following two parts. 
What is most important for military politics in the shifting social 
composition of the French officer corps is not so much the phenome­
non of democratization, but rather that of recruitment from within. 
In the years from 1954 to 1958, it will be recalled, 44 per cent of 
Saint-Cyr cadets and 36 per cent of those at Corps de Troupe were 
sons of professional soldiers; moreover, officer recruits outside the 
two military schools were almost all taken from the ranks of non­
coms with several years' service. The phenomenon of self-recruit­
ment seems to appear most clearly in periods of low military pres­
tige, when the number of qualified applicants from outside the 
military community declines. Though no complete data are avail­
able for the interwar years, the noted British military writer, Cap­
tain B. H. Liddell Hart, noted in 1928 that 50 per cent of Saint-Cyr 
cadets were then sons of officers.57 By the fatter recruiting years 
1937-39 the proportion of sons of career military men at Saint-Cyr 
(sons of noncoms as well as officers) had dropped to 30 per cent.58 
Again, and more permanently this time, recruitment patterns in the 
postwar years tended to intensify (as well as to demonstrate) the 
separation of the military community from French civilian society. 
The social cleavage between French military and civilian com­
munities in the period after 1945 is similar in many respects to the 
estrangement of the two communities in the nineteenth century and, 
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to some degree, in the 1920's and early 1930's. In all of these periods 
social isolation of the military community was accompanied by 
instability in the French political system. Yet in the nineteenth 
century, we have argued, the army reacted with disciplined poli­
tical neutrality, rather than with bitterness, anger, and finally revolt, 
as in the years after 1945. Why was the military reaction so differ­
ent in the two cases? The essential differences seem to lie in the 
following conditions: first, the threatened loss after 1945 of the 
colonial outlet for military ambition, which has been discussed 
above;59 and second, the extent of the army's dependence upon the 
support of the government and of public opinion. From 1815 until 
1870 the French Army fought only in limited wars which required 
little sacrifice from the population at home. When major wars 
finally came in 1870 and 1914-18, an aroused population united 
behind its army. Following World War II, the French Army in 
Indochina and again in Algeria met a new style of warfare which 
made victory even in remote colonial wars dependent as much on 
political strength and decisiveness as on military skill. It is to that 
style of warfare, which turned military isolation into bitterness and 
revolt, that we must now turn. 
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Political Challenge and Military Response 
When the leaders of the January, 1960, uprising of European set­
tlers in Algiers were finally brought to trial, one of the paratroop 
officers who had given them tacit support, Colonel Joseph Broizat, 
took the stand as a witness and told the court: 
. .  . If we, the officers of 1939-1945, who almost led assaults in 
white gloves and casoar [the plumed cap of Saint-Cyr cadets], if we, 
in short, became interested in the political problem, it was not be­
cause of a taste for politicking; it was because of the demands of 
our professional duty.1 
The colonel's defense of the army's political ventures in Algiers 
cannot be dismissed as apologetics pure and simple. As Broizat 
himself never ceased to explain, from 1946 onward the French 
Army had been engaged in a new and unorthodox style of war 
in which military and political questions were inextricably inter­
twined. 
If one is to comprehend the reasons for the French Army's politi­
cal role in Indochina and especially in Algeria, he must understand 
something of the rebel foes who forced French officers to question 
those military values associated with the "Great Mute." The purpose 
of this and the following chapter will be to examine the essential 
character of "revolutionary-guerrilla war," especially in Indochina 
and Algeria, and then to view the new political roles of the French 
Army in these two wars in the context of that highly political style 
of combat. 
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In all modern Western nations clean-cut lines between the politi­
cal and military realms have been increasingly difficult to trace in 
this century of total war and cold war. For the officer newly en­
gaged in revolutionary-guerrilla war, however, that distinction 
appears almost irrelevant: down to the level of the squad com­
mander, political and human considerations often must be given 
priority over tactical military considerations. And no army in the 
world has as much experience against this style of warfare (or has 
suffered as serious a politicization from it) as has the French 
Army. 
The style of war which the French faced in Indochina and in 
Algeria belongs to a sizeable category of wars, variously styled 
"subversive," "brushfire," "unconventional," "irregular," "revolution­
ary," and (most commonly) "guerrilla." Since 1945 wars of this 
style have raged in China, Greece, Malaya, the Philippines, and 
Cuba, in addition to Indochina and Algeria. What are the com­
mon and distinguishing features of what will here be called "revo­
lutionary-guerrilla war"?2 All depend upon the use of guerrilla 
tactics, especially in the early phases. In this sense, and in their 
rural or mountainous bases of operation, they are essentially differ­
ent from the urban revolutions in France in 1789 and in Russia in 
1917.3 But guerrilla forces have often been employed simply as an 
adjunct to regular armies, or as a means of defense against an 
invader after the defeat of regular forces (as in Spain in 1803-13 
against Napoleon, and in Russia in World War II against Hitler). 
In the Chinese Communist revolutionary war, and in other similar 
recent wars, guerrillas were used as a revolutionary offensive 
weapon which was coupled with intense psychological warfare 
aimed at subverting the defending regime and building a strong 
popular revolutionary front. 
Revolutionary-guerrilla war of the Communist Chinese style had 
a number of historical precursors, among them the slave revolt led 
by Spartacus against the Roman Republic in 73-71 B.C. and, in 
modern France, the Protestant Camisard rebellion of 1702-4 and 
the Catholic Vendeen uprising against the revolutionary govern­
ment after 1793.4 It was only in the twentieth century, with the 
British Colonel T. E. Lawrence and his Arabian guerrillas of World 
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War I, however, that revolutionary-guerrilla war began to be a 
systematic, self-conscious weapon.5 Far more important as a mentor 
to modern rebels was Mao Tse-tung, who combined an excellent 
comprehension of the age-old rules of guerrilla warfare with an 
intelligent communist's organizational talent and ideological zeal.6 
Mao's numerous writings on the subject of revolutionary-guerrilla 
war return again and again to a central theme: guerrilla war, a 
tool of the militarily weak, can be successful only if it is also a 
people's war. 
Many people think it impossible for guerrillas to exist for long in 
the enemy's rear. Such a belief reveals lack of comprehension of 
the relationship that should exist between the people and the troops. 
The former may be likened to water and the latter to the fish who 
inhabit it. How may it be said that these two cannot exist together? 
It is only undisciplined troops who make the people their enemies 
and who, like the fish out of its native element, cannot live. 
Because guerrilla warfare basically derives from the masses and 
is supported by them, it can neither exist nor flourish if it separates 
itself from their sympathies and cooperation.7 
Mao's successful pupils in Indochina, Algeria, and Cuba all un­
derstood this pre-eminent principle of revolutionary war: the most 
crucial immediate task is not defeat of the government army (an 
unrealistic objective in the early years) but development of support 
from, and control over, the civilian population.s Once the "water" 
is safe from pollution, the revolutionary-guerrilla movement is vir­
tually assured of eventual victory. The rebels will watch the enemy's 
every move through millions of civilian eyes and, when outnum­
bered by enemy troops, will melt unseen into a protective civilian 
population. Though rebel losses may far outnumber government 
casualties, as they did in Indochina and in Algeria, a supporting 
native population produces an inexhaustible supply of replacements. 
On the other hand, if the rebellion does not succeed in winning-
over a large portion of the civilian population, it will shrivel and 
die, as it did in Greece in 1949 and then in Malaya after 1953-54. 
Three qualifications are in order with regard to popular support 
for revolutionary-guerrilla war. First, particularly in the early stages 
of the war, strong support in certain base areas may be sufficient to 
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launch the movement and eventually to win more general active 
support, e.g., Fidelist support in Cuba's Oriente Province. Second, 
the revolutionary movement rarely can hope for the support of the 
total population, even in an anticolonial war, for inevitably there 
will be an older native elite fearful of losing all privilege and wealth 
to the revolution. Third, a revolutionary movement which does not 
embody an already existing national sentiment, nor one which easily 
can be aroused by propaganda, usually turns to terrorism on a mass 
scale in an attempt to coerce "traitors" within the target group to 
rally to the revolutionary cause. In Kenya, Algeria, and Malaya 
rebel terrorism struck the indigenous population far more often 
that it struck European civilians or security forces." Yet the true 
stakes of revolutionary-guerrilla war remain support from the popu­
lation, for if the target population cannot be brought to believe 
that the revolutionary cause is just and right, terrorism may well 
produce alienation rather than support. Such was the case in 
Malaya in the early 1950's and in Kenya after the Larbi Massacre 
in 1953.10 
The term "guerrilla warfare" alone describes only one of the 
tactics and one of the phases (albeit the longest one) of revolution 
on the Chinese Communist model. Though no fixed chronological 
sequence of phases fits all wars on this model,11 in very general 
terms it may be said that a successful revolutionary-guerrilla move­
ment must accomplish the following tasks: (1) develop a political-
military organization which eventually extends its control over a 
majority of the population; (2) organize guerrilla units to harass 
and eat away at enemy defenses and morale; (3) develop a secure 
territorial base for training, for escape from pursuing enemy troops, 
and for the seat of a provisional government (either in a moun­
tainous or remote area where the population is sympathetic, as in 
Cuba and China, or in a bordering country, as in Vietnam after 
1949 and in Algeria); (4) finally, if the enemy's strength and deter­
mination are too great to be broken by a long guerrilla war of attri­
tion, develop a regular army and launch a conventional campaign 
to defeat his armies. The most frequent developmental tendency 
for a successful revolutionary movement is from an early stage of 
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organization, propaganda, and often terrorism, to expand guerrilla 
activities, and finally to primary reliance upon a regular revolution­
ary army. 
In the course of a revolutionary-guerrilla war an appeal is usu­
ally made for aid from foreign countries, and that aid may be a 
vital factor in the outcome of the war. Following the Chinese Com­
munist conquest of all of mainland China in 1949, the Vietminh 
received Chinese war materials, which allowed the development 
of the large and powerful army that was more than a match for 
crack French paratroop regiments at Dien Bien Phu in 1954. The 
process worked in reverse in Greece, where Tito's break with the 
Cominform in 1948 led to withdrawal of Yugoslav aid and shelter 
to Greek Communist guerrillas, thus contributing heavily to their 
defeat a year later.12 Yet foreign aid or its lack is not necessarily 
crucial, for guerrillas notoriously supply themselves by disarming 
prisoners and by raiding enemy depots and arsenals. The Chinese 
Communists supplied themselves primarily with equipment stolen, 
captured, and bought from Chiang Kai Shek's troops, and Fidel 
Castro overthrew the Batista regime without important foreign aid.13 
The Indochinese and Algerian rebellions are of course of greatest 
interest here, for they occupied the French Army for sixteen years. 
Each deserves a brief description. 
During World War II Ho Chi Minh, alias Nguyen Ai Quoc, 
founder of the Communist Party of Indochina, succeeded in taking 
the lead of the newly created League for the Independence of 
Vietnam, popularly known as the Vietminh.14 When Japanese troops 
overthrew the French Vichyite administration in Indochina on 
March 9, 1945, former schoolteacher Vo Nguyen Giap and his 
Vietminh guerrillas extended rebel control—first over the Tonkin 
countryside, and then, following Japanese surrender in August, 
1945, over the whole of that northernmost province. Free French 
troops moving in from the south on the heels of the British were 
able to re-establish control in Hanoi, capital of Tonkin, only after 
heavy fighting with Vietminh forces. The Vietminh retreated to 
the countryside, leaving the cities to the French, and strengthened 
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their organizational hold over a population already favorably dis­
posed toward independence. 
The war, of course, was then only beginning. The French grad­
ually and painfully learned of the skilful manner in which the 
Vietminh organized and controlled the Vietnamese population, 
leaving the French administration, especially outside the larger 
cities, nothing but a hollow shell cut off from its nominal charges. 
The Vietminh's chief revolutionary strategist, General Giap, gave 
clear priority to political over military activities in the early stage 
of what he termed "armed propaganda led by Vietminh political-
military units.15 Using non-communist nationalists as well as com­
munists placed in key positions, the Vietminh employed threats 
along with persuasion in creating a powerful system of "parallel 
hierarchies,' as French military writers have labeled it, composed 
of an "associational hierarchy'' and a "territorial hierarchy." 1(i The 
Vietminh progressively organized the entire population in its strong­
hold areas and a large part of the population outside those areas 
into a series of specialized associations for youth, peasants, non-
peasants, women, elderly people, and so forth, according to the 
natural groupings of the local population. Alongside the associa­
tional hierarchy, which rose from village to canton to subprefecture 
to prefecture to nation, was a territorial hierarchy composed of 
governing committees for the entire population at each of the same 
levels, responsible always to the unit above. Alongside these two 
hierarchies was still a third, this one more selective in composition 
—the Party. Throughout this overlapping organizational structure, 
personal responsibility was clearly assigned, and safeguards against 
disloyalty were multiple and overlapping. A leading French military 
expert on the Vietminh, Colonel Charles Lacheroy, writes: "We 
hardly have an example of an agent who lasted over three months 
in enemy territory." 17 
Though often forced to operate clandestinely, Vietminh terri­
torial committees were capable of administering justice, enforcing 
decisions through a Vietminh police force, gathering information, 
and generally undermining effective French control even in areas 
where French military superiority was undeniable. The Vietminh 
often succeeded in realizing the full totalitarian possibilities of this 
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system of overlapping structures. The cause of independence be­
came a glorious national mission; its defenders were patriots and 
its opponents—and often the uncommitted as well—could only be 
traitors. The pure, hard Vietminh movement dealt violently with 
"traitors," especially those who collaborated with and informed the 
French. Vietnamese who were tempted to provide information to 
French troops when they moved into a village in force could rest 
assured that the Vietminh would survive any French repression 
and, when French troops moved on, would claim its revenge. 
And so the French controlled the cities and the roads—during 
daylight hours 18—while the Vietminh controlled the countryside 
and built a powerful military system composed of local guerrilla 
and self-defense units, larger regional units, and a powerful regular 
army. While the Vietminh watched their every move, French 
forces rarely could decipher the nature and movements of their 
enemy through the dense screen of popular silence and widespread 
hostility. As France hesitated to concede independence to a non­
communist Vietnamese government, then did so only in form after 
1949, the Vietminh built up a political-military machine which, with 
Chinese Communist military equipment and tens of thousands of 
bicycle-pushing civilians to carry it, attacked and defeated an im­
portant French fortress at Dien Bien Phu. Indigenous troops fight­
ing with the French, soldiers whose morale had never rivaled that 
of the Vietminh, all but disintegrated as negotiations at Geneva 
led finally, in July, 1954, to an armistice and partition of the coun­
try at the seventeenth parallel. Again as in China five years before, 
a powerful modern army, with air power and armor, had been 
defeated by a revolutionary enemy equipped initially and primarily 
only with small arms—and with the loyalty of the civilian 
population. 
The victory of the National Liberation Front (F.L.N.) in Algeria 
is even more impressive in some respects, for French interests were 
greater there, French forces and colonists were more numerous, 
and F.L.N. military strength, even at its height, considerably less 
than that of the Vietminh.19 When a group of impatient young 
rebels, encouraged by Colonel Nasser of Egypt, broke with the 
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older, factious Algerian nationalist groups in March, 1954, and 
created the embryo of what was to become the F.L.N. and its mili­
tary twin, the National Liberation Army (A.L.N.), they benefitted 
from no such power vacuum as Ho Chi Minh enjoyed in 1945. The 
French government, in fact, saw no reason for serious alarm on 
November 1, All Saints Day, 1954, when seventy terrorist attacks 
in Algerian cities, followed by rebel guerrilla raids in the Aures 
Mountains, announced the beginning of what was to be a futile 
eight-year war for France.20 The obstacles to an F.L.N. victory 
seemed great indeed. Algeria had been French since the 1830's. 
Her three departments were considered parts of the French Repub­
lic. Over a million Europeans had made their homes on Algerian 
soil, in contrast to the scant ten to fifteen thousand European resi­
dents in Indochina at the outset of the war there. 
When the strength of the F.L.N. rebellion grew to serious pro­
portions, the brunt of French defense was no longer left largely 
to native troops, as it had been in far-off Indochina, where all but 
some 175,000 men (many of these Africans and Foreign Legion­
naires) out of the 500,000 defending troops had been uninspired 
Indochinese.21 A French defending army of similar size in Algeria 
after 1957 was composed largely of draftees from the metropole. 
Against such a formidable French Army the A.L.N. probably 
never had more than 30,000 to 40,000 men in arms within Algeria 
itself, far fewer than the Vietminh's estimated 350,000 troops in 
1953.22 Militarily the French were relatively stronger in Algeria 
than they had been in Indochina and the rebels considerably 
weaker. In eight years of war in Algeria, French military forces 
lost only 9,000 men while killing 141,000 rebels.23 Though rebel 
forces were able to replenish their ranks indefinitely and continue 
a prolonged war of harassment and terrorism, it was not military 
defeat which forced out the French. In fact, the military operations 
led by Commander in Chief Maurice Challe in 1959-60 were quite 
successful against rebel military forces. If one looked only at the 
strength of the rebel army within Algeria, there was some truth to 
the claim of army Chief of Staff Andre Zeller in June of 1959: "The 
victory thus acquired by the military in Algeria is taking a form 
unknown until now. All that is left is to conclude it politically."24 
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Yet military means proved incapable of breaking the F.L.N. 
political-military organization and its control over a broadening 
segment of the population; nor, so long as that organization re­
mained intact, could they halt terrorist attacks and scattered guer­
rilla raids, despite the considerable success of the French (especially 
after 1957) in cutting off rebel supplies and reinforcements from 
abroad and from A.L.N. bases in Tunisia and Morocco.25 The war 
came to an end in March, 1962, when it had become apparent to 
De Gaulle and to the majority of Frenchmen that the only alterna­
tive to Algerian independence was interminable war. 
The F.L.N. owed its victory'against apparently strong odds, not 
so much to foreign aid (as French official and military opinion often 
held),2'1 as to terrorism, political organization, and widespread 
underlying resentment against the privileged European colons. 
F.L.N. tactics were similar in many respects to those of the Viet­
minh, although the Algerian rebels, as Arab nationalists, had little 
love for the Algerian Communist Party, which was predominantly 
European in composition and initially opposed to Algerian inde­
pendence.27 
Since the position of the F.L.N. was much weaker than that of 
the Vietminh had been at the outset of the war, terrorism played 
a more important role (probably a necessary one from the rebel 
point of view) in tightening F.L.N. control over a wavering popula­
tion.28 General or systematic terrorism, usually in the form of bomb 
and grenade explosions in buses, cafes, theaters, and other public 
places, was designed to pose the "Algerian problem" and to create 
a climate of fear and lack of confidence in French protection. 
Shortly the F.L.N. turned as well to selective terrorism aimed at 
Moslem public officials and, generally, to those Moslems and 
Europeans who formed a bridge between the two communities. 
Notes threatening death or mutilation went out to Moslem notables 
who sat on municipal councils, to shopkeepers who refused to 
contribute to the F.L.N., and to many others, even strong Moslem 
nationalists, who refused to accept F.L.N. authority. For those 
who did not comply, punishment was immediate, cruel, and widely 
publicized, as in those cases where the victim was returned to his 
village alive, but with his nose, lips, ears, or sexual parts savagely 
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cut off.29 If "treason" was a collective act on the part of a whole 
village, the F.L.N. on occasion resorted to a general massacre in 
which women and children were not always spared—for example, 
in the village of Melouza, where the entire male population of 
three hundred was slaughtered in May, 1957, for co-operating, 
not with the French, but with the rival Algerian National Move­
ment.30 
In Algeria, as in Indochina, the heart of the rebel movement 
was not the rebel army but the solid political-administrative or­
ganization which again pulled the native population out from 
under an undermanned French administration. Though somewhat 
unsystematic in the early stages, the F.N.L. gradually by mid-1956 
had extended its organization from mountain strongholds to the 
whole of Algeria.31 The official F.L.N. weekly, El-Moudjahid, later 
explained that the fundamental mission of early guerrilla bands 
was not military activity but "above all the organization of the 
people and the diffusion of patriotic passwords. These groups 
organized successful ambushes, lightning attacks, spectacular as­
saults. But their primary task consisted of setting up the F.L.N. 
organization."32 Only then could the A.L.N. be built and sup­
ported on this organizational base. 
Constructed on a communist-type cellular principle and building 
from the village or district level up to the six "Willayas" (plus the 
autonomous zone of Algiers), into which all of Algeria was 
divided, the F.L.N. organization consisted at most levels of a gov­
erning committee of three to five members. At middle and higher 
levels a political-military chief had the assistance of a political 
executive, a military executive, an executive for liaison, and another 
for intelligence. Each of these four executives belonged also to a 
parallel (and watchdog) system of functional hierarchies, accord­
ing to their special responsibility.33 Alongside the territorial and 
functional hierarchies were, as in Indochina, a number of profes­
sional associations, notably the powerful General Union of Algerian 
Workers formed in February, 1956. Though there existed a national 
liberation army (the A.L.N.), political considerations generally 
took precedence over military considerations, according to the guid­
ing principle adopted by the rebel congress held in August, 1956, in 
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the valley of Soummam. Once the F.L.N. political-military or­
ganization was in place, repeated military defeats could not destroy 
the rebel movement. 
Underlying much of the effectiveness of F.L.N. terrorism and 
organization was the vulnerability of Algerian society. An uneven 
pace of social and economic modernization, coupled with rapid 
population growth after 1930, had disrupted the traditions and 
restraints of Arab family and communal life, creating an uprooted 
and poverty-stricken urban working class, a frustrated educated 
elite, and a peasantry newly aware of its misery. The French 
sociologist, Pierre Bourdieu, described the war accurately when 
he wrote: 
Its underlying causes may be found in a bitterly real drama: the 
overthrow of a vital order and the collapse of a whole world of 
values. 
To claim that the war was imposed upon the Algerian people by 
a handful of ringleaders who resorted to compulsion and trickery 
is to deny the fact that the struggle was able to draw on strong 
popular sentiment for its vital strength and purpose, a sentiment 
inspired by an objective situation.34 
In Algeria (as in Malaya, for example) 35 rebellion attracted those 
who had broken with the traditional way but had been refused 
self-fulfilment within the framework of Western colonial society. 
The F.N.L. drew strong support from Moslem intellectuals (who 
were aware of their subordinate social and professional status in a 
colonial society) and from Moslem youth (who through educa­
tion, mass media, physical mobility, and especially urbanization 
were torn from traditional family and communal restraints). 
Clearly, one cannot explain the determination, the sacrifice, the 
fighting spirit of the Algerian rebellion, its hold over Moslem intel­
lectuals and youth, nor the mass of Moslem demonstrators it finally 
called out on the streets of Algiers in December, 1960, without 
reference to Algerian nationalism, without mention of the bitter­
ness of an awakening and disoriented native population subordi­
nated socially and economically to a European community only a 
tenth its size. The failure of French psychological warfare and 
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its theme of "integration" of the two communities is further evi­
dence that not just any goal will do. Lawrence of Arabia once 
remarked that a rebellion can be made by an active 2 per cent of 
the population, if only—but only if—the bulk of the remaining 
population is "passively sympathetic" to the rebel cause.36 
Here, then, was the kind of enemy against which the French 
Army battled so frustratingly for sixteen years. Shunning the open 
field of battle, at least in the early stages, this rebel adversary gave 
clear priority to political organization and control of the population 
above all purely military objectives. Once having achieved control 
over the majority of the target population through a blended 
campaign of propaganda, terrorism, and organization, he could 
not be rooted out by military action alone. 
The varied responses of the French Army to such an unorthodox 
foe are significant in that all of them in some way contributed to 
the erosion of effective civilian control. What were those responses? 
Throughout the Indochinese war and in the initial years of the 
Algerian war, French officers generally failed to understand the 
nature of the war being waged against them and riposted inef­
fectually (and worse) with an old-fashioned military attempt at 
repression. A second type of response was proposed (and occa­
sionally attempted) by numerous military specialists in la guerre 
revolutionnaire, who urged that the French turn back against 
the rebels their own totalitarian techniques of organization and 
thought reform. Yet neither the French government nor the majority 
of French officers were willing to turn the whole of Algeria into 
a totalitarian state, though most agreed that effective means had 
to be found to deal, not only with rebel bands, but also with the 
rebel political-administrative organization. Hence, thirdly, govern­
ment and army devised other political activities in which military 
personnel played a leading role, notably "psychological action" 
and organization and administration at the local and regional 
levels. Fourthly, once fully involved in the political character of 
revolutionary-guerrilla war, key French officers became increas­
ingly impatient with the flagging determination of French govern­
ments and the French population. It seemed to these officers that, 
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if Algeria were not to be lost, the army would have to focus its 
new political and ideological leadership, not only on the Algerians, 
but on the French government and the metropolitan French popu­
lation as well. 
The civil-military tensions which arose from all of these re­
sponses were in good measure the result of the new political 
demands of revolutionary-guerrilla war and deserve further con­
sideration in that context in this and the following chapter. Those 
tensions were also aggravated, however, by the feeble authority 
of the Fourth Republic, which delegated wide powers and failed 
to control their exercise. Such was particularly the case with 
psychological action and military use of torture, both of which 
will be mentioned only briefly here and then discussed in more 
detail in a succeeding section under the rubric "political authority 
and civilian control." 
The initial and instinctive reaction of most French officers to 
colonial rebellion was to call for more troops and more police in 
order to crush the enemies of France. Colonial uprisings as recent 
as those in the Algerian city of Setif on V-E Day in 1945 and in 
Madagascar in 1947 had been snuffed out quickly with a ruthless 
campaign of repression which killed several thousand Moslems in 
the first instance and some thirty thousand Malagache rebels in 
the second.37 Yet the French predicament in Indochina after 1946 
and in Algeria after 1954 was infinitely more complex than in these 
and earlier colonial rebellions. Whereas harsh official suppression 
of revolts at Setif and in Madagascar had been almost ignored by 
the French population at home and by the world outside, by the 
1950's general and rapid social change in French colonial countries, 
modern communications, and anticolonialist sympathy both at 
home and abroad all conspired to publicize colonial revolts and 
the official reaction to them. Moreover, the enemy was now better 
organized, more widely dispersed, and skilled in the techniques 
of revolutionary-guerrilla war. 
Like their more aristocratic predecessors of the early eighteenth 
century against the Camisard rebellion, French officers in Indochina 
and Algeria soon discovered that against a popular, well-organized, 
and determined rebellion, a tactic of bloody repression often sue­
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ceeds only in spreading and intensifying the fire.38 French troops 
in Indochina and then in Algeria unthinkingly fell headlong into 
the' trap intended by rebel terrorists to alienate the native popula­
tion from the French and their army. Upon seeing Frenchmen and 
their native supporters slaughtered and mutilated by rebel terror­
ists and guerrillas, who could not be distinguished from the ordi­
nary urban worker or rural peasant and who hid behind a general 
conspiracy of silence, French soldiers rather naturally came to look 
upon all natives as rebels until proven otherwise. French reprisals 
against supposedly rebel villages and summary executions of sus­
pects, practices already rather familiar in Indochina, became com­
monplace in Algeria.30 
Given the unorthodox and total character of revolutionary-
guerrilla war, it is not surprising that atrocities on both sides 
usually abound. A French platoon which arrived in an Algerian 
village to find the gruesomely mutilated bodies of their ambushed 
comrades not infrequently vented their horrified anger in burning 
the village and massacring its inhabitants—or by requesting an 
air raid upon the village as a rebel stronghold.40 In some units 
(certainly not all) the cycle of terror, reprisal, and increased terror 
produced an attitude of strong suspicion and hostility with regard 
to all Moslems. Troops moving into a village often fired at all who 
ran from them, although many who fled did so only from fear 
aroused by past reprisals. 
Arbitrariness in reprisals and repression was partly the result 
of the pitiful weakness of French intelligence. Following the 1954 
armistice, General Giap is reported to have told French officers, "I 
won notably because the French were not informed. The French 
were always an average of a year behind in their evaluation of 
our strength."41 The same problem plagued the French in Algeria, 
where frequent resort to beatings, electric shock, and the "water 
treatment" (forced ingurgitation or repeated near drowning), in 
the "interrogation" of suspects often picked up almost at random 
could not compensate for the absence of a co-operative and sym­
pathetic local native population. 
In Algeria those officers who understood the requirements of 
lasting pacification, particularly those assigned after 1955 to politi­
cal-military "Specialized Administrative Sections' (SAS), were 
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usually aware that random and uncontrolled brutality was self-
defeating rather than "realistic." 42 Hence, despite military objec­
tions that "the armed forces are one,"43 tension developed between 
most SAS officers, on the one hand, and combat (especially para), 
intelligence, and security-unit officers, on the other. The primary 
task of the former was to win over the population; that of the 
latter, to ferret out the rebels and destroy them. One successful 
commander of an SAS unit, vexed by the brutality of troops 
passing through his sector, reported to his superiors in this manner: 
"At a time when the population is more and more coming back 
over to us and when it is important to convince them that French 
troops are there to protect them, such incidents must absolutely 
be avoided."44 
The problem was well stated by another French officer deeply 
engaged in pacification effors, an officer said to be none other than 
Colonel Antoine Argoud, later a key leader in military revolt: 
Incapable by their own means of distinguishing rebels from peace­
ful citizens, they [the forces of order] are forced by lack of informa­
tion to lead a blind repression, and they amass abuses of justice. 
Each false fellagha struck down is replaced by ten real ones; until 
the day when our forces, finding before them the totality of the 
population, will be forced to practice a policy of extermination—an 
hypothesis excluded by definition—or give up. . . .45 
Similar sound advice was given the French by Adjoul-Adjoul, a 
captured rebel leader: 
Those people who flee at the sight of French troops because they 
have learned of or seen with their own eyes summary executions 
carried out by the troops, or because the fellaghas have forbidden 
all contact with the French, are so many recruits ready to rejoin 
the ranks of the outlaws.46 
Violence and counterviolence increasingly split the Moslem and 
European communities, throwing more and more of the hesitant 
into the rebel camp. Moslems continually suspected of being 
rebels became vitally aware of their alienation from the dominant 
European community and eventually fulfilled suspicions about 
them.47 
164 The Political Demands of Revolutionary-Cuerrilla War 
The rising cycle of violence and counterviolence had at least 
two deleterious effects on military morale and, ultimately, on 
civilian control. Reports of atrocities committed by the French 
Army made their way to the metropole, where many good repub­
licans as well as communists registered disapproval, and poli­
ticians and journalists from the extreme Left to the Left-Center 
launched a series of stinging attacks on the behavior of the na­
tion's army.48 Within Indochina and Algeria themselves the angry 
heavy-handedness of many army units tended to cut off the French 
from the very populations which they would have had to win 
over if the rebellions were to be crushed. By contributing in this 
manner to the certainty of French defeat, such tactics had a part 
in producing that deep sense of frustration and humiliation among 
officers which played so important a role in the breakdown of 
civilian control in 1958.49 If French attempts at military repression 
of revolutionary-guerrilla war produced some threat to civilian 
control, more serious civil-military tensions arose, as will be shown 
in the following chapter, after the French Army began to wage 
a broader and more political counterinsurgency campaign in 
Algeria. 
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Chapter 7 
Counterinsurgency and Military Politics 
Many of those French officers who returned home from Indochina 
and from Vietminh prison camps reflected lengthily on their defeat 
and particularly on the unorthodox character of their victorious 
adversary. It was clear to all that French military repression had 
been pitifully ineffective against the Vietminh. For some, like Gen­
eral Navarre, a weak and vacillating French government was almost 
entirely to blame; but in the minds of a growing number of cap­
tains, major, and colonels, it gradually became clear that the army 
itself had failed to understand the political nature of revolutionary-
guerrilla war. And so in the early years of the Algerian war, a whole 
doctrine of la guerre revolutionnaire was developed and diffused 
within the army until it became official policy.1 Detailed discussion 
of that doctrine will be deferred to a later chapter; suffice it to say 
here that theorists of la guerre revolutionnaire looked, not to mili­
tary action, but to psychological warfare and organization of the 
population as primary weapons against a revolutionary-guerrilla 
enemy. In many respects they were right. Unfortunately for civilian 
control of the French military, their conception of the political 
demands of counterrevolutionary-guerrilla war drew them even­
tually into conflict with civil authorities. 
One strong wing of the guerre revolutionnaire school insisted that 
only by abandoning temporarily the restraints of a liberal democ­
racy, only by resorting to totalitarian tactics, could France possibly 
defeat a totalitarian enemy.2 The rebel political-administrative ap­
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paratus (the core of the rebel movement) could never be crushed, 
it was argued, if France gave more attention to individual rights 
than to victory. One of the earliest and most influential military 
theoreticians of this persuasion was Colonel Charles Lacheroy, a 
close student of Vietminh organizational tactics. In November, 
1953, as the Indochina war still continued, he wrote: 
On the one side, an easy-going justice in a venal and relaxed democ­
racy; on the other, a popular-political-military dictatorship, relatively 
pure, always hard, and, when necessary, cruel. . . . One replies 
to war gas with war gas, to "strategic" bombing with "strategic" 
bombing, to the atomic bomb with the atomic bomb; otherwise, 
one gives up hope of winning and goes home.3 
Lacheroy's plan was to meet the enemy's organizational efforts with 
a massive French campaign to establish its own "parallel hier­
archies" to control the native population. The colonel was fully 
aware of the totalitarian character of such a plan. "Every living 
being" must be forced to "engage" himself, he writes: 
It is necessary that all forms of complicity, including those of 
abstention and silence, be rendered impossible or treated, in the 
same manner as the crime of treason, by special courts and an 
expeditious procedure.4 
Lacheroy's proposal was taken up and applied in a few cases in 
Algeria, notably by Colonel Yves Goddard and by Colonel Roger 
Trinquier. In February, 1957, the Tenth Paratroop Division under 
General Jacques Massu was called into Algiers and given full police 
powers; the F.L.N. organization, officially estimated at only two 
hundred terrorists supported by some five thousand militants, was 
killing two hundred civilians per month while local police stood 
by virtually helpless.5 Thousands of suspects were picked up by 
Massu's paras, interrogated, often tortured, and sometimes exe­
cuted without a trial.6 Paratroopers stood ready to utilize all infor­
mation in surprise raids against the F.L.N. organization. From 
February to October the F.L.N. apparatus and its terrorist cam­
paign were largely crushed; then they succeeded in self-regenera­
tion from April to June; but, finally, both were torn down again 
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from June to October as high F.L.N. leaders were killed (Ali la 
Pointe), captured (Yacef Saadi), or forced to flee.7 
In the course of the "battle" Massu's executive officer, Roger 
Trinquier, worked with Sector Commander Colonel Godard in 
creating an hierarchical organization which extended down to 
districts, Hots, and groups of houses, subjecting every resident to 
the control and scrutiny of carefully selected leaders.8 A careful 
census and a system of identity cards indicating the exact district 
of residence of the bearer facilitated tight control of all movement 
of persons into and within the city. Under the control of Colonels 
Godard and Trinquier this "organization of the population, as 
Trinquier refers to it, served largely as a channel for collecting 
information without fully realizing the indoctrination potential 
which Lacheroy had envisaged for it.9 Nevertheless, during the 
dramatic May days of 1958 following the army-supported French 
Algerian uprising in Algiers, Colonel Trinquier (whose troops had 
been instrumental in the revolt's success by failing to halt it) went 
back into the Casbah, renewed contacts with what remained of his 
"organization of the population," and in co-operation with French 
military urban-administration and psychological-warfare officers on 
the scene, brought thousands of Moslems onto the Algiers Forum 
on May 16 for a massive fraternization festival with the European 
population.10 
The organization of the European population, unlike the organ­
ization of Moslems (where Frenchmen held the higher posts), was 
pied noir (European settler) throughout. It facilitated later French 
Algeria crusades, from that of May 13, 1958, to the Secret Army 
Organization.11 So long as military officers could control these 
"organizations of the population" (both Moslem and European), 
they had at their disposal a political weapon which could as easily 
be turned against the Paris government as against the F.L.N. 
To the despair of French revolutionary-war theorists the organ­
ization created in Algiers in 1957 was not maintained, nor was it 
used as a model for pacification elsewhere.12 Officers such as Gen­
eral Massu and his guiding colonels (Argoud, Broizat, Godard, 
and Gardes) received little more satisfaction concerning the 
"'adaptation" of procedures of justice, despite their repeated pleas.13 
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As we shall see more fully in the following chapter, Massu and his 
staff went far toward "adapting" justice on their own initiative, 
without waiting for changes in the law. What is important here, 
however, is the rather widespread (though far from universal) 
military belief—especially in paratrooper, military-security, and 
intelligence circles—that summary executions and torture were 
essential tools in defense against a terrorist and guerrilla enemy.14 
"One does not fight a revolutionary war with the Napoleonic code," 
argued Colonel Lacheroy, one of the more cautious exponents of 
"adapted" justice.15 From the Message des forces armees during 
the battle of Algiers came the warning, "Legality is bad when it 
no longer protects the victim from the murderer."16 And, again from 
the Message a year later, "Either France and the French will die in 
legality, or they will save themselves . . . with new laws." 1T 
And what manner of new laws were thought to be required? To 
paraphrase Colonel Broizat, who finds in the battle of Algiers a 
high percentage of "unusual and even illegal procedures" but "a 
very high percentage of just solutions," "adapted" justice must be: 
decentralized, rapid, with penalties geared to war and not to peace, 
often secret in testimony but public in execution, applicable to 
all who aid the rebellion in any way, without appeal to higher 
courts, and with allowance for exceptions.18 As for Colonel Argoud, 
another of the army's political colonels, justice (as defined in French 
law) applied in Algeria is seen as 
profoundly unjust, since, save in exceptional circumstances, it 
strikes only the little man; it is totally ineffective, since, in the 
place of a severe, simple, immediate, exemplary justice which the 
Moslem people and the circumstances call for, we have had for 
six years, alas, a justice of criminal weakness, desperate slowness, 
and Byzantine complexity, justice often delivered almost in secret.19 
And what does Argoud understand by "severe, simple, immediate, 
exemplary justice"? If the published text of his secret testimony at 
the Barricades trial is authentic, he there provided the answer in 
relating his personal experience as commander of a sector at Arba 
during the battle of Algiers: 
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. .  . I decided, of course after mature reflection and without 
hiding from myself the disadvantages of the system, I applied this 
justice personally under my own responsibility; that is to say 
that after a precise, tight investigation, aided by inspectors from 
the judicial police, I shot the murderers and rebel leaders on the 
public square.20 
Justice in the fashion of Colonel Argoud, coupled with torture of 
suspects, unquestionably broke the F.L.N. in Algiers, at least tem­
porarily, and henceforth stood for Massu, Broizat, Argoud, Trin­
quier, and others as a model of counterterrorism.21 But there were 
others for whom torture and summary executions were dishonorable 
and completely unacceptable; among these were General Paris de 
Bollardiere, whose protests led him to two months of fortress 
arrest,22 and former minister of defense, General Pierre Billotte. 
Billotte and Massu carried on a heated exchange in 1957, during 
which the military master of the Algiers area replied to Billotte in 
the following terms in a circular sent to his officers and to selected 
politicians: 
The soldiers who, in Algiers, arrested hundreds of killers know that 
there are few cases indeed where the killers have not been able 
to give the name and address of their cell leader, of other killers 
of the cell. How does the general believe that we arrested these 
killers? By subtle reasoning? . . . Does he believe that one can 
afford the luxury of waiting weeks, or just days, for a bomb setter 
to give the address of the cache where bombs are hidden? . . . 
General B. is ready to suffer the misfortune of others with the 
greatest abnegation and the greatest nobility. . . . Let hundreds 
of people perish (and we are saying hundreds) rather than dirty 
our hands!23 
To pose the problem in dramatic terms, as does the novelist Jean 
Larteguy, suppose the capture of a terrorist known to have planned 
and supervised the planting of bombs set to explode in crowded 
stores in mid-morning.24 The terrorist refuses to divulge the location 
of the bombs. Shall his interrogator force out the secret by torture, 
or shall he be indirectly responsible for the death and maiming of 
dozens of innocent civilians? The moral problem is a difficult one, 
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especially for the man who is directly responsible for the safety of 
his civilian and military charges;25 yet, of course, the dilemma is 
not fairly stated in Larteguy's fictional account, nor by protagonists 
of the "hard" line generally.26 Given the French Army's tenuous 
contacts with the Moslem population, given the frequency of de­
nunciations which were simply acts of personal vengeance,27 one 
can understand the alarm of French liberals when Massu could 
announce that ". . . . the rights of the innocent are superior to 
those of the guilty." 28 
Purely on grounds of expediency, the case for "adapted" justice 
to allow summary executions and regulated torture is far from clear. 
If such tactics were effective temporarily in the rebel autonomous 
zone of Algiers, it is not at all likely that they would have succeeded 
over the whole country—unless, it must be added, France had been 
willing and able to renounce outright its constitutional tradition and 
to organize the entire population in a totalitarian state. As one of 
Massu's critics put it: 
. .  . If we continue to defend French civilization in Algeria by 
torture, even against an enemy who never hesitates to play the 
butcher, torture will install itself in Algeria, but French civilization 
there will be destroyed.29 
In view of the reaction of the free press and of the political oppo­
sition in metropolitan France, it is quite likely that the cause of 
French Algeria was damaged, rather than strengthened, as a result 
of the battle of Algiers. The cases of Maurice Audin, Henri Alleg, 
Djamila Bouhired, and other victims of the paras served as power­
ful symbols reminding Frenchmen of their guilty conscience and 
undermining their faith in the justice of the French position. 
The Gestapo-like police activities of certain army units in Algeria 
contributed significantly to those civil-military tensions which finally 
erupted in May, 1958. On the one hand, the battle of Algiers pro­
duced the strongest attacks yet voiced in French political and press 
circles against the army and further revealed the isolation of many 
French officers from the mainstream of French opinion. With regard 
to specific military grievances against governmental officials, mili­
tant colonels like Argoud, Gardes, Godard, Trinquier, and Broizat 
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(all key figures in later military revolt) were disgusted and em­
bittered by the abandonment of experiments of the Algiers variety 
and by government investigations into military behavior during the 
battle of Algiers.30 
Even though the French government and probably most army 
officers shied from a totalitarian solution to the problem of pacifi­
cation in Algeria, many (but not all) civil and military officials 
gradually became aware of the need for a positive political response 
to what was viewed, by 1956-57, as a predominantly political 
challenge. Largely as a result of the growing influence of the guerre 
revolutionnaire school,31 more and more military officers and civil 
administrators came to conceive of their task as had the famous 
colonizer, Marshal Gallieni, in his too-long-forgotten directive of 
May 22, 1898: 
. . . We must remember that in colonial struggles we must destroy 
only in order better to build. . . . Each time that incidents of war 
require one of our officers to act against a village or an inhabited 
center, he must not lose sight of the fact that his first concern, once 
the inhabitants have submitted, will be to reconstruct the village, 
to create a market there, to establish a school there. It is from 
the combined action of force and politics that the pacification and 
eventual organization of the country will later result. Political 
action is much more important. It draws its greatest strength from 
the organization of the country and its inhabitants. . . . 32 
To be sure, the guerrilla bands had to be defeated and the rebel 
political-administrative organization destroyed. Yet if the crucial 
support of the civilian population was to be won and held, the 
French, it was beginning to be understood, would need a political 
program of reforms aimed at the satisfaction of real grievances, 
propaganda to put across that program, and political organization 
capable of both interpreting the appeal and implementing reforms. 
In fact, in all of the most striking recent instances in which a revo­
lutionary-guerrilla movement has been defeated (in Greece, Malaya, 
and the Philippines), government military efforts were strongly 
seconded by an effective economic and political appeal.33 
A series of official statements in 1956 evidences a firm govern­
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mental decision to vest the army with important political and 
administrative responsibilities in an attempt to renew French con­
tact with the Moslem population and to win it over through propa­
ganda and organization. In the summer of 1956 Minister of National 
Defense Bourges-Maunoury remarked: 
It has become almost a commonplace to speak of psychological 
war and revolutionary war. . . . We now have not only an Army 
of soldiers; we have an Army of builders, an Army of doctors, an 
Army of pioneers, I could almost say an Army of propaganda, an 
Army of "contact" with the population.34 
At about that same time (in June, 1956) the resident minister 
in Algeria, Robert Lacoste, issued a general directive to military 
personnel in Algeria impressing upon them their obligation to help 
rebuild general confidence in France, to rejoin the Moslem and 
European communities, and to sell the government's reform pro­
gram of local self-government, industrialization, improvement of 
agriculture, and opening of the civil service to more Moslems.35 In 
a follow-up statement printed in the July, 1956, issue of the Revue 
militaire d'information under the heading "The Role of the Army in 
Psychological Action," Lacoste argued: 
Military action is nothing without action on opinion. . . . The 
Army must play the role of the connecting link in acting both on 
the Moslem population and on the French population to break this 
sort of complicity in mutual ignorance and, if something is not 
done rapidly, in hatred.36 
Even more indicative of shifting military roles was Lacoste's Gen­
eral Directive Number Three of November 30, 1956: 
. .  . I know what you are today being asked to do: protect the 
population, care for them, teach them, sometimes administer them. 
I beg of you now to help them in their local politics since, in this 
strange form of conflict, psychological and political action are jux­
taposed tightly with military action. . . . The purely military phase 
of your action in Algeria is ending in effect and is tending to be 
progressively replaced by a political-military phase where the search 
for contact with the French Moslems through specific institutions 
will be the conducting wire.37 
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Specifically, what were the army's new political responsibilities? 
Of the three major aspects of the counterinsurgency campaign— 
a political program, propaganda, and organization—only the formu­
lation of a program was intended to remain a totally civilian re­
sponsibility, and even there the military progressively moved to 
fill a civilian vacuum. The story of French military "psychological 
action" and its abuses will be left to the following chapter, where 
it can be better understood in the context of the immobilisme and 
waivering authority of the Fourth Republic. Discussion here will 
focus on French military efforts at winning over local communities 
and mobilizing them against the rebels. 
A few scattered attempts at organization and mobilization of 
local communities against the Vietminh had been made in Indo­
china, even though, with few exceptions (Colonel Lacheroy and a 
few others), the French were as yet quite ignorant of the more 
political aspects of revolutionary-guerrilla war.38 One notable ex­
ception to the general pattern was the relatively systematic policy in 
Cambodia after 1952 of relocating threatened communities and or­
ganizing them for self-defense.39 Another was the successful pacifi­
cation of Ben Tre Province at the mouth of the Mekong River 
where, armed with full powers, a Eurasian colonel in the French 
Army, Jean Leroy, skilfully combined military action with agrarian 
and political reform.40 Beginning with the Catholic minority, Leroy 
built a twelve-thousand-man militia, the "Mobile Units for the 
Defense of the Christian Communities.' He protected the peasant 
against the landowner and moneylender, combining a veritable so­
cial revolution with local self-government. His mode of operation 
was similar to that of the Vietminh: armed bands moved into a 
community in strength, forced out the enemy, indoctrinated and 
organized the population for self-defense, economic reconstruction, 
local self-government, and community development (schools, in­
firmaries, sports). But when Leroy was assigned to a larger, but 
strictly military, command in November, 1952, the nominally inde­
pendent Vietnamese government in Saigon was eager to diminish 
the strength of his militia. The Vietminh quickly moved back into 
the province, and Leroy's embryonic organization largely collapsed. 
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Other less thorough attempts at political-military organization 
on the local level included the brief efforts in Tonkin in 1952 by 
"Mobile Administration Groups for Operational Purposes," com­
posed mostly of Vietnamese,41 and the more strictly military work 
of the French military Section Action, which raised some thirty 
thousand anti-Vietminh guerrillas among mountain people in 
Tonkin and Laos.42 
With the exception of the Cambodian self-defense policy guided 
by Premier Norodom Sihanouk and the work of Colonel Leroy, 
organizational efforts against the Vietminh stopped short of effec­
tive mobilization of popular support. In both of these exceptional 
cases it is interesting to note the following: first, vigorous native 
leaders (quasi-native in the case of Leroy) played an important 
role; and second, the character of mobilization was positive and 
reformist, more than it was repressive.43 Would community political-
military organization throughout Indochina have defeated the Viet­
minh? Most probably not, for the weakness and vicissitudes of 
French policy and its feeble political appeal in Indochina would 
have limited the success of such an enterprise, except perhaps in 
the strong Catholic areas within North Vietnam. 
The program of community organization and mobilization 
launched in Algeria in 1955 was far more systematic than anything 
attempted in Indochina. Given the serious shortage of civil admin­
istrators in Algeria,44 the high proportion of pieds noirs in the 
Algerian civil service, the reluctance of civil servants in France to 
go to a war-torn country,45 the dominance of narrow colonialist 
interests in local government councils,46 and the constant threat 
of terrorist and guerrilla attacks, government officials had little 
choice but to call on the military for help, at least in rural areas. 
Governor General Jacques Soustelle, the anthropologist turned poli­
tician, began what was, in effect, a revival and an expansion of a 
century-old institution—the Bureaux Arabes. It was in 1833, three 
years after the French conquest of Algiers, that Captain Lamori­
ciere had headed the first Bureau Arabe, an early effort to spread 
French administration into the hinterland.47 Eleven years later the 
Bureaux Arabes were extended to the whole of occupied Algeria by 
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Marshal Bugeaud. They were later subjected to attack and revision, 
but they survived to serve as the model for a similar system of 
military administration in Tunisia after 1881 and Morocco after 
1911.48 The Bureau Arabe officer was expected to do more than 
simply maintain order with the aid of his small body of native 
troops: he was expected to take the lead as well in directing eco­
nomic and hygienic improvements within his district—all with due 
regard for local tradition. Within Algeria the system continued in 
force under various names until 1945, when it was dismantled 
everywhere but in the Saharan regions. 
"Saharan Affairs Officers*' had dropped in number to only 75 by 
1950;49 but the still-familiar concept of the officer-administrator 
facilitated the creation in September, 1955, of Specialized Adminis­
trative Sections (SAS), designed to extend an effective local French 
administration to threatened areas.50 According to official figures, 
the corps of SAS officers increased from 160 in January, 1956, to 
1,287 by the end of 1959.51 Alongside 661 noncoms and 2,921 
civilian specialists, these officers manned a total of 660 sections 
in Algeria in that year.52 Aided by a doctor (often a military 
doctor), a social assistant, a small security force recruited locally 
(the Maghzen), and sometimes a few civil servants, the SAS officer 
put men to work on road construction and other public projects, 
opened schools (often with the help of military personnel as teach­
ers ), expanded medical assistance, and began to rebuild community 
life. By the end of 1958, 1,023 soldier-teachers were teaching 58,641 
pupils in 752 schools; over 400 military doctors and a number of 
civilian doctors under the SAS handled 940,000 free medical visits 
each month; a thousand Moslem sports directors had been trained; 
and 407 public-works projects were operating under military di­
rection.53 Even many of those who are generally most critical of 
French pacification in Algeria have kind words for SAS officers and 
their efforts in education, medical care, and community devel­
opment.54 
SAS officers necessarily gave attention to the collection of intelli­
gence and to the registration and control of all local residents. 
Under the guidance of the Fifth (psychological-action) Bureau, 
they also created and maintained numerous organizations within 
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the Moslem population, notably among youth, women, and veter­
ans.55 As a rule, however, SAS officers were inspired less by the 
theory of "parallel hierarchies" than by the tradition of Gallieni and 
Lyautey, the two most famous French colonial generals of the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In Indochina from 1893-96 
and then in Madagascar from 1896-1905, Gallieni perfected the 
"splash of oil" (tdche d'huile) strategy of pacification, whereby 
through arming loyal villagers, winning the confidence of the local 
population, and increasing economic prosperity in the pacified zone, 
he prepared the population in progressively larger areas in turn to 
accept French authority. Lyautey described the "Methode Gallieni" 
(which Lyautey made his own) as consisting "less in military op­
erations than in an organization in movement."56 This tradition 
was undeniably paternalistic and authoritarian; but it was infinitely 
more humane than either military pacification—or rather repression 
—in Algeria or the parallel-hierarchies school. 
There is good reason to believe that the work of the French 
Specialized Administrative Sections in outlying areas, and that of 
the similar Urban Administrative Sections after 1957, was aimed 
accurately at one of the major roots of rebellion. If Professor Bour­
dieu is correct, as he very likely is, if rebellion in Algeria was fed 
by "the overthrow of a vital order and the collapse of a whole world 
of values" 57—if the rebel, more than the non-rebel, was uprooted 
and adrift—then it appears inescapable that pacification could suc­
ceed only by integrating rebels and potential rebels into a modern­
izing community.58 
Clearly, the task of the SAS was immeasurably complicated by 
(a) the presence in Algeria of over a million European settlers 
intent on preserving their privileges, (b) uncontrolled military re­
pression, and (c) the majority population's being of a different race 
and culture. Many French officers, and especially those in the 
SAS, were quite aware that if the army was to win, it would have 
to lead its own social and economic revolution in Algeria to bring 
education, health, dignity, and a greater measure of prosperity to 
the Algerian masses. For example, a commander of a pro-French 
Moslem commando unit conceived in this manner of the motiva­
tions of his men, all of whom were former rebels: 
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We do not hide it; we all are revolutionaries. These men joined 
the ranks of the rebellion pushed by a revolutionary will which, 
though badly defined, was singularly violent. The rebellion disap­
pointed and deceived them. With us, they know that they will 
carry out that revolution which the FLN is incapable of accom­
plishing.59 
The vast resettlement program which emptied well over a million 
people from mountainous and border areas into fortified villages 
was inspired, not only by military considerations, but also by the 
desire to organize and integrate the Moslem masses into tightly-knit, 
modernizing communities.60 Unfortunately for the French, the most 
uprooted and educated elements of Moslem society, i.e., those most 
eager for modernization, had for the most part either emigrated 
to the cities or joined the rebels. As Bourdieu discovered, French 
officers too often attempted rigidly and unsuccessfully to impose 
a more modern, Western style of life (built around uniform houses, 
on straight streets, with a war memorial in the village center) 
upon the most traditional people in all of Algeria.61 
Yet, despite Bourdieu's uniform condemnation of military au­
thoritarianism and intolerance in the resettlement program, SAS 
officers were very different in their approaches to the problem.62 
Some were career officers, others reservists. All were left with wide 
local initiative. Their styles ranged from totalitarian to liberal 
reformist. All in all, the work of the Specialized Administrative 
Sections provided a number of bright spots in a pacification effort 
that was otherwise depressingly gloomy. One early practitioner and 
student of community organization for "self-defense': in Cambodia, 
Captain Andre Souyris, is probably correct when he argues that 
organization on a community level is the ideal point of entry in 
combining a strong political appeal with economic and political 
reforms and eventually with a local self-defense organization. In 
this manner, Souyris concludes, the vicious circle in which 
a government is caught: reestablish order before granting reforms 
or grant reforms before reestablishing order, can be broken."63 
Restoration of order can proceed together with supporting reforms 
to meet real grievances and to reintegrate wavering elements of 
the community. 
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Despite the extension of military control to the fields of admin­
istration and propaganda, especially after May 13, 1958, the French 
pacification effort never achieved that unity of conception and 
command which is crucial in war against a revolutionary-guerrilla 
enemy.64 Conflict rather frequently arose between officers intent 
upon exercising ever broader powers and civil administrators 
jealous of authority which they often had no means to enforce. 
Once involved in administrative responsibilities themselves, officers 
like Colonel Roger Barberot (who also clashed with the military 
high command over its resort to strong-arm police tactics) often 
became impatient with the civil administration for its red tape, its 
eternal procrastination, and its excessive centralization.65 There was, 
for example, the captain who wrote in 1959 that ". . . mention of 
a civilian administration is enough to bristle the hairs of any sol­
dier." 66 Beyond their frequent differences in basic outlook and 
operating procedure, military commanders and civil administrators 
often clashed on such specific questions as judicial restraints, 
civilian-run detention centers, and the government's social-welfare 
program, with its centres sociaux.67 
While it is undeniable that pacification suffered from a lack of 
unity of command and a lack of clear policy goals and guidelines 
from Paris, the unification of civil and military powers under Gen­
eral Salan in May, 1958, produced no miraculous improvement.68 
When General Maurice Challe replaced Salan in December, 1958, 
the rebel bands were as strong as ever.69 In fact, pacification suf­
fered, not only from civil-military rifts, but also from confusion 
in military circles regarding proper strategy against the F.L.N. and 
the absence of tight, unified controls over units in the field. One of 
the problems, as Gallieni and Lyautey had warned over half a 
century before, lay in the Bureaux Arabes concept, which called 
for separation of territorial military administrators from regular 
troop commanders and, hence, the establishment of a troublesome 
dualism within the army.70 Again, in Algeria as in Indochina, mili­
tary operations often cleared out rebel bands but in doing so 
alienated the local population to the extent that the rebel organiza­
tion and military effort soon reappeared stronger than ever. 
It was probably inevitable that the political assignments of a 
great number of officers in Algeria—SAS officers, psychological­
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action officers, officers engaged in police duties (like those of the 
Tenth Paratroop Division), and many regular combat officers— 
would further erode the traditional value of political neutrality 
among professional officers. The objectives of war have always been 
political. Now the means as well had become deeply political as 
each officer—indeed, each soldier—was called upon to be a gov­
ernment propagandist and a jack-of-all-trades. The old military 
values associated with the traditional cavalry commander seemed 
almost beside the point to officers like Captain Estoup of the First 
Foreign Legion Paratroop Regiment. When brought to trial for his 
participation in the military revolt of April, 1961, Estoup replied: 
I was never taught at Saint-Cyr to organize the provisioning of 
fruits and vegetables for a city like Algiers. On January 2, 1957, 
I received the order to do so. 
I was never taught at Saint-Cyr to do the work of a police inspec­
tor. In February, 1959, in September and October, I received the 
order to do so. 
I was never taught at Saint-Cyr how to exercise the functions of 
Prefect of Police for a population of about 30,000 inhabitants. In 
January, February, March, 1957, I received the order to do so. 
I was never taught at Saint-Cyr to set up the embryo of a munici­
pality, to open schools, to open a market. In the Fall of 1959 I 
received the order to do so. 
I was never taught at Saint-Cyr to disperse insurgent citizens by 
political means. In February, 1960, I received the order to do so. 
I was never taught at Saint-Cyr to defy my comrades or my 
leaders.71 
With new functions came an evolution in military values: if war 
could no longer be won militarily, then was not the officer allowed, 
even obligated, to exert political pressure when necessary to fulfil 
his original mission—the protection of the national territory? So 
it seemed to many.72 
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Clearly, the deeply political nature of the army's assigned tasks 
in Algeria tended to draw military men into the political realm. 
Yet the mixture of military and political roles was not in itself suffi­
cient to produce a praetorian army. The officer-administrator was 
less prominent than were paratroop, Foreign Legion, and psycho­
logical-action officers in the April putsch of 1961, when military 
sector commanders in Algeria were almost unanimous in their loy­
alty to the government.73 Paratroop and psychological-action officers 
had also been assigned political tasks in Algeria and had been 
deeply marked thereby. Yet war against a revolutionary-guerrilla 
enemy presents other political demands, which will be considered 
next, which placed greater stress upon civilian control in France. 
Revolutionary-guerrilla war, we have seen, is pre-eminently war 
for the "conquest" of the population, as the guerre revolutionnairc 
school often put it. And since lasting "conquest" must rest on con­
sent as well as on force, at least outside a totalitarian setting, it is 
of critical importance that adversaries convince the population of 
their unflinching determination to carry the battle to victory and 
to honor all commitments made. The least indication that the exist­
ing government might abandon its friends, renege on its promises, 
even give in to the rebellion, will immediately cast doubt over the 
whole pacification effort. For members of the target population it 
would be more than unwise to be caught in the camp of treason 
after a rebel victory. In the Algerian war in particular one might 
have hoped for leniency or even clemency if the French were to 
win; the rebel record left the Moslem friend of France with little 
such hope of mercy in case of an F.L.N. victory. 
In his testimony to the Barricades trial, paratroop Colonel Joseph 
Broizat told of his experience in visiting a village in Algeria where 
a French second lieutenant had just been killed. "I was able to 
question the men, Broizat related: 
They told me, "What do you want us to do? We are forced to help 
them. If France remains, we will always manage! If they come 
back, they will cut off our heads!" And they told me, "You, you 
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don't give a damn! You will leave for Paris with your wife and 
children. It isn't your wife who will have her head sliced off, it 
isn't your house that will burn, it isn't your children who will have 
their throats cut, it's mine!"74 
Hence, the vital importance of a clear show of strength and con­
sistent determination to win if the French were to rally the popula­
tion to their active support. 
Especially when the defending government is a colonial govern­
ment, the vision of a bright tomorrow within the government pro­
gram must be supported with consistent statements and actions 
if it is to hold any lasting appeal. The colonial government has less 
to lose than a native defending government and will be more sub­
ject to suspicions of a weakening will. As Brian Crozier has put it, 
"When the question, 'Is it worth it?' begins to be asked, the terror­
ists are winning. When the answer is 'No,' they have won." 75 The 
British were "defeated" in Palestine, in the Suez Zone, and in 
Cyprus by terrorist tactics alone—simply because the prize was 
not worth greater sacrifice to them. The French in Algeria did not 
lose so much as they failed to win and finally tired of the costs of 
interminable war. Mao warned that revolutionary victory could be 
achieved only after regular rebel armies entered the fray.76 He was 
correct only when the defending government is relatively strong 
and determined. Victory in any war is psychological, as well as 
military, in that it comes when one side feels the fight is no longer 
worth the likely rewards and gives up. This psychological factor is 
much more important in revolutionary-guerrilla war, where the 
visible signs of who is winning are obscure and difficult to read. 
Huntington has expressed it concisely and well: "Whichever side 
can convince the target group that it is winning is in fact winning."77 
Promises of reform and even reform action are of little avail 
unless the government succeeds in building public confidence in 
its word, its good will, and its determination to win. The successful 
experience of Marshal Papagos against the Greek communist rebel­
lion and, especially, that of Ramon Magsaysay against the Huks in 
the Philippines demonstrate the key role of credibility and determi­
nation in defense against a revolutionary-guerrilla enemy. In these 
instances credibility was in good measure the product of a dynamic, 
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even a charismatic style of leadership, which was rare in the 
French camp after 1945.78 The political system must be strong 
enough and stable enough to produce and support such a leader. 
Resident Minister for Algeria Robert Lacoste fully understood 
the crucial importance of credibility in revolutionary-guerrilla war 
when he issued his General Directive Number Five of August 12, 
1957: 
Confidence, that is the key word of this summer of 1957. . . . 
[With it, all is saved.] On the other hand, if we should falter, if 
the French by their behavior, their attitude, their statements allow 
it to be believed that a tired France is refusing the effort imposed 
upon her, is betraying her duties by desertion, then we will see our 
adversaries renew their hopes, their intrigues, their efforts, and 
multiply their crimes.79 
Such a warning from the pen of the government's socialist minister 
in Algeria was aimed at Paris, as well as at the army in Algeria.80 
Given the retention of French sovereignty in Algeria as a fixed 
goal, Lacoste's warning was both logical and necessary. Though 
it is likely that such a goal was no longer realistic in 1957,81 at 
least so long as France remained a liberal, democratic society, the 
internal logic of Lacoste's position was sound. In order to carry 
out an original government policy of permanent French sovereignty 
in Algeria, Lacoste was obliged to convince his civilian and mili­
tary subordinates, as well as the Moslem population, that French 
determination was boundless and the goal was worthy of all sacri­
fices. He had no difficulty in convincing the bulk of the French 
officer corps of the high stakes involved. The greater difficulty came 
in persuading all concerned, and particularly the Moslems, that 
the rumblings of the antiwar party at home did not mean a weaken­
ing of French determination. Even though the official goal of 
French Algeria remained intact, at least until 1959, domestic politi­
cal attacks on this official French position could only serve to 
strengthen the rebel hold over the Moslem population. 
In view of the primacy of consistent determination in building 
public confidence in the government against a revolutionary-guer­
rilla enemy, it is now easy to understand the fury of a large seg­
ment of the French Army at the noisy antiwar and antiarmy cam­
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paigns being waged in French political and press circles.82 As 
early as 1962 a celebrated French officer, Colonel M. de Crevecoeur, 
insisted on the primacy of determination in counterrevolutionary 
war before an audience of Ecole de Guerre officer-students: 
In the light of this psychological fact, the restrictions placed on us 
by our allies and the campaigns of abandonment in France appear to 
be much graver mistakes than those which may be made by leaders 
and subordinates in striving for victory.83 
General Vo Nguyen Giap, the Vietminh military commander, might 
well have agreed with Colonel Crevecoeur on this point, though 
the two military leaders would have clashed on the meaning of 
"justice. In his book, People's War, People's Army, Giap writes 
of his French enemy of many years: "His weak point lay in the 
unjust character of his war. As a result, he was internally divided, 
not supported by the people of his own country and did not enjoy 
the sympathy of world opinion." 84 
Again in Algeria the French Army was accused on all sides of 
fighting an "unjust" war. Again, more ferociously this time, army 
spokesmen retorted with charges of "treason' and ''subversion" 
against those Frenchmen who weakened French confidence and 
determination and gave moral support to the Algerian rebellion.85 
Among the more moderate statements were those by General 
Jacques Allard, commander of the Algiers Army Corps, and Com­
mandant Jacques Hogard, a prominent theoretician of la guerre 
revolutionnaire. In November of 1957 Allard told a SHAPE con­
ference: 
The fact that the FLN can say that there is no national unanimity in 
France for the maintenance of French Algeria is, in my opinion, 
along with aid from abroad, one of the principal causes of the 
prolongation of the struggle in Algeria.S(i 
Writing in the November, 1958, issue of the Revue militaire d'in­
formation, Hogard was more direct: 
Who does not see that the "turning point" of the Algerian War 
would be reached decisively the day when the rebels would cease 
to be encouraged, aided by certain Frenchmen of France, the day 
when the Algerian populations would finally have the certitude 
Counterinsurgency and Military Politics 189 
that France will never capitulate, will never abandon them to their 
executioners.87 
The day when the French Army could fight in distant lands 
and win without great support or sacrifice from the French gov­
ernment and population at home was now past. Given its political 
character and frequent setting in a spotlight of world attention 
and contention, war against a revolutionary-guerrilla enemy does 
not allow victory without sustained political determination. 
In view of the capital importance of clear and consistent de­
termination in winning such a war, it is understandable that 
French officers were alarmed whenever it appeared that the 
French government was about to negotiate with rebel leaders on 
grounds other than surrender. It was felt that no matter what the 
outcome, such negotiations would have the effect of raising doubts 
and, hence, of jeopardizing the government's pacification efforts. As 
a case in point, the announcement of an impending Geneva confer­
ence on Indochina in early 1954 had the dual effect of demoraliz­
ing and disintegrating the Vietnamese government units fighting 
with the French on the one hand, and of rallying and strengthening 
the Vietminh military effort on the other.88 French Commander in 
Chief Henri Navarre, who in a cable to Paris characterized the 
decision to call the Geneva conference as "catastrophic," claims 
that he was neither informed nor consulted regarding the govern­
ment's intention to negotiate.89 Even after eight years of war with 
the Vietminh, either French government officials had not yet 
learned that political and military questions could not be treated 
in separate and water-tight compartments, or they felt that civilian 
control could be assured only by presenting the army with a fait 
accompli. French negotiators at Geneva had the painful experience 
of watching the French outpost at Dien Bien Phu crumble and fall 
as the talks proceeded. France was fortunate indeed to save all of 
Vietnam below the seventeenth parallel from the Vietminh control. 
Negotiation with the Vietminh was the only means by which the 
war could be ended as the French desired. Yet resort to negotia­
tion was above all an admission that the war could not be won, 
or at least that France was weary of trying to win it. 
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Reflecting upon the French experience at Geneva in 1954, French 
military theorists of la guerre revolutionnaire concluded that one 
must avoid negotiations with a revolutionary-guerrilla enemy. "To 
negotiate as an equal with the totalitarian revolution does not end 
its venture; it only facilitates and hastens its success," wrote Major 
Hogard as his eleventh rule of counterrevolutionary war.90 Hogard's 
statement is particularly significant in that it appeared in June of 
1958 and likely was written before or during those stormy May 
days of 1958, when the army helped to overthrow the Fourth 
Republic precisely because a new Prime Minister, Pierre Pflimlin, 
was on record as favoring negotiations with the F.L.N.91 
» And, of course, the De Gaulle solution to the treize mai crisis 
only delayed the issue of negotiation. But first came De Gaulle's 
speech of September 16, 1959, in which he proposed "self-determi­
nation" as a goal of French Algerian policy: the Algerian popula­
tion was to be given an option between independence, association 
with France, or integration into France. In the army, and especially 
in paratroop and psychological-action circles, such a policy was 
frequently taken to mean the first step toward another abandon­
ment. Again, one of the most vigorous spokesmen for the militant 
French Algerian element in the army was Colonel Broizat, whose 
attitude led him eventually into the preparation of the April putsch 
and then into the O.A.S. At the Barricades trial he testified: 
What does it mean to obtain self-determination from the French 
Government if one puts himself within the framework of revolution­
ary war? It means essentially that the enemy, that is to say France, 
has agreed to envisage an outcome wherein she could be beaten; 
that is to say that she has envisaged as possible the independence 
which is the objective of the FLN. Consequently, one can say that 
victory is won, for the enemy has ceased wanting to win at all cost 
since he accepts the hypothesis that he might be defeated.92 
At that same trial General Jacques Faure was equally hostile to 
the self-determination policy: 
. . . September 16, 1959, marks the date, the point of departure 
of all the uncertainties and all the fears, and one has to have lived 
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through that period as we have, in positions of responsibility, to 
measure its difficulties.93 
In fact, neither the French government nor the majority of the 
French population were willing to win "at all cost." The results 
of the referendum of January 8, 1961, were convincing proof of a 
majority will to end the war, even at the sacrifice of French sov­
ereignty over Algeria. 
Yet Broizat was right so long as the French war goal remained 
the retention of French Algeria. As General Challe claimed in his 
own trial after the April putsch of 1961, De Gaulle's admission of 
an "Algerian Algeria" on November 4, 1960, was undoubtedly taken 
in Moslem circles as evidence of waning French determination.94 
A French government policy of self-determination and negotiation 
finally allowed the F.L.N. to extend its control over virtually the 
whole of a long-hesitant Moslem population. When the F.L.N. 
staged massive street demonstrations and riots in Algiers in De­
cember, 1960, the green and white flag of the rebellion was allowed 
to wave virtually undisturbed by a French administration which 
had almost ceased to wage war.95 
In the Challe trial and again briefly in the Salan trial, the 
accused and their defenders made much of the still mysterious 
Si Salah affair in 1960 and its implications for negotiations in 
revolutionary-guerrilla war.96 Colonel Si Salah was the commander 
of "Wilaya 4," the province-sized F.L.N. administrative area which 
surrounded a smaller F.L.N. administrative area labeled the 
"Autonomous Zone of Algiers. In March, 1960, he and his col­
leagues apparently contacted French authorities in the hope of 
ending the war. Si Salah, his executive officer (Major Si Moham­
med), and Captain Si Lakdar all are said to have visited Paris in 
June, 1960, to arrange for a peace settlement within the context of 
De Gaulle's earlier offer of amnesty to the rebels—all without the 
approval of the F.L.N. provisional government in Tunis. No word 
was heard from them after their return to Algeria. Then, according 
to Challe, the French learned that Si Mohammed had reversed his 
position, killed Si Salah and many of his supporters, and taken 
control of Wilaya 4.97 Challe and other French military officers 
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involved in the exchange were convinced that De Gaulle's appeal 
of June 14, 1960, to rebel leaders in Tunis for negotiations, and 
subsequent announcement of a forthcoming French-F.L.N. con­
ference at Melun, had in effect undermined the position of Si Salah 
and precluded a major, and perhaps a conclusive, French victory.98 
Despite the tribunal's reply to Challe that the F.L.N. provisional 
government in Tunis simply caught up with Si Salah," it is most 
probable that a French policy of negotiation with the provisional 
government gave courage to his enemies within the A.L.N. and 
disheartened his supporters. An appeal for negotiation on grounds 
other than surrender could only strengthen the rebel hand. That 
fact was well understood by angry and militant French Algerian 
partisans in the army.100 
One final political characteristic of revolutionary-guerrilla war 
which merits attention is the vital importance of political commit­
ment among troops on either side. Characteristically, rebel troops 
are strongly indoctrinated in the cause for which they are fighting. 
General Giap's statement regarding political commitment is of 
particular interest in view of the fanatical fighting spirit of his 
Vietminh troops: 
Profound awareness of the aims of the Party, boundless loyalty to 
the cause of the nation and the working class, and a spirit of 
universal sacrifice are fundamental questions for the Army and 
questions of principle. Therefore, the political work in its ranks is 
of the first importance. It is the soul of the army. 101 
Must a defending army be similarly indoctrinated and dedicated? 
The answer must depend upon two major factors: the kind of 
troops in question, particularly the extent of their professional 
training and the strength of their esprit de corps, and the degree 
to which they are given political responsibilities. Well-disciplined, 
highly professional troops (e.g., the U. S. Marines or the French 
paratroopers in Indochina) will usually fight well out of esprit de 
corps, with no need for ideological commitment—so long as they 
are confined to action against rebel bands. Even here, of course, 
troops unaware of the political stakes involved may do serious 
harm by alienating the native population. 
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If the troops in question are not highly professional, they most 
probably will need a strong political commitment, even if they 
are confined to strictly military tasks. To be sure, the experience 
of World War II (despite the strong ideological overtones of that 
struggle) demonstrated that troops often derive their fighting spirit 
more from small peer-group support and pressure than from ideo­
logical commitment.102 In the intense political conflict of revolu­
tionary-guerrilla war, however, the experience of defending troops 
in Greece, the Philippines, Cuba, and Indochina (both under the 
French and more recently) demonstrates that in order to face up 
to an inspired enemy, in order to weather the storm of his psycho­
logical-warfare attacks (your war is unjust, criminal, imperialist), 
the non-professional defending soldier must have a fairly clear 
notion of why he is fighting. Often dispersed in relatively small, 
unmechanized units in difficult terrain, he may shy away from 
combat and retreat when attacked unless, like his adversary, he 
has some of the qualities of the crusader as well as those of the 
soldier. 
The true novelty of revolutionary-guerrilla war, of course, 
lies not in its highly ideological and propagandistic character, but 
in its primary target—the population. If, as in the Algerian war, 
defending soldiers are asked by their government also to be political 
organizers and propagandists, they must understand the political 
goals of the war and believe fervently in them. How else can they 
hope to compete with the rebel soldier-militant in appealing for 
popular loyalty and confidence and in guiding their own actions 
in terms of political as well as military goals? 103 
In the early days of the Algerian war military students of revo­
lutionary-guerrilla war began insisting that the French Army could 
not be effective against the F.L.N. without a doctrine, a faith, or 
at the very least, a deep attachment to clear and consistent political 
goals for which it supposedly was fighting.104 Even an early critic 
of French Algerian policy, Raymond Aron, found the "politiciza­
tion" of the French Army quite normal: " . .  . Perhaps this is the 
essential: one cannot lead a war against a nationalist rebellion 
without a political conception."105 Aron's conclusion is correct, 
though his statement would have been more accurate had he in­
sisted on the revolutionary-guerrilla style of the F.L.N., rather 
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than its nationalist fervor. Support for the same argument (as 
applied to revolutionary-guerrilla war) comes from Samuel P. 
Huntington, the staunch defender of "objective civilian control" 
of a strictly apolitical military establishment. In "domestic war," 
Huntington agrees, the only effective solution is "subjective civilian 
control," whereby the soldier is motivated primarily by belief in 
the political cause which he is defending, rather than simply by his 
professional sense of duty.106 The recent history of revolutionary-
guerrilla war points to the rather clear conclusion that defense 
against a revolutionary-guerrilla enemy cannot be effective and 
lasting unless political action is combined with military action. 
And defending troops will fail in their political-military missions, 
or will ruin the political work of civilian organizers and propa­
gandists, unless they know why the war is being fought and what 
promise victory holds. 
It is obvious, especially in a liberal democracy, that political 
indoctrination of defending troops raises serious problems con­
cerning the delineation of an official "doctrine' and then control 
over its uses and abuses. As will be seen in the following chapter, 
such problems helped to undermine civilian control of the French 
Army in Algeria. 
Convinced that the army's political work in Algeria was insuf­
ficient so long as the French population and the French government 
seemed unwilling to maintain French Algeria at all costs, spokes­
men for a growing military faction began pleading that the army 
should now play a leading political role within France herself. 
As indicated earlier,107 the demand for a new political role for the 
army arose in part from a widespread military belief that the 
French civilian population was defeatist and sick, rotted" (pourri) 
by communist and progressiste propaganda, leaving the army as 
the sole remaining guardian of the national patrimony. At least as 
significant as a reason for changing military attitudes in this respect, 
however, was the political nature of revolutionary-guerrilla war, 
which rendered public support and determination of vital im­
portance to the counterrevolutionary campaign. General Jean 
Valluy put it aptly: "I am told, 'Let the Army do its job and be 
victorious. But precisely, success has become political." 108 
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One of the earliest and boldest pleas came from the pen of 
General L. M. Chassin in an article written in 1954 entitled "On 
the Ideological Role of the Army. 
It is time that the Army ceased to be the Great Mute. The time has 
come for the free world, if it is not to die a violent death, to apply 
certain of the methods of its enemy. But one of these methods—and 
without doubt the most important—resides in the ideological role 
which, behind the iron curtain, is given to military forces.109 
Lacking effective civic education from other institutions, Chassin 
argued, the citizen-soldier must be prepared by the army for 
ideological warfare through a three-month period of civic instruc­
tion in the strengths of Western values (justice, liberty, the rights 
of man) and the evils of communism (its effects on family and on 
individual liberty). 
As we shall see later, the preoccupation with a Western political 
and philosophical doctrine and with the army's role in spreading 
that doctrine, a preoccupation seen in Chassin, in army Chief of 
Staff Andre Zeller, and in the growing guerre revolutionnaire school 
generally, stemmed not only from the political nature of revolu­
tionary-guerrilla war, but even more from a tendency to identify 
all revolutionary anticolonial enemies with international com­
munism.110 Nevertheless, apart from the communist threat, revo­
lutionary-guerrilla war in itself demanded clear objectives on the 
part of the defending government and a strong political conscious­
ness on the part of defending troops. This theme is a central and 
recurring one in the French military press, as well as in the court 
testimony of a host of officers.111 Had the French Army not ex­
perienced long and direct involvement in a highly political form of 
war, other factors pushing toward politicization would not have 
produced military disobedience and revolt. 
By rendering impossible clearcut military victories, by finally 
forcing the transformation of French officers into policemen, 
propagandists, civil administrators, political organizers, and ideolo­
gists, France's revolutionary-guerrilla adversaries of sixteen years 
seriously undermined the power of that old and usually respected 
adage that Tofficier ne fait pas de politique." What lessons for 
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civil-military relations are suggested by the French experience 
with revolutionary-guerrilla war? 
Clearly, an effective response to a revolutionary-guerrilla enemy 
must join with military action a determined, concerted, and con­
sistent program of political action, including reforms to meet real 
grievances, political propaganda, political organization, and fre­
quently, troop indoctrination. In the midst of terrorism and guer­
rilla activity it is probably unrealistic to expect that civilian civil 
servants in sufficient numbers can handle all of even the most 
obviously political aspects of the government's counterinsurgency 
campaign. Two critical problems arise as a result of the inevitable 
involvement of the defending army in such a political program. 
The first problem involves changes in government goals as the 
war proceeds. As we have seen, war goals must not only be clear, 
consistent, and backed with determination; they must also be 
accepted and believed by the defending army, which must spread 
public confidence in them. If the government later changes those 
goals, as Pflimlin was suspected of intending in May, 1958, and as 
De Gaulle actually did after September, 1959, the army may well 
reply with wrathful charges of defeatism, abandonment, and be­
trayal. When a large segment of the army believes the original 
goals to be vital to the preservation of the nation as they conceive 
of it, wrath may turn to disobedience and revolt, as in France. 
Those French officers who were most deeply affected by the 
Indochinese and Algerian wars have often argued that once the 
army has been assigned its mission, the government must desist 
from tampering with that mission until the war is won.112 
There is no easy solution to this problem, certainly not a return 
to the notion of a completely non-political military sphere. On the 
contrary, as a beginning the defending government might provide 
military leaders and cadre with an early and continuing exposition 
of government goals and their relative priority, allowing for the 
possibility of future change. Admittedly, great care would have to 
be exercised to avoid weakening general confidence in the govern­
ment and its will to win. Moreover, such an approach assumes a 
certain stability and continuity in policy formulation. 
A second difficult problem arising out of the political nature of 
revolutionary-guerrilla war, one which will be explored in the 
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following chapter, involves a situation (such as that in France 
from 1946-58) where government is too weak and too unstable to 
formulate a clear, coherent, and determined policy, complete with 
specific operational objectives for the army. Once the defending 
army realizes the importance of clear and consistent objectives, it 
will be sorely tempted to fill the vacuum with objectives of its own 
conception. Such was the case in France. When former army Chief 
of Staff Andre Zeller presented the case for a more active political 
role for the army in April, 1957, he dismissed the danger of 
praetorianism, but added significantly: "In any case, military dic­
tatorship results less from the ambition of a leader than from the 
infirmity of existing institutions." m There is some truth in Zeller's 
words, despite their in appropriateness from the pen of an eminent 
military leader at a time when the "infirmity'' of the Fourth Repub­
lic was already being discussed in military circles.114 In order to 
view the political demands of revolutionary-guerrilla war in an 
explosive French setting, we must turn in the following chapter 
to an examination of French political weakness, instability, and 
immobilism in the conduct of recent colonial wars. 
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Part IV





"Immobilisme" and Delegation of Power 
In no area of public policy were the legendary weakness and 
instability of the French Fourth Republic more dangerous than 
in the field of colonial policy. The general story of that instability 
is too well known to bear lengthy retelling here.1 In brief, a system 
of multiple, doctrinaire parties resting on a political society which 
lacked broad political consensus, combined with a traditional 
parliamentary suspicion of strong popular executives, produced a 
series of hamstrung coalition governments with an average 
longevity of eight months. Public policy under "le systeme," or 
"le regime des partis," as its opponents referred to it, was char­
acterized, not so much by discontinuity, as by procrastination and 
immobility. There were occasional breakthroughs, among them the 
successes of Pierre Mendes-France in ending the Indochinese war 
and setting Tunisia and Morocco on the road to independence, 
and the decision (in 1957) to join the Common Market. In the 
main, however, the system rewarded cautious diplomats and tem­
porizers like Henri Queuille and banished dynamic and popular 
leaders like Mendes-France (who as Prime Minister ignored the 
rules of the parliamentary game in appealing directly for popular 
support). 
The fragmented French National Assembly followed a pattern 
often typical of factious parliaments: negative agreement came 
easily, but positive agreement on an alternative government or 
policy was extremely difficult to attain. Colonial wars in Indochina 
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and Algeria deepened the persistent divisions between parties, 
opened new cleavages within parties, and played a direct or indirect 
part in the fall of sixteen of the Fourth Republic's eighteen gov­
ernments.2 Civil servants carried on as governments rose and fell, 
but administrators could not initiate the bold new policies which 
alone could have avoided lengthy and futile wars in Indochina 
and Algeria. In the absence of vigorous governmental leadership 
from Paris, local French settlers and administrators in Indochina 
and Algeria tended to wield disproportional influence in shaping 
French policy in those areas. The French political system was not 
conducive to the organization of potential majorities capable of 
challenging vested colonial interests. 
Within this picture of hobbled governmental authority and 
lengthy colonial wars must be fitted an additional element—the 
French tradition of rather extensive autonomy for the army in 
colonial service. Such famed military colonizers as Lyautey and 
Gallieni left behind a legacy of independence and occasional dis­
obedience of governmental authorities. De Gaulle, the greatest of 
modern French military rebels, had that legacy in mind when he 
wrote in the early 1930's, " . .  . Those who accomplish something 
great often must pay no heed to the appearances of a false dis­
cipline." 3 The memory of such a legacy facilitated military chal­
lenges to civilian control during the Algerian war, when civil-
military tensions were great and governmental authority danger­
ously weak. 
One of the most striking and tragic features of the Indochinese 
war was the complete inability of the French government to decide 
upon the objectives for which the war was being fought. To be 
sure, De Gaulle had suggested limited local autonomy in March, 
1945, and on March 6, 1946, French representatives recognized a 
"free" Republic of Vietnam within the Indochinese Federation and 
the larger French Union.4 Yet the crucial question of the limits of 
local freedom remained unanswered by a chain of virtual care­
taker governments in Paris. The policy vacuum left by indecision 
and weakness in Paris had two effects: it encouraged unauthorized 
initiatives by French officials in Indochina, and it frustrated a 
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French Army which could not defeat its revolutionary-guerrilla 
enemy without a clear alternative political program. 
Soon after French representatives arrived in Indochina in the 
late summer of 1945, there emerged two divergent points of view 
in official French circles on the scene. The new high commissioner 
and commander in chief, Admiral Georges Thierry d'Argenlieu, 
was a Gaullist of 1940 who now came under the influence of local 
French administrators intent upon turning back the Indochinese 
clock to 1939 and unchallenged French supremacy.5 In contrast, 
the commander of French Army forces in Indochina, General 
Philippe Leclerc, and the French commissioner for North Indo­
china, Jean Sainteny, were convinced that a new form of Viet­
namese-French association was needed to respond to a genuine 
and widespread Vietnamese nationalist sentiment.6 
Rather than launch a war which they feared would be long and 
bitter, Leclerc and Sainteny preferred negotiation with the gov­
ernment of Ho Chi Minh on the basis of Vietnamese self-govern­
ment. Summarizing the situation as of April 30, 1946, Leclerc 
reported: 
Nonetheless, negotiations and agreements are necessary; it is no 
longer a question at this hour of imposing ourselves by force on 
masses who desire evolution and change. If not, no slackening of 
our military effort will be possible for a long time." 
The prospect of Vietnamese self-government struck terror in the 
hearts of the French administrators in Saigon, who encouraged 
D'Argenlieu to undermine and sabotage a negotiated settlement.8 
The admiral proceeded to do just that, especially after the agree­
ment of March 6, 1946, was concluded between Sainteny and 
Ho Chi Minh.9 Though that agreement clearly called for an 
eventual referendum to determine the fate of Annam (Central 
Vietnam) and Cochin China (Southern Vietnam), D'Argenlieu 
considered it to be a strictly local North Vietnamese accord and 
won the agreement in principle of Overseas Minister Marius Moutet 
for the creation of a "free state of Cochin China." 10 On May 30, 
1946. D'Argenlieu acted without instructions in recognizing the 
creation of the "Republic of Cochin China,' thereby presenting 
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the French government in Paris and its expected guest, Ho Chi 
Minh, with a serious fait accompli.11 Delay and indecision in Paris 
had prompted the admiral's move, which went unpunished and 
almost unnoticed. 
In the course of the Fontainbleau conference, held with French 
and Vietnamese representatives in the summer of 1946, Pham Van 
Dong asked, with good reason, who spoke for France—her repre­
sentatives in Saigon or those in the metropole?12 Negotiations at 
Fontainbleau all but collapsed over the definition of "independence"' 
and the fate of Cochin China. Finally, on September 14, 1946, 
Ho Chi Minh signed a limited, desperation agreement which bound 
the Vietminh to end the hostilities which had broken out in the 
south and to safeguard French economic interests and customs 
control. 
In Vietnam the absence of firm policy guidance from Paris 
worked to the advantage of the D'Argenlieu group. The French 
Expeditionary Corps, which the admiral had long wished to throw 
against the Vietminh,13 at last had its chance in late November, 
1946, when a clash between French troops and Vietminh militia 
over French customs control led to a general French bombardment 
of Haiphong. Part of the responsibility for the generalization of 
that conflict—the actual beginning of the Indochinese war—must 
be assigned to the local French commander, Colonel Debes, who 
first sent tanks against Vietminh militia and then refused to apply 
a truce agreement reached by his superiors in Hanoi.14 Yet if 
General Morliere, acting French commissioner in Tonkin, was 
fearful of the consequences of Debes' actions, the Haiphong com­
mander received full support and encouragement from Saigon. On 
November 22 the order came from the French expeditionary corps 
commander and acting high commissioner, General Jean Valluy, 
that "by all means at your disposal you must make yourself the 
complete master of Haiphong and bring the commanders of the 
Vietnamese [Vietminh] Army to repentence."15 
Admiral d'Argenlieu was at that time absent from Indochina, 
leading a vigorous anti-Vietminh campaign in press and political 
circles in Paris, where the French elections of November 10, 1946, 
had left the government headed by Georges Bidault in a tempo­
"lmmobUisme" and Delegation of Power 211 
rary caretaker position. On November 23, D'Argenlieu persuaded 
the Interministerial Committee for Indochina to support the use 
of force, if necessary, against any breech of faith. But that very 
day French naval artillery was already flattening large sections of 
Haiphong (on orders from Debes) and killing an estimated six 
thousand persons.16 A further French ultimatum to the Vietminh 
followed, and when Jean Sainteny returned from Paris to his post 
as French commissioner for Tonkin in early December, 1946, the 
Haiphong bombardment had created a situation in which com­
promise was impossible and general war inevitable. 
Lest D'Argenlieu, Valluy, and their civil-servant advisers be 
taken too readily as the villains of the piece, it need be added 
that they were quite right in asserting that the Vietminh was 
under communist leadership. Nor should these events of 1945-46 
be taken as clear evidence of military ascendancy in political 
affairs. Leclerc, the first French Army commander in Indochina, 
vigorously opposed D'Argenlieu, who, as high commissioner, was 
inspired and supported primarily by civilian civil servants.17 It 
would not be fair to say that it was the French Army which chose 
to fight a war in Indochina.18 What is of greatest interest here is 
the manner in which local French officials committed the nation 
to war while the Paris government remained virtually a passive 
spectator, incapable of setting guidelines for French policy in 
Indochina.19 
If in hindsight D'Argenlieu must be credited with understanding 
the communist nature of Vietminh leadership and the ultimate 
futility of negotiations aimed at preserving an important degree of 
French influence,20 he must equally be saddled with major re­
sponsibility for French failure to envisage a viable alternative to 
Vietminh rule. Puppet Vietnamese governments would hardly do; 
yet that was the best the admiral and his advisers had to offer.21 
Leclerc spoke wisely in January, 1947, when he said, "Anticom­
munism will be a lever without a fulcrum so long as the national 
problem goes unresolved." 22 In the years after 1946, division and 
hesitation in Paris combined with strong pressure from colonist 
and administrative circles in Saigon to delay and impede move­
ment toward Vietnamese independence under a non-communist 
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government; that goal alone would have made victory over the 
Vietminh possible. As a result, French policy in Indochina was 
the slave of events, rather than their master. When the prospect of 
Vietnamese independence began to take on greater reality in the 
early 1950's, it was too late: the French had already thoroughly 
discredited Emperor Bao Dai by starring him in a futile attempt 
at puppetry. 
In the context of revolutionary-guerrilla war the absence of at­
tractive French war goals (in fact, the absence of any clear goals), 
division and evasion of responsibility in guidance and conduct of 
the war,23 and profound political dissension in Paris concerning 
French policy in Indochina—all served to make the French Army's 
assigned task a hopeless and frustrating one. To be sure, despite 
Navarre's apologies, French military commanders (Navarre in­
cluded) were far from brilliant in their comprehension and conduct 
of the war. After the fall of Dien Bien Phu a government-appointed 
investigation commission headed by General Catroux apparently 
concluded in its secret report that immediate responsibility for that 
critical defeat lay with General Navarre and his errors of strategy.24 
In a subsequent book, however, Catroux hastened to add that the 
Laniel government and its predecessors were equally responsible 
for defeat in Indochina—responsible, among other things, for failure 
to define French objectives there.25 Taking "victory" to mean the 
creation of an independent Vietnam under a non-communist gov­
ernment closely allied with France, rather than under the Vietminh, 
Brian Crozier is correct when he writes: "In terms of results... 
the conduct of the war was almost irrelevant, for political action 
had created the conditions of defeat, not victory." 26 
The French experience in Algeria after 1954 followed a similar 
pattern. By November, 1954, the goal of a modernizing Algeria 
tied closely and permanently to France was perhaps already unat­
tainable. Again, as in Indochina, local colonial pressures and 
immobilisme in Paris were key factors in French failure to provide 
an attractive alternative to anti-French nationalism. On September 
20, 1947, when the French National Assembly adopted the Algerian 
Statute, there seemed to be hope for greater Moslem political 
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participation within legal institutions.27 A newly created Algerian 
Assembly gave equal representation to the two electoral "colleges," 
one primarily European and the other totally Moslem.28 In practice, 
however, after a frightening display of nationalist strength in the 
municipal elections of October, 1947, the exercise of the ballot was 
rigged by the administration to exclude all but a few Algerian 
nationalists.29 The Algerian Assembly, now a tool of European 
settlers and Moslem "beni-oui-ouis'' (yes men), exercised none of 
the special reform powers delegated to it in regard to local gov­
ernment, women suffrage, teaching of Arabic in the schools, and 
elimination of state controls over the Moslem religion.30 At a time 
when the Moslem population was beginning to stir under the 
pressures of urbanization, rapid population growth, agricultural 
depression, and budding nationalism, the European population in 
Algeria and the administration which it largely dominated fought 
off all challenges to their privileged position. Rigged elections and 
an immobile French government left ambitious and embittered 
Moslems with little hope for a legal enactment of the social revo­
lution which alone could begin to relieve mounting frustrations.31 
The outbreak of rebellion on November 1, 1954, failed to rouse 
Paris and Algiers out of their lethargy, though it produced a chorus 
of declarations that "Algeria is forever French" from Prime Minister 
Pierre Mendes-France and others who lived to regret their words.32 
To be sure, there were the announced reforms mentioned above:33 
easier access for Moslems into the administrative ranks, greater 
involvement of Moslems in local self-government, extension of edu­
cational opportunities, economic development, and the whole SAS 
community-development concept. Nevertheless, the French gov­
ernment failed to resolve a long-standing confusion between the 
goals of assimilation and federation, and it left the Moslem popu­
lation with no clear notion of how the new Algeria was to differ 
from the colonial society of old. Continuing dissension and in­
stability in Paris were demonstrated, for example, by the failure 
of the Edgar Faure government and the National Assembly to 
agree on anything more than short-term reforms in October, 1955.34 
And, after Faure took the fatal step on December 1, 1955, of dis­
solving the French National Assembly for the first time since 1877, 
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the newly elected legislature was more hobbled than before by 
Communists on the Left and Poujadists on the Right. 
A new government under the Socialist Guy Mollet, which was 
to last for eighteen months, rapidly proved itself as weak as its 
predecessors in facing up to the demands of the European popula­
tion in Algeria. Mollet and his intended resident minister for 
Algeria, General Georges Catroux, were suspected in Algiers of 
dangerously liberal and even capitulatory intentions.35 A hostile 
crowd of European settlers and a barrage of stones and ripe 
tomatoes directed at Mollet during a visit to Algiers on February 
6, 1956, convinced the new Prime Minister that his plans for 
Algeria would need revision. Catroux was allowed to withdraw (to 
avoid embarrassment to the government) and was replaced by 
Robert Lacoste. By capitulating to the European community in 
Algeria, Mollet lost whatever chance there might have been for a 
viable solution to the Algerian problem and thereby set the stage 
for May 13, 1958. 
Mollet and his government lasted until May, 1957, when he 
was eventually replaced by Maurice Bourges-Maunoury, who him­
self was defeated over Algerian reforms on September 30, 1957. 
Never was the colonial-policy paralysis of the Fourth Republic 
more evident than in the last year of its life, when Bourges-
Maunoury and his successor, Felix Gaillard, attempted to gain 
legislative approval for a "basic law' which would grant a degree 
of local autonomy to Algeria and political equality to its Moslem 
majority. The National Assembly eventually accepted a diluted 
basic law for Algeria on November 29, 1957; but it was only after 
bitter opposition from within the government, notably from 
Bourges-Maunoury's defense minister, Andre Morice, and a final 
admission of executive helplessness in an appeal to an extra-con­
stitutional "round table" of parties and politicians. The final legis­
lative product was hedged with so many safeguards for the 
privileges of the European minority that it was incapable of pro­
ducing an effective impact on Moslem opinion.36 
French officers who began to understand something of revolu­
tionary-guerrilla war after 1954 became increasingly impatient with 
the procrastination, confusion, and general weakness of French 
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Algerian policy. As usual, the Message des forces armees was most 
violent in its commentary. One captain wrote in February, 1956; 
We have the disarming impression that all action has become vain 
henceforth because it is sabotaged by a political "System" which 
is incapable of awakening the national consciousness and gives itself 
up to unreal games at a time when the country is in danger of 
foundering.37 
Later that same year an arrest was made which previewed the 
gravity of the threat which angry and impatient officers were soon 
to pose to the French political system. As executive officer for 
operations in the Algiers division in 1956, General Jacques Faure 
had become convinced that only by taking power directly by means 
of a coup could the army convince the Moslem population that 
France was in Algeria to stay. He contacted Colonel Robert 
Thomazo and his pied noir territorial units and Poujadist friends, 
conferred with Michel Debre and others in Paris (but got little 
encouragement), and finally, with surprising naivete, revealed his 
plans to the secretary-general of police in Algiers, Paul Teitgen. 
Teitgen tape-recorded his conversation with Faure, who was re­
called to Paris, relieved of his command, and sanctioned with 
sixty days' fortress arrest.38 
In the aftermath of Faure's arrest the editors of Message remarked 
that now, perhaps, the government would pay more heed to the 
moral crisis in the army. Claiming to speak for their fellow officers 
as well, the editorialists found 
on the part of governmental leaders a complete bankruptcy in the 
definition of war goals, in the elaboration of a general policy adapted 
to these goals, in the supply of means necessary for the battle, 
in the repression of defeatism and even of treason and in the 
formation of opinion.39 
A Message editorial of August, 1956, was more threatening in tone: 
Charged for ten years with accepting in its flesh the responsibility 
for our political errors, tossed about at the mercy of events which 
were easily foreseeable, but in which one pretended not to believe, 
badly adapted to badly defined missions, fighting all of that time 
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with more abnegation than faith, the Army, ignored in Indochina, 
humiliated in Morocco and Tunisia, will it be able to stand another 
forfeiture?40 
For many of those officers who were now interested in politics, 
governmental weakness was not only a fact to be stressed and 
protested, but also an additional and sufficient reason for the army 
to move to fill a policy vacuum.41 A Message editorial stated that 
position quite clearly in November, 1957: 
. . . Fearing that at this hour and for a long time yet nothing posi­
tive can still come from Paris, the Army is driven to finding by itself 
the roads to total victory, and not only to the military victory which 
is now within its grasp. 
As an instrument of times of crisis, the Army has the duty to 
compensate at all echelons in Algeria for a wavering authority. Why, 
for example, would it allow disembodied politicians or judges to 
impose upon it a political statute stemming more from intellectual 
acrobatics than the concrete facts of the problem?42 
A year later Message looked back at May 13, 1958, as an example 
of governmental failure to defend the nation; the army had only 
restored a "saving authority": "If this role was played by the Army 
last May it was uncontestably because she was more vividly aware 
[than other public bodies] of the gravity of the situation." 43 Clearly, 
governmental weakness and immobility under the Fourth Republic 
were critical factors in preparing military opinion for that pattern 
of delegation and usurpation of power which developed in Algeria 
after 1956. 
Temporary delegation of power was a time-honored custom for 
the French National Assembly whenever the consequences of legis­
lative immobility became too grave. The law of March 16, 1956, 
was in this tradition when it empowered the Mollet government 
to act as it saw fit in restoring order in Algeria.44 What was new, 
however, was the absence of the necessary administrative means 
in Algeria to make these powers effective. Outside the cities an 
undermanned civil administration stopped well above the local 
level, leaving in the villages only a few Moslem caids, or local ad­
ministrators, who lacked prestige and authority. Governor General 
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Jacques Soustelle remarked after a tour of the Algerian hinterland 
in 1955: 
. .  . At each step I was conscious of how great a void we had 
allowed to hollow itself out behind the decor of the regular ad­
ministration, which hovered too high while it should have clung at 
ground level with those who lived and suffered in these expanses.45 
On November 1, 1954, when the rebellion began, the sixty-five 
thousand scattered inhabitants of the Aures region were served 
by only one administrative post and fourteen gendarmes.46 
Understandably, Resident Minister Lacoste and the Mollet gov­
ernment leaned ever more heavily upon the army to administer 
Algeria. Well before the Algerian uprising of May 13, 1958 (when 
all Algerian prefects and underprefects were replaced by military 
officers), the army had been delegated full police and administra­
tive powers on the local level in almost all parts of Algeria. 
Specialized Administrative Sections (SAS) officers were under 
orders from the Directorate of Algerian Affairs, which answered 
directly to the Government Genera] in Algiers; but they were also 
under the orders of those military-sector commanders who had 
joined, and sometimes superseded, civilian underprefects in rural 
districts. At each administrative level above the local community 
(where most often there were no French civilian administrators), 
a military territorial hierarchy was constructed paralleling the civil 
administration from arrondissement (underprefect and military-
sector commander) to department (prefect and zone commander) 
to region (administrative inspector general on extraordinary mis­
sion—the "I.G.A.M.E." or "superprefect"—and corps commander) 
to Algeria as a whole (minister or governor general and supreme 
joint commander).47 In a number of arrondissements—and even 
in a few remote departments—the army assumed primary responsi­
bility in 1956 and 1957, with the civilian administrator staying on 
as deputy to the military commander.48 Even in Algiers itself, 
General Massu and his Tenth Paratroop Division had been given 
full police powers and extensive administrative functions.49 
Delegation of power, however, did not constitute an Algerian 
policy. Lacoste still faced barriers in many directions: the French 
political milieu which kept Mollet's government in power, local 
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vested interests (including the local administration), and now the 
army itself.50 The directives received by military administrators 
at the local and sector levels continued to be "vague, hesitant, con­
tradictory." 51 Moreover, despite his long tenure as resident minister 
(February, 1956, to May, 1958),52 Lacoste was helpless to suppress 
the doubts and fears about Algeria's future stirred up by political 
dissension in Paris. Within this context of chronic uncertainty, the 
delegation of propaganda responsibilities to the army in 1956-57 
was to prove an exceedingly dangerous act. 
Unlike the Americans and the British, the French had no special 
psychological-warfare service during World War II.53 Even in 
Indochina there were only a few French psychological-warfare 
specialists, and these relied upon rather standard propaganda tech­
niques. Mention has already been made, however, of the horrendous 
impact of Vietminh prison camps upon those French officers who 
were hardy enough to survive them. Military schools and the 
military press gradually began to take interest in their accounts 
of self-criticism sessions, carrot-and-stick conditioning, and con­
version' through forced progressive compromise of the prisoner.54 
An "Introductory Course in the Study of Psychological Warfare' 
was created in the Ecole de Guerre (the French war college) in 
September, 1954, though its purpose was primarily to provide 
British and American specialists in allied headquarters with trained 
French colleagues.35 More significant were the innovations of 
1956-57. A group of forty "itinerant officers' was recruited from 
among Vietminh prison-camp veterans to teach psychological-war­
fare techniques in the various military units stationed in Algeria.56 
A Psychological-Warfare Instruction Center (Centre d'Instruction 
de l'Arme Psychologique) was created in Paris in 1956 to train 
specialized officers, and, in the following year, courses on psycho­
logical warfare were introduced in all military schools.57 In Algeria, 
Resident Minister Lacoste created a Psychological-Action Com­
mittee to study reform plans within the framework of counterrevo­
lutionary-war objectives.58 Most important of all, in 1957 a Fifth 
Bureau was created in all military headquarters in Algeria to 
advise commanders on the use of "psychologal action."59 The 
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Defense Ministry's information service became the Information 
and Psychological-Action Service, under Colonel Charles Lacheroy. 
An official "provisional order" on psychological action, which 
appeared in July, 1957, under the signature of Prime Minister 
Maurice Bourges-Maunoury, announced its object as being "to 
form, develop, and sustain morale and to immunize personnel 
against enemy psychological attacks."60 The term "'psychological 
action' was customarily thought to apply to defensive action on 
one's own population and military forces, as opposed to psycho­
logical warfare which one waged against the enemy.61 In practice, 
however, the difficulty of distinguishing friend from foe in Algeria 
encouraged the use of the term ("psychological action") to describe 
such diverse techniques, wherever applied, as information, propa­
ganda, conditioning of the masses, organization of the population, 
parallel hierarchies, and "brainwashing" (or intensive individual or 
group indoctrination). 
From the standpoint of civilian control the most formidable of 
all parallel hierarchies created in Algeria was that composed of 
Fifth Bureau officers themselves. To be sure, on paper the itinerant 
officers and the loudspeakers and tract companies (C.H.P.T.) 
which formed the embryo of the Fifth Bureau were securely con­
trolled through regular command channels.62 In practice, however, 
the military high command and the commanders of units to which 
psychological-action officers were assigned frequently left them 
alone through lack of interest or knowledge. Fifth Bureau officers 
naturally turned for advice to fellow psychological-action officers 
at higher levels, thus forming a hierarchy separate from the regular 
chain of command.03 French political objectives in Algeria, we have 
seen, were ambiguous and uncertain; hence, in order to do its 
job, the Fifth Bureau picked up elements of government policy 
regarding Algeria, expanded upon them, and laid them out as a 
permanent, irrevocable statement of French intentions.64 Those 
objectives which would seem necessary to success in the eyes of 
the Fifth Bureau are easily predictable in terms of the revolution­
ary-guerrilla-war setting. First and foremost was the unnegotiable 
affirmation that Algeria was forever French; second was the assur­
ance that the Moslem population could expect equality and social 
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and economic progress. The military newspaper in Algiers, Le Bled, 
returned to these themes again and again in 1957-38.65 Other 
elements of French psychological action were more strongly 
ideological and less generally accepted; these will be reserved for 
later discussion.66 
The Fifth Bureau directed its campaigns at French Army officers 
and enlisted men, at the Moslem population, and eventually at 
the French government and population. On the national level 
Colonel Lacheroy stated in July, 1957, that the tools of psycho­
logical action included the Revue d'information militaire and Le 
Bled, the latter then having a circulation of three hundred and 
fifty thousand in four editions, including one in Arabic.67 Le Bled 
repeatedly featured French victories, French determination and 
reforms, the rallying of Moslems to the side of the French, and 
attacks upon the F.L.N. and the "Egyptian dictatorship' behind 
it.68 Basic-training centers and military schools generally (espe­
cially the Ecole de Guerre) now gave more attention to French 
values, rights, and objectives in Algeria.69 In order to reach into 
the French civilian population Colonel Lacheroy suggested in 1957 
that younger reserve officers within the National Union of Reserve 
Officers (U.N.O.R.) devote serious study to la guerre revolution­
naire. There followed, beginning in 1958, the emergence within the 
U.N.O.R. of a "young Turk" movement, which held a series of 
army-financed conferences, taking upon itself the task of interpret­
ing the army's present actions to the French population and edu­
cating the population to an awareness of the high stakes involved 
in the defense of Algeria and the deadly menace of "subversives' 
who would give up the fight.70 Meanwhile, psychological-action 
training officers in Algeria urged recalled reserve officers to carry 
on the fight for French Algeria after their release from active 
duty.71 
All newly arrived officers in Algeria received instruction in "why 
we fight" from Fifth Bureau officers at the Joan of Arc training 
camp and later at the Arzew training camp.72 Itinerant officers 
spread the message effectively throughout the army in Algeria and 
guided a program of tracts, meetings, and organization designed 
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to win over the Moslem population.73 In some internment camps 
techniques were introduced—probably by subordinates—which 
strikingly resembled brainwashing of the Chinese and Vietminh 
variety. According to a secret psychological-action circular, Moslem 
internees were to be subjected to a group method of thought 
reform in three phases, revealingly entitled: "Disintegrate the In­
dividual"; "Creation of a Collective Conscience: Reindoctrination''; 
and "Creation of the Collectivity: Reaction of the Collectivity on 
the Individual." 74 This circular and the techniques it outlined were 
suppressed after a draftee and former Catholic seminarian, Chris­
tian Bloc, sent a copy to his- clerical superiors, who apparently 
gave it to the press. (Bloc, however, was arrested for divulging 
state secrets.) 75 A number of officers continued to resist the Fifth 
Bureau's new-fangled notions about war. Yet, as Jean Planchais put 
it in 1959, "Without falling into a paradox, one could write that 
'indoctrination' succeeded best on a part of the military com­
munity." 76 
All went relatively smoothly between the Fifth Bureau and the 
government so long as Mollet, Lacoste, and others of their per­
suasion in official positions agreed with the goal of a new French 
Algeria. It was only in the spring of 1958 that the psychological-
action monster revealed that he was unleashed. Le Bled's searing 
attack on the "defeatist press' on March 12, 1958, was aimed as 
well at prospective government leaders who favored negotiation 
with the F.L.N.77 The Fifth Bureau went on to exploit and direct 
the pied noir uprising of May 13, as we shall see in the following 
chapter. By its inaction and excessive delegation in the public-
information field, the government in Paris had encouraged the 
monster 'to grow.78 Governmental leaders had failed to listen to— 
of all people—the then Captain Antoine Argoud, who in discuss­
ing psychological warfare in 1948 had warned: "It is up to it [the 
government] to take this weapon well in hand, in such a manner 
as to prevent that it be misused." ™ 
No aspect of the war in Algeria produced more passionate con­
troversy, more violent attacks on the French Army, than the 
extensive use of torture by government forces. Again, local initiative 
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and weakness of governmental controls led to a clash between 
the army and "the system." The fact of torture in Algeria is beyond 
refutation, though the number of victims is still impossible to 
determine. It is certainly safe to say that thousands of persons 
underwent torture by electric shock, beatings, hanging from the 
feet, repeated near drowning, and forced bloating with water.80 
Already in 1954 and 1955 torture was rather commonly used by the 
gendarmerie and police in Algeria and was largely unpunished by 
the administration. One inspector general of administration, Roger 
Wuillaume, reported on March 2, 1955, after a trip to Algeria, that 
forty of the sixty-one prisoners whom he had interviewed there 
had been tortured. Many had scars to prove it.81 The inspector 
concluded, however, that limited and regulated use of torture was 
justified in some cases. Therefore, he argued: "It is fitting to raise 
the veil of hypocrisy with which these police procedures have 
been covered. That is the only way of giving the police the neces­
sary confidence in their activity." 82 
Torture by army personnel was begun on the initiative of 
information-hungry subordinate officers in the field. In 1956 and 
especially 1957 it became a frequent and even systematic practice 
in some units, notably in the Algiers area, where the special powers 
delegated to the army by the Mollet government were exercised to 
allow suspects to be held by paratroopers in "placement centers. 
In Algiers, as in other cities and towns where French troops were 
assigned security duties, the primary objective of torture was not 
to extract information about rebel bands. Rather, the information 
sought, information denied the French by an unco-operative 
Moslem population, concerned the activities and personnel of 
the F.L.N. political-administrative organization, which was re­
sponsible for terrorist attacks. 
The best known of the placement centers run by the para­
troopers in Algiers was the one in the El-Biar district. It was there 
that Henri Alleg and Djamila Bouhired were tortured, Maurice 
Audin disappeared, and Ali Boumendjel committed "suicide"—all 
in the spring and summer of 1957.83 Some twenty-four thousand 
persons were 'assigned to residence' in Algiers between January 
and September, 1957, and passed into the hands of the paras.8* 
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When accusations, testimonials, and pleas filled the French press 
as the battle of Algiers got underway in 1957, it appeared that 
either the administration and the military high command were 
permitting the use of torture or that they had lost control over their 
charges. In fact, both alternatives applied, depending on the indi­
vidual official involved. Civilian administrators in Algiers like Paul 
Teitgen, secretary-general of police in Algiers, and Jean Reliquet, 
prosecutor general, were quite helpless to protect suspects after 
police powers in Algiers were given over on January 7, 1957, to 
General Massu, who delegated them to his subordinates. Teitgen 
resigned in protest in September, 1957, over the manner in which 
justice was being abused. He was particularly concerned with "the 
anonymity and irresponsibility which can only lead to war 
crimes." 85 Reliquet stayed on until September, 1958; but later, in 
the Audin case at Rennes in the fall of 1960, he described the im­
potence of civilian control during the battle of Algiers.88 
Other more highly placed members of the Mollet government in 
1957 left Massu's organization a free hand, not so much because 
civilian control was impossible, as because the army was at last 
destroying the F.L.N. terrorist network in Algiers. The names of 
three ministers of the Fourth Republic usually arise when antitor­
ture campaigners talk of civilian "cover" for army torture: Robert 
Lacoste, Maurice Bourges-Maunoury, and Max Lejeune (resident 
minister for Algeria, defense minister, and secretary of state for 
the army, respectively, in the spring of 1957).87 Official government 
statements continued to affirm that the use of torture was forbidden, 
rare in actual practice, and secretly punished whenever proven. 
Prime Minister Mollet asserted in April, 1957, that reprehensible 
acts'' were so few they 'could almost be counted on one's fingers." 88 
Mollet's personal attitude is difficult to fathom, though his 
defense of the army won him enemies on the liberal Left. In regard 
to the three ministers mentioned above, however, the lack of written 
evidence of official approval of torture does not disprove the exist­
ence of a tacit or verbal cover for the use of torture.89 The secret 
testimony of Prosecutor General Reliquet and General Jacques 
Allard to an examining magistrate at Rennes is significant here, 
though unfortunately that testimony is known only through the 
224 Political Authority and Civilian Control 
copy made by a hardly disinterested party, Madame Audin, widow 
of Maurice Audin, whose disappearance was the subject of the 
trial.90 According to Madame Audin's report, Reliquet testified that 
despite numerous reports of torture, Lacoste did nothing to disavow, 
forbid, or punish the use of violence against suspects and prisoners. 
In fact, Reliquet reported hearing from General Jacques Allard, 
Algiers corps commander, that Lacoste, Bourges-Maunoury, and 
Lejeune had encouraged such practices.91 The examining magistrate 
proceeded to call upon Allard, who testified that the ministers in 
question had placed no restriction on their orders to destroy the 
F.L.N. and the Algerian Communist Party whatever the cost."92 
Recalling a visit in the company of a minister to the headquarters 
of the celebrated paratroop colonel, Marcel Bigeard, Allard told 
of the minister's praise for the colonel's success and the latter's 
reply: "Monsieur le ministre, don't think that one gets such results 
with choirboy procedures." Allard added, "To which he was told 
only to be careful that there were no marks." 93 
Even if torture was never explicitly approved by representatives 
of the government (and this cannot be determined with certainty), 
their failure to take vigorous action to stop the practice lends some 
truth to the charge made by Pierre Mendes-France at the Radical 
congress of May 3-4, 1957: "The errors [torture] are not imputable 
to the Army, but to our political and governmental leaders. ,"94 
The Mollet government had indeed created a Permanent Commis­
sion for the Safeguard of Individual Rights and Liberties on April 
5, 1957. Despite the obstacles which were thrown up against the 
commission's investigation in Algiers, the report of the secretary-
general, Parisian barrister Maurice Garcon, contained evidence of 
illegal detention, extensive use of torture, and mysterious disap­
pearances of detained persons.95 Yet the report was withheld from 
the public until it leaked out and was printed by Le Monde on 
December 14, 1957. Apparently very little government action was 
taken as a result of the commission's findings.96 
A second Commission de Sauvegarde, created in August, 1958, 
was equally without effect, though the Audin trial and that of 
Djamila Boupacha were transferred from Algeria to France on its 
request. In fact, there is good reason to wonder if the commission 
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itself did not approve of "adapted justice." Colonel Antoine Argoud 
testified in the Barricades trial that the president of that commis­
sion, Maurice Patin, approved of summary executions and insisted 
only that they not be allowed in written instructions. Patin was 
most concerned about a Massu-Argoud directive which sanctioned 
summary executions. According to Argoud, Patin said to him on 
this subject: 
I understand perfectly your anguish; I understand perfectly the 
importance which this problem has assumed for the army. But, for 
the sake of God, cancel your directive, make up good dossiers for 
us, even create false witnesses; I will do everything to help you, but 
cancel, for heaven's sake, cancel your directive.97 
Argoud's impressive argumentative powers apparently won over 
the commission which was sent to control him and his colleagues. 
If the Commission de Sauvegarde exercised no effective supervi­
sion over the army in Algeria, neither did the committees of the 
National Assembly. In mid-March of 1957, in the heat of the battle 
of Algiers, an investigating committee composed of seven members 
of the Interior Committee reported with one dissenting voice (a 
Radical) that it had found no substantial evidence of torture in 
Oran. The committee added, suspiciously, that ordinary means 
were inadequate against the F.L.N.98 The National Defense Com­
mittee in the National Assembly was no more effective as a control­
ling organ in this field, either under the Fourth of Fifth republics. 
Drawn from those elements in the various parties which were more 
favorable to the military than their colleagues (a number of them 
were former officers themselves), committee members usually di­
rected their efforts to the defense, rather than the control, of the 
army. The subject of torture was rarely, if ever, mentioned in com­
mittee meetings. If anything, the National Defense Committee 
probably encouraged the army to stand up to the "defeatists" in and 
out of the government." 
Massu and his paratroopers did not ask for police powers in 
Algiers. Massu apparently assumed them with some reluctance,100 
though some of his colonels were probably pleased at the oppor­
tunity to take on the F.L.N. organization in Algiers. Once deeply 
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involved in a brutal pacification effort, Massu and his officers under­
standably believed themselves covered by ministers who knew and 
did not object. Government officials, eager to end terrorism in 
Algeria, yet aware of the political dynamite involved in the use 
of torture, apparently failed either to take full responsibility for, 
or to call an early halt to, interrogation by electric shock and other 
such practices. Would civilian control have been better assured had 
those officials issued clear orders to end the use of torture and then 
acted to back up that order? Clearly, as in the case of "'adapted 
justice," Massu and his officers would have been angered by such 
limitations. Nevertheless, clearcut governmental action would have 
helped to break that pattern of military usurpation of powers in 
which the army—not the government—was setting the pace in 
Algeria. 
As it was, the battle of Algiers and its aftermath of accusation 
and investigation clearly heightened the resentment of officers in 
Algeria, particularly those paratroop officers directly involved. La­
coste, Bourges-Maunoury, and Lejeune could not bind other present 
and potential ministers, nor could they control the antiarmy cam­
paign being conducted from Paris. Despite resistance from military 
authorities, several officers accused of torture during the battle of 
Algiers (including the often mentioned Lieutenant Charbonnier of 
the El-Biar center) were called before civilian examining magis­
trates.101 As the anti-torture campaign mounted in the metro-pole, 
the government replied, both before and after the treize mai, that 
when suspects were mistreated " disciplinary or judicial sanc­
tions are always imposed. Obviously no publicity is given to them, 
for it is easy to see how they could be exploited to the ends of a 
dismal propaganda." 102 In fact, it appears that by 1962 sanctions 
of some variety (mostly quite light, in all probability) had been 
imposed in approximately 125 cases of this variety.103 
Officers who felt they had been "covered" often blamed a weak 
and hypocritical government for throwing their colleagues to the 
wolves.104 As early as March, 1957, when the anti-torture writings 
of J. J. Servan-Schreiber and P.-H. Simon had just begun to ap­
pear, an unnamed officer stationed in Algeria wrote in Message. 
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Civil authorities were incapable of assuring the functioning of the 
judicial system and the collection of political intelligence and found 
it convenient to have these sordid jobs done by soldiers, remaining 
free to accuse them next of cruelty. . . . los 
This officer declared that the "moral elite" of the officer corps would 
leave the army if not relieved of such "degrading" tasks. Among 
most officers in the Tenth Paratroop Division, however, the inclina­
tion was not to give up so easily. Colonel "Raspeguy," a thinly 
disguised Colonel Bigeard, is made to say (in former paratrooper 
Jean Larteguy's bestseller, Les- Centurions): 
However "they" told us to use all means to win it, this battle of 
Algiers. . . . Each time that ministers or deputies came to our 
Headquarters, I told them: "It takes place on the side. . . . We do 
it because your government has ordered us to, but it disgusts us, 
it sickens us." They pretended not to understand or believed I was 
only joking. Others replied with a little unctuous gesture of the 
hand: "It is for France." Now these same bastards [salopards] want 
to send us before their courts. Hold fast to the stocks of your 
machine guns, then no one will come to bother [emmerder] us.106 
The colonel stretches the facts when he shifts the responsibility 
for the initial decision to use torture from military to civilian 
shoulders. Yet here again, diffusion, delegation, and evasion of re­
sponsibility contributed to the anger and disgust which most officers 
felt toward the Fourth Republic. Nor did the overthrow of the 
Fourth Republic end the rancor of Massu and his officers, for inves­
tigations continued. Massu is said to have complained of De Gaulle 
in January, 1960, "He made me a grand officer of the Legion of 
Honor for having won the Battle of Algiers. And now he brings my 
officers before the examining magistrate." 107 
Two specific incidents, both of which had grave consequences, 
serve to demonstrate the pattern of unchecked military initiative 
which developed in Algeria during the Fourth Republic: the cap­
ture of Ben Bella and other F.L.N. leaders in October, 1956, and 
the bombing of the Tunisian border town of Sakiet Sidi Youssef 
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on February 8, 1958. In the night of October 21, 1956, French 
intelligence in Morocco learned that the leader of the F.L.N., 
Mohammed Ben Bella, and several of his associates were to fly 
across Algerian soil en route to Tunis.108 Resident Minister Lacoste 
was in France at the time, and Defense Minister Bourges-Maunoury 
was in London. The French commander in chief in Algeria, Gen­
eral Henri Lorillot, finally got through by phone to Max Lejeune, 
secretary of state for the army and for Algerian affairs. Lejeune 
approved a plan for the capture of the rebel leaders. But then the 
French crew of the Moroccan plane carrying Ben Bella changed 
plans and landed at Majorca, thereby avoiding an overflight of 
Algerian soil. At that point, without civilian approval, someone 
within the air force hierarchy in Algeria ordered that the kidnap 
plan be carried through. The pilot was told by radio whom he had 
aboard and persuaded to land in Algeria. Lacoste returned to Al­
giers when the plane was already over Algerian soil and agreed to 
carry out the capture plan.109 
Prime Minister Guy Mollet and President of the Republic Rene 
Coty are said to have reacted with sharp disapproval upon hearing 
of the incident. Alain Savary, secretary of state for foreign affairs, 
protested vigorously, called for the release of the rebel leaders, and 
finally resigned when Mollet decided to accept responsibility for 
the kidnapping.110 Lejeune's authorization of the kidnap plan and 
Lacoste's belated approval remove this incident from the realm of 
clear military usurpation, though apparently military authorities 
alone decided to carry out the plan over international waters.111 
Already in October, 1956, a serious cleavage was evident within 
the government, a cleavage which was to widen in succeeding gov­
ernments and which facilitated and encouraged military initiative. 
As for the effectiveness of the Ben Bella coup, F.L.N. terrorism in 
Algiers continued mounting and the F.L.N. as an organization was 
not seriously hurt, though the Moroccan government was badly 
offended. 
Early in 1958, in retaliation for F.L.N. raids launched from 
Tunisian bases, the French joint commander in Algeria, General 
Raoul Salan, approved of a proposed air attack on the Tunisian 
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border town of Sakiet. The raid killed seventy-five persons and 
wounded over a hundred more.112 Intended as a warning to the 
Tunisian government, the bombing was ordered without the ap­
proval of the French government, then headed by Felix Gaillard.113 
Military authorities had become virtual masters in Algeria and were 
apparently unwilling to risk a governmental veto on the Sakiet raid. 
Foreign Minister Christian Pineau told Joseph Alsop on February 
11 that the bombing was "a deplorable mistake" which had not been 
authorized by the government.114 Yet, perhaps fearful of the army 
reaction to a denunciation, Prime Minister Gaillard decided to 
accept responsibility for the Sakiet raid and apparently persuaded 
Pineau to deny the remarks made in his interview with Alsop. 
Gaillard went so far as to accept the very doubtful French Army 
story that most of the victims had been Algerian rebels.115 
The consequences of the raid were (1) an angry Tunisian pro­
test placing in doubt the future of French bases in Tunisia; (2) 
an American "good offices" mission led by Robert Murphy; (3) a 
hostile French popular reaction against Murphy and American 
interference generally; (4) a further weakening of the authority of 
the Paris government; and (5) a strong additional impulse to mili­
tary and civilian activists 116 in Algeria to stand up to Paris.117 
In the spring of 1958, when its enemies struck, the Fourth Repub­
lic was divided within itself, lacking authority in the nation, and 
helpless to control its nominal subordinates in Algiers, to whom it 
had delegated great power. As for the armed forces, chief of staff 
of national defense, General Paul Ely, later explained that by May, 
1958, the army " . .  . had been led to exercise activities far su­
perior to those which had formerly been assigned to it. . .  . It was 
therefore in a position, faced with a new situation, to expand still 
further its field of activity." 118 The expanded "field of activity" of 
which General Ely speaks included decisive military support of the 
insurrection which felled the Fourth Republic. 
With the picture of the Fourth Republic's policy paralysis and 
extensive delegation of powers in Indochina and Algeria now in 
mind, can it be said that civilian control would not have been 
menaced in the spring of 1958 had the French government, backed 
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by a more united nation, been able to lay out and carry through 
a clear and vigorous colonial policy? Military apologists often have 
replied with an unqualified yes.119 In fact, the answer must depend 
upon the following conditions: first, the time at which such a policy 
might have been attempted; and second, the aims of that policy 
with regard to French sovereignty in Algeria. Had there been clear, 
consistent, and vigorous civilian leadership from 1946 onward— 
even from 1954 onward—the army could have been held in check, 
despite its anger, even by a government intent upon independence 
for the colonies. By 1957 and 1958, however, once the army had 
been allowed (and even encouraged) to step into a civilian power 
vacuum in Algeria, once military honor, prestige, and self-esteem 
had been heavily invested in the defense of French Algeria, it was 
probably too late for any government of the Fourth Republic, no 
matter how vigorous, to abandon French Algeria without serious 
obstruction from the army. By the last years of the Fourth Republic, 
as the treize mai crisis revealed, the French Army in Algeria clearly 
preferred to be left a free hand in Algeria by a weak government 
in Paris, rather than to receive firm but unacceptable directives 
from a more vigorous government.120 Had the Pflimlin government 
in May of 1958 been capable of rallying the firm support of the bulk 
of the French population behind a policy of negotiation with the 
F.L.N. (it was not), it probably could have saved the Fourth Re­
public, but it could not have avoided a clash of some sort with its 
army in Algeria. 
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Chapter 9 
Political Authority and Civilian Control 
in the Praetorian Years 
May, 1958, marks the official entry into politics of the French Army 
as an institution. Isolated individuals—notably General Jacques 
Faure—had toyed with revolution in the preceding years; but only 
in 1958 did the army, virtually as a unit, reject the crumbling au­
thority of the Fourth Republic. General Massu, who became presi­
dent of the insurrectionary Committee of Public Safety, later ex­
plained publicly his role on May 13, 1958, when demonstrators 
stormed the Government General Building in Algiers: "I was not 
in on any plot; I boarded a 'moving train, if I may put it that way, 
and I tried to reach the locomotive to prevent it from going to a 
catastrophe." 1 The same may be said of most of those officers who 
were to play leading roles in the fatal May days of 1958. Raoul 
Salan, joint military commander in Algeria, Colonel Charles Lache­
roy, Colonel Roger Trinquier—none of these were originally parties 
to the revolt; yet all contributed to its success and direction. Lest 
the "'moving train' analogy be taken too seriously, however, it must 
be noted that the initial civilian conductors of the treize mai train 
had acted largely because of an expectation of army support, with­
out which the revolt could not have succeeded. 
There were exceptions to the general rule that civilians, not offi­
cers, plotted the uprising of May 13.2 Gaullists, Poujadists, and 
other enemies of the Fourth Republic in both Algiers and Paris 
hoped to capitalize upon the Algerian war and the embitterment 
it had produced among French settlers in Algeria and among the 
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army cadre. A nameless and clandestine "counterrevolutionary" 
organization in the metropole had as its leader and potential dic­
tator of France a former French commander in Algeria (now 
retired), General Paul Cherriere, who was assisted by the familiar 
General L. M. Chassin, who remained on active duty until shortly 
before May 13 as NATO co-ordinator of aerial defense.3 Within 
metropolitan France, Cherriere and Chassin had the co-operation 
of the volatile Veterans of Indochina (of whom Chassin was honor­
ary president).4 In Algeria they claimed the support of the activist 
North African French Union, under the leadership of an Algerian 
winegrower and former Cagoulard, Robert Martel. Among military 
officers on active duty, Chassin and Cherriere won the sympathy 
and latent support of General Roger Miquel, commander of the 
Toulouse military region, and Colonel Robert Thomazo, head of 
the auxiliary territorial units in the Algiers area, both of whom were 
also recruited by Gaullist conspirators.5 
The Gaullist forces, who eventually won control of the rebellion, 
could claim the services of a number of influential former leaders 
of the Gaullist Rally of the French People (R.P.F.), among them 
the French Algerian attorney J. B. Biaggi, Senator Michel Debre, 
Jacques Soustelle (still a popular hero in Algeria and leader of the 
Union for the Safety and Renewal of French Algeria [U.S.R.A.F.]), 
and Minister of Defense Jacques Chaban-Delmas. Chaban-Delmas, 
or more precisely, Leon Delbecque, the head of a Defense Ministry 
"antenna" or delegation in Algiers, played a double game of helping 
to overthrow the government and even the republic in which he 
served. Aided by Guy Ribeaud, the secretary-general of the Social 
Republicans (the remnants of the R.P.F.), and by two army officers, 
Major Poujet and Captain Lamouliatte, Delbecque canvassed and 
organized military officers and civilian activists, preparing them 
for a Gaullist coup.6 Delbecque inspired the creation of the activist 
Vigilance Committee in Algiers, which united Gaullists, veterans, 
Poujadists, Martel and his followers, and Colonel Robert Thomazo. 
Then, on April 26, 1958, despite protests from Lacoste and Salan, 
he directed a mass demonstration against a possible investiture in 
Paris of Rene Pleven as the next Premier.7 
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The Fourth Republic, like the Third, harbored its own grave-
diggers: a Defense Ministry representative was stirring up rebellion 
in Algiers while the resident minister himself, Robert Lacoste, was 
telling friends and associates that only a "government of public 
safety" could save Algeria from a "diplomatic Dien Bien Phu."8 
As for the military high command in Algeria, on May 9, 1958, 
General Salan issued a virtual ultimatum to present and potential 
governments. His message to President of the Republic Rene Coty, 
sent through the chief of staff for defense, General Paul Ely, indi­
cated that he would accept an appeal to the rebels for surrender 
with guaranteed amnesty—but nothing more.9 He continued: 
The Army in Algeria is troubled by the consciousness of its responsi­
bility: 
—in regard to the men who are fighting and risking a vain sacrifice 
if national representatives are not determined to maintain French 
Algeria, as the preamble of the basic law stipulates [the basic law 
of January 31, 1958]; 
—in regard to the French population of the interior which feels itself 
abandoned and the French Moslems who, each day more numerous, 
have again placed their confidence in France, confidence in reiter­
ated promises never to abandon them. 
The French Army, in a unanimous fashion, would feel the 
abandonment of this national patrimony to be an outrage. One could 
not predict its reaction of despair. 
I ask you please to call the attention of the President of the 
Republic to our anguish, which can only be erased by a government 
firmly determined to maintain our flag in Algeria.10 
Paris was now duly warned that if an "acceptable" government was 
not forthcoming, the army was prepared to turn against its civilian 
masters in a "reaction of despair." 
When the big day finally arrived, neither Delbecque, Cherriere, 
nor those few other military officers who were dans le coup had 
much control over things. A day of demonstrations ordered by the 
Vigilance Committee was to culminate in a ceremony at the 
monument to the dead. Generals Salan, Jouhaud, Allard, Massu, 
and Admiral Auboyneau appeared briefly about 6 P.M. amid cries 
of "the Army to power" and "Massu to power." n At that point, 
without the knowledge of the Gaullist contingent of the Vigilance 
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Committee, Robert Martel and student and Poujadist leaders in 
the committee launched an attack on the Government General 
Building (the "G.G."). Pushing aside security police and a handful 
of paratroopers, who hardly resisted, a few hundred demonstrators 
smashed in the G.G. gate with a paratrooper truck and took the 
building by storm. 
The deed was done against the protests of Colonel Ducourneau, 
Lacoste's military aide, Colonel Godard, commander of the Algiers-
Sahel sector since early 1957, and Colonel Thomazo, who only felt 
that the time was not ripe, nor the army yet fully committed.12 Yet 
the few hundred activist storm troops could easily have been halted 
if either the security police (the Compagnies Republicaines de 
Securite) or the "Bigeard Regiment" (the Third Colonial Paratroop 
Regiment), now on security duty under its new commander, Colo­
nel Roger Trinquier, had been at all serious about the defense of 
the G.G.13 That paratroop regiment had been recalled from the 
Tunisian border a few days earlier, and, as veterans of the battle 
of Algiers, its members were most unlikely to deal harshly with a 
French Algerian uprising.14 Moreover, Premier Felix Gaillard had 
apparently ordered that police and paratroopers should not fire on 
the crowd.15 The point is not crucial, since the "paras" likely would 
not have fired if so ordered, and a successful defense of the G.G. 
by security police on May 13 would not have prevented a more 
powerful popular rebellion in succeeding days. 
Once the G.G. had fallen to activist besiegers led by student 
leader Pierre Lagaillarde, General Massu soon arrived, vented his 
fury at the activist leaders,1'1 and then proceeded to negotiate a 
settlement. In order to prevent the locomotive from going to a 
catastrophe, Massu agreed to preside over the Committee of Pub­
lic Safety, which joined Delbecque (a late arrival), local activist 
leaders, and those military officers who were most acceptable to 
the European community—Colonels Trinquier, Ducasse (Massu's 
chief of staff), and Thomazo, and as "candidate members," Cap­
tains Engels, Marion, and Renauld.17 The committee drafted a 
historic cable to Paris which Massu sent in his own name: 
REPORT CREATION CIVIL AND MILITARY COMMITTEE PUBLIC SAFETY 
IN ALGIERS, PRESIDED OVER BY MYSELF, GENERAL MASSU, BECAUSE 
GRAVITY SITUATION AND ABSOLUTE NECESSITY MAINTENANCE ORDER, 
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AND THIS TO AVOID ALL SPILLING OF BLOOD. DEMAND CREATION PARIS 
OF A GOVERNMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, ALONE CAPABLE OF RETAINING 
ALGERIA INTEGRAL PART OF METROPOLE.18 
Early the following morning, after a National Assembly with its 
back to the wall had invested Pierre Pflimlin as Premier, Massu 
produced another stronger message beginning, we are announcing 
to the population that the government of abandonment led by M. 
Pflimlin has just been invested with the participation of communist 
votes." 19 
Massu faced a rebellion which was not directly of his making; 
yet he was in full agreement with its intent, and, rather than repress 
it with violence, he preferred to become an insurgent himself. By 
recognizing the Committee of Public Safety, General Salan as well 
placed one foot in the camp of rebellion. 
In the night of May 13-14 General Salan was vested with full 
civil powers in the city of Algiers by Gaillard and then, the fol­
lowing morning, by Gaillard's successor, Pierre Pflimlin, after the 
latter had been invested as Premier. Salan then proceeded to bal­
ance delicately between legality and rebellion, moving progres­
sively toward the latter. The military commander continued to 
report to Paris and assure the Pflimlin government of his loyalty. 
Yet he asserted full power over the whole of Algeria without au­
thorization from Paris;20 he called for a government of public safety 
in Paris;21 he publicly added his voice to the cries of "Vive De 
Gaulle' on May 15 before a crowd at the G.G.;22 he gave legal sanc­
tion to Massu's insurrectionary Committee of Public Safety;23 he 
secretly contacted De Gaulle;24 and finally, he took command of 
"Operation Resurrection," designed to overthrow the Fourth Re­
public by force, if necessary.25 On the other hand, Delbecque was 
never certain that Salan was not about to arrest him.26 Salan, or the 
"Mandarin," as he was sometimes called, played a complex and 
subtle game, hopeful perhaps both of avoiding violence and of 
covering himself in any eventuality.27 Yet he must be credited with 
maintaining that veneer of legality which facilitated a bloodless 
transition to the Fifth Republic. 
General Salan, in fact, was an enigma in many ways. A former 
intelligence officer, said to be a republican, perhaps a socialist, and 
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(more doubtfully) even a Free Mason, he arrived in Algiers with 
a not altogether undeserved reputation of having favored looser 
French ties in Indochina. He was thought by Algiers activists to be 
so much of a threat to French Algeria that his assassination was 
attempted. That still mysterious bazooka attack of January 16, 
1957, killed Salan's aide and set off a spectacular investigation in 
which an alleged committee of 6," including Michel Debre, was 
accused of inspiring the deed.28 In contrast to the popular Massu, 
General Salan was regarded with suspicion and hostility by Euro­
peans in Algeria; the Mandarin stepped out on the balcony of the 
G.G. on the night of May 13 to address the crowd and was met with 
angry cries of "Indochine," "Vive Massu," and "Foutez le camp' 
(roughly, "Get the hell out of here!").29 It took public pleading by 
Colonel Thomazo and probably some behind-the-scenes work by 
Martel and by army psychological-action and security officers to 
produce a more favorable popular reaction to Salan when he ad­
dressed the crowd again on May 15.30 The successful outcome of 
the May 13 uprising and Salan's newly found popularity led the 
cautious and enigmatic Mandarin into quite a new type of exist­
ence: total commitment to a passionate and violent crusade, that 
of French Algeria. 
May 13 was the work of activist leaders of the local European 
population; yet these men were responsible for neither of the two 
major themes which treize mai came to represent—Gaullism and 
integration. The Gaullist turn of the insurrection must be credited 
to Delbecque, a skilful manipulator, to Massu, a "Gaullist of 1940," 
to Jacques Soustelle, who arrived in Algiers on May 17 after an 
escape from police surveillance in Paris, and to De Gaulle himself, 
who spoke and acted discreetly and in time, and who, though not 
immensely popular among career officers, was nevertheless a mili­
tary man. Generals Cherriere and Chassin quickly lost any control 
they might have had over the uprising.31 
"Integration," with its radical political equality of Moslems and 
Europeans in Algeria, was the price pied noir leaders were forced 
to pay for critical army support.32 Integration as a theme was largely 
the product of the Fifth Bureau in Algiers. Working with Colonel 
Godard's networks within the European and Moslem populations 
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in Algiers, seizing especially upon contacts with reservists, veterans, 
and local auxiliary territorial units, the Fifth Bureau helped to 
develop a climate of opinion which facilitated the treize max upris­
ing and turned it toward integration as a dominant theme.33 In 
defense of integration, psychological-action officers, Colonel Trin­
quier, Colonel Godard's agents, and officers of the Urban Adminis­
trative Sections all co-operated in staging one of the most dramatic 
events of the May crisis. Trinquier and Godard, the creators of the 
organization of the population in 1957, personally went into the 
Casbah to negotiate and organize a Moslem demonstration for May 
16. Thousands of Moslems flooded out of the Casbah to join more 
thousands of Europeans in a delirious festival of integration.34 
Here was the greatest success which French psychological action 
in Algeria was to achieve. Moslems and pieds noirs were sincerely 
moved at the time; but Algerian nationalism on the one hand and 
racism and privilege on the other were too deeply rooted to be 
overcome for long by a revival-meeting conversion. 
Soustelle arrived on May 17, met a cool reception from Salan, 
but stayed on to confirm the theme of integration.35 The Fifth 
Bureau under Colonel Charles Lacheroy became, henceforth, the 
primary carrier of that message, he Bled blossomed forth in its 
issue of May 21 with headlines announcing the permanence of 
French Algeria and describing the integration miracle of May 16.36 
Working more with the Committee of Public Safety than with 
Joint Commander Salan, the Fifth Bureau displayed an open inde­
pendence and power which were to end only with its dissolution 
in February, 1960. 
The attitude of the army was quickly apparent. Minister of 
Interior Jules Moch later told a Socialist Party conference, "Out of 
nine officers commanding military regions [in the metropole], at 
least four—with authority over forty departments—did not hide the 
fact that they were in sympathy with Algiers." 3T On May 15 General 
Maurice Challe, deputy chief of staff for defense, visited Guy Mollet 
to inform him that the armed forces as a whole were in sympathy 
with the dissident generals in Algeria.38 Defense Minister Pierre de 
Chevigne then shuttled General Challe off to assigned residence in 
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Brest for having ordered twelve paratroop planes to Algeria on 
May 11, though Challe insisted the planes were necessary rein­
forcements and not intended to support a paratroop attack on 
Paris.39 The Chief of Staff of National Defense, Paul Ely, had urged 
Pflimlin to resign on several occasions; on the 16th he submitted 
his own resignation, purportedly because of the action taken against 
General Challe and another air force General, Andre Martin, who 
was expedited to Metz.40 Ely's post was refused by two generals, 
Blanc and Gouraud, before the government finally found a taker— 
army chief of staff and former joint commander in Algeria, General 
Henri Lorillot. And even Lorillot cabled Salan that he was accept­
ing only in order to support the army in Algeria and maintain 
the unity of the army.41 
The government's few firm supporters in the army were badly 
outnumbered.42 Operation Resurrection, the plan for an armored 
and paratroop assault on Paris, was more than a bluff, though gov­
ernment officials in Paris were indeed the object of a well-orches­
trated "intoxication'' campaign of mysterious radio messages, anony­
mous telephone calls, and rumors of impending invasion—all 
designed to frighten them into abdication.4-! Command of the opera­
tion was given by Massu and Salan to General Miquel, to be sup­
ported by French paratroopers under his command as head of the 
Toulouse military region, by more paratroopers to be flown from 
Algeria, and by Colonel Gribius and his armored group at Ram­
bouillet, near Paris.44 Had De Gaulle agreed to the landings (he did 
not),45 or had he not been invested by the National Assembly on 
June 1, Operation Resurrection probably would have gone into 
effect.46 In fact, General Miquel testified in the Salan trial that 
even after the investiture of De Gaulle as Premier, the presence 
in his cabinet of men associated with the 'system' prompted a 
military directorate in Algiers to consider again the appropriateness 
of a coup.47 According to Miquel, Salan opposed a military coup 
on the grounds that De Gaulle had been invested and now had to 
be trusted.48 
Army officers were patently unwilling to come to the defense of 
le systeme. Some of the reasons for that unwillingness have been 
suggested above;49 others will be explored in detail below.50 Here 
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it is sufficient to say that the defense of French Algeria had become 
for a large segment of the army a sacred cause, integrally linked 
with safeguarding not only the French nation (for some, the entire 
Western world) but also military honor, prestige, and power. The 
most serious military grievance against le systeme (which, through 
its weakness, had magnified the army's stake in French Algeria) 
was its lack of determination in waging the holy battle across the 
Mediterranean. On June 4, 1958, when De Gaulle arrived in Algiers 
as Premier, General Massu introduced him to the Committee of 
Public Safety for Algeria with these words: 
The rush of the Algiers crowds toward the Government General 
Building was intended to express refusal to continue to accept suc­
cessive capitulations, the abandonment which appeared unavoidable, 
the acceleration of French decadence through the fatal and thought­
less action of irresponsible governments subject to the haggling and 
incompetence of the party politicians who made up the Parliament.51 
For Massu, as for numerous other military spokesmen, the Fourth 
Republic had long since lost its legitimacy.52 
The behavior of the army in May, 1958, was not simply an 
obedient response to a few dissident commanders at the top of the 
military hierarchy. On the contrary, hostility toward le systeme was 
probably greatest among younger officers, especially in Algeria, 
who held positions below the highest command posts.53 In Algeria it 
was not Salan who formally joined the insurrection but Massu, 
whose captains, majors, and colonels had facilitated the organization 
of the European settlers for direct political action during the battle 
of Algiers."'4 In the metropole General Ely and others like him 
leaned toward Algiers largely because of a fear of splitting the 
army. In July, 1958, Message editorialists, spokesmen for many of 
the more politically aggressive officers in the lower and middle 
ranks, wrote: 
Some have talked of plots and conspiracy. Blind are those who have 
not been able to see that the cry which burst forth from Algiers 
had long burned the lips of virtually all of us, and that our agree­
ment was such that there was no longer any need for either pass­
words or instructions.55 
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Two months later he Bled added its joyous benediction to "the era 
of Byzantine discussions." •"'" 
If the great majority of French officers had lost respect for the 
Fourth Republic, most probably would have hesitated to turn on 
their civilian masters had it not been for two factors: (a) the choice 
forced on them by the action of Massu and his officers in Algiers, 
and (b) the general disaffection of civilians as well as military offi­
cers toward le systeme. In 1958 the Fourth Republic found its 
authority in an advanced stage of disintegration, not only with 
respect to the army, but also with respect to police, gendarmes, 
some civil administrators, and the French population generally. 
Here, as is often the case, political authority (and its collapse) 
was of a piece. 
Even if Operation Resurrection had been launched, there prob­
ably would have been no civil war. Police and security troops in 
the metropole were strongly antiparliamentary in outlook, particu­
larly in the case of the influential "Dides network' within the police 
force."'7 Minister of the Interior Jules Moch soon became aware of 
"the most humiliating weakness of the reliable means at my dis­
posal." 58 He received devastating proof of his helplessness on May 
24, 1958. A delegation was dispatched to Corsica by Massu and 
Salan and on that day succeeded in rallying the support of Captain 
Ignace Mantei and the two hundred fifty paratroopers of his First 
Shock Batallion stationed there. Mantei and his paratroopers were 
sent to the departmental capital of Ajaccio, where police and gen­
darmes put up no opposition as civilian demonstrators invaded 
public buildings and formed a committee of public safety.59 Rein­
forcing gendarme units sent by air from Nice arrived only to place 
themselves under the orders of dissident military authorities.60 
The prefect of Corsica resisted, as did the deputy mayor of the 
city of Bastia; yet all but one of the six underprefects rallied to 
Algiers.61 
Where were the republicans in May, 1958? In effect, the Left 
could not arouse much popular passion over the survival of the 
Fourth Republic. To be sure, a belated mass demonstration in Paris 
on May 28 attracted over 100,000 people. Moreover, Pflimlin de­
liberately refrained from appealing for working-class support, 
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fearing the Communist Party might come out the winner, rather 
than the Fourth Republic.02 Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that 
work stoppages ordered by the communist-led General Confedera­
tion of Labor (C.G.T.) were almost totally ignored. In a referen­
dum organized by the C.G.T. in the Paris area, only 20 per cent 
of the workers favored a general strike in the event that De Gaulle 
were invested as Premier.63 Near the height of the crisis, on May 
25, meters on the Freeway of the West counted 36,463 automobiles 
leaving Paris for the weekend—3,126 more than in the preceding 
year. As Tournoux puts it, "The weekend triumphs." 64 More elo­
quent yet are the results of an opinion poll taken in August, 1958. 
When a national sample was asked whether the army's role in the 
treize mai had been useful or harmful, 55 per cent of all respond­
ents answered useful, as against only 17 per cent who replied 
harmful.65 
Might the Pflimlin government have turned the tide and saved 
the Fourth Republic if, instead of hedging and temporizing, it had 
condemned categorically the insurrection and had appealed vigor­
ously to the French people to defend the republic, at the barricades 
if necessary? Three years later, such vigorous executive leadership 
threw hesitant army officers behind Paris, rather than Algiers, and 
helped to squash the April putsch. In May of 1958, however, 
Pflimlin (who was no De Gaulle) represented a republic which 
had allowed its authority to erode away, both with regard to mili­
tary and police forces and with regard to a civilian population 
which found little to be proud of in le systeme. The most likely 
alternative to De Gaulle was not pure republicanism, but military 
dictatorship. Incapable of rallying the nation behind it, unable to 
act effectively and in time, helpless at the hands of foes within 
its ranks, the government of the Fourth Republic was indeed an 
easy prey for its civilian and military enemies. 
Reinstalled as chief of staff of national defense in the summer 
of 1958, General Paul Ely addressed a call to obedience to the 
armed forces in an article published in the August-September issue 
of the Revue militaire d'information. He lavished praise on the 
army for having prevented a cleavage between Algeria and the 
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metropole in May, 1958, and then dismissed the fears of those who 
saw the army as a threat to civil authority: "The Army always 
remains in its place with a strong government and when it knows 
it is being commanded." 66 Unquestionably, De Gaulle was a strong 
political leader with firm popular and parliamentary support. Yet 
in the first three years of the Fifth Republic, he was to face the 
following opposition: first, in January, 1960, a muted repeat per­
formance of the treize mai; and then, in April, 1961, an open and 
aggressive military revolt. Why did military indiscipline continue 
to be a problem despite vigorous governmental leadership? Of 
course, all of those interrelated politicizing factors discussed in 
earlier and succeeding chapters were still at work; nevertheless, 
one must ask why renewed governmental strength was inadequate 
to check their effect. A brief review of the "Week of the Barricades" 
and the April putsch of 1961 will be necessary in answering that 
question. 
Until September 16, 1959, De Gaulle and the army in Algeria 
coexisted without great mutual trust, but also without serious 
conflict. Government officials were at times annoyed by a tendency 
of military authorities in Algiers (especially the Fifth Bureau) to 
act on policy matters without government authorization.67 And 
among officers in Algeria there were undoubtedly some, like Massu, 
who felt De Gaulle was wrong in ordering military personnel out 
of all committees of public safety in September, 1958, and in trans­
ferring a number of key officers out of Algiers, among them General 
Salan, who was recalled to Paris in December, 1958.68 However, 
a climate of latent military revolt began to form only after De 
Gaulle's announcement on September 16, 1959, that the Algerian 
population was to be allowed to choose independence, association,' 
or integration with France. 
Shortly after that announcement, the chief of the Fifth Bureau 
for Algeria, Colonel Jean Gardes, persuaded Salan's successor, Gen­
eral Maurice Challe, to call together representatives from all army 
corps, zones, and sectors. Again on Gardes' urging, the group was 
informed that the army would continue to campaign for French 
Algeria.69 Challe must have been aware that such an order prob­
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ably would not have met with official approval in Paris. We have 
the testimony of Colonel Gardes, to whom Challe said, "You will 
not write it. These orders are only verbal, and you will give these 
instructions yourselves verbally."70 In the next several months, 
until his transfer in April, 1960, however, Challe publicly continued 
to defend the goal of French Algeria in his speeches and even in 
his formal directives.71 He was never rebuked by De Gaulle for 
taking that line, though in his own pronouncements the President 
of the Republic clearly shied from a commitment to integration. 
De Gaulle was understandably hesitant to clash with the army 
unnecessarily; yet his reluctance to halt the army's campaign for 
French Algeria allowed officers and their defenders to claim they 
had been tricked and betrayed by a government which was only 
awaiting a chance to renege on French commitments in Algeria.72 
On the basis of Challe's verbal orders that "we will continue to 
work for the most French solution'" among the three alternatives, 
Massu could later defend French Algeria partisans of the Week of 
the Barricades on grounds that they were within the bounds of 
discipline.73 But, of course, the issuance of the orders themselves 
had been an act of indiscipline. 
De Gaulle increased anxiety in military circles in Algeria when 
in his press conference of November 10, 1959, he called for nego­
tiations with rebel leaders leading to a cease-fire and promised that 
the self-determination referendum would be "entirely free' and 
open to all Algerians.74 By mid-January, 1960, General Massu was 
in an explosive state of mind. As "superprefect" of Algiers (since 
June, 1958), in addition to his role as commander of the Algiers 
Army Corps, Massu felt that "it was difficult for me not to engage 
in politics. That was the role of civil authorities which I 
was." 75 The general apparently was unaware that, in principle at 
least, the prefect's job is not to faire de la politique. And, of course. 
Massu's view of politics was no longer that of General de Gaulle. 
Massu's fury was unleashed in an interview with a German journa­
list, Hans Ulrich Kempski of the Suddeutsche Zeitung.''6 Remarking 
that "we no longer understand his policy," Massu, the strong Gaul­
ist of the treize mat crisis, went on to suggest that "he was the only 
man at our disposition. But perhaps the Army made a mistake 
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there."77 Not content with lamenting past errors, the Victor of 
Algiers added: "The first question to be asked is to know when a 
successor to General de Gaulle will arrive. . . . The Army has the 
strength. It has not shown it so far. The occasion has not presented 
itself; but, in a certain situation, the Army would establish its 
power."78 
Understandably enough, Massu was recalled to Paris and relieved 
of his command. With Massu gone the only key military figure of 
the treize mai still left in Algiers was Colonel Yves Godard, now 
Directeur de la Surete for all of Algeria. Among those who had 
been transferred out were: the joint commander in Algeria, Gen­
eral Raoul Salan, who was given the "up and out" treatment with a 
nonexistent post as "inspector general of defense"; the air com­
mander for Algeria, General Edmond Jouhaud, who retired on 
request after Salan's recall; the commander of the Algiers Army 
Corps, General Paul Allard, who became commander in chief of 
French forces in Germany; the one-time president of the Committee 
of Public Safety for Algiers, Colonel Roland Vaudrey; Colonels 
Lacheroy and Goussault of the Fifth Bureau; the commander of 
the gendarmerie in Algiers, Colonel Crazafor; and Colonel Trin­
quier, whose paratroopers had done so little to halt the treize mai 
assault on the G.G. 
Deprived of the last of their military defenders of the treize mai, 
leaders in Algiers rallied the auxiliary territorial units in that city 
and launched what was intended to be a repeat performance in 
republic-busting.79 Military authorities in Algiers refused to allow 
an assault on public buildings; yet paratroopers ordered to the 
scene conveniently (and purposefully) arrived too late on January 
24, I960,' to assist security guards in a move to clear armed demon­
strators from Boulevard Laferriere in central Algiers.80 A fierce 
battle ensued between the well-armed demonstrators and the secur­
ity police, whose weapons initially had been unloaded, as ordered.81 
Civilian casualties totaled 6 dead and 24 wounded, as against 14 
dead and 123 wounded among the security guards.82 Thereafter the 
paratroopers moved in as arbitrators, more interested in forcing 
Paris to retract its self-determination policy than in routing armed 
demonstrators out of their barricaded retreats. De Gaulle held firm, 
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and a week after the crisis had begun, paratroop commanders on 
the scene finally began reacting as disciplined soldiers, rather than 
as arbitrators and negotiators. Shorn of tacit military support, the 
rebellion crumbled. 
As in May, 1958, the leaders of the immediate uprising were not 
military officers but local civilian activists, this time Pierre Lagail­
larde (as on May 13) and Joseph Ortiz, the neo-fascist leader of 
the ten-thousand-member French National Front (F.N.F.).83 But 
even more than on the treize max, army officers, and especially those 
of the Fifth Bureau, were in large measure responsible for creating 
the means and the will for revolt. It was the auxiliary and locally 
recruited territorial units which provided the weapons and most of 
the manpower which were turned on the gendarmes on January 24. 
The period of a year and a half from May 13, 1958, to January, 
1960, was the heyday of psychological action in Algeria. The French 
military doctrine of la guerre revolutionnaire was officially accepted 
in military schools and in most military headquarters in Algeria, 
despite De Gaulle's preference for more classical warfare.84 The 
Fifth Bureau was blocked abruptly after May 13, when it attempted 
to propagandize the metropolitan French population with films and 
recordings glorifying the themes of French Algeria and fraterniza­
tion of Europeans and Moslems.85 Colonels Lacheroy, Goussault, 
and Feaugas of the Fifth Bureau in Algiers were rebuked and 
transferred in the fall of 1958 after Le Bled published an article 
attacking various men of le systeme.m So long as the Fifth Bureau 
in Algiers stuck to propaganda and political organization within Al­
geria, however, it was generally left free to campaign for French 
Algeria and for integration.87 And even within the metropole the 
cause of French Algeria found vigorous military and quasi-military 
propagandists in Marshal Juin (who long purported to be an 
interpreter of De Gaulle's intentions) and in the "Young Turk" 
movement within the official National Union of Reserve Officers.88 
The "pilot Bureau" in counterrevolutionary war, as General Massu 
had described the Fifth Bureau,89 succeeded in producing no more 
than surface reactions among Moslems, who had reason to be 
disillusioned by a rapid pied noir retrenchment into their Afrikander 
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mentality after May 16, 1958. Psychological-action officers then 
made the fatal error of attempting to swim in the European, not the 
Moslem sea. To be sure, in the fall of 1959 the chief of the Bureau 
in Algiers, Colonel Jean Gardes, attempted to create a massive 
Moslem and European organization comparable to the "political­
administrative organization" of the rebel F.L.N. and based on Euro­
pean territorial units and Moslem self-defense corps.90 But the 
European population in Algiers was more receptive than the Moslem 
population. 
In practice, the Federation of Territorial Units neither joined 
Moslems with Europeans nor assured army control over pied noir 
activists; on the contrary, it served as a tool and an arsenal of those 
it was intended to control—notably of Joseph Ortiz, who placed the 
commander of his personal four-thousand-man F.N.F. army, Cap­
tain Ronda, as secretary-general of the federation. "Control," how­
ever, was not the only aim of military authorities in Algiers. Local 
activist organizations served as a useful and indirect weapon against 
the government in Paris. Alongside representatives from Massu's 
headquarters, Colonel Gardes worked closely with Ortiz, giving his 
F.N.F. a quasi-official status.91 Ortiz, in return, promised to consult 
Massu before "launching anything" in Algiers.92 The relationship 
between the army in Algiers and the F.N.F. could be characterized 
better as one of complicity, rather than army control, as Massu 
claimed.93 
In the afternoon of January 23, 1960, after a stormy interview 
with De Gaulle, Massu telephoned his chief of staff, Colonel 
Argoud, to rescind earlier orders to hold tight.94 Argoud took this 
to mean an approval of activist demonstrations.95 Local activist 
leaders were soon informed. A number of territorial units had been 
mobilized mysteriously during the night of January 22-23, "on order 
from Colonel Gardes" their officers were told.96 Gardes likely did 
not give the order, but he was clearly sympathetic, if not to a repeat 
performance of the treize max, at least to a rousing demonstration 
designed to put pressure on De Gaulle.97 That sympathy was shared 
by a number of other officers in Algiers, notably Colonel Argoud 
and Colonel Broizat, commander of the First Chasseurs Pararroop 
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Regiment, which showed such little enthusiasm for maintaining 
order in face of activist insurgents.98 
Gardes and Argoud, however, could not speak for Massu's suc­
cessor as commander of the Algiers Army Corps, General Crepin, 
who was in no mood to give over the city to Ortiz, or for Colonel 
Fonde, commander of the Algiers-Sahel sector. Even General Challe 
apparently concurred in the order to use troops to clear armed 
demonstrators off the streets, though earlier on the 24th he had 
given Ortiz permission to carry out a peaceful demonstration." 
Elsewhere in Algeria, the army generally remained loyal to Paris. 
In Oran, General Gambiez disarmed the territorial units and put 
his tanks into action.100 Clearly, despite the government's "'self­
determination" policy and rumors of impending negotiations with 
the F.L.N., the mood of most elements within the officer corps was 
not revolutionary: De Gaulle could not be scorned so easily as 
Pflimlin. 
It so happened, however, that the psychological-action and para­
troop colonels then in Algiers were among the army's most violent 
partisans of French Algeria, despite the transfers of the past eight­
een months. Most of those colonels who later planned the April 
putsch of 1961 and then built the Secret Army Organization were 
assembled there. There was Colonel Jean Gardes, who had been 
deposed as chief of the Fifth Bureau for his political adventures 
two weeks before the barricades went up,101 but was still on hand 
on January 24 to appear in uniform with Ortiz on the balcony on 
the Territorial Unit Building, which had become the F.N.F. com­
mand post.102 There was Colonel Antoine Argoud, regarded as 
"one of the best brains of the Army," 103 a Polytechnicien who had 
not served in Indochina, but who had, of late, become a theorist of 
la guerre revolutionnaire (as were all of these men).104 There were 
the paratroop colonels, especially Colonel Joseph Broizat, an intel­
lectual, a former Catholic seminarian, and a dedicated anticom­
munist crusader; and Colonel Dufour, commander of the First 
Foreign Paratroop Regiment, which later provided the shock troops 
for the April putsch of 1961.105 
These were the men who in fact controlled Algiers for the Week 
of the Barricades, with Argoud the leader among them. On the 
night of January 24, General Challe and Resident Minister De­
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louvrier called in two battalions of the Twenty-fifth Paratroop Di­
vision (under General Ducourneau) from the Constantine area to 
add to the Tenth Paratroop Division (under General Gracieux, 
who was now given Colonel Fonde's post as commander of the 
Algiers-Sahel sector). This attempt to quiet the uprising gently 
with the beloved paras failed completely. Gracieux became the 
tool of his colonels, whose troops fraternized with the demonstra­
tors and allowed them to enter and leave the barricaded areas at 
will. Colonel Gardes, in fact, before his recall to Paris on January 
27, even attempted to effect a reconciliation between the leaders 
of two rival activist camps—Lagaillarde and Ortiz.106 
When Premier Michel Debre arrived in Algiers on the night 
of January 25, he was told by the generals on hand (Crepin among 
them) that the troops would never fire on the demonstrators.107 
The colonels were even more blunt and rude. Argoud, by his own 
testimony, announced that Challe would have to take charge if 
De Gaulle refused to renounce his self-determination policy. "If he 
refuses?" Debre asked. "Monsieur le premier ministre, Argoud 
replied, "'at that moment it will be an affair for the colonels, 
whatever their names may be." 108 Debre returned to Paris think­
ing that Algiers was in the hands of a soviet of colonels.109 
Thereafter the insurgents' position weakened as a result of a 
series of developments. The army attempted to organize another 
massive Moslem-European rally on the model of May 16, 1958, 
and met with complete failure.110 Delouvrier persuaded Challe to 
join him on January 28 in an escape from the city which neither 
now controlled. Chief of Staff Paul Ely arrived in Algiers and 
talked severely with the colonels, though earlier the same day he 
had urged Debre to make firm promises regarding the future of 
Algeria.111 Finally, and most important, De Gaulle addressed the 
nation and the army on January 29, conceding to the latter the 
right to supervise future elections in Algeria and to select the 
proper means for restoring order in the present crisis. He was 
firm and convincing, however, in regard to those officers who 
wished to formulate the nation's Algerian policy. His warning was 
clear enough: "No soldier may associate himself at any time, even 
passively, with the rebellion without committing a grave mis­
take." 112 His words had a powerful effect on a hesitant officer 
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corps in Algeria.113 Shortly after the broadcast of his address in 
Algeria, while the Algiers colonels were realizing that it was all 
over (for the moment), telegrams from unit commanders and 
SAS officers flowed into Delouvrier's office proclaiming army loyalty 
to the head of the state.114 
In contrast to the treize mai crisis, this time the army elsewhere 
in Algeria had remained loyal, with few exceptions. Now, after 
the master had spoken, Gracieux broke with his political colonels, 
the Tenth Paratroop Division was replaced by regular infantry 
troops (including many draftees), the territorial units were called 
to active duty, and activist forces were left only to surrender (as 
did Lagaillarde) or flee (as did Ortiz). De Gaulle's strong public 
support in the metropole, his firmness and self-assurance, his com­
manding manner in addressing the army and the nation—all these 
contributed to the realization that this time the unity of the army 
could be preserved only through loyalty to the government.115 
The Barricades crisis served as a warning to De Gaulle that 
the army's loyalty could not be assured through generous delega­
tion of civil powers. Prefects and underprefects gradually were 
given back their civil powers wherever possible.116 The whole 
structure of the Fifth Bureau was dissolved.117 Le Bled offices were 
moved to Paris in early May, 1960, and the very term "'psychological 
action' soon became taboo in official military circles. However, a 
number of psychological-action specialists continued their activities 
under other services, particularly under the Second and Third 
bureaus.118 Officers who had encouraged the insurrection or at­
tempted to profit from it were removed from their posts. Among 
them were Colonels Gardes, who was the only officer to be tried 
(he was acquitted), Argoud, Broizat, Godard, and Bigeard (who 
had sent a message of support to the insurgents), and Generals 
Mirambeau (Bigeard's superior at Sai'da) and Faure (the eternal 
conspirator).119 General Challe himself was transferred in April, 
1960, likely because he was not thought to have been firm enough 
with his colonels and with the insurgents in January.120 
Transfers could not halt a renewal of anti-Gaullist conspiracy, 
however, as the President of the republic spoke progressively of a 
future "Algerian Algeria,"121 and then of an "Algerian Repu­
blic." 122 The group of military conspirators led by Colonel Argoud 
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acted on a sentiment that was widespread in the army, as evidenced 
by the impressive array of spokesmen who renewed the cry of 
"halte a l'abandon in the winter of 1960-61. General Challe re­
signed from active duty in December, 1960, in protest over De 
Gaulle's Algerian policy. Shortly before the referendum of January 
8, 1961, on that policy, statements of opposition were made by 
Marshal Juin on December 28, by General Valluy on December 
31, and then by General Zeller and sixteen other retired generals 
on January 4.123 
In October, 1959, and again in January, 1960, Right-wing con­
spirators in Paris had hoped, for the co-operation of Generals 
Zeller, Salan, and Jouhaud.124 Now, for the first time, a purely 
military conspiracy was bred and implemented by the colonels— 
Argoud, Gardes, Broizat, Lacheroy, Godard—and the four generals 
whom they succeeded in recruiting to lead the coup—Andre 
Zeller, Edmond Jouhaud, Raoul Salan, and Maurice Challe.125 As 
in May, 1958, the professional officer corps as a whole was favorably 
disposed toward another military crusade to prevent Algerian 
independence, how more imminent than ever.126 
If military sentiments had not changed, however, there had 
been a great change in the willingness of officers to act on their 
convictions in defiance of a vigorous, self-confident governmental 
leader who rapidly won the active support of the French popula­
tion. Pflimlin had temporized with the peaceful and admittedly 
ambiguous insurrection of May 13; De Gaulle quickly labeled in­
surgents as such. On April 23, 1961, a day after Challe and his 
forces had staged a palace revolution in Algiers with the aid of 
First Foreign Paratroop Regiment, De Gaulle addressed the nation 
and the army by radio, warning that "I forbid all Frenchmen, 
and above all all soldiers, to execute any of their orders." 127 In 
effect, De Gaulle was saying that, by entering into a state of 
insurrection, those officers who had rallied to Challe had lost all 
command authority, leaving their subordinates under the orders 
of loyal superiors, or of the President as commander in chief. 
Again, as on January 29, 1960, it was difficult for officers to ignore 
such a commanding voice. To be sure, "loyalist" officers refused to 
arrest their Challist colleagues, though a number of arrests were 
made in the other direction.128 Few officers were ready to oppose 
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the Challists outright; yet few outside the Tenth and Twenty-fifth 
paratroop divisions were willing to throw their lot with the putsch 
against the express orders of De Gaulle. As a result, Challe was 
forced to send a few paratroop regiments scampering all over 
Algeria to press local military commanders to join him.129 With 
very few exceptions, military zone and sector commanders remained 
loyal to the government.130 
The final blow to the mutineers was the response of thousands 
of conscripts, who had posed no barrier to the treize mai uprising. 
In the metropole De Gaulle's pleas of "Francaises, Francais, 
Aidez-moi!" met with a hearty response from trade unions (includ­
ing police unions), political parties (except for the extreme Right), 
and the population generally;131 in Algeria citizen soldiers in many 
units pressed their commanders to declare against Challe and 
ceased obeying orders if those commanders refused. In a few 
cases, as in the La Calle sector, conscripts went so far as to arrest 
their officers.132 The putsch might well have collapsed eventually 
even without the obstruction of the conscripts; nevertheless, their 
attitude and passive disobedience clearly hastened its demise.133 
Challe's surrender on April 25 ended the immediate crisis, but 
not the smoldering threat to military discipline. Generals Salan 
and Jouhaud and almost all of the soviet of colonels fled after 
disagreeing with Challe's refusal either to call on the armed sup­
port of European settlers or to launch the nation into civil war. 
The Secret Army Organization (O.A.S.), which had played a 
minor role in the putsch, under the leadership of General Salan 
now became the central organ of a clandestine and insurrectionary 
movement aimed at joining the army and civilian partisans of 
French Algeria in a desperate campaign to prevent Algerian inde­
pendence. In hopes of forcing the army into alliance with the 
pieds noirs through provoking a bloody racial war between the 
Moslem and European communities in Algeria, the O.A.S. pro­
ceeded to kill twelve hundred Moslems and two hundred Europeans 
by April, 1962.134 
It soon became clear, however, that if a military leader as 
prestigious as Maurice Challe could not outbid the Fifth Republic 
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for the army's obedience, neither could the less popular Salan. The 
April putsch had revealed that again military disobedience was to 
be considered a crime, despite the grandeur of its motives. On 
March 5, 1962, as negotiations between the F.L.N. and the De 
Gaulle government were reaching a successful conclusion, army 
forces in Algiers finally opened fire on European demonstrators. 
Unable to persuade the army to join with it, the O.A.S. turned 
its terrorists on unco-operative army personnel, killing fourteen 
officers and sixty-two enlisted men by mid-June, 1962.135 These 
assassinations only served to widen the rift between the O.A.S 
and the majority of officers. 
In spite of the now obvious risks involved, however, a number 
of officers did desert the army to join the ranks of the O.A.S. By 
the end of 1962 some two hundred officers were in prison for 
antigovernment activities,136 and perhaps another hundred de­
serters and purged officers were still active within, or on the 
fringes of, the O.A.S.137 A general reduction in officer personnel 
provided the opportunity for releasing from active duty over a 
thousand officers, many of whom undoubtedly were purged for 
disloyalty to the government. Almost all of those released from 
active duty against their will were from the armee de terre, rather 
than the navy or air force.138 An increased rate of voluntary 
resignations and a large number of unpublicized sanctions within 
the service completed the picture of a purge which could strike 
only at the most obvious activists in a generally disaffected officer 
corps. 
With the circumstances of the Week of the Barricades and the 
April putsch of 1961 now in mind, it is possible to shed a bit more 
light on the French Army's indiscipline in the face of a solid, 
popular, and effective political regime. The explanation seems to be 
threefold. First, as the French political scientist Maurice Duverger 
put it in 1958 (writing as a Frenchman as well as a political 
scientist): "It is said that there are women who have never had a 
lover, but few indeed who have had only one lover."139 Once 
crossed, the Rubicon could more easily be recrossed. The first 
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crossing had been simple enough and had won public acclaim for 
the army; why should military men stop at a second political 
venture to save French Algeria from abandonment? 
Second, De Gaulle took power at a time when the army in 
Algeria was the effective governing and administrative power in 
that province. He could not easily or quickly withdraw delegated 
powers. In fact, the constitutional referendum and elections of 
the fall of 1958 forced him to call on additional military aid in 
order to conduct an election in a war-torn country where the 
F.L.N. was circulating threats to candidates and voters.140 Officers 
attending the Ecole de Guerre in Paris were sent to Algeria to help 
officers there in the conduct of the election.141 The army helped 
to produce a massive affirmative vote in Algeria for the De Gaulle 
Constitution, but in the process, military commitment to French 
Algeria was further extended. 
Third, the treize mai did not end the ambiguity which had long 
surrounded the objectives of the French government in Algeria. 
Thirty years earlier, De Gaulle himself had recognized the im­
portance of clear directives when he wrote: 
In the last resort exaggerations of initiative are caused primarily by 
the absence or laxity of decisions by the superior echelon. An enter­
prising spirit in a leader is never a danger in itself.142 
Yet now in office, despite his early and continuing doubts about 
the feasibility of ending the war by "integrating" Algeria and 
France, De Gaulle was after all indebted to, and limited by, the 
military and civilian king-makers of the treize mai—most of whom 
were devoted partisans of French Algeria. One of the reasons for 
his recall to power and for his widespread popularity in 1958 was 
that the defenders of French Algeria and their opponents in France 
each felt that De Gaulle was in agreement with them. Coupled 
with De Gaulle's own pragmatic search for terms on which the 
war might be ended, these limitations lent a mysterious oracular 
quality to pronouncements on Algeria by the chief of state. Even 
the historic "self-determination' speech of September 16, 1959, 
failed to end all ambiguity. Initially, De Gaulle pronounced 
neither for "integration" nor for "association" with France.143 His 
The Praetorian Years 263 
preference for "association" gradually became apparent; yet this 
notion was itself so ambiguous that it might include anything from 
limited local autonomy to complete independence under the F.L.N. 
—the form it finally took in the Evian agreement of March, 1962. 
De Gaulle probably could not have moved more rapidly toward 
Algerian independence without stirring up even worse opposition 
than he actually met.144 Military attacks on De Gaulle's "double 
game' in Algeria, such as that made at the Salan trial, must not be 
taken at face value.145 It is not true, as one lieutenant colonel 
argued in 1962, that "de Gaulle had only to tell us what he 
intended back in 1958 and all the trouble would have been 
avoided." 14e Gardes, Argoud, Challe, and others were quite aware 
that De Gaulle never fully committed himself either to "integra­
tion' or to "French Algeria." Nevertheless, whatever the causes, 
an absence of clear policy goals, especially in the first two years 
of the Fifth Republic, again encouraged uncontrolled military 
initiatives in the domain of policy formulation and allowed the 
army's commitment to French Algeria to deepen before the goal 
of an "Algerian Republic' was finally declared.147 The army's long-
standing fears of "betrayal" and "abandonment" were intensified 
as De Gaulle's firm promises of September, 1959, and January, 1960 
—no political negotiations with the F.L.N. alone and none whatso­
ever until after a full cease-fire—were eventually broken.148 
In the last analysis, French military behavior since 1958 appears 
to support, rather than to disprove, the theory that firm, well-
rooted governmental authority, buttressed by a general belief 
within the civilian population in the legitimacy of the existing 
government, is the strongest single deterrent to military disobedi­
ence and revolt. The army in Algeria in April, 1961, had all the 
reasons for disobedience which had inspired it in May, 1958. 
De Gaulle was now more committed to an independent Algeria 
than Pflimlin had ever been. The army was still the object of abuse 
in the metropolitan press. The F.L.N. had more and bolder sup­
porters in the metropole than ever before. The paratroopers had 
gained in political aggressiveness since 1958, and the army as a 
whole was more convinced than ever of the political demands of 
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revolutionary-guerrilla war. The army still hungered for a victory, 
and the war seemed all but won militarily. Military honor was at 
stake in regard to innumerable pledges to France's Moslem and 
European supporters in Algeria that they would never be aban­
doned. Nevertheless the putsch rallied only a minority of officers, 
just as the "'soviet of colonels" in Algiers had failed to draw general 
army support in January, 1960. To be sure, some officers most 
probably were disheartened by the massive F.L.N. demonstrations 
of December, 1960, and by the pied noir Arab hunts which fol­
lowed. Yet the major novelty in the situation was undoubtedly 
De Gaulle, who brought to the French political scene a firm 
authority rooted in a wide, charismaticly based consensus. 
French experience since 1939 in general seems to support the 
thesis that political authority stemming from consensus is the 
single most powerful guarantor of civilian control.149 The recent 
experience of underdeveloped countries reveals even more dramati­
cally the frequent praetorian consequences of feeble political au­
thority.150 Especially in the West, however, solidity of political 
authority is not the only significant defense against praetorianism, 
nor is it always sufficient. As mentioned earlier, the French Army 
in the nineteenth century remained obedient, for the most part, 
despite the instability and uncertain authority of the French 
political system during most of that period. The French Army 
under the Fourth Republic probably would have behaved similarly 
had it not been for the strains of decolonization and revolutionary-
guerrilla war. 
It is the relatively weak government with shallow roots which 
needs be most wary of the assignment of political tasks to its 
army. During the French Revolution the Directorate sealed its 
own fate when, on the one hand, it left Napoleon with full powers 
outside France and, on the other, came to rely upon army support 
for defense against its domestic political enemies.151 The Corsican 
responded to a Directorate alarm in 1799, only to gobble up his 
civilian masters.152 As for that very recent period since World 
War II, it is obvious that uncontrolled delegation of political powers 
helped to undermine civilian control. 
Judging from recent French experience, it would appear that 
even a more powerful government enjoying considerable authority 
The Praetorian Years 265 
may find itself unable to control power delegated to the military 
if one of two conditions are present: first, if a tradition of civilian 
control is absent or if it has been recently weakened by a serious 
and successful challenge; and second, if military leaders have been 
allowed to acquire the habit of largely uncontrolled exercising of 
political power. Both conditions prevailed in the early years of the 
French Fifth Republic. One of the first acts of the Challists, once 
in power in Algiers in April, 1961, was to restore full civil govern­
ment powers to territorial military commanders.153 The second 
condition seems also to have played a considerable part in produc­
ing American civil-military tensions in Korea in 1950-51 and in 
West Germany from 1949-55.154 
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Part V

Attitudes and Ideology 

Chapter 10 
The Rivals of Discipline 
Professional military officers in France are almost as diverse in 
political and religious beliefs as the nation which they represent. 
Non-believers as well as devout Catholics are to be found among 
them, socialists and radicals as well as conservatives and fascists. 
Yet there are attitudinal patterns which tend to distinguish most 
professional officers from their civilian compatriots. With the earlier 
discussion of professional military attitudes before 1939 as a 
backdrop,1 the present chapter will examine some of the most 
relevant of these typical military attitudes in the period from 1945 
to 1962. The army's closest approach to a consistent military 
ideology in these years—the guerre revolutionnaire doctrine—will 
be reserved for discussion in the following chapter. 
In view of the grave damage suffered by the French professional 
military tradition of discipline and political neutrality in World 
War II and the decade and a half of revolutionary-guerrilla wars 
thereafter, it might be argued that praetorianism in France from 
1958 to 1961 was simply the result of a collapse of professional 
restraints. Indeed, the guerre revolutionnaire school had nothing 
but scorn for the traditional, white-gloved cavalry officer, who 
symbolized strict military obedience and warfare of a more noble 
and gentlemanly genre than the battle of Algiers. Yet, in fact, much 
of the rationale for military rebellion was found within the body 
of traditional military values, among which discipline was often 
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difficult to reconcile with such ideals as honor and military effec­
tiveness. 
Again, the absence of systematic attitude-survey data complicates 
the task of piecing together the postwar character of the French 
"military mind." On the basis of the rather sketchy evidence 
available it would appear that, with the exception of political 
neutrality, all of the traditional "functional-requisite" values of the 
French officer corps—stress on the role of force and on nationalism, 
and preference for unity, self-sacrifice, hierarchy, and order over 
individualism and democratic politics—were still widely held among 
officers from 1945 to 1962. For example, there is a timeless quality 
to the comments of Major "G. F." (entitled "Military Ethic and 
Democracy") in Message of October, 1956: 
. . . The military ethic is founded on the recognition of the insuffic­
iency of the individual, on the necessity of constraint, on the secon­
dary value of human life in relation to other absolute values, on 
confidence in a hierarchy and a method, on the importance of force 
in human relations.2 
Military values of discipline, respect, and self-sacrifice are so lack­
ing in democratic society, he continues, that only the army is left 
to teach them.3 Similarly, a high ranking French officer remarked 
in 1961: 
In reality, whether one wishes it or not, there is an incompatibility 
between liberal customs and habits as we practice them and the 
behavior of officers . . . who to be effective must be authoritarian 
in their acts and in their thoughts.4 
The classic antagonism between French military values and those 
of liberal democracy became sharper and more dangerous in a 
post-World War II climate of political vacillation and military 
frustration. Cheated of victory by elusive revolutionary-guerrilla 
adversaries, on the one hand, and maddened by sniping politicians 
and journalists, on the other, the officer corps developed a smolder­
ing hostility toward the timorous Fourth Republic and a wide­
spread conviction that national salvation was now a military 
responsibility. The theme of military antipathy toward le systeme 
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has been evoked often enough in earlier chapters to make its 
repetition here unnecessary.5 Suffice it to say that colonial war cast 
the army in a position of power at the very moment when dominant 
civilian and military values were drawing further apart.6 
Beyond victory in Algeria, stronger national unity (imposed, if 
necessary), and greater recognition for military men, French of­
ficers had no common conception of the nature of national salva­
tion.7 Antiparliamentarism among French military officers had no 
clearcut obverse side, for those who agreed on opposition to le 
systeme included reformist republicans, authoritarian traditional­
ists (on the early Vichy model), Bonapartists, and even a few 
fascists. The military values of unity, hierarchy, and discipline do 
not define a complete political regime. Historically, it might be 
argued, there was some affinity between military attitudes and the 
Bonapartist tradition, which was so closely tied to military glory. 
Among latter-day beneficiaries of the Napoleonic tradition, how­
ever, both Boulanger and De Gaulle derived their political strength 
primarily from civilian supporters. Boulanger was viewed as some­
thing of an upstart by senior officers, many of whom were of 
monarchist persuasion.8 De Gaulle never enjoyed strong popularity 
in the army (except among those rare Gaullists of 1940).9 He was 
pushed to the top in 1958 because he seemed to be the only man 
whom the country would accept peacefully. All in all, the per­
sistence of the Napoleonic tradition into the Gaullist era owes 
more to civilians than to military officers. 
Alongside the authoritarian, antiparliamentary strain of the 
traditional French military ethic, the nationalist strain also lived 
on into the post-1945 period. Mention has already been made of 
the army's tendency to consider itself a lonely defender of France 
against her enemies, both domestic and foreign.10 Army nationalism 
also came occasionally to the surface when talk of European in­
tegration seemed to threaten French sovereignty. To be sure, 
French military leaders generally looked with favor on French 
ties to the Atlantic Alliance in the postwar years, despite con­
siderable hostility among officers toward the United States and its 
anticolonial policy.11 Yet when the integration of Western European 
military forces was proposed in the European Defense Community 
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plan in the early 1950's, the only living marshal of France, Alphonse 
Juin, spoke out publicly against it in March, 1954—an action which 
led successively to his summons by the Premier, Juin's refusal to 
reply to that summons, his removal from all official French gov­
ernment posts, and finally, a rowdy veteran's demonstration at the 
Etoile in protest against these government sanctions.12 Juin's oppo­
sition to E.D.C. was shared by Message, which led a campaign 
against what it held to be a threat to French national integrity.13 
Nationalism and patriotism, variously conceived, remained core 
values within the officer corps. 
Among those traditional French military values stemming largely 
from the functional requisites of the military profession, political 
neutrality was the most serious casualty of the postwar years, 
especially within the guerre revolutionnaire school, where military 
effectiveness often was viewed as no longer compatible with un­
questioning obedience.14 With obedience to civil authority placed 
in the balance, in many an officer's mind, against the elemental 
demands of national defense, there was no obvious resolution to 
be found through reference to professional military values. If the 
role of the professional soldier generally required that he serve 
his civilian superiors loyally, it also required him to be a deter­
mined and effective warrior. The problem appeared simple, de­
ceptively simple, to one contributor to Message who wrote in 
January, 1960, amid military fears of impending negotiations and 
self-determination. Picking up where his predecessors had left 
off in 1954, writing the epitaph to the battered French military 
tradition of unquestioning obedience, he asserted: 
When discipline—as a means—is no longer adapted to the goal— 
which is always to win—it can be rejected as dangerous and as no 
longer suited to its purpose. We see there the first clear arid indisput­
able limit to discipline, in a fashion a "technical limitation."15 
In his impatience, the officer had forgotten the teachings of 
Clausewitz: war is never an end in itself but a means to political 
ends. 
The whole moral battle between obedience and victory (an 
elusive goal), however, was at base less a problem of conflicting 
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functional-requisite values than one of discipline versus military 
honor. It will be pursued in that context shortly. 
Before leaving the topic of functional-requisite values, the ques­
tion must be posed, if not fully answered, whether military respect 
for discipline and hierarchy does not stem in part from personality 
factors present in officers before their entry into military service. 
It would seem reasonable to expect that a military career would 
attract men who respond favorably to order and hierarchy. The 
only precise evidence available on this point comes from a study 
of attitudes and motivation among all 1,250 candidates who applied 
to military academies in 1960. In that study the Centre d'Etudes et 
d'Instruction de 1'Armee de l'Air found that the two most important 
reasons given by the candidates for preferring a military career 
were "patriotic ideal" and "liking for command." lf< While these 
findings are somewhat limited in value here because of the absence 
of data on a control group, control-group data was collected in the 
same study with regard to 'militaristic" attitudes. Using four 
Guttman scales built on seven questions each, the air force re­
searchers found roughly twice as many 'militarists" among candi­
dates as among a matched group of non-candidates in response 
to questions such as the following: "Do you believe that military 
personnel, in general, are more useful to their country than civil­
ians?"; "Do you believe the army should allow itself to be criti­
cized?"17 
These findings, plus the rigid, hierarchical social system spon­
taneously adopted among students preparing for Saint-Cyr in at 
least one prep school, seem to indicate that some of the functional-
requisite values of the military profession are strongly seconded 
by existing predispositions of men attracted to a military career.18 
Any systematic study of the French officer corps probably would 
find a wide variety of personality types. It would not be surprising, 
however, if officers (more often than civilians) were found to 
exhibit, like Marshal Petain, that intolerance for ambiguity so 
characteristic of the authoritarian personality.19 
Returning to the French professional military ethic, one must 
quickly add to attitudes and values deriving largely from profes­
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sional requisites the further central value of military honor which, 
though used in a multitude of meanings to sanctify a variety of 
motives, retains some of its earlier power and meaning.20 Among 
the consistent elements of military honor which have been passed 
from the feudal period to the twentieth-century officer corps via 
an aristocratic officer tradition and kept alive by the corporate 
interests of the officer corps are the following: (1) pursuit of 
glory through consistent willingness to fight and abhorrence of 
surrender; (2) Christian chivalry and fidelity; (3) personal loyalty 
to the commander; (4) cohesion of a self-regulating brotherhood.21 
Of these four aspects of military honor, chivalry suffered most from 
two world wars and sixteen years of revolutionary-guerrilla war.22 
Yet military honor still requires that an officer be true to his word. 
In all four of its major meanings military honor was often inter­
preted to be in conflict with discipline and political neutrality in 
the period from 1940-62. The significant role of military honor 
will be seen in the following discussions of important military 
attitudes which conflicted with discipline in those years after 1940. 
The clash between discipline and honor in World War II need 
not be retold here.23 Suffice it to say that De Gaulle's appeal of 
June, 1940, was based in part upon the dictum that the officer 
always fights: to surrender when there remain means for resistance 
is to dishonor oneself.24 The lasting effect of that appeal and its 
aftermath on the tradition of military discipline is told by numerous 
military spokesmen, among them Colonel Argoud in the Barricades 
trial: 
Is not the path of duty all laid out: that of obedience without a 
murmur? In fact, that went without saying for Captain Alfred de 
Vigny, but since then many events have occurred which have com­
pletely modified the facts of the problem. First, on a certain day in 
June, 1940, officers of France were called upon to choose between 
the way of honor and that of discipline. Some chose honor; others, 
much more numerous, discipline. One cannot say precisely that all 
were rewarded for their decision.25 
A similar thought was expressed by Vice Admiral Ploix, who was 
a defense witness in the Salan trial, despite his disapproval of the 
O.A.S.: 
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In order to respect this motto of 'Honor and Country' [the naval 
officer's motto], there are days, fortunately very rare, when it is 
necessary to take a decision, a capital decision, a grave decision, 
where—I have weighed my words carefully—it is necessary to choose 
between rebellion and perjury. 
It is to the honor of General de Gaulle to have chosen the path he 
followed in June, 1940. Four years later, moreover, the people of 
France acclaimed him. Well, in my soul and conscience, I am con­
vinced that it was the same path in the same dilemma which 
Genera] Salan intended to follow.26 
The lessons of World War II came to life when again honor and 
discipline appeared to part ways, even though this time the gov­
ernment of France was free from the chains of foreign occupation. 
Perhaps no other factor was more significant in preparing a 
general climate of incipient revolt in the French Army than the 
bitter humiliation of successive defeats.27 Spurred on by the pursuit 
of glory and the abhorrence of surrender (both of which found 
support in traditional military honor), French officers grew increas­
ingly thirsty for victory after the defeat of 1940, the armistice in 
Indochina in 1954, withdrawal from Tunisia and Morocco in 1955, 
the Suez fiasco in 1956, and finally, threatened surrender in Algeria. 
This is a theme on which military testimony is abundant. 
As he watched representatives of the victorious Vietminh cross 
the Hanoi bridge in 1954, one French colonel remarked, "Even so, 
it would be nice to be on the winning side from time to time."28 
A paratroop colonel was more emphatic when he looked back over 
his victoryless career in the early years of the Algerian war: 
I have had enough of pulling down the flag. For fifteen years I have 
had that job. If it continues in Algeria, I will go over to the other 
side. I will become a communist.29 
For many, humiliation brought with it a passionate desire for vic­
tory, a passion which reached full bloom in the guerre revolution­
naire school and which was already fully evident in a Message 
article of July, 1954: 
We have had enough of defeats which are glorious, or so described 
by press accounts!! 
Success is the only military rule. 
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The hope of one day being a victorious leader, honored, glorious, 
that is what is attractive for youth. 
"Military servitude," that is the phrase of a sick poet. There is no 
more servitude. There is success and defeat. One does not teach 
oneself in order to serve. One teaches oneself in order to conquer. 
That is the only way of serving with honor!30 
Victory seemed within grasp at last during the Suez expedition 
in 1956, when French paratroopers moved into the Suez with almosi 
no opposition. A brief euphoria gave way to deepened humiliation 
as the expeditionary corps was recalled. One air force officer. 
Major Raoul Bernard, who was with the paras, told of theii 
reaction: "Nothing could describe the dejection of my paratroopers 
who, though victorious, had to leave Egypt, turning their backs 
on their victory. . . . "31 
It was the long and frustrating Algerian war, however, which 
brought the desire to win to its greatest intensity. A few quotations 
will help re-create the mood: 
A major in 1956: " . .  . It [the Army] would not agree to liquidate 
Algeria the way it was forced to liquidate Indochina."32 
A "Message" editorialist in early 1957: "The Army, faithful to 
its tradition, is above all thirsty for effectiveness and honor."33 
Paratroop Colonel Marcel Bigeard, just a few days before the "treize 
mai": "That makes twenty years that we have been suffering defeat, 
and yet those defeats are not imputable to us. We are officers; we 
have chosen freely; we are dead men on deferment; but we have had 
enough of dying for a band of damn fools [cons]." 34 
A "Message" editorialist in April, 1958: "For the first time in eight­
een years, the French Army feels that victory which would be 
solely of its own making is within grasp. And that revives a great 
hope. 
"However, a doubt persists: instinctive, badly formulated per­
haps, undoubtedly exaggerated. But why not say it clearly? 
"Yes, the French Army is simply afraid of being cheated of its 
victory. 
"And that victory is the last chance. 
"Last chance for itself to begin with, for it is impossible to 
require of an army twenty years of successive reversals, captivities, 
humiliations. . . . 
"Last chance for the countrv as a whole. . . . " 35 
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An editorialist for Le Bled, a month later: "At the time when our 
soldiers in Algeria are accumulating success upon success, at the 
time when the enemy is physically crushed by our troops, it would 
be criminal and insane to cheat the French people and the Army 
of final victory. For having carried the heaviest weight of the 
struggle, neither would tolerate a moral capitulation and, without 
having suffered a single military reversal, end up with what M. 
Lacoste calls 'a diplomatic Dien-Bien-Phu.' "36 
Rumors of impending negotiations with the F.L.N. renewed 
army fears of another humiliation, leading one regular army captain 
in Algeria to remark: "The Army will never accept negotiations. 
That would be to dishonor itself, to dishonor its comrades who 
died in Indochina and Algeria." 3T Again in April, 1961, the desire 
to win, to avoid a further humiliation, to prevent a decade and 
a half of war from having been in vain, was clearly a strong element 
in the motivations of men like Challe, Salan, and those who fol­
lowed them.38 Among those given prison sentences after the putsch 
was General Andre Petit, who in testimony affirmed his belief that 
defense of the entire national territory was the essential mission, 
a transcedent truth1' of the military profession. "No one," he 
argued, "has the power to divert the Army from its natural voca­
tion, to make of it an army of abandonment." 39 
Military effectiveness, the quest for glory, and the abhorrence 
of surrender—all held unquestionable and legitimate places in the 
traditional French professional military value system. When swollen 
in importance by successive military frustrations, however, they 
tended to choke out the core value of professionalism—obedience 
to civil authority—without which the whole edifice would be 
opened to the danger of factionalism, schism, political strife, and 
a decline in technical proficiency. 
Very closely linked with the widespread fear of further humilia­
tion was a strong military attachment to the French Empire, an 
empire which had been largely conquered, pacified, and then ad­
ministered by army leaders like Generals Bugeaud in Algeria, Gal­
lieni in Madagascar and Indochina, and Lyautey in Algeria and 
Morocco.40 The "abandonment" of Indochina, Morocco, Tunisia, and 
Algeria—all familiar lands to most officers—rather naturally ap­
peared to be a direct affront to the army which had won and 
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protected them, as well as a symbol of lost national glory. It was 
with great regret that French officers withdrew from these former 
colonies, where the uniform had long carried power and prestige, 
leaving behind colonists and native friends of France. In circum­
stances somewhat similar to those of the French Army in Algeria, 
even an army as steeped in civilian supremacy as that of Great 
Britain had experienced serious unrest in 1914 when called upon to 
implement the Liberal government's policy of Home Rule for the 
whole of Ireland against violent Protestant protest in Ulster.41 
One must not conclude from the French Army's attachment to 
the empire and its defense of French Algeria that it shared the rigid 
gonservatism of the colons. French Army traditionalism, so ap­
parent at the time of the Dreyfus Affair, has (since 1900, at least) 
contained a certain paternalist, reformist element, as seen, for 
example, in the work of Lyautey and in the attitude of officers 
elected to the National Assembly before 1940.42 Since World War 
II, probably aided by an influx of officers from rather modest 
social origins, that paternalist element has turned more clearly 
reformist. In Indochina a number of officers began to feel the 
injustice of privilege and wealth alongside dire poverty. One cap­
tain remembered the poignant parting words of a political com­
missar in his Vietminh prison camp: "You will soon be liberated 
and you will be able to go to North Africa to defend the property 
of the big colonial landowners ['gros colons']."43 In Algeria the offi­
cer corps became a force for reform, strongly hostile to the privileges 
of the European settlers. General Massu and Colonel Godard both 
adopted Moslem orphans.44 With few exceptions (though important 
ones) the officer corps learned to detest the pieds noirs, with their 
narrowly self-interested mentality and their racism, which fed the 
fire of Algerian nationalism. One captain, writing in a communist 
review (which might have been expected to lump together military 
and colonial "fascists") affirmed, " . .  . Never have I heard around 
me a soldier come to the defense of a pied-noir. Never."45 No 
theme is more recurrent in Claude Dufresnoy's interviews with 
officers in 1959-60.46 Here is a sampling: 
An unidentified officer (to Jules Roy, quoted in his Introduction to 
"Des officiers parlent"): "The day when we learn that they have 
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expelled 500 Algerian Frenchmen who belong to the hundred 
families which remain opposed to all social progress and hold a 
great part of capital resources, champagne corks will pop in the 
mess halls. . .  . In each village, there is a small or large potentate 
who must be destroyed. We are ready to do it, as we are ready to 
fix ourselves the vital minimum wage."47 
A regular army lieutenant: "What is needed above all is to eliminate 
'les c o l o n s . ' " 48 
Colonel de G . , a regimental c o m m a n d e r : " . .  . T h e r e i s o n e s u b j e c t 
on which they [military personnel] are all agreed, from the private 
to the colonels, that would be to use all effective means against the 
'colons' and the 'little whites': means which would go as far as 
expropriation and expulsion from Algeria. The whole army, apart 
from a few generals and staff officers, would agree en bloc to par­
ticipate in a purge of that order."49 
Captain de R., an Indochina veteran: "Moreover, they are the first 
who play the game of communism with their racism, their sectarian­
ism, and this [pied noir] 'Algerian nationalism.' . . .  "B  0 
Colonel A.: "Those people are bastards [salauds]; when I think of 
the fact that our boys are coming to get shot up for them and of the 
manner in which they receive us, ah, I assure you, I have a heavy 
heart. "S1 
It is probably safe to say that the great majority of French 
officers in Algeria believed in the elimination of colonial privileges 
and saw in the social revolution that would follow the only hope 
for an enduring French Algeria.52 There were, of course, some of­
ficers who were pieds noirs themselves. A number of these moved 
naturally into the camp of revolt in April, 1961.53 A few other 
officers who joined the putsch, especially in the Tenth Paratroop 
Division, which was the idol of Algiers, were probably motivated 
partly by personal attachments in the pied noir community (often 
wives or mistresses).54 In the main, however, the cause of French 
Algeria was viewed in quite different terms by officers and colons. 
Throughout the trials of mutinous officers which followed the 
April putsch of 1961, the dominant theme of military apology was 
not so much defense of the empire or the humiliation of surrender 
(though these had their place) as the sacred pledges made by the 
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army to stay and protect the Moslem friends of France.55 The old 
concept of Christian chivalry was still alive in the minds of a few 
aristocratic officers like General Paris de Bollardiere, but for most 
officers it had been badly battered by total war and revolutionary-
guerrilla war. The close link between military honor and faithful­
ness to one's word, however, was as obvious to French officers after 
1945 as it had been to Marshal Lyautey in 1904 when, after push­
ing his troops across the Moroccan border from Algeria, he asked 
to be replaced rather than obey a government order to withdraw— 
an order requiring the abandonment of a population which he had 
promised to protect.56 
In 1954 many an officer carried with him out of Indochina a 
vivid memory of mountain people who had been recruited and 
then left to Vietminh vengeance,57 of Catholic communities in the 
north which had been promised permanent protection, of those 
thousands of Vietnamese who had tried to climb on departing 
trucks or had attempted vainly to swim out to embarking French 
military ships in order to escape what they feared their fate would 
be in a communist Vietnam.58 One of the many officers who lived 
through those years later testified, "When one has been mixed up 
in that tragedy he swears to himself never again to be an accom­
plice in such an affair." 59 Then, in Algeria the political character 
of the war against the F.L.N. forced thousands of French officers 
to promise native soldiers (the harkis) and villagers that France 
intended to stay in Algeria to protect those who chose the tri­
color.60 Without such assurances the number of Moslem rallies 
would have been few indeed. Having given those assurances, 
officers like Challe, who greatly expanded harki forces, felt their 
honor at stake whenever French withdrawal from Algeria was 
rumored. 
A host of government statements from 1954 to 1957 covered 
those military pledges in proclaiming the permanence of French 
Algeria. The firm commitment to French Algeria by Prime Min­
ister Pierre Mendes-France and his government in November, 
1954, has already been mentioned.61 In late 1956 there had ap­
parently been no change in official government policy: Prime 
Minister Guy Mollet assured the press, "France will never abandon 
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Algeria." 62 After May 13, 1958, the early statements of De Gaulle 
himself were taken as proof that pledges of French determination 
to stay in Algeria again had official government backing.83 One 
has only to recall De Gaulle's pronouncements in Algiers on June 
4, 1958 ("I have understood you. . . . There are only full French­
men"), and at Oran two days later ("France is here for good").64 
Yet as French officers were painfully aware, the De Gaulle Republic 
hesitated to commit itself fully to French Algeria, especially after 
the general's self-determination speech of September 16, 1959.65 
To be sure, Resident Minister Paul Delouvrier reassured his civilian 
and military subordinates in Algeria in November, 1959, with the 
words, "I say again with force: we are fighting for a French 
Algeria. . . ."66 By the Week of the Barricades in January, 1960, 
few still believed that De Gaulle's commitment was so clear. 
The events of 1958 and the activities of the Fifth Bureau further 
deepened the army's (if not the government's) commitment in 
Algeria. Soon after the fraternal demonstration of May 16, 1958, 
the Algiers Committee of Public Safety sent out a proclamation 
under General Massu's signature in which the Moslem population 
was assured of French protection: "Let them know that France 
will never abandon them. . . . All of us who have entered the 
fight in order to affirm the permanence of France in Algeria have 
given our solemn pledge of that permanence." 67 With the investi­
ture of De Gaulle hundreds of officers were required to repeat 
that pledge in the course of the constitutional referendum of Sep­
tember 28, 1958, run by the army in Algeria.68 
When Algerian independence and the renunciation of pledges 
again appeared imminent in the spring of 1961, Challe and his 
followers believed that military honor was at stake. An angry edi­
torial in the March, 1961, issue of Message described the mood 
of those officers who were then on the brink of revolt. Recalling 
the treize mai as seen by the army, "that union of men for whom 
human sentiments are more than superstructures," the editorialist 
remarked: 
It [the army] swore to all men of good will to protect their property, 
their families, their future. Would it suffer the shame tomorrow of 
breaking its pledge? Could it, without denying itself, abandon those 
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whom it has compromised, who risk death and torture for them­
selves and their families because they associated themselves with 
our task?69 
The answer came a month later with the April putsch. Among 
the first public statements from putsch headquarters in Algiers 
on April 22, 1961, was this radio announcement: 
You have before you Generals Challe, Jouhaud, and Zeller. On May 
13, the French Army gave a solemn pledge to keep Algeria under 
French sovereignty. We come today to renew that pledge in the 
name of the Army. . . . 70 
Challe later personally explained his fear of dishonor in the 
concluding remarks of his court testimony: 
Well then, we are told, "Obedience, Discipline, Duty." And we 
reply, "Yes, obedience; yes, discipline; yes, duty; until death, and in­
cluding death, but not including perjury repeated ten times, a hun­
dred times. We are not domestic animals but human beings, and 
there is no law in the world which can require a man to make 
perjury his daily bread."71 
Very similar testimony was given by one of Challe's faithful and 
admiring subordinates, Major Denoix de Saint-Marc, who in April, 
1961, had been interim commander of the First Foreign Paratroop 
Regiment, the unit which provided shock troops for the putsch in 
Algiers. Saint-Marc explained his attitude in these terms: 
One can ask a great deal of a soldier. One cannot ask him to disavow 
what he has said, to contradict himself, to lie, to cheat, to perjure 
himself. Oh, I know, there is discipline. The drama of discipline was 
familiar to our elders. We have also known it as young cadets. You 
can believe that again it weighed painfully on our shoulders in face 
of the destiny of Algeria about which our leaders have time and 
again repeated that it was part of the national territory.72 
Again and again in the testimony of those officers who followed 
Challe—and of several who had no part in the putsch—the clash 
between discipline and honor stands out.73 While the putsch trials 
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were still in progress in June, 1961, General Valluy, who had no 
part in the affair, described honor as a core value for the French 
Army, one stressed at Saint-Cyr and throughout the army, and 
one which now was in open conflict with discipline.74 General de 
Pouilly, who as commander of the Oran Army Corps in April, 
1961, was one of those few commanders who took a firm and 
consistent stand against the Challists, came forward at the Salan 
trial in defense of the mutineers: 
I chose a direction completely different from that of General Salan; 
I chose discipline. But in choosing discipline I chose as well to share 
with my fellow citizens and the French Nation the shame of an 
abandonment. . . . History will tell perhaps that their crime is 
perhaps less serious than ours.75 
Within the army officer corps it would appear that a strong 
majority (if not the "totality" claimed by Colonel Pierre Buchoud) 
was at least badly troubled by the dishonor of broken pledges.76 
From the standpoint of General Challe and those officers who 
surrendered with him when the putsch failed (as opposed to 
Salan, Jouhaud, Argoud, Lacheroy, Gardes, Godard, and others, 
who fled to carry on the fight in the O.A.S.), the whole affair has 
much of the character of a baroud d'honneur (a fight for the 
defense of one's honor) intended, not so much to overthrow the 
Gaullist regime, as to cleanse a guilty conscience. One of Challe's 
aides in the putsch, General Andre Petit (an influential Gaullist in 
May, 1958), later testified, "To tell the truth, I never found that 
affair to be reasonable." 77 Challe, the very efficient military com­
mander, gave remarkably little attention to such critical factors as 
the Algerian food supply.78 Despite his claims to the contrary, 
Challe's plan to end the war in two to three months was decidedly 
Utopian, given the French experience of the past six and a half 
years.79 In his talks with a number of officers in Algeria and in 
his later court testimony, Challe claimed that he acted for strictly 
"military" goals, with no intent of carrying the battle to metro­
politan France.80 Challe and his defenders (including most of those 
officers who refused to join him in April, 1961) conveniently forgot 
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two facts. The first was Challe's radio announcement of April 22 in 
which he declared: 
The High [Challist] Command reserves the right to extend its 
action to the metropole and reconstitute a constitutional and repub­
lican order which has been gravely compromised by a government 
whose illegality is obvious to the eyes of the nation.81 
The second was the existence of an abortive military plot in Paris, 
of which Challe was certainly aware, led by General Jacques 
Faure.82 
Even though Challe likely would have been pleased to have 
seen De Gaulle replaced, the putsch leader's primary goals were 
more limited, as evidenced by his reluctance to give over any real 
authority to civilian activists in Algiers,83 by his lack of enthusiasm 
at the arrival in Algiers of General Salan, who was set upon a 
fight to the finish and was closely linked (through the O.A.S.) 
with civilian enemies of the Gaullist regime,84 and by his decision 
to surrender, rather than call upon civilian-activist support or risk 
civil war. 
From Challe's statements of mid-April, 1961, to the court testi­
mony of imprisoned Challist officers after the collapse of the 
putsch, there runs a consistent thread: military honor can be 
safeguarded only through a desperate final attempt to save French 
Algeria. Several of these statements deserve to be quoted: 
General Challe to Colonel Marcel Lennuyeux (who did not join 
him) on the eve of the putsch: "If we fail, we will be shot, but 
we had our backs to the wall; we had to act. We will go all the 
way."85 
Lieutenant Jacques Favreau of the First Foreign Paratroop Regi­
ment in the Challe trial: "I am convinced that we are all indebted 
to General Challe for being able to appear in court today with 
clean hands." 86 
General Andre Petit at his own trial: "I am profoundly sad at 
what has happened, but I feel today relieved of all that weight 
of shame and guilt which has been building up inside me for two 
 8T years.
Captain Delacour in his own trial: "I broke my career as officers 
formerly broke their swords rather than break their honor. But if 
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I had agreed to perjure myself, in my soul and conscience I would 
no longer have been worthy of my officer's ideal." 88 
Major Georges Robin at his own trial: When tomorrow, 
deprived of my rights as a citizen, dismissed from the officer corps 
of France, I present myself before my children, in the name of 
those who have given their lives in the past fifteen years so that 
the word of France might be respected, I will be able to leave 
them, in lieu of material security, the heritage of uncompromised 
honor." 89 
Clearly, the behavior of Challe and those forty-five other of­
ficers who surrendered and were convicted with him cannot be 
understood without reference to the concept of military honor, 
conceived primarily as fidelity to one's word and (a theme almost 
as recurrent) loyalty to the memory of all of those officers and 
men whose death could not be rendered vain.90 The subsequent 
assassination and mistreatment of at least hundreds and probably 
thousands of Moslem harkis who fought with the French lend 
credence to the fears of men like Challe who recruUed them.91 
Fidelity to the pledged word was undoubtedly one important 
motivation for military revolt, though probably not so predomi­
nant a cause as the putsch trials might suggest. It must be borne 
in mind that officers on trial and those defending them were 
primarily concerned with justifying the mutinous behavior of the 
Challists. Their apologetics must not be taken at face value. Be­
neath the noble and romantic expressions of fidelity to military 
pledges often lay other powerful sentiments, particularly the frus­
trated desire to win, which would have sounded less generous 
in open court. Military honor, taken in the sense of fidelity to 
one's word and abhorrence of surrender, was closely intertwined 
with the defense of corporate military interests, notably military 
status and power, both of which seemed to many officers to require 
victory in Algeria and a continuing colonial role for the army. 
We have examined so far the role of military honor conceived 
as abhorrence of surrender and fidelity to the pledged word. The 
last two aspects of military honor mentioned earlier—personal 
loyalty to the commander and the cohesion of a self-regulating 
brotherhood—were also sufficient motives for military revolt in 
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some cases. One clear example was that of Major de Saint-Marc, 
the heavily decorated interim commander of the First Foreign 
Paratroop Regiment, for whom Challe was in April, 1962, 
. . . the great chief whom we admired and who, like de Lattre 
in Indochina, had given us hope of victory. He told me that it 
was necessary to complete that already acquired victory, that we 
should remain true to our promises to the troops, to the popula­
tion, that we should save our honor. Well, Monsieur le President, I 
followed General Challe. And today I am before you to answer for 
my actions and those of the officers of the first R.E.P. who acted on 
my orders.92 
As in 1942, once the legitimacy of orders from Paris had been 
opened to question by a rival leader, officers like General Georges 
Heritier, joint chief of staff in Algiers, and General Leon Perrotat 
commander of the central Oranais zone, looked for direction, not 
to governmental authority, but to their immediate commanders. 
Heritier refused to join the Challists, despite his apparent sympathy 
for them, because his superior, General Gambiez, joint commander 
in Algeria, had remained loyal to Paris. The case of Perrotat is 
even clearer. Confronted during the putsch by General Gardy, 
Challe's representative, Perrotat said: "I have no position. It is 
General de Pouilly alone who is my chief. It is up to him to take 
the positions arid not up to me!" 93 Presumably, if De Pouilly had 
joined the revolt, Perrotat would himself have become a rebel. 
As for the corporative spirit of the officer corps, it was largely 
that sentiment which discouraged loyalists from arresting Challist 
officers during the putsch and then, when he failed, brought them 
into the courtroom to testify in his defense.94 It was that same 
sentiment which drew Marshal Juin and General Demetz, mili­
tary governor of Paris, into Sante prison to visit the accused and 
which later allowed officer-deserters to plead the O.A.S. case 
among French units in Germany without fear of being denounced to 
French civil authorities. In March, 1962, for example, during a secret 
tour of French forces in Germany, Colonel Antoine Argoud of the 
O.A.S. was brought into the presence of General Vincent Moneglia, 
an infantry brigade commander who did not know whom he was 
to meet. According to the testimony of Lieutenant Colonel Piau, 
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one of eight officers who were later tried for setting up an O.A.S. 
ring in Germany, Moneglia refused to support the O.A.S., though 
he decided to hush up the Argoud visit. In Piau's words, "He told 
me that he was afraid that if he denounced him [Argoud] the offi­
cers of the garrison would thereafter refuse to shake his hand." M. 
Dechezelles, the presiding magistrate, then added, "Ah yes! and 
that, you see, is the saddest and most lamentable aspect of this 
dossier." 95 Even though he had been condemned to death in ab­
sentia for his role in the April putsch, Argoud was protected by the 
fraternal feelings even of officers who opposed the O.A.S. 
So far in the present chapter, discussion of French military atti­
tudes has focused on threats to military discipline which arose out 
of the Indochina and Algerian wars. From one final and differing 
vantage point, one can see another supporting factor behind the 
weakening of military obedience in the French Army. One careful 
student of the American military establishment has concluded that 
there are tendencies among American officers toward (a) a shift 
from "authoritarian domination" to "'manipulation, "persuasion," 
and "group consensus' as the typical style of military discipline, 
and toward (b) "civilianization" of the military establishment 
through the increasing importance of technical and managerial 
tasks.96 The second of these tendencies was only beginning to be­
come visible in the French Army during the period of revolutionary-
guerrilla wars from 1945 to 1962. The first trend, however—a shift in 
the character of military discipline—was clearly observable in 
the French as well as in the American Army. As Morris Janowitz has 
hypothesized, in both cases it probably spurred on the military 
quest for a political answer to the question, "Why do we fight?" 
In the early 1930's Charles de Gaulle was aware that the increas­
ing importance of individual initiative in modern warfare and the 
weakening general respect for traditional authority which he saw 
in civilian society were already shifting the basis of military author­
ity from rank alone to proved leadership ability.97 More recently, 
with the political demands of revolutionary-guerrilla war to hasten 
the demise of blind obedience, a number of military writers have 
looked to social psychology for tools to bolster morale and cohesion 
within the French military establishment.98 As the officer comes to 
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feel he must win respect in order to command clear obedience from 
his troops, he is quite naturally drawn to explaining the goals which 
his orders are intended to serve. According to Captain Andre Souy­
ris, for example, the old army attitude that "'one must not seek to 
understand" is now outmoded in political and psychological war­
fare." As chief of staff of national defense, General Paul Ely agreed 
but warned that, in the last analysis, spontaneous obedience is the 
touchstone of military effectiveness.100 Indeed, the understanding" 
provided by Fifth Bureau answers, we have already seen, intensified 
civil-military tensions when official war goals in Algeria were al­
tered. Undoubtedly the political nature of revolutionary-guerrilla 
war was the primary reason for this new emphasis on understanding 
and commitment, as opposed to unquestioning obedience.101 Even 
without the Indochinese and Algerian wars, however, the erosion 
of automatic obedience seen by De Gaulle probably would have 
continued. 
As for the phenomenon of "civilianization'' through technical 
modernization of the military establishment, the French Army 
before 1962 differed markedly from the American Army in that the 
primary French preoccupation was with antiguerrilla warfare which 
did not involve much ultramodern military hardware. The question 
of modernization, or rather military hostility to modernization, de­
serves attention, however, for it has been vested with great im­
portance by at least two prominent French experts in military 
affairs. One of these is Francois Gromier, who views the moderniza­
tion crisis, rather than the Algerian war, as the true root of the 
recent "uneasiness" (malaise) of the army.102 There is no question 
but that the "military Poujadism" of which Gromier writes, i.e., the 
hostile reaction of threatened military branches to technical mod­
ernization, is a real phenomenon. I would argue, however, that 
without fifteen years of colonial wars, that problem could have 
been resolved without serious threat to civilian control. Let us 
examine the evidence. 
In favor of the "military Poujadism" thesis, it must be said that 
military revolt has been fed mostly by the army, rather than by 
the more technical branches (the navy and the air force). And 
within the army, the largest number of angry men have been pro­
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duced by the paras, the "knights of guerrilla war," who could expect 
a serious loss of status in an army of missiles and technicians. Even 
in the highest grades one hears warnings against jeopardizing the 
officer's status and traditional values (honor, love of action, personal 
responsibility) by transforming him into a technician or a man­
ager.103 Judging from the above-mentioned study of candidates to 
French military schools, the army, as opposed to the navy, and 
especially to the air force, tends to attract men whose attitudes are 
characterized by a liking for combat, a clear preference for things 
military over things civilian, and a distaste for technical specializa­
tion.104 The same phenomenon is evident, in reverse, in the recent 
aversion of graduates of the military engineering school, the Ecole 
Polytechnique, for an army career.105 
The fact of recent army hostility to technical modernization 
appears less determining, however, when considered in historical 
context. As suggested earlier, personal involvement in the com­
mitments and frustrations of revolutionary-guerrilla war was more 
important than branch affiliation in inclining officers toward the 
camp of military revolt.106 At least three of the four generals who 
led the April putsch of 1961 were quite at home with technical 
military questions. General Challe was an intelligent and highly 
trained air force officer who had nothing to fear from modernization 
of the military establishment.107 General Jouhaud was also an air 
force officer, and General Zeller spent most of his career, not as a 
combat commander, but as a military manager and logistics spe­
cialist.108 Zeller's protest resignation as chief of staff of the army in 
1956 was not occasioned by modernization but, on the contrary, by 
a government decision to break up modern French mechanized 
units in Germany for service in Algeria. Among the colonels, the 
most active and most powerful, Colonel Argoud, was a brilliant 
graduate of the famed Ecole Polytechnique.109 
As for the guerre rivolutionnaire school generally, some of the 
best and most original minds in the army were drawn into its circle. 
They were attracted, in large measure, because the army's principal 
and consuming assignment after 1946 was to stop colonial revolu­
tions, a costly mission which required the temporary sacrifice of 
technical modernization. Men like Hogard, Lacheroy, and Broizat 
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were no more defenders of military traditionalism than were those 
few strong military advocates of a French atomic bomb: they only 
conceived of the probable style of modern war in different terms. 
In the early years of the Algerian war Message spread the guerre 
revolutionnaire doctrine on the one hand and called for the devel­
opment of a French atomic bomb on the other.110 The Algerian 
war was the central concern of the guerre revolutionnaire school and 
the army officer corps in general, however, and when De Gaulle 
began dangling his atomic force de frappe as an alternative to 
victory in Algeria, most officers rejected the bait.111 
In short, army opposition to technical modernization was real, 
especially among paratroop and Legion officers; in the main, how­
ever, it was of secondary importance in comparison with the Al­
gerian question and the military pride, honor, and status which 
were invested therein. Without the Indochinese and Algerian wars, 
modernization and technical training would have spread gradually, 
thereby easing a transition which promised to be more difficult in 
the 1960's. 
Discipline, the traditional capstone value in the French military 
ethic, came violently into conflict in the period from 1945-62 with 
military attitudes arising from three major sources: (a) the func­
tional-requisite values of professional soldiers (from which disci­
pline itself is derived), (b) military honor, and (c) the corporate 
interests of the military community. Out of the functional requisites 
of his profession, the officer derived his nationalism, his desire for 
military effectiveness, and indirectly, his distaste for parliamentary 
democracy. All of these attitudes helped to undermine civilian 
supremacy at a time when a divided nation and timid Fourth 
Republic governments seemed incapable either of defending the 
empire or of making peace with it. Weak and unstable governmen­
tal leadership before 1958 (when it was too late) left the army 
hamstrung in its essentially political battles against revolutionary-
guerrilla movements. Out of the traditional concept of military 
honor came an abhorrence of surrender, a passionate desire to be 
faithful to innumerable army pledges to defend France's friends 
in the colonies, and a loyalty to fellow officers against attacks from 
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the civilian world. From the corporate interests of the military com­
munity the officer derived a strong attachment to the empire built 
by his military forebears (though not to the social and economic 
status quo there) and a fear of further humiliation and permanent 
decline in military status and power should overseas France be lost. 
All of these sentiments came to focus on the defense of French 
Algeria and, with the army deeply committed to that cause by the 
late 1950's, on contempt for any government, weak or strong, which 
dared contemplate Algerian independence. 
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Chapter 11 
The French Military Doctrine of 
"La Guerre Revolutionnaire" 
In view of the wide range of religious and political beliefs within 
the professional officer corps, it is clearly inaccurate to speak of an 
all-inclusive French military ideology. Yet it is equally clear that 
the influential French military doctrine of la guerre revolutionnaire 
contained strong ideological elements. Moreover, that doctrine was 
sufficiently coherent and consistent to bear systematic analysis. 
Certain of its aspects have already received attention in connection 
with the discussions above of revolutionary-guerrilla war and French 
psychological action in Algeria. The threads of the doctrine must 
now be pulled together, with particular attention to its more 
ideological components. 
The origins of the French military doctrine of la guerre rSvolu­
tionnaire may be traced to two immediate roots in the latter years 
of the Indochinese war. With two books on Mao Tse-tung, General 
Lionel-Martin Chassin, former air commander in Indochina, at­
tempted to draw military attention to Chinese Communist doctrine 
regarding revolutionary war; and with an article on the French 
Army's proper ideological role, he tried to show how the West must 
defend itself against communist subversion and revolution.1 At that 
same time, from 1951-54, French officers in the field in Indochina 
learned about revolutionary war, not from library research, but 
from their enemy, the Vietminh. Colonel Charles Lacheroy was 
sent to Indochina with the warning from his superiors that there 
would be little to learn from the unmechanized war he would fight 
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there. He and many other captains, majors, and colonels returned 
believing, on the contrary, that "no period of our military career 
was as formative. . . ." 2 
The guerre revolutionnaire school soon won over many of the 
most dynamic and intelligent younger officers in the army. After 
1955 the military press was filled with articles on the subject and 
on the related topic of psychological action (the two terms were 
sometimes used almost interchangeably). Guerre revolutionnaire 
theorists like Major Hogard, Colonel Nemo, Colonel Lacheroy, and 
even Captain Souyris became familiar figures to readers of the 
Revue militaire d'information and the Revue de defense nationale.3 
Under General Lecomte the Ecole de Guerre helped to spread the 
guerre revolutionnaire doctrine.4 By 1957 the guerre revolutionnaire 
school had won over General Jacques Massu, Chief of Staff of 
National Defense Paul Ely, Algerian Resident Minister Robert 
Lacoste, and Defense Minister Maurice Bourges-Maunoury. Under 
their patronage it became the official military doctrine of the French 
Army.8 The guerre revolutionnaire school never succeeded in win­
ning over the entire officer corps; yet it is significant that almost 
all of the political colonels of 1958-62 were strongly committed 
theorists or practitioners of that doctrine. Among them, one finds 
Colonels Broizat, Argoud, Lacheroy, Gardes, and Godard—the 
master strategists of military revolt. 
The basic elements of the French military doctrine of la guerre 
revolutionnaire may be summarized in the following propositions. 
First, since the early 1950's a nuclear stalemate between East and 
West has rendered nuclear war most unlikely. In fact, the most 
probable form of war which the West will be forced to fight 
(indeed, which it is already fighting) is subversive, revolutionary 
war. Second, the universal revolutionary war now in progress is 
unlike conventional war in that its primary object is not defeat of 
the enemy army but physical and moral conquest of the population. 
Third, that same revolutionary war is being conducted by interna­
tional communism and may be characterized as permanent and 
universal. It uses anticolonial nationalism as a tactic to overwhelm 
the West by surrounding and weakening it. The battle for Algeria, 
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like that for Indochina before it, is part of World War III; its out­
come may well be decisive in the struggle between communism and 
Western civilization. Fourth, in order to defend itself against the 
communist foe, the West must do the following: it must adapt to 
its own purposes some of the techniques of the enemy, especially 
in regard to propaganda, indoctrination, and organization; and it 
must perfect a Western ideology with which and for which to fight. 
The second proposition has already been discussed in Chapters 
VI and VII above. The other three propositions merit further 
exploration. 
Revolutionary War as Modern War 
Most military theorists and strategists in the West now probably 
would accept the argument made by General Chassin in December, 
1954, at a time when the United States was adopting a defense 
policy of 'massive retaliation' : 
Thus the appearance of the atomic bomb [wrote General Chassin] 
and especially that of the fission bomb diminishes the probability 
and the risk of a generalized war. . But what we have said 
above shows as well that if the atomic bomb diminishes the risk of 
a world war, it increases the risk of localized jungle wars—and of 
wars which we will lose if we are not careful.6 
Similar statements were made by a number of military spokesmen 
from 1954 to 1958,7 among them Colonel Lacheroy, head of the 
Information and Psychological Action Service at the Ministry of 
National Defense, who told a group of reserve officers in July, 1958: 
There are many of us in the officer corps who think that perhaps 
we will not have an atomic war, perhaps we will not have a con­
ventional war; but revolutionary wars—alas, we will have many of 
them. We have them already. That is all we do. Well then, we do 
not want it always to end at Geneva!8 
Clearly, if present and future wars were to be of the revolutionary-
guerrilla variety, the armed forces, or at least important elements 
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within them, should be trained in the political, as well as the 
military, requirements of that style of combat. 
So far the argument is close to that voiced by American critics 
of the massive-retaliation policy in the 1950's—critics who prevailed 
after 1961, when the Kennedy administration gave increasing atten­
tion to both conventional war and unconventional (revolutionary­
guerrilla) war. In the third proposition, however, the more dubious 
ideological elements of la guerre revolutionnaire begin to appear. 
Permanent and Universal Revolution 
French officers who had learned of revolutionary-guerrilla war 
against a communist enemy in Indochina were quick to raise the 
cry of "communism" when again they faced a similar style of war in 
Algeria. For those Indochina veterans who viewed the Algerian 
rebels as simply the "Viets" displaced from tropical rice paddies to 
the North African bled, it seemed that the similarity between F.L.N. 
and communist tactics was proof enough that the rebellion was 
under the direction of Moscow.9 
For the French military propagandist and for many relatively 
unsophisticated combat officers, there seemed no reason to mince 
words in regard to communism in North Africa. Among those offi­
cers interviewed by Claude Dufresnoy in 1959-60, a number spoke 
of the communist menace, the following comments being particu­
larly noteworthy: 
Captain X (regular army, Fifth Bureau): "The F.L.N. is only a mani­
festation of communism." 10 
Major N. (Fifth Bureau): "If we leave, tomorrow Russia will be 
here in our place. . .  . It is us or the Russians, and in the long 
term, the paralysis of Europe and its gradual slide into the com­
munist orbit."1X 
Colonel B. (regimental commander on the Tunisian border): "The 
subversive war must never be forgotten; the communists are winning 
ground. Ethiopia is entirely in their hands (sic). Egypt, Tunisia, 
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Morocco have entered the soviet orbit. . . . Believe me, give up 
Algeria and it is the end for the West." 12 
Major M. (regular army, stationed in the hinterland), when asked 
what he would think if the government proposed new talks with the 
F.L.N.: "That would be the defeat of France: the last bastion against 
communism would crumble." 13 
It was more than incidental that among those officers whom 
Dufresnoy interviewed the "F.L.N. equals communism" equation 
was frequently suggested by psychological-action officers.14 Le Bled, 
the tool of the Fifth Bureau, moved from cautious identification 
of the F.L.N. with communism in 1957 to much greater daring in 
November, 1959, when there appeared an article entitled "The 
F.L.N., Instrument of Communism." 15 
As was so often the case, the Fifth Bureau had the full support 
of Besident Minister Bobert Lacoste on this matter in 1957-58. In 
fact, in his General Directive Number Four of April, 1957, he went 
beyond them: 
The whole of North Africa would normally be expected to follow the 
Western pattern, and only our civilization is capable of preventing 
it from falling into chaos. Only an Algeria profoundly united with 
France can also prevent neighboring countries from falling into 
disorder and then into the communism which now animates the 
subversion in a quasi-official manner.16 
By "the subversion" Lacoste could only have meant the F.L.N. 
Most theorists of la guerre revolutionnaire, however, were more 
subtle. Intelligent military writers eager to avoid the ridicule of 
civilian as well as military critics could not ignore facts so blatant 
as the early French Communist Party denunciations of the F.L.N., 
the insistence of the latter that no alliance be formed with the 
Algerian Communist Party, and F.L.N. acceptance thereafter of 
individual Communist participation only on subordinate levels.17 
Most frequently, theorists of la guerre revolutionnaire found it 
unnecessary to assert that F.L.N. leaders were conscious Communist 
agents. Indeed, one leading theorist of that school, Major Jacques 
Hogard, frequently remarked (usually in footnotes) that the Al­
gerian nationalist movement was not essentially communist. It 
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was enough to state, as did Hogard, that the movement was the 
creation and the instrument of international communism for the 
destruction .of protective colonial ties.18 
The basic premise of the guerre revolutionnaire doctrine, stated 
by Major Hogard, was that "the Revolutionary War is 'one' in space, 
in time, and in its methods. . . . The enemy is 'one' from Paris to 
Saigon, from Algiers to Brazzaville."19 For Hogard and for the 
guerre revolutionnaire school generally, revolutionary war was, by 
definition, a communist phenomenon. Only after 1960 did military 
writers begin to distinguish between a general category of "sub­
versive war" and a communist subcategory of "revolutionary war."20 
At about the same time that Hogard's statement appeared (in early 
1957), a similar idea was stated more forcefully, as might be ex­
pected, by Message: "It must finally be clear even to the blindest 
eyes that for years now we hfave been engaged in the Third World 
War." The Algerian war, the writers continued, was only one 
"tactical phase of the permanent revolutionary war." 21 
Basing their analysis on the self-declared intent of the second 
congress of the Communist International in 1920 to use bourgeois 
nationalism as a weapon against imperialism,22 the guerre revolu­
tionnaire theorists concluded that anticolonial uprisings everywhere 
are communist controlled and, if successful, will open the way (in 
the words of Chief of Staff Paul Ely) to "an inexorable process: 
independence, neutralism, satellization. . . ." 23 For Colonel Broizat, 
for example, "Algerian nationalism was an artificial dialectical cre­
ation," designed solely to serve the purposes of international com­
munism.24 Similarly, a Fifth Bureau colonel declared in April, 1959, 
"There is no Moslem nationalism. There is communism which uses 
nationalism; that is different." 25 Taking up the same theme, General 
Andre Zeller and fifteen other retired generals declared in a pre-
referendum statement of January 4, 1961: "The truth is that the 
rebellion, which has touched only an infinite fraction of Algerian 
youth, was fomented and is directed by international commu­
nism." 26 Other military spokesmen, among them Generals Navarre 
and Massu, tended to subsume Arab nationalism in its entirety 
under the category of communist subversion.27 In that manner the 
Algerian war and the Suez campaign of 1956 could both be fitted 
into a global anticommunist crusade. 
314 Attitudes and Ideology 
Frequently the writings of the guerre revolutionnaire school 
linked the notion of permanent and universal revolutionary war 
with a neat and complete bifurcation of the world into communist 
and anticommunist camps and a firm conviction that international 
communism must either conquer the world or disappear entirely.28 
Hogard, for example, seems to have expected the communist bloc 
to remain forever united and intransigent, even though as early as 
1954 some French military writers had anticipated a Chinese-
Soviet rift.29 
A further recurrent theme in the guerre revolutionnaire literature 
was the notion that the French Army, almost singlehandedly, was 
defending Western civilization from what might well be a fatal 
blow in Algeria. Testifying at the Barricades trial, Colonel Jean 
Gardes first discussed the novel style of revolutionary-guerrilla war 
and added: 
And then, a second sentiment which still animates me, which per­
haps animates me more than in December when I took charge of 
the Fifth Bureau: that is that over there we are waging, we are 
still waging today, our last battle as free men.30 
Message had voiced the same cry of alarm as early as February, 
1956, when "Milites" wrote: 
In brief, Algeria appears to be the keystone of the French Union. 
Its loss would produce definitively that of the French Union, prob­
ably that of our political institutions. In effect, it is the fate of the 
West and that of Christianity which is at stake at the present time 
in Algeria.31 
Four years later, in January, 1960, the warning was repeated by 
Major Cogniet in a lecture at the Ecole Superieure de Guerre. Re­
ferring to the army's state of mind in Algeria before May 13, 1958, 
he announced: "Then that war, that war which without doubt is the 
last battle, that war which is without the least doubt the Verdun 
of the revolutionary war, we decided not to lose it."32 The same 
warning that liberty, Christianity, and all of Western civilization 
would probably be lost with Algeria came from the lips and pens 
of General Salan, Colonel Argoud, and many others.33 
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More cautious military theorists like Hogard and Souyris stopped 
short of resting the entire fate of the Western world upon that of 
Algeria; all were agreed, however, that the French Army in Algeria 
—alone, misunderstood, and maligned—was helping to hold the 
dike of Western civilization against the menacing communist floods. 
Time and time again military spokesmen cried out in anguish and 
anger that all but the army were blind to the mortal danger of 
communist-revolutionary war. "One can truthfully say," wrote Cap­
tain Souyris in October, 1958, "that the [French] Army is at present 
almost the only body of the Nation which understands that the 
Third World War has already begun."34 Why was the French 
Communist Party left free to work its subversion, officers demanded, 
when the revolutionary war was one—in Indochina, in Algeria, in 
France itself? 35 
As for the international scene, where the French Army was again 
viewed as a rare beacon of light in the West, why did the nation's 
supposed allies come to her aid so late in Indochina and then, in 
fact, sabotage her defenses in Algeria and in the Suez expedition? 
Why was the United States so naive as to feed the communist fires 
of anticolonialism, so blind as to ignore the universal character of 
communist-revolutionary war, so narrowly self-interested as to 
believe that she could continue to ease France out of her colonies 
and then replace her, as in Vietnam? 36 
Confident in the belief that by virtue of its experience and aware­
ness the French Army was destined to play the leading role in the 
Counter-Revolution,37 the guerre revolutionnaire school disregarded 
its domestic critics and set off to rally support in allied military 
headquarters. On November 15, 1957, General Jacques Allard, 
Commander of the Algiers Army Corps, presented in effect an 
introductory lecture on the French military doctrine of la guerre 
revolutionnaire to an interallied group assembled at SHAPE head­
quarters at Fontainbleau.38 The basic elements were all there in his 
presentation: the communist nature of the underlying enemy in 
Algeria, the vital importance of that province for Western defense, 
the inevitable "communization and satellization" of an independent 
Algeria, and the political and ideological character of revolutionary-
guerrilla war. NATO failed to embrace Algeria as Allard wished,39 
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but his speech was a further indication that the guerre revolution­
naire doctrine had the stamp of official French military approval.40 
Fire against Fire 
Once the universal and virtually omnipotent communist enemy 
had been identified, theorists of la guerre revolutionnaire turned to 
the problem of defense against him. On the practitioner's level, 
where Colonel Lacheroy first studied revolutionary-guerrilla war, 
defense was often viewed simply as a matter of turning the rebel's 
organizational and psychological weapons back against him or, 
rather, against the population which both adversaries sought to 
"conquer." Here two basic difficulties emerged which were never 
quite resolved: Are parallel hierarchies, conditioning of the masses, 
and small-group indoctrination simply neutral techniques as Lache­
roy suggested, or do they also foreclose certain kinds of value ob­
jectives? 41 And second, are techniques alone sufficient for the con­
quest of the population or is the choice of goals of equal impor­
tance? 
Colonels Lacheroy, Trinquier, Godard, and Argoud were more 
concerned with winning than with safeguarding freedom of the 
individual conscience, especially in view of the coercion to which 
the Moslem population was already subjected by the F.L.N.42 
Trinquier provides the most complete description of the "organiza­
tion of the population' in his book La Guerre moderne, wherein 
he argues that the totalitarian controlling apparatus must be in place 
in time to prevent a subversive attack.43 Given a cold-war setting, 
where the threat of subversion may be felt to be permanent, it 
would appear that Trinquier's scheme would lead inevitably to per­
manent controls of a police-state nature, relatively clandestine in 
"peacetime," more overt in time of crisis. In fact, when the anti­
communist paranoia of the guerre revolutionnaire school is com­
bined with its deification of totalitarian techniques, some of the 
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elements for a military neo-fascism are already assembled, as Mau­
rice Duverger pointed out in 1958.44 When pushed to the wall after 
the failure of the putsch in April, 1961, theorists and practitioners 
of la guerre revolutionnaire, now rebels themselves in the O.A.S., 
did not hesitate to use terrorism, threats, and all the techniques for 
"conquest of the population" against the French people them­
selves.45 
Yet, lest Trinquier and the O.A.S. colonels be taken as typical 
spokesmen, it must be recalled that the theory of parallel hier­
archies (or "organization of the population," to use Trinquier's 
phrase) was not universally espoused in the guerre revolutionnaire 
literature and was applied in only a few cases in Algeria.46 Nor 
were brain-washing techniques used extensively, despite the curious 
impact they had made upon officer-veterans of Vietminh prison 
camps, where lasting conversions had been extremely rare.47 In 
principle, French military psychological action within the context 
of la guerre revolutionnaire was intended to shun the "violent," 
"deforming," "lying" propaganda of the enemy, which appealed to 
base emotions and manipulation of the subconscious, in favor of 
the "honest" and "objective' exposition of the truth.48 It hardly 
need be added that within the context of la guerre revolutionnaire, 
truth was invariably interpreted to coincide with the case against 
Algerian independence.49 More often than not, the Fifth Bureau 
in Algeria told the truth, but rarely the whole truth. 
As it is a question of techniques and only of techniques, there is no 
reason why Franco-Vietnamese technicians cannot do as well as 
those of the Vietminh—and more rapidly since they benefit from the 
experience of the enemy.50 
So wrote Colonel Lacheroy shortly before the Indochinese war 
ended in armistice and partition. The images which Lacheroy uses 
so well in his speeches and writings are indicative of his unconcern 
for goals as opposed to techniques: once a population is held in an 
organizational vice, like a flower vase in the hand, the holder may 
then put in it whatever he desires. When a man's coat is to be 
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remade for a boy, it must not simply be shortened; it must be 
unsewn completely, laid flat, recut, and then reconstructed. So with 
human society, the colonel suggests.51 The old attitudes must be 
compromised, placed in doubt, and then replaced through intensive 
propaganda within the tight physical and moral controls of parallel 
organizational hierarchies. 
For Lacheroy and his fellow theorists, the world of revolutionary 
war was largely one in which skilful manipulators could turn the 
masses in any chosen direction—if only the manipulators' skills were 
great enough. French military specialists in 'psychological action" 
owed their faith in mass manipulation through propaganda partly 
to careful study of Serge Chakotin's The Rape of the Masses, a book 
written in 1939, before World War II experiences such as that of 
occupied France had revealed the toughness of the psychological 
defenses of a hostile population.02 Unlike some officers of the Tract 
and Loudspeaker Company set, Lacheroy, Trinquier, and Godard 
—particularly the last two—were aware of the limited power of 
propaganda unless supported by tight organizational controls over 
the population. The power which they denied to propaganda, how­
ever (and Trinquier and Godard were at odds with the Fifth Bureau 
on this point), they tended to attribute to coercion, organization, 
and police controls, minimizing the significance of popular aspira­
tions and grievances.53 Trinquier was convinced that threats, co­
ercion, and terror were the only reasons for the F.L.N.'s successes.54 
Critics of the guerre revolutionnaire school have pointed out, and 
rightly so, that in viewing colonial rebellion as "an artificial dialec­
tical creation" (Broizat), this doctrine seriously neglected the polit­
ical and sociological terrain which gave the rebels their decisive 
advantage in both Indochina and in Algeria.55 Had French military 
officers viewed revolutionary-guerrilla war in less manipulative 
terms, had they given more attention to grievances actually felt, it 
is quite likely that they would have rallied earlier and more vigo­
rously to the campaign against colonial privileges. But even when 
acting as agents of reform, as they often did, French officers were 
inescapably aliens working with an unassimilated native population. 
In any case, basic reform was a domain in which the government, 
not the army, should have been expected to provide leadership. 
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A Creed to Defend 
Though it may at first appear paradoxical, the guerre rdvolu­
tionnaire school, which placed such faith in techniques as opposed 
to ideas, was also vitally concerned with the construction of a 
Western ideology to throw against international communism. The 
paradox, though real in some cases, was most often only apparent, 
for ideology was viewed simply as another necessary tool for the 
"'conquest" of the population. To be sure, as discussed earlier, the 
very nature of revolutionary-guerrilla war forced the defending 
French Army to ask why it was fighting; for some officers, the 
answers found undoubtedly had real and binding force. For many 
theorists of la guerre revolutionnaire, however, ideology took on a 
more instrumental role. The existence of a French military search 
for an ideology after 1954 is obvious in the military press.56 The 
results of that search, however, were ambiguous and diverse. No 
single, all-encompassing ideology ever won over a majority of the 
officer corps, though three contrasting points of view are evident 
among the searchers. 
One group, closest to the mainstream of French political thought, 
preferred to speak, not of ideology, but of refinement of national 
ideals such as freedom, respect for the individual, and faith in 
reason, justice, and progress.57 These writers, with their democratic 
and vaguely Christian ideal, together with others who emphasized 
a renaissance of patriotism,58 were most representative of the official 
French military attitude as taught in most military schools as a 
base for psychological action.59 
Two opposing groups of military ideologists were more deter­
mined to produce a complete Weltanschauung on which to base 
the anticommunist crusade. Jean Planchais refers aptly to these 
two doctrines as "National-Catholicism" and "National-Com­
munism.80 
Ever since the French Revolution laid siege to the privileges of 
the Church as well as to those of the aristocracy, there have been 
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French Catholics who have rejected the principles of '89 and the 
republics which have been built upon them. Even after Rome came 
to terms with republicanism in 1893, Catholic conservatives and 
pseudo-Catholic reactionaries (particularly Charles Maurras and 
the Action Francaise) continued to figure prominently among the 
enemies of the republic. The Vichy experience discredited the anti­
republican Catholic camp, prompting many French Catholics in the 
postwar period to align with liberal and even anticolonial forces. 
Cold-war and colonial-war tensions rapidly revived Catholicism of 
the extreme Right, however, as anticommunism definitively replaced 
anti-Semitism and anti-Masonry as the major foeus of political 
action from this quarter. Several minority organizations sprang up 
on the fringes of the Church espousing an integriste style of Ca­
tholicism which rejected liberal democracy and drew an authori­
tarian political philosophy directly from a dogmatic view of Catholic 
theology. The best known of these, founded in 1946, was the Cite 
Catholique, whose clandestine cellular organization was inspired 
by the communist enemy.61 
The political doctrine of the Cite Catholique is laid out in detail 
in its official journal, Verbe.62 Among the recurrent themes are 
these: legitimate power stems, not from the people, but from God; 
all civil authority is subordinate to the natural order and to natural 
law; above all, subversion and revolution must not be allowed to 
undermine the natural moral order of society. In the view of the 
editors of Verbe popular sovereignty and freedom of expression are 
guilty of enthroning Error alongside Truth. Liberalism is described 
as wrong in itself and, worse, as incapable of defending against a 
greater evil—communism. 
In 1956-57 la Cite Catholique took advantage of the services of 
a modern-day counterrevolutionary, Captain Gerard de Cathe­
lineau, who created some hundred small integriste cells among mili­
tary personnel in Algeria.63 Later acclaimed as a saint of the 
anticommunist crusade,64 De Cathelineau described his mission in 
the following terms in a report prepared for a Cite Catholique 
conference shortly before the captain's death on an Algerian battle­
field on July 12, 1957: 
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Psychological action in the Army is the order of the day. It has at 
its disposal an official Service at the Ministry of Armed Forces and 
its essential objective is to oppose a national Faith to the Marxist 
faith. But it has become evident that there is no serious foundation 
for that national Faith except in an authentic patriotism rooted in 
the light of the doctrines of the Church. The Cite Catholique has 
no other goal than to spread that light.68 
Henceforth until early 1959 Verbe took care to dovetail its efforts 
with the emerging military doctrine of la guerre rdvolutionnaire and 
psychological action. 
Early in 1958 Verbe opened its pages to a "theologian in uni­
form," 66 writing under the nom de plume of Cornelius. Cornelius 
affirmed the ultimate anticommunist character of the French strug­
gle in Algeria, defended the right of the military officer to disobey 
his government when its orders threaten to allow a subversion of 
the "natural order," and justified the use of torture (for the common 
good) against prisoners who are clearly guilty.67 This article was 
reprinted under the cover of the Tenth Military Region headquar­
ters in Algiers in the review Contacts and helped to calm military 
consciences after the battle of Algiers. Cornelius raised serious pro­
tests from Catholic clergymen with his argument that, when neces­
sary for defense of the natural order, torture was more than justified: 
it could be an act of "true charity."68 Yet he was not without 
kindred spirits. A year earlier, during the battle of Algiers, a mili­
tary chaplain with the Tenth Paratroop Division, Father Louis 
Delarue, had pronounced a sermon in which he justified, in certain 
circumstances, "an effective interrogation, without sadism." 69 Like 
another clergyman, Abbe G. de Nantes, who wrote in September 
and October, 1957, for the review I'Ordre frangais, Delarue did not 
restrict the use of torture to prisoners known to be guilty, as did 
Cornelius, though he admitted "serious" interrogation only in search 
of information, not confession.70 Following Delarue's sermon, Gen­
eral Massu addressed a secret memorandum to his officers, thank­
ing the chaplain and inviting "all worried and disoriented souls 
to listen to him,' for "the condition sine qua non of our action in 
Algeria is that these methods be accepted in our souls and con­
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sciences as necessary and morally valid." 71 Undoubtedly, Delarue 
was not the only military chaplain to calm guilty consciences.72 
There were others, however, who condemned the use of torture 
without reserve. 
To return to the Cite Catholique, it would appear that numerous 
military supporters of that organization were found among in­
structors at the Ecole de Guerre and especially among psycho­
logical-action officers, some of whom accepted integriste Catholicism 
as an official doctrine.73 Among those in attendance at the Cite 
Catholique conferences of 1959 and/or 1960 were Marshal Juin, 
Generals Weygand, Chassin, Touzet du Vigier, and Fremiot, and 
Admirals Auphan, De Penfentenyo, and Moreau.74 Chief of Staff 
Paul Ely sent a letter of encouragement to the 1960 conference.75 
Cite Catholique was not totally the creature of military activism, 
however. Beginning in February, 1959, Verbe became highly critical 
of military psychological action and its penchant for manipulative 
psychological techniques which appeal to the unconscious, rather 
than to reason.76 In the final analysis, the directors of Cite 
Catholique were Catholics first and counterrevolutionaries second.77 
Primary loyalty to the Church was not so clear in the founder 
of the integriste Centre d'Etudes Superieures de Psychologie 
Sociale, Georges Sauge.78 Moulding integriste Catholicism into a 
guerre revolutionnaire setting, Sauge was received eagerly in all 
the important French military schools.79 His widely distributed 
lecture entitled "L'Armee face a la guerre psychologique'' was 
delivered to an audience which included, among others, General 
Jouhaud, chief of staff of the air force, General Blanc, former 
army chief of staff, and the inevitable General L. M. Chassin.80 
He combined staunch patriotism, religious sanction, revolutionary-
war tactics borrowed from the Communists, abiding faith in the 
army as a counterrevolutionary force, and hostility to civilian 
politicians in a doctrine well suited to catch the military ear. Of 
all integriste spokesmen Sauge was probably the most influential 
in military circles, especially with the Fifth Bureau. 
In addition to the Cite Catholique and to Sauge's 'civic commit­
tees, for which he claimed seven thousand active supporters, 
there was a scattering of other integriste counterrevolutionary or­
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ganizations; notably, Armee-Nation, the Centre d'Etudes Politiques 
et Civiques, and the Cherriere-Chassin organization mentioned 
earlier.81 Probably under the auspices of Cherriere's Counter­
revolutionary Organization, a manual was circulated among mili­
tary officers entitled Contre-revolution, strategie et tactique. Here, 
in a text written by the Belgian journalist Pierre Joly, one finds 
an exposition of the guerre revolutionnaire doctrine imbued with 
a strong religious tone.82 The entire French population is aligned 
by Joly according to its "revolutionary'' or "'counterrevolutionary' 
character, with trade unions, the F.L.N., communists, Progressives, 
state-school teachers, families opposed to religious education, all 
political parties of the "system," and even the French National 
Council of Manufacturers—all of these falling into the camp of 
evil. But the forces of good are said to be represented by the 
army, the French in Algeria, veterans, nationalist organizations, and 
most of the clergy and the faithful of the Church.83 
The penetration among military officers of the doctrine of Cite 
Catholique, Sauge, Joly, and other integriste counterrevolution­
aries is difficult to determine with precision. Among the leaders of 
military revolt Colonel Broizat, Colonel Gardes, General Chassin, 
and General Zeller were clearly all in the integriste camp. Colonels 
Argoud and Lacheroy may have made some instrumental use of 
the doctrine, as did a number of Fifth Bureau officers; but they 
likely were not themselves of that persuasion, nor were Colonel 
Trinquier, General Challe, or General Salan. Among Catholics 
generally within the officer corps the integriste line undoubtedly 
strengthened and sharpened a commitment to French Algeria 
which had other primary origins.84 The example of General Walker 
and his "pro-Blue' campaign within the American Army (though 
he is atypical) indicates that cold-war tensions have produced 
advocates of authoritarian politico-religious solutions elsewhere 
than in the French Army.85 Sauge and Schwartz (head of the 
Christian Anti-Communist Crusade), moreover, have much in 
common, despite their contrasting Catholic and Protestant origins. 
A third group of officer-ideologues deserves mention under 
Planchais' label of "National Communism," though here one finds 
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neither a consistent doctrine nor a supporting organization. In this 
group belong Colonel Argoud, a very influential figure in military-
activist circles, perhaps Colonel Trinquier, and certain elements 
within the O.A.S.86 This current of thought is distinguishable from 
the integriste school by reason of its secularism, as well as by its 
socialist, reformist bent, which would benefit the Moslem popula­
tion, the French working class, and the small businessman at the 
expense of wealthy "'capitalist" segments of society. Especially 
among younger officers, the traditional military conservation of the 
pre-World War II era was giving way to a closer identification with 
the social and economic underdog. 
A second striking feature of the National Communism group 
was its dual hostility toward international communism, which 
would destroy French national independence, and toward what 
Trinquier prefers to call "Great International Capitalism." As seen 
by these officers, capitalism in France is guilty of blocking reforms 
needed to restore the loyalty both of the Moslem population in 
Algeria and the communist working class in the metropole, and 
of continuing to lend powerful support to De Gaulle after 1959. 
In the United States the same capitalist forces are said to be guilty 
of toying with anticolonialism and of attempting to root France 
out of her economic spheres of influence—first from Indochina, 
and then from her Algerian oil fields. The argument is clearly 
stated in the party platform of Colonel Trinquier's "People's 
Party," founded in 1961. On the one hand, France is menaced by 
the communist revolution, he writes, while 
at the other end of the world another menace has raised itself: 
GREAT INTERNATIONAL CAPITALISM materialized in America. Between 
these two blocs which seek to divide the world between them, our 
civilization and we ourselves are in danger of disappearing.87 
As for the greater of the two evils, Colonel Trinquier told the 
writer in 1962 that "if ever I were forced to choose between com­
munism and Great International Capitalism, I would choose com­
munism." 88 
Adding nationalism to socialism, is not the product then national 
socialism, a revival of that totalitarian and revolutionary spirit of 
the radical Right, born in France with the fascist leagues of the 
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1930's? Certainly some of the elements are present: rejection of 
both communism and large-scale capitalism by young officers, 
many of them with origins in the lower middle class;89 fascination 
with power (what else is the deification of totalitarian techniques 
of organization?) with little systematic interest in the purposes to 
which it will be put; and hostility toward the supposed flabbiness 
of political liberalism. If honest, Argoud would probably have to 
plead guilty to the charge of fascism, especially in his O.A.S. 
period.90 So, indeed, would General Salan's O.A.S. adviser, Jean-
Jacques Susini, though that organization was united on little else 
other than the defense of French Algeria and perhaps revenge on 
De Gaulle. Trinquier's case is a bit more ambiguous. Known for 
his weakness for totalitarian solutions in Algeria, he claims in his 
public statements to have some respect for individual liberties 
and popular sovereignty.91 As for the review, Patrie et progres, 
which appeared in 1959 and was often labeled fascist, its young 
editors combined socialism and French patriotism in a fashion 
more reminiscent of the liberal-democratic socialism of Jean Jaures 
than of the national socialism of Marcel Deat or Jacques Doriot.92 
It is simple enough to lay out the basic propositions of the guerre 
revolutionnaire doctrine and the ideological questions on which 
unity was not achieved. A more difficult task, but one which must 
be undertaken with full knowledge of the incompleteness of the 
evidence available regarding French military attitudes, is that of 
assessing the power of the guerre revolutionnaire doctrine in pro­
ducing military indiscipline and revolt in favor of the Counter-
Revolution. It is a matter of record that the colonels who were 
instrumental in the "cold" military revolt of January, 1960, and 
the "hot" revolt of April, 1961, were almost without exception 
enthusiasts and theorists of la guerre rSvolutionnaire. Moreover, 
General Challe announced twice during the April putsch that the 
army's purpose was to protect Algeria—and the metropole—from 
the communist threat.93 Nevertheless, there are numerous indica­
tions that ideological factors were of only secondary importance. 
Throughout the Algerian war there remained a sizable element 
within the officer corps which was unconvinced either of the 
effectiveness of psychological action or of the ultimate communist 
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nature of the enemy. To be sure, the more articulate and dynamic 
younger officers were mostly in the guerre revolutionnaire camp. 
Yet writers on the subject of psychological action and la guerre 
revolutionnaire frequently complained of fellow officers who were 
skeptics and scoffers on this subject. The lead article in the special 
February-March, 1957, issue of the Revue militaire ^information 
on "La Guerre revolutionnaire," for example, begins with the state­
ment, "Military opinion today has become allergic to the words 
themselves, guerre revolutionnaire."94 Occasionally, but only oc­
casionally, the skeptics spoke out publicly. There was the captain 
who wrote to Message in October, 1956, arguing that "As for 
psychological action . .  . all of those people are not only useless 
(and they know that themselves, I believe) but even harmful. 
. . ."
95
 Another of the rare public scoffers dared to raise his protest 
against "the war of brains" and "the assault of the loudspeaker 
companies" in the Revue militaire (^information, and that in Oc­
tober, 1959, when psychological action was still riding high.96 
Publicly dissenting voices were scattered arid little noticed until 
late in 1961, when "a group of officers" wrote a letter to Combat 
stating: "If the Algerian War proved anything on the level of mili­
tary doctrine, it was the inanity of wanting to lead the battle 
within the population and to conquer it with an army which is 
not drawn from the population itself. . . ."97 
Among general officers, the guerre revolutionnaire school made 
proportionally fewer converts than among field-grade officers. 
Allard, Massu, and Salan were converted, as was Ely to a large 
degree; but Challe remained only partially convinced, and his 
two successors as French commanders in Algeria, Generals Gambiez 
and Ailleret, like many other generals, had little sympathy for 
Colonel Lacheroy et tie.98 Challe's decision to take the lead of 
the April putsch probably was occasioned much more by a feeling 
that his honor and that of the army were at stake in Algeria than 
by a fear that Western civilization was in jeopardy.99 Challe's 
invocation of the communist bogeyman during the putsch was at 
least in part a tactical move to attract domestic and American 
support.100 
On the whole, the reasons for which French officers were willing 
to disobey and revolt were emotional, unreflective, and incapable 
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of being formed into an ideology which might guide a military 
dictatorship. It is significant that the dominant theme of military 
testimony in the trials following the April putsch was not anti­
communism but humiliation and dishonor. To be sure, there were 
officers—Colonel Broizat was certainly one of them—for whom 
the anticommunist Counter-Revolution was a vital and consuming 
crusade. In most cases, however, including initially even that of 
Colonel Gardes, ideology served more as a rationalization for 
primarily visceral reactions to frustrations and humiliation. The 
doctrine of la guerre revolutionnaire undoubtedly systematized and 
fortified those reactions, especially on the part of many of the 
leaders of military revolt. Even among the leaders, however, one 
must distinguish between those who followed Salan into the O.A.S. 
and those who surrendered with Challe in April, 1961. Argoud, 
Gardes, Lacheroy, Broizat, Salan himself—these are the officers who 
were most deeply politicized, who were intent, not only upon 
saving French Algeria, but also upon establishing a new political 
order more capable of pursuing the anticommunist Counter-Revolu­
tion (though they did not all agree on the nature of the new 
order). These men represented a small minority within the total 
officer corps. Even within that minority, moreover, and to a 
greater extent among the hesitant majority of the officer corps, one 
must seek the roots of praetorianism, not so much in ideology, as 
in less reflective emotional responses to a decade and a half of 
defeat, humiliation, and embitterment and to that prospective 
Algerian independence which seemed to threaten military honor, 
pride, and status.101 
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guerre revolutionnaire school had increased its number of converts. Even in 
its heyday, however, a large number of officers remained unconvinced. 
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Chapter 12 
Cleavages within the Military Establishment 
The major factors which produced a climate of indiscipline and 
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that of delineating more carefully the distinctions between various 
groupings of officers with regard to political attitudes. What char­
acteristics are to be found among the leaders of military revolt; 
and, below them, who were the officers who were still willing to 
act, to risk career and even freedom in order to prevent De Gaulle 
from granting Algerian independence? The answer is fourfold. 
They came primarily from the army (rather than from the navy 
or air force), usually from below the normal military elite, fre­
quently from the guerre revolutionnaire school, and last, but most 
important of all, most often from the paratroopers. With the 
exception of the guerre revolutionnaire school, which has already 
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been discussed in some detail, each of these points merits further 
attention. 
Chief of Staff Paul Ely was quite correct in speaking of the unity 
of the armed forces during the death agony of the Fourth Republic. 
Civilian activists initiated the uprising, army officers in Algiers 
took over its leadership, and the majority of military officers in 
all branches were in obvious sympathy with them.1 The naval 
commander in Algiers, Admiral Auboyneau, and the air com­
mander, General Jouhaud, accompanied Salan at all local cere­
monies after May 13.2 Air officers were present on several com­
mittees of public safety.3 Numerous air force planes flew back 
and forth across the Mediterranean despite official grounding of 
all flights.4 A naval officer was the first Algiers appointee as mili­
tary commander of Corsica;5 and the maritime prefect in Toulon, 
Admiral Barjot, let the Algiers group know that the Mediterranean 
fleet would rally to its leadership if necessary.6 No action was 
necessary, however, and the willingness of most naval and air force 
officers to act upon their sympathies was never tested. With De 
Gaulle at the helm, the air force, and especially the navy, remained 
loyal during the Week of the Barricades and the April putsch. 
Naval officers were protected from the consequences of direct 
political activity by a fear of being burned as so many of their 
colleagues had been by political association with Vichy,7 and 
by the relatively minor involvement of the navy in the Algerian 
war. Out of a total of seventy-three military officers who were 
tried and convicted for participation in the putsch of 1961 or the 
accompanying "Paris plot," only one was a naval officer.8 The one 
exception, Naval Lieutenant Pierre Guillaume, had served for a 
time after 1957 as commander of a paratroop-commando unit in 
Algeria, a unit of which his brother had been commander until 
killed in combat.9 After the failure of the putsch only a handful 
of naval officers were attracted into the O.A.S.10 
The air force was more heavily represented, with fifteen of the 
seventy-three officers convicted, a ratio (20 per cent) fairly close 
to the proportional size of the air force and army officer corps. 
However, the figures are misleading. To be sure, the putsch 
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claimed air force officers like General Challe, its leader, General 
Jean Louis Nicot, deputy chief of staff of the air force, General 
Pierre-Marie Bigot, commander of the fifth air force region (which 
covered Algeria), and General Edmond Jouhaud, former air force 
chief of staff. Despite this impressive array of air force brass, most 
air officers in Algeria followed the lead of General Clause, com­
mander in the Constantine zone, and General Fourquet, air com­
mander of the Constantine zone, both of whom remained loyal 
to the Paris government.11 On two bases where Challists were in 
control, Blida and Maison-Blanche, a number of officers had to 
be arrested and paratroop detachments called in to prevent 
"loyalist" demonstrations.12 Throughout the putsch, pilots on 
Challist-controlled bases had to be watched lest they attempt to 
fly off to "loyalist" territory.13 
The rather sizable number of air force officers among the 
Challists is explicable largely in terms of three factors. At least 
three of the fifteen, including Jouhaud and Bigot, were pieds noirs 
and needed little other motive.14 Another group, including General 
Challe himself, a former joint commander in Algeria, and three 
officers of an air force paratroop-commando unit, had been directly 
involved in revolutionary-guerrilla war to a degree rare among air 
force officers.15 Those relatively few air force and naval officers 
who shared the experiences of army officers also frequently shared 
their political attitudes.16 Lastly, the presence at the head of the 
insurgency movement of Jouhaud and especially Challe, both 
air force officers, undoubtedly drew into the revolt officers of their 
branch who otherwise would have remained loyal. General Nicot, 
for example, testified in his own defense that, though he rejected 
Jouhaud's appeals to join the movement, he could not think of 
"denouncing a friend" to his superiors.17 It is significant that, once 
Challe had surrendered, only two air force officers fled to continue 
the fight with the O.A.S.18 Thereafter, O.A.S. recruits within the 
air force corps were exceedingly rare.19 
It was the army, then, which was the major source of military 
revolt, but not by any means the whole army officer corps. In 
the years following World War II, army officers developed strong 
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attachment to the ideal of army unity, hoping at all costs to avoid 
a repetition of the internecine French Army battles of Dakar and 
Syria. Moreover, army unity was frequently held to be the irre­
placeable guardian of national unity. Nonetheless, repetitious pro­
fessions of army solidarity after 1945 contained as much myth 
as reality. After the postwar purges were over, the remaining 
officers of the armistice army mingled uneasily with colleagues 
drawn from the Free French forces and from the internal resist­
ance.20 These wounds gradually healed over, but new ones appeared 
in Indochina and Algeria as younger combat officers, especially in 
the Legion and in the paratroops, began to feel that they alone 
were bearing the brunt of the war. These new tensions in turn 
faded into the background during the treize mai crisis, when, 
in the words of General Paul Ely, the army's "obsession with unity 
and cohesion" was "one of the essential elements which prevented 
a split between Algeria and the metropole." 21 Yet internal cleavages 
reappeared stronger than ever when the defense of French Algeria 
came to mean a struggle against the popular and powerful Presi­
dent of the Fifth Republic. The army as a whole failed to follow 
the lead of psychological-action and paratroop colonels in the 
Week of the Barricades. Colonel Argoud, leader of the "soviet of 
colonels," testified in court that his fellow officers outside Algiers 
had failed to understand what was at stake, leaving him with no 
choice but to give in to De Gaulle in order to avoid a disastrous 
split in the army.22 
With few exceptions23 both military activists and disciplined 
officers continued to pay homage to the ideal of army unity until, 
in April, 1961, the putsch openly split the army into Challists, a 
few staunch loyalists, and a mass of hesitant officers between.24 
Army unity as fact and myth was shattered by the putsch as the 
joint commander in Algeria, General Gambiez, the Algiers Corps 
commander, General Vezinet, the commander of the Tenth Para­
troop Division, General Saint-Hillier, and a number of lesser 
figures had to be arrested by the Challists. Challist officers like 
Colonel Charles de la Chapelle, commander of the First Foreign 
Cavalry Regiment, later argued that they had wanted only to 
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preserve army unity and believed that this could be done only 
under Challe's leadership.25 In fact, the unity ideal was no longer 
powerful enough (if, indeed, it had ever been) to justify dis­
obedience in the face of a popular and determined government. 
An emerging political consciousness among conscripts and reserve 
officers further deepened the schism within the army in Algeria.28 
Challe and his advisers were apparently taken completely by 
surprise when most conscripts chose to respond to the putsch as 
outraged citizens, rather than as blindly obedient soldiers.27 As 
in the Russian Revolution of 1917 and in the German Revolution 
of 1918, numerous conscripted enlisted men broke with their of­
ficers when civilian attitudes and professional military attitudes 
clashed.28 
In the aftermath of the putsch the army officer corps remained 
badly divided, though the beginnings of a renewed unity ap­
peared by mid-1962, by which time the most embittered officers 
had deserted to join the O.A.S. and those remaining, of all political 
persuasions, shared a shocked reaction to O.A.S. terrorists attacks 
on military personnel.29 
Those cleavages within the army and the army officer corps 
which appeared in April, 1961, were not so much created by the 
putsch as simply unmasked by it. One of the most persistent of 
divisions was that between older and younger generations of of­
ficers, between most generals and most of those who had been 
field commanders in Indochina and Algeria—the captains, majors, 
and colonels. After the treize mai crisis of 1958 one young officer 
told a journalist, with only slight exaggeration, "There must be no 
illusions. With us are 90% of all subordinate officers, 50% of field 
grade officers, and 5% of general officers." 30 Newspaper headlines 
often gave a misleading picture of the treize mai crisis and of the 
April putsch by focusing upon the role of the generals (like Massu, 
Salan, and Challe) to the neglect of the colonels behind the scenes 
who were the true instigators of military revolt. Massu, who as a 
paratroop commander was exceptionally close to the colonel 
mentality, unquestionably played an aggressive role in the treize mai 
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crisis, but so did Colonels Thomazo, Vaudrey, Trinquier, Godard, 
Lacheroy, and Dufour, among others. And if four generals were 
recruited as platform leaders of the April putsch, the whole affair 
was in fact prepared by five colonels—Argoud, Gardes, Lacheroy. 
Godard, and Broizat. 
There is nothing so very startling in the colonels', more than 
generals', being the driving force of French military revolt from 
the mid-1950's to 1962. So long as the status of generals at the 
top of the military-power pyramid is not badly threatened by the 
existing regime, so long as revolt involves a considerable risk, it is 
understandable that members of the military elite will be reluctant 
to gamble all they have achieved in an attempted putsch. Colonels, 
who have more to gain and less to lose, have figured heavily in 
the history of military revolt in both Western and non-Western 
countries.31 Tension between conservative generals and their im­
patient subordinate officers was not new in the French Army,32 
though only after World War II did it become serious enough to 
pose a grave threat to internal military discipline. By the mid­
1950's, according to an overwhelming number of reports, it was 
the common belief among field-grade, and especially company-
grade, officers that most French generals were incompetent, self-
interested, corrupted by political intrigue, imprisoned by le 
systeme, disinterested in the plight of field troops, unwilling or 
unable to understand revolutionary-guerrilla war, and lacking 
generally in initiative, courage, and character.33 Jean-Jacques 
Servan-Schreiber returned in early 1957 from a tour of duty as 
a recalled reserve officer to report that "in the discussions of all 
the mess halls of Algeria the refrain is everywhere the same: "The 
generals are damn fools [cons].'"34 
This disrespect of subordinate officers for their generals is 
traceable to four major sources. First, as most officers were aware, 
the rapid collapse of the French Army in May and June of 1940 
was largely attributable to incompetent and unimaginative mili­
tary leaders who were, as the phrase goes, "a war behind" in their 
thinking.35 
Second, high ranking officers emerged from World War II 
divided into clans according to their wartime patrons and affilia­
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tions (Free French, African army, internal resistance) and often 
maintained contact with the civilian politicians who had fought 
with them. Political contacts undoubtedly entered into high mili­
tary appointments. In at least one case, the "Affair of the Generals'' 
in 1949-50, career advancement became openly involved with 
political intrigue and unprincipled business interests.36 In 1949 
the chief of staff of national defense, General Georges Revers, 
visited Indochina and returned to report in a secret memorandum 
to the government that the war there was being grossly misman­
aged. Within a month the Revers report had been leaked out, 
apparently from Revers to General Mast, an active candidate for 
Leon Pignon's job as French high commissioner in Indochina, then 
to one Roger Peyre, a political intriguer and profiteer, and finally, 
to a Vietnamese supporter of Bao Dai. A slightly different version 
of the report reached the hands of Vietminh agents, perhaps also 
via Peyre. Key Socialist and Radical cabinet ministers rapidly 
hushed up the affair—only to see it explode in the press in January, 
1950. A parliamentary commission of inquiry was then created to 
investigate the scandal and discovered, among other things, that 
Revers, Mast, and Peyre (who was not above bribery) had been 
maneuvering with receptive Socialist and Radical politicians in an 
effort to oust Pignon, an M.R.P. appointee. Peyre, who managed 
to escape to Brazil before the public scandal broke, was revealed 
to be, not only a political confidant and mysterious influence ped­
dler for Revers, but also a trafficker in the illegal piaster exchange in 
Indochina and a double agent attached to one of the rival French 
secret-police services. With the Communist Party drawing public 
attention to the scandal, prominent members of the government 
were accused of concealing evidence in an attempt to prevent a 
public unveiling of widespread corruption and partisan maneuvering 
in high governmental circles. In the end only Mast and Revers were 
sanctioned, both by being retired from active duty, leaving subor­
dinate army officers with the twin example of political intrigue at 
high military levels and a penchant among politicians for blaming 
the army.37 
Intrigue aside, General Grout de Beaufort described correctly 
the tendency at least of the Fourth Republic when in June, 1961, 
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he stated: "Unfortunately . . . governments tend to appoint to 
top positions in the military hierarchy persons who accept too many 
things without protesting and leave their subordinates to manage 
for themselves."38 Careerism and the tenacles of le systeme re­
strained the enthusiasm of the general staff in Paris for the glory-
less Indochina war. Colonel Trinquier testified accurately in the 
Salan trial that, apart from Marshal de Lattre, full generals and 
lieutenant generals had avoided Indochina like the plague and 
devoted little attention to it, leaving colonels and subordinate offi­
cers to bear the brunt of military leadership. 39 One of those obscure 
generals who served as French commander in chief in Indochina, 
General Navarre, left his command feeling almost as venomous 
toward the general staff in Paris as toward politicians of the Fourth 
Republic.40 
Naturally enough, in these circumstances it was the colonels and 
subordinate officers in the field, not the generals, who first studied 
and began to understand the radically new style of revolutionary-
guerrilla war in which the French Army was engaged. With the 
single exception of General Chassin, all of the major leaders in the 
guerre revolutionnaire school were colonels, majors, or captains. 
The usual military elite proved itself, once again, too lethargic and 
unimaginative to understand changing modes of warfare.41 
A last factor which contributed to dwindling respects for gen­
erals among company-grade and field-grade officers was the over­
abundance of officers in the highest grades which had developed 
by the mid-1950's.42 War casualties were very largely in the lower 
officer grades and offered no promotion advantage to those nu­
merous and unusually able majors, lieutenant colonels, and colonels 
who had entered the officer corps from 1936 to 1945. The lack of 
decisive large-scale battles, moreover, inhibited the normal rapid 
promotions and demotions of a wartime army seeking out its most 
capable leadership. Colonel Roger Barberot returned from a tour 
of temporary active duty in Algeria in 1956-57 with nothing but 
scorn for the rigidity and red tape of the high command:43 
In 1957, in the midst of war (the Algerian war is indeed a war), 
there would be no possibility that a Leclerc could be a general of 
the army at 45 years of age (he would be a colonel) that a Brosset, 
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who was a general and a division commander at the age of 42, 
would be anything more than a brilliant lieutenant colonel.44 
And so it was that a whole generation of colonels, majors, and 
captains in the combat arms came to feel that they were led by 
slackards and incompetents who knew nothing of revolutionary-
guerrilla war and who could not be trusted with the destiny of 
France's army. With the single notable exception of Argoud, who 
was never sent to Indochina, all of the political colonels—Lacheroy, 
Gardes, Trinquier, Godard, Vaudrey, Thomazo, Dufour, Broizat, 
and others—had in common a long personal experience on two 
continents in a highly political style of war. That experience 
set them apart—a long way apart—from the generals who sup­
posedly led them. 
Another, and a more important cleavage within the French Army, 
one which in part overlapped with the division by age, was that 
between "elite troops," especially the paratroopers, and the rest of 
the army. Two major factors were largely responsible for heavy 
French reliance on elite troops in Indochina and in Algeria. First, 
revolutionary-guerrilla war being essentially a war without fronts, 
the defending army is obliged to assign large numbers of troops 
to the immobilizing task of protecting the lives and property of the 
local population. Specialized, highly mobile units are then needed 
for the job of chasing rebel bands. In Indochina and particularly 
in Algeria the paras and the Foreign Legion made up the 'general 
reserves,' which did most of the chasing. Second, it must be borne 
in mind that in neither of these two colonial wars did the French 
Army receive much enthusiastic support from the French popula­
tion at home. When conscripts were finally called upon in Algeria, 
they rarely exhibited that fighting spirit born of the belief that the 
homeland is in danger. With the Legion and the paras an extra­
ordinary esprit de corps could substitute in part, but only in part, 
for the absence of a clear national cause.45 
There developed the common practice of calling in the Legion 
and especially the paras whenever any serious fighting was to be 
done. Officers in non-elite units were often disturbed at the sight 
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of their para colleagues monopolizing the little glory that was to be 
had in these wars,46 and a few psychological-action officers re­
gretted that the paras were more interested in glorious military 
victories than in the more fundamental task of wining over the 
population.47 Nevertheless, all had to admit, as did Major Enrico 
in the novel by Colonel Georges Buis, that ". . . there are not 
thirty-six kinds of fighters. There are two. There is the infinitesimal 
minority who really attack and the others. The paras attack."48 
The paras and the Legion were given ample opportunity to attack. 
From reading newspaper accounts of the war in Algeria one would 
hardly have guessed that in 1959 the paras and the Legion made 
up only 3 per cent and 5 per cent, respectively, of all army troops 
in Algeria.49 
Cast in a perpetual shock-troop role, paratroop officers and men 
came to symbolize the continuing battle for the defense of French 
Algeria. They were widely credited with all glory for French suc­
cesses in Algeria and blamed for all atrocities. The paras generally, 
and the Tenth Paratroop Division in particular, became the object 
of idolization on the part of French colonists in Algeria. Even after 
the failure of the putsch in April, 1961, the camouflaged "leopard-
skin" combat uniform of the paratroopers continued to be a symbol 
of resistance to Algerian independence, even among those who had 
never been paras themselves. For example, Armond Belvisi, one of 
the instigators of the September, 1961, assassination attempt against 
De Gaulle, was located and trapped in his apartment by the police. 
Before surrendering he insisted on changing into the leopard-skin 
uniform, which had become a common garb for O.A.S. com­
mandos.50 For the Algerian rebels and their sympathizers, and 
for liberals in France who opposed the war, the paras, the "victors 
of Algiers," were equally symbolic of French Algeria. In June, 
1957, in the midst of the battle of Algiers, an elementary school 
teacher in the Casbah of Algiers asked his Moslem pupils to write 
an essay on the subject, "What wpuld you do if you were invisi­
ble?" 51 Almost all of the responses from his eleven- to thirteen-year­
old charges mentioned vengeance on the paras: 
"If I were invisible I would kill the soldiers and the paratroopers. 
. .  . I would kill the paras who torture men. . .  . I would kill 
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all of Massu's Paras."—". . . I would kill all the paras because 
they are doing evil. . . ."—"I would attack Massu's paras, those 
miserables, those thieves, those imbeciles, those idiots, those cretins. 
Down with Massu's paras."—"If I were invisible, the first job I would 
do would be to go seek revenge on the paras who caused so much 
misery to my brothers. I would take a rope and I would strangle the 
last of the paras who patrol in the tunnel of our neighborhood and 
I would take his weapons, then I would run after the other paras 
and kill them. . . ." 52 
The paras were not entirely deserving of either all the credit or 
all the blame which they received. There was considerable truth to 
the legend however, not only with regard to the fighting effective­
ness and the brutality of the paras, but also with respect to their 
key role in the army's attempts to prevent Algerian independence. 
The May 13, 1958, uprising could not have succeeded without the 
support of paratroop officers like General Massu and Colonels Trin­
quier, Thomazo, Godard, and Vaudrey.63 The extension of that 
movement into Corsica and the reality of the military threat which 
it posed to Fourth Republic headquarters in Paris owed much to 
paratroop officers.54 The Week of the Barricades, even more than 
treize mai, was largely the affair of paratroop officers, especially 
those of the Tenth Paratroop Division, without whose sympathy 
and support the civilian insurgents would have posed no serious 
threat to De Gaulle.55 Whereas in May of 1958 para officers had 
been representative of army-officer attitudes generally, now, in face 
of De Gaulle, they could no longer count on the rest of the army 
to follow their daring lead. The clearest evidence of the important 
role of the paras in military activism and revolt is found in the 
April putsch of 1961. As mentioned above, the paratroop regiments 
formed the backbone of the Challist putsch. The trials of officers 
accused of supporting the putsch or of participating in the simul­
taneous "Paris plot" clearly revealed the extent of Challe's depend­
ence on paratrooper support. Of a total of fifty-seven officers in the 
grade of colonel and below who were found guilty in those trials, 
thirty-six were paratroop officers.56 Again, in the O.A.S. paratroop 
officers were fairly numerous, though not so predominant in num­
bers as in the putsch.57 
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Why, it must be asked, were paratroop officers so often in the 
spearhead of military indiscipline and revolt from 1958 to 1962, and 
why were their men so ready to follow? The shock-troop role of 
the paras was certainly one contributing factor, for it deepened 
their personal and group involvement in the cause of French Al­
geria. Out of that same shock-troop role came the para reputation 
for toughness and love of battle, which naturally attracted the 
most adventuresome officers and enlisted men into the paratroop 
regiments. Equally significant, however, was the esprit para—that 
constellation of attitudes, imposed and maintained by a vigorous 
esprit de corps, which set the paratrooper apart from his fellows 
in non-elite units. In order to understand the political role of French 
paratroop officers one must look at the spirit which permeated that 
arm and the unique relationship between paratroop officers and 
men: deprived of the solid and enthusiastic support of his men, 
the paratroop officer would have been no more fearsome a political 
threat than officers in other arms. 
Careful studies of both the German and the American armies in 
World War II have indicated the importance of small-group solidar­
ity in the maintenance of a fighting spirit in military units.68 
The esprit para owed a great deal to the extension of those same 
primary, face-to-face relationships from the squad level to the 
platoon, the company, and, on occasion, even so far as to the regi­
ment. As Gilles Perrault, a former paratrooper, has perceptively 
remarked, the paratrooper officer generally rejected the traditional 
father-image role of the unit commander. Perrault writes: 
That Epinal-style imagery which showed the elite corps of former 
times going gaily into fire under the benevolent orders of the colo­
nel, the "Father of the Regiment," is intolerable for paratroop offi­
cers. Bigeard wanted to be the elder brother of his men, their ring­
leader.59 
The elder-brother role demanded a much more intimate social bond 
between officers and enlisted men than military tradition had nor­
mally allowed. Another former para, Jean Larteguy, describes that 
bond in the making during the training period of recalled draftees. 
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Through the imaginary pen of one of the initially disgruntled 
draftees, we see this picture: 
We live mixed together, intermingled, officers, noncoms and pri­
vates; but it is Raspeguy's [read: Bigeard's] "wolves" who set the 
tone. They are seeking, it seems, to have themselves plebiscited by 
us, as if they expected us to name them to the grades and to the 
functions which they already occupy. Once chosen, no one will any 
longer be able to question the orders that they will give us.60 
Nor did the elder-brother role cease once the unit entered into bat­
tle. Larteguy describes the alarmed reaction of a fictional former 
commander in Tonkin who followed "Raspeguy" through a night of 
combat: 
I don't agree with Raspeguy's manner of commanding. It engages 
you too much. Because I send a soldier to die I don't believe my­
self obliged beforehand to invite him to coffee in my living room, 
nor listen to him tell me about his mother or his conception of the 
world. The units like the one commanded by your Raspeguy 
threaten to become one day a sort of sect which will no longer wage 
war for a country or an idea but for itself alone, like the monk 
gives himself up to his macerations in order to gain entry into his 
paradise.81 
The general's fears were quite justified. The style of leadership 
which Bigeard symbolized and which, through his vigorous and 
prestigious example, permeated the whole paratroop arm with 
varying degrees of effectiveness, had as one of its strongest effects 
the creation of an unusually strong loyalty between enlisted men 
and officers. Even though some 70 per cent of all enlisted men in the 
paratroopers were draftees in 1961, officers like Lieutenant Colonel 
Lecomte, commander of the Fourteenth Paratroop Regiment (Chas­
seurs), and Colonel Masselot, commander of the Eighteenth Para­
troop Regiment (Chasseurs), were able to rally to Challe and, in 
contradiction to clear orders from division headquarters, set their 
units off on a march which eventually led them across the breadth 
of Algeria in the service of the putsch.62 Eventually, as the rest of 
the army in Algeria failed to rally to Challe, conscripts in the para­
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troopers became somewhat restless at the prospect of fighting fellow 
Frenchmen.63 Paratroop units, however, were almost completely 
free from the conscript strikes and demonstrations which plagued 
Challist and uncommitted commanders in other arms. The sharp 
contrast between the behavior of conscripts in the paras and those 
in other units is explicable, in part, in terms of the attraction of 
that arm for men predisposed toward defense of French Algeria. 
Unquestionably, however, the unique esprit de corps of the paras 
also played an important part.64 Tales of dramatic conversions of 
Left-leaning draftees and reserve officers are not uncommon.85 
Significantly enough, when the April putsch failed, the O.A.S. re­
cruited a number of its cadre among former paras. One of these, 
Paul Stefani, was arrested for his role in an O.A.S. assassination and 
explained, "When one has been a para, one is always a para."66 
If the unconventional para style of leadership was one factor in 
the development of that powerful esprit de corps which existed in 
most paratroop regiments, another factor was the sectlike character 
of the entire paratroop arm, a phenomenon which must be traced 
partly to the paras' being acknowledged as elite shock troops, and 
partly to the natural selectivity of jump training. The jump itself, 
first from the training tower and then from an airplane, took on 
many of the characteristics of a supreme test and an initiation into 
the sect. As Perrault puts it, "It is the whole man whom one pre­
tends to judge at the jump door." 67 Another paratroop veteran, J.-J. 
Thieuloy, looks back on his own jump training and recalls the 
ridicule and abuse which were the lot of the degonfle, the trainee 
who refused to jump. "Only bastards refuse to jump," Thieuloy's 
lieutenant told his group.68 The former paratrooper continues: 
The fifteen days of prison which are the lot of the para trainee 
who washes out are not degrading in themselves. More degrading 
are the insults of his superiors, under the eyes of his comrades who 
watch him crawl or run while shouting "I am a degonfle, I am 
among the blessed [un bien-heureux], I am a degonfle, I am among 
the blessed" around the practice tower from which he could not 
fling himself. Some training cadre were content to mark the letter 
"D" on the backs of failures, but I saw a Master Sergeant make two 
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of the walk around the camp of the Base-School of Pau with 
signs on their backs saying, "/ am a degonfle." 
From the private to the colonel (grade is of little importance more­
over in the airplane), the para knows that in jump school a race is 
formed.69 
Like the U.S. Marine Corps, where the rigor of basic training also 
serves as a form of initiation into an elite fighting corps, the French 
paratroopers have come under public criticism for mistreatment of 
recruits.70 In October, 1962, a corporal in the Fourteenth Paratroop 
Regiment (Chasseurs) in Toulouse was accused of slapping recruits 
in his charge and ordering them to carry out a number of humiliat­
ing acts of a fraternity-initiation variety.71 His superiors were more 
amused than angered by his behavior, and the corporal himself 
claimed only to be doing what had been done to him in his own 
training period. In fact, the corporal had lacked discretion, even in 
the eyes of his superiors; yet humiliation and abuse apparently had 
a regular place in the initiation of paratroop recruits. 
The paras prided themselves, as most elite troops do, on their 
unique dress, language, and manner.72 Each item of apparel received 
minute attention, from the prized jump boots (or, better yet, Amer­
ican ranger boots) and colored beret to the Saint Michael medals 
(after the paras' patron saint), which most of them wore. Paras 
were allowed the privilege of wearing their bizarre leopard-skin 
combat uniform even when on pass. Following the April putsch of 
1961, the Ministry of War ordered that the camouflage uniform be 
reserved strictly for combat, and that in summer the colored para 
beret be replaced by a new kepi, or military peak cap, as part of 
the standard dress uniform of paratroop noncoms and officers.73 
These orders met angry resistance from the paras. First, regulation 
uniforms were said by the paratroop units to be "unavailable." 7< 
Then enlisted men proceeded to show their scorn for the khaki 
berets by ceremoniously stomping on them and burning them (in 
Nancy), posing the old crimson beret before the monument to the 
dead (in Bayonne), and demonstrating in mass against the new 
regulations (again in Nancy).75 
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The April putsch provided definitive proof that the famous para 
esprit de corps had become a serious threat to civilian control. The 
usual antagonism between in-group and out-group which is charac­
teristic of tightly-knit social units had developed, in the case of the 
paras, into a scornful aloofness from the rest of the armed forces 
and a strong disgust for politicians and civilians generally. Colonel 
Marcel Bigeard set the tone with his frequent displays of disrespect 
and indiscipline toward the regular military hierarchy and toward 
other non-elite units.76 Among the paras, who were well-trained, 
young, physically fit, and eager for combat, generals were fre­
quently known as "poireaux" (leeks) and non-elite troops generally 
were referred to as "lead ass' (cul-de-plomb) units. 
The paratrooper's typical attitude toward other army units ap­
pears almost generous in comparison with his disgust for civilians 
and especially for politicians.77 Larteguy's observant draftee again 
describes accurately the paratroop mold which was being imposed 
on him before the treize max: 
Radio-Raspeguy [the regimental loudspeaker] insists on all that 
which can disgust the soldier about civilian life. The outside world 
is presented as vile, rotten, without grandeur, power being in the 
hands of a band of small-minded swindlers. 
My comrades already say "'we" in opposition to everyone who does 
not wear the cap and the camouflaged uniform [Colonel Bigeard 
outfitted his regiment with a unique long-billed cap that became 
a proud symbol of his unit]. They are clean, sharp; they are be­
coming agile; they are pure, while in France, there reign cor­
ruption, cowardliness, baseness, "the world of sin" seen from our 
monasteries.78 
Luxury, flabbiness, materialism, cowardliness, and treason—these 
were the evils frequently attributed to civilians and especially to 
politicians and intellectuals. Thieuloy, the paratroop veteran, sug­
gests that the typical para, at least in 1958, tended to lump his 
outsider enemies together and to pick as their symbol the deputy: 
For the para, the deputy is the man-woman, the underman given to 
prattling and inaction. 
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The para has words, whose meaning no longer escape anyone, to 
describe the deputy. He calls him tante ["pansy"] or pedale 
["homo"]. I heard our old captain, though more of a humorist than 
a fanatic, shout in speaking of the members of the Chamber, "We 
are going to give those prostitutes a thrashing." ["Ces filles de joie, 
nous irons les rosserl"]79 
When one looks beyond the famous para esprit de corps to the 
dominant mystique of the paratroop arm, this antagonism to French 
bourgeois society is more fully understandable. Most of those 
paratroop veterans who have written of their experiences agree on 
the central features of the esprit para: idealization of youth, of 
strength, of combat as the supreme test of self.80 Join to these the 
romantic fascination with sacrifice and death, found especially in 
the writings of Bigeard, and one has a mystique which is funda­
mentally opposed to the values of an acquisitive and liberal French 
society. The "Paratroopers' Prayer,' which was posted on many 
barracks walls, reveals that clash in values: 
Give me, my God, that which you have left over. Give me that 
for which you are never asked 
I do not ask for wealth

Nor for success, nor even for health

You are asked so often, my God, for all that

That you must not have any left

Give me, my God, that which you have left over

Give me that which people refuse to take from you

I want insecurity and restlessness

I want torment and brawling

And that you should give them to me, my God,

Once and for all

Let me be sure to have them always

For I will not always have the courage

To ask you for them.81
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The same love of battle and the same spirit of hardship and sacrifice 
are the predominant themes in the writings of Colonel Bigeard, 
especially in his captions to the collection of photographs entitled 
Aucune Bete du Monde. To take a few samples, on the subject of 
sacrifice and self-mastery he writes: 
It seemed to us then [in the desert] that in that privation and that 
solitude, in the thirst and in the hunger, we had found that enemy 
which we had been pursuing for so long: ourselves, our fear and 
that body which suddenly demanded of us juicy fruits, welcoming 
girls, deep beds, and a comfortable life.82 
On love of battle: 
An immense sadness overtook us on the evening after the vic­
tory. . . .83 
On death: 
At each turn of the road, behind each dune, each rock, we had a 
rendezvous, but it was with our death. . . .84 
[In his dedication of the book to a sergeant who was killed in 
combat]. Of us all he was the luckiest, for he made a success of 
his death after having led the tormented life which he had chosen.85 
Nor was Bigeard alone in his romantic conception of war. In the 
instructions posted on the barracks doors in the Niel paratroop 
training center in Toulouse were the following words: 
Paras, you are the [sic] elite soldiers. You will seek out combat and 
you will train yourselves for the hardest tests. Battle will be for 
you the supreme test. . . . For you, either victory or death. There 
is no other alternative. It is a question of honor. . . .86 
As Gilles Perrault has indicated at some length, there are un­
mistakable parallels between the esprit para and fascism, especially 
fascism of the German variety.87 One finds in both a glorification 
of strength, sacrifice, and battle for its own sake (or, more pre­
cisely, for the sake of continual testing of one's strength and 
courage). In both, as well, there is a strong emphasis upon youth.88 
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In one sense the French paratroopers battled for the love of battle 
itself; yet one must not neglect, as does Perrault, the presence of 
ideologues of the guerre revolutionnaire school among paratroop 
officers. Men like Colonels Dufour and Broizat inevitably gave a 
political tone to the test of battle.sy Even among those many para­
troop officers who were not so dedicated to the Christian anti­
communist crusade as were Dufour and Broizat, the prospect of 
termination of the Algerian war posed a serious threat to their 
status and style of life. Independence for Algeria, the last of the 
colonial battlegrounds, would mean the end of fighting, as well 
as an inevitable eclipse of the. glorious para legend. In this sense, 
at the very least, the paratrooper was not completely indifferent 
to war goals. 
Bound by a strong, sectlike esprit de corps, scornful of non-elite 
troops and officers who lacked its fighting spirit, resentful of 
civilians and especially politicians (who preferred abandonment 
to the sacrifices of battle), and inspired by a romantic fascination 
with war as a supreme test of strength and courage, the paratroop 
arm was indeed poorly equipped to carry out a policy aimed at 
Algerian independence. 
Alongside the paratroopers in the general reserve was the Foreign 
Legion, which bore much of the heaviest fighting in Indochina 
and Algeria. The Legion enjoyed, as did the paratroopers, a strong 
esprit de corps and a tradition of unquestioning loyalty of men to 
their officers, most of whom were French. The Legion styles of 
leadership and discipline were more traditional than those of the 
paratroop regiments; yet unlike some para draftees, the Legion­
naires, being foreigners, had no conflicting civil loyalties which 
might interfere with obedience to their officers. The power which 
that unquestioning obedience gave to Legion officers is particularly 
clear in the case of the Legion paratroop regiments. 
Of all the regiments of the Legion, it was the paratroop regi­
ments, and especially the First Foreign Paratroop Regiment (1" 
R.E.P.), which were most attracted to the Challist camp in the 
putsch of April, 1961. Despite the frantic Challist recruiting efforts 
of General Paul Gardy, a former inspector general of the Foreign 
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Legion, most Legion units remained loyal during the putsch, 
although there were intra-unit struggles for control in a few regi­
ments, notably in the First Foreign Regiment, the Fifth Foreign 
Regiment (Chasseurs), and the Second Foreign Paratroop Regi­
ment.90 When General Gardy arrived at Legion headquarters at 
Sidi-Bel-Abbes, he was informed quite abruptly by Colonel Brothier, 
commander of the First Foreign Regiment, that the Legion, com­
posed of foreigners, should be kept out of internal French political 
affairs.91 
Out of a total of twenty-two French Legion officers who were 
convicted for insurgency against the government after the putsch 
had failed (out of a total of sixty-eight officers convicted), four 
were from the Second Foreign Paratroop Regiment (2' R.E.P.) and 
fourteen were from the First Foreign Paratroop Regiment.92 Why 
were the Legion paratroop units so heavily represented among 
the insurgents? First, they were paras, as well as Legionnaires, 
and shared many para attitudes.93 Second, a matter of circum­
stances, the First Foreign Paratroop Regiment was stationed near 
Algiers in April, 1961, making it a natural choice for the job of 
carrying out a palace revolution. Third, the First Regiment had 
suffered exceptionally heavy personnel losses both in Indochina 
and in Algeria. As the First Foreign Paratroop Battalion, it had 
twice been virtually annihilated in Indochina.94 Reformed as the 
First Foreign Paratroop Regiment, it lost four hundred fifty men, 
including Regimental Commander Colonel Jeanpierre, in the battle 
of Guelma on the Tunisian border in 1957-58.95 Out of long 
acquaintance with danger and sacrifice came an extraordinary unity 
within the First Regiment, a strengthening of that already famous 
loyalty of the Legionnaire to his officers and an attachment to the 
Algerian soil for which the unit had fought.96 In view of a law 
(in force for one hundred and thirty years) forbidding the em­
ployment of the Foreign Legion in metropolitan France, there was 
considerable fear among Legionnaires that Algerian independence 
would mean the dissolution of their refuge-home.97 
The collapse of the April putsch produced ample proof of the 
solidarity of the First Regiment (which was officially disbanded), 
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as well as of its confirmed hostility to the Paris government. After 
blowing up much of the materiel left in their camp at Zeralda, 
enlisted men of the unit rode off to reassignment in Sidi-Bel-Abbes 
shouting "Algerie francaise' and throwing roses to the crowd, while 
the officers of the regiment rode into Algiers to face judgment 
singing, "Je ne regrette rien' and "Si tu doutes en ton destin, viens 
chez les paras!"98 When twelve of the officers of the regiment 
were brought to trial, they snapped to attention upon the arrival 
in the courtroom of Major Saint-Marc, the interim commander 
of the regiment during the putsch, who had already been divested 
of rank and sentenced to ten years imprisonment." One of the 
twelve, Lieutenant Ysquierdo, testified: "In refusing [to follow] 
Saint-Marc, I would have been a pitiful slob. I would have de­
served to be in Fresnes [a prison] twice over." 10° As for those 
officers of the First Foreign Paratroop Regiment who were not 
brought to trial, at least seven of them demonstrated their soli­
darity with Saint-Marc by joining the O.A.S.101 Enlisted men from 
the First Regiment, moreover, were exceptionally numerous among 
the killers and bomb-setters of the O.A.S.102 
If some Legion officers, like Colonel Brothier, believed that 
foreign troops should be kept out of domestic political struggles, 
there were others, especially in the Legion paratroop regiments, 
who were closer to the para mentality and eager to avoid Algerian 
independence at any cost. Once a Legion commander like Saint-
Marc had decided upon rebellion, he could count upon a habit of 
obedience and an extraordinary esprit de corps to unite his officers 
and men behind him. 
Who were the officer-mutineers? For the most part, they were 
army officers from below the highest ranks, sometimes specialists 
in psychological action, but more often members of the elite corps, 
especially the paratroopers. They shared a high degree of personal 
and group involvement in the Algerian war. In the case of para­
troop officers and, to a lesser degree, Legion officers, their French 
Algerian persuasion and their potential for action were frequently 
buttressed by a solid esprit de corps. 
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Conclusion 
Those French civil-military tensions which erupted in May, 1958, 
may be viewed profitably from two points of view. On the one 
hand, military indiscipline and revolt in France were the result 
of a unique and impressive conjuncture of historical factors. A 
brief overview of the most important of those factors will serve 
to place them in perspective. From another point of view to be 
taken up following that brief survey—that of the student of com­
parative politics—the French experience casts new light on cross-
national theories of civil-military relations. 
The recent political adventures of the French Army are not 
explicable in terms of a long tradition of military intervention in 
politics. On the contrary, until World War II the army, with rare 
exceptions, was a disciplined servant of the government of the 
day, no matter what the political complexion of that government. 
When the army posed an open threat to civilian political institu­
tions in France (in the years from 1958 to 1961), it acted under 
the impulse of a long series of grievances and frustrations, includ­
ing a string of humiliating defeats which began in 1940. In the 
eyes of most army officers the Algerian war became the final, the 
decisive battleground on which military status, self-esteem, and 
honor had to be redeemed. Faced with a highly political style of 
war in Indochina and Algeria, on the one hand, and with a divided 
French nation which devoted little interest and gave even less 
support to wars for the defense of empire, on the other hand, the 
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more dynamic elements within the French Army officer corps 
threw up an ideology to guide and justify their cause. They deter­
mined to save France despite herself. When the wars went badly, 
those officers, not entirely without cause, tended to blame their 
failures on treason in the metropole and weakness and immobility 
in government. A series of ephemeral governments of the Fourth 
Republic suffered from the shallowness of their authority, the 
flimsiness of the French political consensus, and a resulting general 
doubt as to the legitimacy of the whole structure of government. 
Unsupported by a strong public opinion, yet too weak to cut 
France free from her colonies, these governments defaulted in 
the definition of war goals and increasingly gave over the war, 
especially in Algeria, to psychological-action officers, military 
administrators, and aggressive elite troops. 
With military honor, status, and self-esteem seemingly in the 
balance, officers naturally recalled the army experiences of World 
War II, when unquestioning obedience had been largely dis­
credited. Those officers whose personal and group involvement in 
the Algerian war were deepest tended to take the lead in throwing 
the army behind the uprising of French settlers in Algeria on the 
treize mai. De Gaulle lent new authority to civil government; yet, 
though he was able finally to overcome military revolt, he was not 
able to prevent its occurrence. The symbolic importance which 
Algeria had assumed for the army, the extensive powers which 
military men had been given there, and the successful precedent 
of May 13—all conspired to encourage another military interven­
tion into politics in April, 1961, again with the purpose of prevent­
ing Algerian independence. 
Decolonization would have been a bitter pill for the army in 
any case. Coupled with the recent trauma of World War II, long 
and highly political wars in Indochina and Algeria, an unsympa­
thetic public opinion at home, and a power vacuum in civilian 
government until 1958, it proved explosive. 
Several of the key factors in this pattern deserve closer attention, 
particularly with respect to their implications for theories of civil-
military relations. First, and most important, the French experience 
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from 1945 to 1962 lends added weight to the theory that military 
intervention in politics is closely related to the degree of legitimacy 
of existing civilian political institutions, i.e., the strength and 
breadth of the national political consensus which supports them.1 
Had government leaders in Paris enjoyed solid authority and the 
backing of a more united nation, in all probability there never 
would have been a serious threat to civilian control in France. In 
fact, however, the authority of the Fourth Republic was chal­
lenged both on the Left, where the Communist Party commanded 
the votes of almost a quarter of the electorate, and—especially 
after the Poujadist gains of January, 1956—on the Right, where 
the army traditionally was viewed as a powerful potential ally. 
Nor did the majority of Frenchmen between these political 
extremes feel much attachment to the existing regime. The apathy 
of the French population in May, 1958, when the Fourth Republic 
was fighting for its life, was a determining factor in the outcome 
of that crisis. The Pflimlin government and the National Assembly 
itself quickly discovered that very few Frenchmen indeed were 
willing to fight, or even to protest very loudly, in defense of le 
systetne. De Gaulle's trump card three years later in the April 
putsch was his command over public opinion. In April, 1961, army 
fears of "betrayal" and "abandonment" of French Algeria were 
more vivid and more soundly based than had been the case in 
1958. Yet in 1961 the leaders of military revolt faced a hostile 
French public opinion which mobilized behind De Gaulle and 
which reached into the conscript ranks of the army itself. General 
Challe failed to attract the active support of the majority of of­
ficers, for these men saw that mutiny now meant civil war and 
a split within the army. 
It may well be that the French citizenry in 1961 was no more 
deeply attached to the Fifth Republic as a pattern of institutions 
than it had been to its predecessor. Yet De Gaulle himself, as a 
charismatic leader, had succeeded in establishing the legitimacy 
of his own personal government to a degree unknown under the 
Fourth Republic. Aided by a widespread popular desire to have 
done with colonial wars (witness the referendum of January, 
1961), De Gaulle could claim with good reason to represent the 
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French nation in throwing his enormous prestige behind the policy 
of self-determination for Algeria. However, based as it was on 
the unique historical and personal appeal of its leader, as well 
as his political acumen, De Gaulle's Republic benefited from a 
kind of legitimacy which would be unavailable for the defense of 
a successor government or for the protection of a constitutional 
transfer of power from one administration to another. Effective 
civilian leadership may compensate temporarily, but only tempo­
rarily, for the absence of a strong constitutional consensus. 
The absence of a firm political consensus capable of lending 
legitimacy to political institutions may be a necessary condition 
for successful military revolt, as it was in postwar France; yet 
it is not sufficient in itself to produce a pattern of praetorianism, 
as French history in the nineteenth century reveals. Other com­
pensating factors, to be reviewed shortly, were sufficient to main­
tain civilian control. 
Two other factors which contributed to military indiscipline and 
revolt in France—military hostility to le systeme and delegation 
of power—are closely related to the weakness of governmental 
authority and to the political dissension which lay behind it. When 
a nation lacks the stable bonds of a strong political consensus and 
when, as a result, political authority is uncertain, the relation of 
the military establishment to politics may take one of two forms, 
or may partake of a mixture of the two. If dissension is chronic, 
the military establishment itself may suffer the same lack of au­
thority and unity which characterizes the society around it. Such 
sometimes has been the case in Latin America, where military 
factions have opposed each other. On the other hand, if the mili­
tary establishment is relatively cohesive (as a result, perhaps, of a 
professional military spirit and social isolation from civilian society), 
there is a tendency for officers to conceive of the military as an 
island of health, unity, and courage in a sea of corruption, conflict, 
and decay. Such was clearly the case in France, especially among 
younger officers in the field. From the 1930's onward the rise of 
the French Communist Party had loomed large in most military 
eyes as a vicious internal threat to national security. After 1945 
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the consistent attacks on the army by the French Communist Party 
and by other French anticolonialists, the government's reluctance 
to silence these critics, and the general absence of public support 
for colonial wars—all were taken by military men as evidence of 
advanced dry rot in the body politic. 
When political authority wanes in a democracy, the latent con­
flict between military and civilian values is likely to come to the 
fore. By virtue of his primary responsibility for national defense, 
the military officer may be encouraged to believe that his devotion 
to country is stronger and purer than that of civilian politicians. 
Indeed, in some cases it may be so, though the belief is more 
important than the fact. The very distinction between nation and 
government which allowed French officers in the nineteenth century 
to serve a succession of governments had the reverse effect after 
1945: it encouraged military resistance to governments viewed by 
many officers as antithetical to the interests of the nation. The 
tension between dominant civilian and military perspectives be­
comes particularly acute when, as in France, civilian politicians 
disagree among themselves as to the meaning and scope of national 
defense. For the military officer and for a decreasing proportion of 
French politicians, defense of the nation was taken to include 
defense of the colonies. Journalists, politicians, and then government 
ministers who rejected that interpretation were viewed as cowards 
at best, traitors at worst, deserving in any case of being silenced 
or ejected from their posts. 
As is usually the case, in all probability, the French officers who 
sought to save France from her government—indeed, from herself— 
held a concept of national interest which meshed neatly with the 
defense of military interests. They protested bitterly against polit­
ical attacks on the army and against the surrender of the colonies, 
which many saw as the locus of the army's last hope for the 
redemption of its prestige, glory, and honor. Like the doctrine of 
la guerre revolutionnaire, the military view of patriotism as nation 
above government served primarily to rationalize and to strengthen 
the defense of military interests, even by indiscipline and revolt, if 
necessary. 
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Suffering from lack of consensus with regard to war goals and 
from a generally doubtful authority, the Fourth Republic faced 
a dilemma in which delegation of power to the army was especially 
dangerous for civilian control, yet unavoidable if any action was to 
be taken. Civil administrators in the metropole protested at the very 
suggestion that they might be sent to Algeria. The government in 
Paris, hesitant to rely heavily upon conscripts in wars which were 
not strongly supported by the French public at home, fell back on 
the Legion and the paratroopers to carry the brunt of the fighting in 
Indochina and in Algeria. The psychological-action service, military 
administrators, and the paratroopers were all delegated extensive 
political powers. In the absence of national support for colonial 
wars, military power-wielders became increasingly angry, undisci­
plined, and, in some cases, mutinous. Within the paras the seeming 
weakness and cowardliness of civilian politicians turned a formi­
dable esprit de corps into a mutinous force. Military esprit de corps 
in itself need not be a threat to civilian control: witness the disci­
plined U.S. Marine Corps. When civilian governmental authority is 
faltering, however, and when military interests clash with govern­
ment policies, military esprit de corps (along with delegation of 
political power to the military) may have dangerous consequences 
for civilian control. 
French experience in civil-military relations also lends some sup­
port, with important qualifications, to that theory, elaborated most 
completely by Samuel Huntington, which holds military profession­
alism to be the surest guarantee of civilian control in a democracy.2 
The progressive professionalization of the French Army in the 
nineteenth century was one important factor which helped to 
assure civilian control, despite the relative weakness of the French 
political consensus. In the course of the nineteenth century the 
army officers corps took on many of the characteristics of an order, 
drawing in men of diverse social origins and molding them into 
professional soldiers with similar values. Particularly during periods 
when commercial values and republican values dominated civilian 
society, the professional soldier's respect for authority, hierarchy, 
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discipline, and service set him clearly apart. Disharmony between 
civilian and military values rarely led to open conflict, however, for 
the professional military code decreed that the officer must maintain 
strict political neutrality in his behavior, if not in his private atti­
tudes. At least until World War II most officers believed that only 
military apolitismc could protect the honor, efficiency, and unity 
of the French Army. 
The rather consistent loyalty of the French Army to civilian 
authority before 1939 cannot be explained entirely in terms of 
professional military restraints, however. Also of significance were 
the absence of long wars in the period from 1815-70, which might 
have strained civilian control, and the outlet furnished by colonial 
service for ambitious officers whose taste for power and glory could 
not be satisfied in the metropole. In the absence of serious threats 
to national security in the mid-nineteenth century, the military com­
munity could safely be left in relative social isolation, where it 
gradually developed an apolitical professional military code. After 
1945, however, social isolation had the opposite effect—threatening, 
rather than deepening, the soldier's political neutrality—as revolu­
tionary-guerrilla wars made the army dependent upon active popu­
lar and governmental support for victory. 
In recent years it has become increasingly clear that profes­
sionalism alone is inadequate to assure civilian control, especially 
when the army is in the service of a liberal democracy: since pro­
fessional military values may clash with dominant civilian values, 
the officer must also have a positive commitment to civil su­
premacy.3 French experience clearly demonstrates the potential 
conflict between obedience and military honor, which is also a 
significant part of the professional officer's mental baggage, at least 
in the West. The bitter prospect of dishonoring themselves through 
surrender and through renunciation of military pledges over­
shadowed the sin of disobedience in the minds of a number of 
French officers. 
If the notion of military professionalism is to attain its full utility, 
it also must be complemented with equal attention to the corporate 
interests of military men. For many French officers the colonies in 
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general, and North Africa in particular, traditionally represented a 
coveted refuge in which they could escape the moral climate of 
the metropole, which was often bourgeois and antimilitary, and 
enjoy greater status, authority, and independence than were their 
lot at home. A decade and a half of humiliating defeat and retreat 
in the colonies built up in many French military minds the con­
viction that military status and self-esteem were inseparable from 
the cause of Algerie Frangaise. French military indiscipline and 
revolt in Algeria are understandable, not so much in terms of a 
"breakdown of professionalism," as in terms of the impassioned 
defense of military power, status, and self-esteem. 
Military professionalism, nevertheless, is still one of the most 
important supports to civilian control. Among the more difficult 
problems posed by revolutionary-guerrilla war is that of retaining 
professionalism while allowing professional military men to wage 
battle on the enemy's own (i.e., political) terms. The old solution 
of dividing defense neatly into political and military realms was 
always partly fiction; in revolutionary-guerrilla war it is altogether 
unfeasible.4 Success in such a war requires, among other things, 
both a political program capable of inspiring popular support and 
a mobilization of the masses around that program through an 
extensive and intensive organizational effort. Organized popular 
support—not simply destruction of rebel guerrilla bands—is the 
key to success. The experience of the French in Indochina and in 
Algeria reveals the potential danger to civilian control (as well as 
to military effectiveness) inherent in governmental immobility in 
a revolutionary-war situation. Civil authorities must supply clear 
political directives, lest a defending army be either frustrated by 
defeat or tempted into the political vacuum to define its own war 
goals. The power of the French military doctrine of la guerre 
revolutionnaire, with all of its ideological overtones, was largely 
the result of governmental inaction and immobility in the definition 
of policy and war goals. 
Political directives, no matter what their origin or intrinsic merit, 
will have very limited effect unless military officers and enlisted 
men in the field believe in them, for these are the men who will 
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have the most direct contact with the population. The French 
experience suggests, as well, the difficulty of changing war goals 
once an army defending against a revolutionary-guerrilla enemy has 
come to believe in them. The effect of a policy change on army 
morale perhaps could be mitigated if government officials kept 
military leaders informed of the government's objectives, priorities, 
and alternative plans of action should the current policy fail. The 
problem is essentially that of finding a minimal political commit­
ment which will allow the soldier to battle with conviction and 
with effect without, at the same time, throwing him into the do­
mestic political struggle. The narrower the range of universally 
accepted political ideas and values in a society, the more difficult 
the problem. 
After the stormy conclusion to the Algerian war, what can be 
said of the prospects for future civil-military relations in France? 
Civilianization, long delayed in the French Army, is now clearly 
underway. The officer-technician now being created will probably 
lack much of the militancy of the paratrooper and the theoretician 
of la guerre revolutionnaire, though he probably will develop skill 
as a political promoter of his new technical army. In view of the 
attitudes of recent army-officer recruits, the whole transformation 
from guerrilla fighter to technician will be a difficult one. 
Under what circumstances might the army again threaten civilian 
control in France, despite the lesson of April, 1961? With colonial 
questions largely settled, the radical Right, which might encourage 
military intervention, has all but disappeared as an important po­
litical force. It is conceivable that the plight of uneconomical small 
farmers and businessmen might produce new Poujadist-style pro­
test movements against the dominant, modern economic forces in 
the Gaullist camp. In the unlikely event of a serious economic 
depression, or perhaps in reaction to the excessive economic conser­
vatism of a post-Gaullist government, it is possible that the Com­
munist Party might burst out of its isolation and take the lead in a 
popular-front government. In such a circumstance it is possible that 
the army, which remains fiercely anticommunist, might again 
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intervene, encouraged by the radical Right. Prosperity and the 
Common Market, however, should prevent such a development and 
strengthen the hand of political moderates. Nevertheless, civilian 
control in France continues to suffer from the absence of a clear 
and abiding public attachment to a stable constitutional frame­
work. The emergence of a deeper constitutional consensus, which 
is not yet in sight, would greatly strengthen the hand of civilian 
authority, especially at such critical moments as the transfer of 
power from one government to the next. 
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